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Chapter1: General introduction 
Trade mark rights afford a privileged monopoly to the proprietor. As a direct 
consequence of this monopoly, trade mark owners are able to restrict others from 
dealing with a trade-marked product and thereby affect the freedom of 
movement of goods which legal systems of regional blocs such as the European 
Union (EU) or the East African Community (EAC) guarantee. In most cases, a 
trade mark proprietor derives the ability to circumvent the free movement 
principle from the national systems of trade mark protection. By their nature, 
national trade mark systems are established to serve national markets. This holds 
true even where the national markets are integrated to form a single market. To 
play a meaningful role in a single market of a given regional bloc, national trade 
mark systems of the Member States may necessarily be supplemented with a 
regional trade mark system. The regional trade mark system would thus integrate 
the national trade mark systems into the common market by linking trade mark 
rights with principles governing the common market. In the EU the task of 
integrating trade mark rights into the common market was accomplished through 
the Community Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR)1 which introduced a regional 
trade mark regime.   
Rules underlying the EU’s regional trade mark system may guide authorities 
in other regional blocs, such as the East African Community (EAC), to regulate 
their common markets. The East African Community, established in 1999, 
comprises five Partner States, namely, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. Apparently, the Community has an operational common market in 
which several freedoms, including the free movement of goods are guaranteed.2 
National trade mark systems operational in the Partner States have not yet been 
integrated into the Community regulatory framework. There is thus a potential 
danger that national trade mark rights may be invoked to circumvent the 
principle of free movement of goods underlying the EAC common market.  
The principal aim of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of trade mark 
rights on the EAC common market and to provide a solution thereto. The 
dissertation identifies and scrutinises various scenarios under which the national 
 
1   i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade 
mark. This Regulation was repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 
207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (codified version). 
2   Further information on the EAC is available at <http://www.eac.int>.   
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trade mark systems of the EAC Partner States are likely to affect the proper 
functioning of the EAC common market. In this regard, chapter 2 analyses the 
national trade mark laws of the EAC Partner States and depicts the absence of a 
uniform trade mark regime in the EAC. Absence of uniformity of trade mark 
regulation is clear evidence that the national trade mark systems are still 
independent of each other and hence, the systems provide a platform for trade 
mark proprietors to impair the proper functioning of the EAC common market. 
Additionally, the regulation of the principle of free movement of goods 
governing the EAC common market is closely scrutinised in chapter 3 to find out 
whether and how the principle, as enshrined in the relevant EAC legal 
instruments, facilitates the free movement of branded goods. In this respect, the 
dissertation makes it clear that the general principle of the free movement of 
goods underlying the EAC common market does not have sufficient legal force 
to guarantee the free movement of branded goods across the entire EAC area. 
Thus, chapter 3 attempts to develop an alternative regulation of the free 
movement of trade-marked goods on the basis of principal functions of trade 
marks and on the basis of international rules enshrined in the agreement on the 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS agreement) and the 
General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, in the light of the 
findings contained in the chapter, a free movement regime regulated on the basis 
of principles of trade mark law such as where restriction on the movement of 
trade-marked goods is permitted only if such a restriction is necessary to allow a 
trade mark to perform its functions, is not a better approach, for it is undertaken 
on a case-by-case basis and does not curb every scenario in which trade mark 
rights are disguisedly invoked to hamper free movement of goods. This case-by-
case regulation of the free movement of branded goods may be avoided if a 
Community trade mark system is established to integrate the national trade mark 
systems of the EAC Partner States into the EAC common market.  
A proposal for a Community trade mark regime that could possibly suit the 
EAC common market is presented in chapter 7. The proposal is, by and large, 
modelled on the EU trade mark system. To pave a way for this proposal, chapter 
4 outlines the EU trade mark system, by setting out substantive and procedural 
principles governing creation, protection and termination of EU’s regional trade 
mark rights. In the same vein, chapter 5 of the dissertation offers, in a specific 
context, a discourse on how the interplay between the national trade mark 
regimes of the EU Member States and the Community trade mark regime is 
achieved. This is followed by an examination, in chapter 6, of the free movement 
regime of branded goods in the EU common market.  
Although the EAC has five Partner States, only the laws of three States, 
namely, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are examined in this dissertation. The fact 
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that these countries are the EAC founder States and that they share similarity of 
legal systems inherited from the British colonial master3 has motivated the 
author to delimit the analysis in the dissertation accordingly. However, the 





3   Cf. Footnote No 98, in: JACONIAH, J., “The Requirement for Registration and 
Protection of Non-Traditional Marks in the European Union and in Tanzania”, 40(7) IIC 
756, 773 (2009).   
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
23 
 
Chapter 2:  The Absence of Common Trade Mark Regime in the 
East African Community 
A. Introduction 
Are the substantive provisions of the national trade mark legislations of the 
Partner States of the East African Community (EAC) similar? The positive 
response to this question would negate a central thesis of this chapter. The 
chapter takes the view that unless the substantive differences inherent in the 
national trade mark laws of the EAC Partner States are streamlined and 
harmonised, a common EAC trade mark regime would be impossible.4 As a step 
leading to the foregoing conclusion, the Chapter addresses the subject matter of 
trade mark registration, and the grounds that the national trade mark offices of 
the EAC Partner States may invoke to refuse registration of a trade mark. This is 
followed by an outline of trade mark opposition and cancelation procedure. 
Issues pertaining to trade mark infringement and the system of international trade 
mark registration are depicted in the chapter as well. Preliminary considerations 
are directed to the institutional set up of the national trade mark regimes of the 
EAC Partner States. 
B. Institutions responsible for trade mark registration 
Trade and service marks Act of 19865 (henceforth T.) governs trade mark 
administration in Tanzania. Trade mark rights in Kenya and Uganda are 
respectively created and protected based on the Trade Marks Act (Chapter 506 of 
the laws of Kenya) of 1957 (henceforth, K.) as amended and the Trademarks 
Act6 of Uganda of 2010 (henceforth, U.). These legislations establish an office of 
 
4   The substantive differences depicted in this chapter are only exemplary. It is not the aim 
of the chapter to go into extensive discussion insofar as the differences are concerned, 
but just to highlight the key differences that are essential for the attainment of a common 
EAC trade mark regime. 
5   Act No. 12/86 of the Laws of Tanzania. 
6      Act No 17 of 2010. This Act, which is published in the Uganda Gazette No. 53 Volume 
CIII dated  3rd September 2010, repeals the Trademarks Act (Chapter 217 of the laws of 
Uganda) of 1953 (cf. S. 99 of the Act). 
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Registrar of Trade (and Service) Marks, who is charged with a duty to exercise 
the powers conferred on him by a respective legislation.7  
Section 3, T., establishes the Tanzanian Trade and Service Marks Office. The 
office forms an integral part of the Business Registration and Licensing Agency 
(BRELA) established, under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to provide 
services in relation to business name registration, trade and service marks 
registration, patents, company registration, and industrial licensing.8 Thus, 
BRELA is an administrative support framework that facilitates the administra-
tion of four registries.9 The Kenya industrial property institute (KIPI) is a 
parastatal organisation established, under the ministry of industrialisation of 
Kenya, to deal with inter alia trade mark registrations.10 The Ugandan Trade 
Marks Office is under the control of the office of the Registrar General of the 
Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB)11 whose mandates are overseen by 
the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.12 
C. Substantive Provisions 
I. Subject matter of trade-mark protection 
Protection of a sign as a trade or service mark under the trade mark legislation of 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda is dependent on the sign concerned being 
registered.13 Under some exceptional circumstances, unregistered trade mark 
 
7   Cf. SS. 4, 3 and 2 of T, K and U respectively. 
8   More information on BRELA is available at <http://www.brela-tz.org> (status: 30 July 
2012). 
9   These registries are the Registry of Companies (under the Companies Act No. 12 of 
2002), business names (under the Business Names Act Cap 213 of the laws of 
Tanzania), Trade and Service Marks (under the Trade and Service Marks Act No. 12 of 
1986) and Patents (under the Patents Act No. 1 of 1987). 
10   More information on KIPI is available at <http://www.kipi.go.ke> (status: 30 July 2012). 
11   URSB is established by the Uganda Registration Services Bureau Act No. 7/1998 (Cap 
210 of the laws of Uganda). According to the long title of the Act, USRB Act establishes 
an agency for miscellaneous registrations and collection and accounting for revenues 
under various relevant laws and for the enforcement and administration of those laws 
and provide for other related matters. 
12   See relevant information at <http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/urls.jsp> (status: 30 July 
2012). 
13   S. 14(1) T., S. 30 T., S. 5, K. & Sec 34, U. See also M. WEKESA & B. SIHANYA 
(eds), “Intellectual Property Rights in Kenya” 230 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin 
and Nairobi 2009).  
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rights may still be enforced.14 Registration of a trade mark is prima facie 
evidence that the mark has fulfilled all conditions required of a valid mark.15 To 
meet these conditions a sign must be distinctive16 and must fall within the 
definition provided for under the respective trade mark legislation.17 
1. Tanzanian law 
The Tanzanian trade mark legislation qualifies a sign eligible for trademark 
protection in the following words:  
trade or service mark means any visible sign used or proposed to be used upon, in 
connection with or in relation to goods or services for the purpose of distinguishing in the 
course of trade or business the goods or services of a person from those of another.18  
To get a complete picture of the signs capable of functioning as trademarks 
under the Tanzanian law, one has to supplement the above definition with the 
operational definition of the visibility requirement provided for under the 
respective law. Section 2, T. stipulates that:  
“visible sign” means any sign which is capable of graphic reproduction, including a word, 
name, brand, devise, heading, label, ticket, signature letter number, relief, stamp, seal, 
vignette, emblem or any combination thereof.19 
2. Kenyan and Ugandan laws 
The term “trade mark” is operationally employed in the Kenyan Act to refer to a 
mark used or intended to be used20 in relation to goods or services to indicate in 
the course of trade that a connection exists between the goods or services being 
marketed under the mark and a person who has a right to use the mark.21 On its 
part, the Ugandan Trade Marks Act delineates the term “trademark” to mean “a 
sign or a mark or combination of signs or marks capable of being represented 
 
14   These circumstances are discussed in section C (II) (2) (b) of this chapter. 
15   S. 14(2), T., S. 46, K. & S. 58, U. See also the ruling of the High Court of Tanzania 
(Commercial Court Division) in Kibo Match Group Ltd v. Mohamed Enterprises (T) 
Ltd., Civil Case No. 6 of 1999 (Dar Es Salaam Registry (unreported)), para. 17.  
16   S. 16 T., S. 12(2), K. & S. 11(2), SS. 9 & 10 U.  
17   S. 2, para. 14, T., S. 2(1), para. 26 (a) & (b), K., & S. 1(1), para 15, U.  
18   S. 2, para. 14, T. 
19   S. 2, para. 18, T.  
20   A trade mark is presumed to be used in legal context if it is used in a printed form or any 
other visual representations (cf. S. 2(2)(a), K.). 
21   S. 2(1), para. 26 (a) & (b), K.  
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graphically and capable of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking 
from those of another undertaking”.22 
As regards signs which a trade mark may consist of, both Kenyan and 
Ugandan laws do not seem to put a limit to eligible signs, and for that matter 
they are not at variance with the position under the Tanzanian law. Essentially a 
“device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral or 
any combination of them” may constitute a trade mark registrable in Kenya or in 
Uganda.23 The relevant provision of the Kenyan Act adds to the foregoing list “a 
distinguishing guise and slogan”24 – the distinguishing guise in relation to goods 
being defined to mean a shape or a configuration of containers of the goods.25 
Moreover, the Kenyan Law makes an important specification: where eligible 
signs are combined, they will still qualify for registration irrespective of whether 
such combination is rendered in two or three dimension.26    
The foregoing delineation of the subject matter of trade mark protection under 
the trade mark laws of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda complies with the legal 
standards set out under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
property Rights (henceforth, TRIPS).27 Article 15(1) TRIPs, which describes 
protectable subject matter of trade marks, indicates that Contracting Parties are 
obliged to register as a trade mark “any sign, or any combination of signs, 
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of 
other undertakings”. 
 
22   S. 1(1), para 15, U. By referring to concepts such as “graphical representation” and 
capability to  distinguish, the trade mark definition contained in the Ugandan trade mark 
law is similar to the one enshrined in the relevant laws governing trade mark matters in 
the European Union (cf. Chapter 4  supra, which offers an overview of the system of 
trade mark governance in the EU). 
23   S. 2(1), para. 12, K. & S. 1(1), para 13. 
24   S. 2(1), para. 12, K. 
25   S. 2(1), para. 7, K. 
26   S. 2(1), para. 12, K. 
27   Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are signatories to the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994 in which the 
Agreement on TRIPs forms a part (cf. KIEFF, F. S. & NACK, R., “International, United 
States and European Intellectual Property: Selected Source Material 2007-2008” 34 
(Aspen Publishers, New York 2006). 
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II. Grounds for trade mark refusal 
1. Absolute Grounds 
A detailed discourse on absolute grounds for trademark refusal is covered in 
chapter 4 infra, in the context of the EU Community Trade mark law. The aim of 
these grounds is to exclude from registration various types of marks such as 
those which are not distinctive, or those which are descriptive of the goods or 
services. Others are generic signs, and the type of a shape excluded from 
registration by a stipulation of the law. A brief discussion on these grounds is 
offered below in the context of Tanzanian, Kenyan and Ugandan trade mark law. 
a) Distinctiveness 
aa) Under the Tanzania Trade Mark Law 
Section 16 of the Tanzania Trade and Service Marks Act, apart from providing 
that “[a] trade or service mark shall be registered if it is distinctive”28, also 
expounds the standards a sign has to attain if it is to be regarded as distinctive. 
Within the ambit of the Section: 
[A] trade or service mark is distinctive if it is capable, in relation to goods or services in 
respect of which it is registered or proposed to be registered, of distinguishing goods or 
services with which its proprietor is or may be connected in the course of trade or business 
from the goods or services in the case of which no such connection subsists, either 
generally or, where the trade or service mark is registered or proposed to be registered 
subject to limitations, in relation to use within the extent of registration.29  
The Section further provides that: 
In determining whether a trade or service mark is capable of distinguishing for the purpose 
of subsection (2), regard shall be to the extent to which:- (a) The trade or service mark is 
inherently capable of distinguishing as aforesaid; and (b) By reason of the use of the trade 
or service mark or of any other circumstances, the trade or service mark is in fact capable 
of distinguishing as aforesaid.30   
Capability to distinguish, within the ambit of the above quoted provisions, is 
detached from the sign as such for it is viewed in the light of the relation 
between the sign, its holder and the products or services. Generally, a trade mark 
is capable of being registered as long as the owner can demonstrate that his trade 
 
28   S. 16(1), T. 
29   S. 16(2), T. 
30   S. 16 (3), T.  
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mark (which of course must be a visible sign)31, can distinguish or has already 
distinguished his goods or services from those of others. Thus, section 16 of the 
Tanzania Trade and Service Marks Act calls for the assessment of a trademark’s 
capability to distinguish to be done in view of the goods and services. 
bb) Under the Kenyan and Ugandan Trade Mark Laws 
The Trade Mark Acts of Kenya and Uganda determine distinctiveness based on 
the register of trade marks. Under these laws, an assessment must be made to 
find out whether a particular mark qualifies to be registered either in part A or 
part B of the register. The logic behind dividing the register into two parts is to 
isolate the marks in respect of which an irrefutable, legal presumption of 
distinctiveness must be cast or those in respect of which there is ample evidence 
to show that they are distinctive from those which have potentials to distinguish 
goods and services of one undertaking from those of others.32 The relevant 
provisions of the law regard the following categories of marks as registrable in 
part A of the register: 
(a) the name of a company, individual or firm, represented in a special or particular 
manner; (b) the signature of the applicant for registration or some predecessor in his 
business; (c) an invented word or invented words; (d) a word or words having no direct 
reference to the character or quality of the goods, and not being according to its ordinary 
signification a geographical name or a surname; (e) any other distinctive mark, but a 
name, a signature or a word or words, other than such as fall within the descriptions in 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), shall not be registrable under this paragraph except upon 
evidence of its distinctiveness.33   
In keeping with an operational definition of distinctiveness in relation to a mark 
registrable in part A of the register, the marks enumerated above are regarded 
distinctive if they are “adapted in relation to the goods in respect of which a trade 
mark is registered or proposed to be registered, to distinguish goods which the 
proprietor of the trade mark is or may be connected in the course of the trade 
from goods in the case of which no such connexion subsists...”.34 
A trade mark which qualifies for registration in Part A of the register may as 
well be registered in Part B. As long as a particular mark possesses some 
potential to distinguish goods or services, it fulfils the requirements for registra- 
 
31   Visibility of a sign is a mandatory, formal requirement for trademark registration under 
the Tanzania Trade and Service Marks Act (cf. S. 2, para. 14, T.). 
32   Cf. SS. 12 & 13, K. and SS. 9 & 10, U. 
33   S. 12(1), K. & S. 9(1), U. 
34   S. 12(2), K. & S. 9(2), U. 
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tion in part B of the register.35 This particular mark must be capable, “in relation 
to the goods in respect of which a trade mark is registered or proposed to be 
registered, of distinguishing goods with which the proprietor of the trade mark is 
or may be connected in the course of the trade from goods in the case of which 
no such connexion subsists...”36   
Both laws recognise the legal position that a trade mark may be inherently 
distinctive or may acquire a secondary meaning in the course of trade and thus 
becoming distinctive. However, the fact that the pertinent laws divide the trade 
mark register into two parts connotes that the concept of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness is applied differently depending on which part of the register a 
trade mark concerned is to be registered. This conclusion can be buttressed by 
the fact that these concepts are only relevant to determine whether a particular 
mark can serve a trade mark function or not. With this view in mind and insofar 
as part A of the register is concerned, all the marks mentioned in paragraphs (a) 
to (d) of Sections 12(1) and 9(1) of K. and U. respectively, are regarded as being 
inherently adapted to distinguish, whereas the marks that qualify for registration 
under paragraphs (e) of the above sections their acquired meaning is decisive to 
finding out whether they are actually adapted to distinguish. 
When it comes to a mark registrable in part B of the register, potentiality to 
distinguish can be inherent or can be achieved by actually using a mark.37   
One cannot criticise the distinction made between the proof of distinctiveness 
for the purpose of part A or part B of the register without questioning the essence 
of dividing the register in two parts, and whether, in a modern trade mark 
protection regimes, this division is still needed.38 While this question deserves an 
analysis, it is not the purpose of this chapter to extend a discourse thereto. 
b) Descriptive and generic marks 
A trade mark is regarded as descriptive if it is used to describe the characteristics 
of the goods or services which it markets, rather than performing a distinguishing 
role. This legal concept is not clearly described under the Tanzanian, Kenyan, 
 
35   S. 13(3), K. & S. 10(4), U. 
36   S. 13(1), K. & S. 10(2), U. 
37   S. 13(2), K. & S. 10(3), U. 
38   For instance, only one trade mark register is maintained under the Tanzanian Trade and 
Service Marks Act, 1986 (cf. SS. 6(1) and 2, para. 6, T.). Prior to the enactment of the 
above Tanzanian law, the Trade Marks Ordnance (Cap. 394 of the laws of Tanzania) 
required the trade mark registrar to divide a trade mark register into two parts. However, 
the 1986 trade mark law has abolished this division (cf. S. 62, T.).  
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and Ugandan laws.  As to what may be likened to the principle of descriptive-
ness, these laws incorporate a provision entitling trade mark proprietors to 
disclaim certain features of a trade mark which are considered to be non-
distinctive or to be common to trade.39 A monopoly in these features is not 
allowed on a simple logic that a non-distinctive feature should be left open for 
every member of the society to use it. Indeed, a feature considered to be common 
to a particular trade cannot be monopolised since this would deny a large section 
of the society an access to an essential instrument without which they cannot be 
able to engage themselves on a particular trade.40  
The term “generic mark” is used in the context of trade mark law to refer to a 
trade mark which was once distinctive but in the course of time has turned out to 
be used as a name of the very goods it used to distinguish. While the concept 
“generic mark” is not addressed in the Tanzanian law, the Kenyan and Ugandan 
Acts contain similar concepts under the heading “words used as name or 
description of an article or substance”.41 A trade mark, which after registration 
turns out to serve as the “name or description of an article or substance or of 
some activity”, cannot automatically be invalidated based on the relevant 
provisions.42 In order for the invalidation to be successful, factual evidence must 
be adduced to show that the use of a trade mark as a name or a description is 
well-known and established not only in respect of the goods connected with the 
trade mark proprietor, but also with other identical goods not connected in trade 
with the proprietor of trade mark. Only a disclaimer, by the proprietor, of 
exclusive rights to the use of the trade mark in relation to goods in respect of 
which the mark is considered generic, can salvage the mark from being 
invalidated and deregistered.43   
 
39   S. 18, T., S. 17, K. & S. 19, U. 
40   The corollary to this position is the permission under the law pursuant to which a trade 
mark proprietor’s consent is not required for third parties to use a trade, provided that 
such use is a bona fide description of the character or quality of a third party’s goods (S. 
34 (ii), T., S. 11(b), K. & S. 24(b), U.).  
41   S. 18, K. & S. 42, U. 
42   i.e. S. 18, K. & S. 42, U. 
43   Cf. S. 18(2) (b), K. & S. 42(3) (b), U. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
31 
 
c) Trade Marks based on a shape of the goods 
aa) The Tanzanian Law 
The Tanzanian law on trade marks does not signal the possibility of a shape 
mark being registered and protected. According to Section 19(b) T. “trade or 
service marks which consist solely of the shape or configuration of the goods, or 
the containers thereof” are excluded from those signs that may be registered and 
protected in Tanzania.  
Even if the list of the signs that are capable of being graphically reproduced 
provided in section 2 T. is open for other items constituting visible signs to be 
added; the fact that shapes are not specifically mentioned in the section signifies 
that shape as such cannot be registered under the Act. This conclusion is 
collaborated by the provisions of section 19(b) which specifically excludes shape 
per se from registration. However, one fact remains bare: shapes can be 
reproduced graphically as required under section 2 TMA; they can also acquire 
distinctiveness if used in relation to goods or services. Nevertheless, the effect of 
section 19 (b) TMA in relation to registrations is to make such distinctiveness 
legally valueless. By having such an effect, Article 19 (b) appears to deviate 
from the underlying objective of the trademark protection regime, which is to 
virtually protect a sign as long as such sign is capable of distinguishing goods of 
one undertaking from those of other. In addition, there is a risk that the 
provisions of Section 19(b) T. contravene Article 15(1) TRIPS pursuant to which 
any sign (including figurative elements) that is capable of identifying one’s 
goods or services may be registrable.44  
bb) The Kenyan and Ugandan laws 
Both Kenyan and Ugandan laws legitimatise registration of shape marks. A mark 
as defined under the Kenyan Trade Marks Act includes a distinguishing guise.45 
The distinguish guise in the sense in which it is employed in the Act refers to the 
shape or configuration of containers of the goods applied in relation to particular 
 
44   Regarding the signs capable of being registered as trade or service marks in Tanzania 
including shape marks see JACONIAH, J., “The Requirement for Registration and 
Protection of Non-Traditional Trade Marks in the European Union and in Tanzania”, 
40(7) IIC 756 et seq. (2009).  
45   S. 2(1), para. 7, K. 
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goods.46 The Kenyan Industrial Property Office has offered a guidance as to 
which items may be regarded as distinguishing guises:  
A distinguishing guise identifies the unique shape of a product or its package. If for 
example you manufactured a chocolate moulded to look like a rabbit, you might want to 
register the rabbit shape as a trade mark a distinguishing guise.47  
On its part, the Ugandan law allows registration of shape marks subject to 
general and specific requirements. In keeping with the general conditions, shape 
marks are only registrable if they can distinguish goods48 and are capable of 
being used in relation to those goods in printed or other visual representations.49 
Specific registration requirements concerning registration of shape marks under 
the Ugandan law are stipulated under Section 23(5), U. The effect of the 
provisions of this section is to deny certain shapes a legal capability of being 
registered as trade marks for goods even where such registration may not be 
refused based on the general registrability requirements. In this regard, the 
Ugandan law clarifies that the “shape that results from the nature of goods; the 
shape of the goods that are necessary to obtain a technical result; or the shape 
that gives substantial value to the goods” cannot be registered as a trade mark 
relating to goods.50 
d) Other absolute grounds 
aa) Under the Tanzanian Law 
In addition to the category of marks described above, the Tanzanian law 
excludes from registration as a trade mark other types of marks. For instance, 
any sign the use of which is likely to contravene the good morals of the society 
cannot be registered. Similar prohibition extends to deceptive marks or those 
which are likely to “cause confusion as to the nature, geographical or other 
origin, manufacturing process, characteristics or suitability for their purpose, of 
the goods or services concerned”.51 Section 19(c), T., excludes from registration 
state emblems, official hallmarks, and emblem of intergovernmental organiza-
tions. Thus, Section 19(c), T., aims to make the Tanzanian Trade and Service 
 
46   S. 2(1), para. 5, K. 
47   <http://www.kipi.go.ke/index.php/trademarks> (status: 30 July 2012). 
48   S. 4(1), U. 
49   Cf. S. 1(2), U. 
50    S. 23(5), U. 
51   Cf. S. 19(a), T. 
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Marks Act compliant with the provisions of Article 6ter of the Paris Convention, 
which require Member States to incorporate similar exclusions in their municipal 
trade mark laws. On its part, Section 19(d), T., excludes registration of “trade or 
service marks which constitute reproductions in whole or in part, imitations, 
translations or transcriptions, liable to create confusion of trade or service marks 
and business or company names which are well known” in Tanzania and belong 
to third parties. The provisions of Section 19(d), T., implement Article 6bis of 
the Paris Convention, which requires Member States to protect well-known trade 
marks. 
bb) Under the Kenyan and Ugandan laws 
The Kenyan and Ugandan laws contain an all-embracing formulation capable of 
capturing almost every type of marks prohibited from registration in Tanzania by 
virtue of Sec. 19, T. In this regard, Sec. 14, K. makes it unlawful:  
[To] register as a trade mark or part of a trade mark any matter the use of which would, by 
reason of its being likely to deceive or cause confusion or otherwise, be disentitled to 
protection in a court of justice, or would be contrary to law or morality, or any scandalous 
design.  
Formulation of this provision leaves much to be desired: the use of the phrase 
“be disentitled to protection in the court of justice” is a puzzle, which every 
prospective trade mark registrant has to unfold in order to determine whether his 
trade mark qualifies for registration. A more specific embodiment such as that 
which is enshrined in Sec. 23(1), U.52 would be needed in Sec. 14, K. for the 
precision and predictability of the Kenyan trade mark regime.  
2. Relative grounds 
a) Prior registered trade mark 
The trade mark laws of all the three EAC partner states under discussion refuse 
trade mark registration if a third party successfully claims that he is the 
proprietor of a trade mark and that the applicant has submitted to the trade mark 
 
52   S. 23(1), U. provides that: “The registrar shall not register as a trademark or part of a 
trademark any matter the use of which would be likely to deceive or would be contrary 
to law, morality or any scandalous design”. 
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registrar an application for the registration of an identical or confusingly similar 
trade mark.53  
b) Prior unregistered trade mark 
The law puts it tritely that “no person shall be entitled to institute any proceed- 
ings to prevent or to recover damages for the infringement of an unregistered 
trade or service mark”.54 Nevertheless, unregistered trade mark rights may be 
invoked to prohibit registration of another trade mark. Under the Tanzanian law, 
for instance, unregistered rights may constitute relative grounds for trade mark 
refusal. Thus, a proprietor of earlier unregistered trade mark, may formally base 
on his rights to oppose registration of a trade or service mark.55  
Unregistered trade mark rights are not stipulated under the Kenyan and 
Ugandan laws as relative grounds for the refusal of trade mark registration, but 
such rights may be enforced, under the tort of passing off, against any person 
attempting to use a mark identical or confusingly similar to those rights.56 One 
may question, whether a proprietor of unregistered trade mark in Kenya or in 
Uganda can substantiate his rights to prohibit registration of identical or 
confusingly similar trade marks. The fact that the law acknowledges a possibility 
of unregistered rights being enforced would be interpreted to mean that the trade 
mark registrar is likely to refuse a trade mark registration in respect of which he 
has a reason to believe that such a trade mark is likely to be challenged 
immediately after the grant of the registration.  
 
53   S. 20(1), T., S. 15(1), K. & S. 25(2), U. 
54   S. 30, T. See also S. 5, K. & S. 34, U. 
55   S. 27(2) (a), T.  
56   S. 5, K. & S. 35, U. See also S. 30, T., for similar position under the Tanzanian law. The 
judiciary in the East Africa has offered a legal construction of the tort of passing off: “To 
succeed in any action alleging passing off (which is an infringement of the legal 
principle that no man may sell his goods as those of another) a plaintiff must prove three 
things namely (a) that he has acquired a reputation or good will connected with the 
goods or services and that such goods or services are known to buyers by some 
distinctive get up or feature; (b) that the defendant, has whether intentionally or not, 
made misrepresentation to the public leading them to believe that the defendant’s goods 
are the plaintiff’s; and (c) that the plaintiff has ...........damage because of the erroneous 
belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation” (SUPA BRITE Ltd v PAKAD 
Enterprises [1970] 2 EA563. The case is also quoted in a ruling of the HCK 
(Commercial Court of Kenya (CCK) registry), Civil Suit 314 of 2006, Match Masters 
Ltd v Rhino Matches Ltd [2006] eKLR 5). 
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c) Business or company name  
The Kenyan and Ugandan trade mark laws do not provide an express stipulation 
to the effect that business or company names are relative grounds for trade mark 
refusal. However, the  Tanzanian law57, provides as a relative ground for 
refusing an application for trade mark registration “where the trade or service 
mark resembles in such a way as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, with 
business or company name already used in Tanzania by a third party”. 
d) Trade mark application filed in the name of agent 
A trade mark application may be denied registration, if it is proved that the trade 
mark concerned is registered abroad and that the person seeking registration is 
just an agent of the proprietor of the trade mark.58 
D. Trade mark opposition and cancellation procedure 
The national trade mark laws grant the High Courts59 of the EAC Partner States 
with exclusive powers to deal with disputes relating to a decision of the trade 
mark registrar to register a particular trade mark.  In this regard, the law allows 
interested parties to oppose registration of a particular national trade mark by 
citing some absolute and/or relative grounds for trade mark refusal.60 
Oppositions are normally dealt with by the registrar manning the national trade 
mark office. An appeal against the registrar’s decision on the registrability of a 
particular trade mark may be lodged before the High Court of a respective 
Partner State.61 Trade mark cancellation proceedings62 may be instituted before 
the registrar in a national trade mark office or before the High Court.63 Should a 
 
57   i.e. Section 27(2) (b), T. 
58   S. 27(2) (c), T.  
59   Article 108 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 (as amended) 
establishes the High Court of Tanzania. Article 60 of the Constitution of Kenya [R.E. 
2009] establishes the Kenyan High Court. Article 138 of the Constitution of Uganda 
[R.E. 2000] establishes the Ugandan High Court.  
60   These grounds are outlined in section C (II) of this chapter. 
61   Cf. SS. 27(6) & 48, T., S. 31(11), K. & S. 12, U. See also S. 2, T., S. 2, K. & S. 1, U., 
which define the term “court”, as used in the Acts, to mean the “High Court”. 
62   Cancellation proceedings may be realised either through revocation or invalidation 
proceedings (cf. section G of chapter 4).  
63   Cf. S. 36, T., S. 35 K. & SS. 50 & 63 U. 
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person opt to submit his cancellation claim before the registrar, the registrar may 
(if he so wishes) refer the suit to the High Court irrespective of the stage of the 
proceedings. This is especially the case if, in the course of the proceedings, the 
registrar encounters a question of law in respect of which, in his opinion, the 
court is better placed to provide a proper solution than the registrar would be.64 
Sometimes the registrar may not refer the cancellation suit as aforesaid, but may 
enter a judgment on the merits of the suit accompanying it with a mandatory, 
express statement indicating that the judgment is open for an appeal to the High 
Court.65 Once trade mark proceedings are properly instituted before the High 
Court, the national trade mark registrar must be afforded an opportunity to be 
heard, particularly where the effects of the Court’s decision is to change the 
status of the trade mark registration as had been recorded in the national 
register.66 Usually, the status of a trade mark registration may be changed 
through cancellation.67  
E. Infringement of a registered trade mark 
The trade mark laws of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda demonstrate some 
similarities in the way they address issues pertaining to trade mark infringement 
such as the scope of trade mark protection and the limitation to the trade-mark-
proprietor’s exclusive rights. 
I. Scope of protection 
Trade mark infringement is categorised as a tort of strict liability. Hence, liability 
attaches irrespective of whether the defendant intended to infringe the plaintiff’s 
trade mark or not.68  Thus, where a validity of a trade mark registered in one of 
the EAC partner states is confirmed, an assumption is cast in favour of the trade 
 
64   Cf. SS. 49 & 55, T., S. 53, K. & S. 63, U. 
65   Cf. S. 55, T., S. 53 K. & S. 63 U. 
66   Cf. SS. 52, 53 & 54, T., S. 50 K. & S. 61 U. 
67   The term “alteration and/or rectification of the register” employed in the national trade 
mark laws of the EAC Partner States (cf. SS. 36 & 39, T., S. 37, K. & SS. 45, 46 & 61, 
U.) when referring to circumstances under which the status of a register with respect to 
trade mark registration may be changed is more general and encompasses the term 
“cancellation”.  
68   CCK, 10 May 2001, Case Number: 746/98 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co v Novelty 
Manufacturing Ltd [2001] 2 EA 521, 527 para. (c). 
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mark proprietor that his trade mark registration has extended to him “the 
exclusive rights to the use of a trade or service mark in relation to any goods 
including sale importation and offer for sale or importation”.69 The trade mark 
proprietor’s exclusive rights are considered to be infringed where a third party 
not having the authority to use the proprietor’s trade mark, uses in the course of 
trade or business, a sign which is identical or nearly resembles the trade mark 
considered to be infringed. Unless the use of an infringing sign is likely to 
deceive or confuse consumers as to the origin of the goods or services, the court 
cannot endorse infringement thereto.70 For that matter, it is imperative for the 
plaintiff to prove the similarity between the conflicting marks.71 This may be 
realised through consumers’ testimony indicating the likelihood of confusion or 
deception.72 However, the testifying consumer is not entitled to say that the 
offending mark so nearly resembles the registered mark as to be likely to deceive 
or cause confusion. It falls within the court’s competence to answer the question 
whether the infringing and the registered signs are similar and whether that 
similarity causes consumer confusion or deception.73 To discharge this duty, the 
“court has to wear the shoes of a common man, spread the marks before it and 
ask itself whether there are resemblances between the two which would make it 
pick a product which was not intended but the opposite”.74 
1. Use of a mark as a trade mark 
A registered trade mark can only be infringed if the infringer uses an infringing 
sign as a trade mark.75 No infringement can be imputed to a third party who uses 
a trade mark in a way that does not cause consumers to associate the third party’s 
products with the proprietor of that trade mark. This is opposed to a situation in 
which a third party uses a mark, “upon the goods or in physical relation thereto, 
 
69   S. 31, T. See also SS. 7(1) & 8(1), K. and S. 36, U. See also CAK, 17 October 1997, 
Case Number: 235/96 Samaki Industries (Nairobi) Ltd v Samaki Ltd (K) Ltd (2) [1995-
98] 2 EA 366, 373 para. (e). 
70   S. 32(1) (a), T. & S. 7(1), K. 
71   HCU, 17 February 1964, Aktiebolaget Jonkoping-Vulcan v East African Match Co. Ltd 
[1964] 2 ALR Comm. 176, at p. 183 (lines 30-34). 
72   Cf. CCK, 10 May 2001, Case Number: 746/98 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co v 
Novelty Manufacturing Ltd [2001] 2 EA 521, 527 para. (f). 
73   HCU, 17 February 1964, Aktiebolaget Jonkoping-Vulcan v East African Match Co. Ltd 
[1964] 2 ALR Comm. 176, at p. 183 (line 34) and at p. 184 (line 26).  
74   HCT, Tanzania Breweries Ltd v Kibo Breweries and Kenya Breweries, Civil Case No. 
34 of 1999 (Dar Es Salaam Registry (unreported)), para. 16. 
75   S. 32(1) (a) (i), T. & S. 7(1) (a), K. 
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or in relation to services, or in an advertising circular or other advertisement 
issued to the public”, in a way that makes the consuming public believe that the 
goods or services being marketed or advertised come from the proprietor of a 
trade mark or any other person authorised by him.76  
2. The use of business or company names 
Trade mark infringements may be affirmed, pursuant to Tanzanian law, against a 
person who uses a business or company name identical or closely resembling a 
registered trade mark.77 Viewed critically, this strengthened protection a 
registered trade mark enjoys may not be justified in every circumstances. It is a 
well-established, general principle of trade mark law that as long as the 
proprietor prohibits third parties from using his registered trade mark in relation 
to identical or confusingly similar goods he will be justified.78 By analogy, the 
Tanzanian law should be interpreted to mean that the use of a trade or a company 
name cannot constitute trade mark infringement, unless such use is in respect of 
the goods and/or services which are similar or identical to those for which the 
trade mark is registered. However, insofar as the exception to the above general 
rule is concerned, the Tanzanian law may be justified if the infringed trade mark 
is a well-known or famous mark.79 This position is not different from that under 
the Kenyan and Ugandan laws.  
3. Trade mark with reputation 
Both Kenyan and Ugandan laws do not enshrine a specific provision for the 
protection of trade mark with reputation.80 On its part, the Tanzanian law 
provides an open-ended pigeon-hole in which any use of a sign resembling a 
registered trade mark with reputation would be enjoined by the proprietor, 
 
76   S. 32(1) (a) (i), T. & S. 7(1) (b) & (c), K. 
77   Cf. S. 32(1) (a) (i), T. 
78   Cf. S. 20(1), T. 
79   Well-known and/or famous trade marks may be infringed by the use of similar or 
identical mark for dissimilar goods or services. 
80   However, a general stipulation under the Kenyan law may be invoked to protect marks 
with reputation: Restriction is imposed against a third party who uses a sign, which is 
identical to or closely resembling a registered trade mark, in a manner that is likely to 
cause injury or prejudice to the proprietor of the registered trade mark (Cf. S. 7(1) (d), 
K.).  
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irrespective of whether the goods or services marketed under the sign and the 
registered trade mark are same. According to the relevant Section of the law, any 
use of sign by a third party who has not secured a permission from the owner of 
the registered trade mark will be enjoined if such use is likely to impair the 
distinctive character or acquired reputation of a registered trade mark, unless the 
infringing sign and the registered trade mark are not identical or there is no close 
resemblance between them.81   
II. Limitation to the exclusive rights  
1. Use of one’s own name 
Trade mark laws of the EAC partner states entitle any person to the use of “his 
own name, or of the name of the geographical location of his business, or of the 
name of any of his predecessors in business” in relation to goods or services, 
even where another person owns a registered trade mark similar to the third 
party’s name.82 However, such use of the name by the third party cannot be 
justified unless it is a bonafide use.83   
2. Descriptive use of a trade mark 
It is lawful for marketers to describe the quality or characteristics of their goods 
using a trade mark irrespective of whether the trade mark owner has consented to 
the use. This is however a rebuttable presumption: A person resorting to a 
descriptive use of the mark must ensure that the use does not influence the public 
to think that the goods under description come from the proprietor of the trade 
mark, or that there is any connection whatsoever between the goods under 
description and the proprietor of the trade mark.84 
 
81   Cf. S. 32(2), T. 
82   S. 34 (i), T., S. 11 (a), K. & S. 24 (a), U.  
83   Cf. S. 34 (i), T., S. 11 (a), K. & S. 24 (a), U. It has been held in this regard that “.......A 
man is entitled to trade in his own name provided he does what is reasonable necessary 
to distinguish his business from that of another person of the same name” (CCK, Civil 
Suit 314 of 2006, Match Masters Ltd v Rhino Matches Ltd [2006] eKLR 6. 
84   S. 34 (ii), T., S. 11 (b), K. & S. 24(b), U. 
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3. Honest concurrent use of trade marks 
Under certain special circumstances, the law allows two or more identical or 
confusingly similar trade marks to co-exist in the trade mark register. The 
conditions for such co-existence are met if two persons, who are not connected 
in business, adopt and use an identical trade mark in relation to identical or 
confusingly similar goods or services. The adoption and the use of the mark must 
nevertheless be concurrent and in an honest way.85 The manner, in which trade 
mark co-existence is possible, in a legal sense, may be depicted by a hypothetical 
case. Suppose that PATEL adopts and uses a trade mark, say DRYTOUGH, in 
relation to building-construction materials, but does not apply for registration of 
his trade mark. Assume further that RODGERS, not knowing the existence and 
the use of PATEL’s unregistered trade mark adopts and uses the trade mark 
“DRYTOUGH” in relation to the same goods in respect of which PATEL uses 
the mark. After some time, RODGERS applies for the registration of his trade 
mark. The trade mark examiners, being unaware of PATEL’s earlier adoption 
and use of the mark, issue RODGERS with a certificate of registration for the 
DRYTOUGH mark. In the circumstances, PATEL may get his trade mark 
registered without however invalidating RODGERS’ registration. This may, 
therefore, be seen as a limitation to the principle of exclusivity of trade mark 
rights described in section E (I) of this chapter.86  
On a case variation, RODGERS has no right to restrict PATEL from using 
DRYTOUGH mark even where PATEL does not seek registration of the mark. 
RODGERS would only succeed in excluding PATEL from using the mark if 
PATEL is unable to prove that he, or his predecessor in title, has been using a 
trade mark from the date anterior to the first use or to the registration of the 
registered trade mark in question.87 
4. Exhaustion of trade mark rights 
Exercise of trade mark rights by proprietors is subject to the doctrine of trade 
mark exhaustion. The tenet of trade mark exhaustion refers to a scenario under 
which a trade mark proprietor, having exercised some exclusive rights he/she 
enjoys in relation to his/her trade-marked goods, is taken to have relinquished 
those rights with the consequences that third parties can thereafter commercialise 
 
85   S. 20(2), T., S. 15(2), K. & S. 27, U. 
86   S. 32(4), T., S. 15(2), K. & S. 27, U. 
87   Cf. S. 33, T. & S. 10, K. 
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the goods concerned without requiring a trade-mark proprietor’s permission.88 
However, if trade mark rights have not yet been exhausted the proprietor’s 
exclusive rights protected in a certain territory will remain intact. In the 
circumstances, the trade mark owner will have a right to “stop goods at the 
borders of the respective territory bearing an identical mark to his own”.89   
The doctrine of trade mark exhaustion, in the context of national trade mark 
laws of the EAC Partner States, is discussed in detail in section C (I) (2) to (4) of 
chapter 3. The principle of regional trade mark exhaustion underlying the EU 
trade mark law is outlined in section C of chapter 6. 
III. Duties in relation to a registered trade mark   
1. Renewal of registration 
Trade mark legislations of EAC partner states require as a condition for 
continuation of the validity of trade mark after the expiry of the initial registra-
tion term of registration that the said registration be renewed. Under both 
Tanzanian and Ugandan trade mark legislations, trade mark registrations enjoy 
an initial term of seven years with the possibility of renewal of the registration 
for further terms, of ten years each, commencing from the date of expiration of 
the initial registration.90 Under the Kenyan law, trade marks are initially 
registered for a term of ten years with a possibility of extension of the 
registration for further terms of ten years each.91   
2. Obligation to use a registered trade mark    
Trade mark laws of the EAC Partner States devise a mechanism to avoid trade 
mark system being used as a means of granting a monopoly in words and other 
signs without those words and signs actually being used in relation to goods or 
services. For this reason, trade and service marks are protected in Tanzania and 
 
88   Cf. BAINBRIDGE, D., “Intellectual Property” (7th ed.) 827 (Pearson Education 
Limited, Harlow 2009). 
89   PAGENBERG, J., “The Exhaustion Principle and “Silhouette” Case”, 30(1) IIC 19, 23 
(1999). 
90   S. 29 (1) & (2), T. & S. 21, U. 
91   S. 23 (1) & (2), K. Before the amendment of the Kenyan Trade Marks Act in 2002, the 
initial trade mark registration term was 7 years and subsequent terms were 14 years 
each.  
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in Uganda subject to the condition that such marks be put to genuine use within 
the maximum period of three years from the date of registration of the marks and 
from the date of renewal of the registration of the marks concerned.92 The 
Kenyan trade mark legislation requires a trade mark to be put to genuine use 
within any five years.93 Any trade mark which is not put to genuine use in 
accordance with the foregoing conditions is likely to be deregistered upon a 
request of a third party.  
F. International trade mark registration 
Legal protection of trade marks in the EAC Partner States does not accrue 
automatically. A formal trade mark protection is dependent upon a mark 
concerned being registered as a national trade mark in an individual Partner 
State.94 There are different ways through which such registration may be 
secured. The trade mark proprietor has to decide whether he wants his trade 
mark application to be governed solely by the national law or by both national 
law and the law governing international or regional registration of trade marks. 
Protection, in the EAC, of a trade mark via regional trade mark registration 
scheme is available under the regime established and managed by the African 
Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO),95 whereas protection via 
an international registration system is conducted pursuant to the procedure and 
requirements outlined in the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol.96 
 
92   S. 35(1), T. & 46, U. 
93   S. 29(1), K. 
94   However, unregistered trade mark rights may, exceptionally, be enforced (cf. Section C 
(II) (2) (b) of this chapter).  
95   Cf. the Lusaka Agreement on the creation of an Industrial Property Organization for 
English-Speaking Africa of December 1976, as amended by the administrative council 
of ARIPO on December 10, 1982, December 12, 1986 and November 27, 1996, and as 
amended by the Council of Ministers on August 13, 2004. The Lusaka Agreements 
empowers ARIPO to enact some Protocols that are necessary to define the functions and 
powers of ARIPO in specific fields of intellectual property rights. Thus, ARIPO’s 
competence in relation to issues pertaining to trade mark registration are defined by the 
Banjul Protocol on Marks adopted by the Administrative Council at Banjul, The Gambia 
on November 19, 1993 and amended on November 28, 1997, May 26, 1998,and 
November 26, 1999 and as amended by the Council of Ministers on August 13, 2004.    
96   The system is governed by two international treaties, namely, the Madrid Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of Marks “adopted in Madrid in April, 1891 
and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement adopted in Madrid on 27 June 1989 
and came into force on 1 April 1996. 
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Tanzania and Uganda ratified the Banjul Protocol on Marks and hence are 
fully bound by it. Kenya has not yet ratified the Protocol but enshrined a 
provision in the Trade Mark Act implementing the Protocol. According to the 
implementing provision, the normative order enshrined in the Kenyan Act is 
superior to the stipulations in the Banjul Protocol.97  
Kenya has ratified both the Madrid Agreement and the Protocol thereto (hence 
fully bound by them),98 while Tanzania and Uganda have not. Whereas 
applicants for international trade mark registrations may only designate Kenya, 
such designation may have impact on the internal market in case a regional trade 
mark regime is established in the EAC. 
G. Concluding remarks 
 
The discussion in the Chapter has brought to light a number of discrepancies 
and/or some weaknesses inherent in the national trade mark laws of the EAC 
Partner States. In connection with the absolute grounds for trade mark refusal, 
the concept of distinctiveness under the Kenyan and Ugandan laws is addressed 
differently from the stipulation under the Tanzanian law, the root cause being the 
partition of the Kenyan and Ugandan trade mark register into two parts (i.e., part 
A and part B). While a generic trade mark cannot be legally registered under the 
Kenyan and Ugandan laws, the Tanzanian trade mark legislation does not 
contain any stipulation in this respect. Regarding the relative grounds for trade 
mark refusal, unregistered rights may be invoked to oppose registration of a trade 
mark in Tanzania and in Uganda, but such rights cannot constitute a ground for 
refusing or opposing a trade mark application in Kenya, notwithstanding the fact 
that infringement of such rights may be redressed under the tort of passing off.  
Some other notable substantive differences are the terms of trade mark 
registration and the renewal of the registration. Important as well is the differen-
ce in the time limit with respect to putting a registered trade mark to genuine use.  
Finally, the chapter has revealed that the differences exist with respect to 
systems of international trade mark registrations with effect in the EAC Partner 
States.   
As a condition for attaining a common EAC trade mark regime, the 
differences and weaknesses of the national trademark systems of the EAC 
Partner States identified in this chapter must be addressed.  
 
97   See S. 40D (3), K. 
98   See S. 40B, K. 
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Chapter 3:  The Free Movement of Trade-marked Goods in the 
East African Community 
A. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the principle of free movement of branded goods in 
relation to the EAC Common Market. In this regard, three documents, namely, 
the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community and the 
Protocols99 establishing the East African Community Common Market and the 
Customs Union are identified as the main legal basis for the free movement of 
goods in the EAC Common Market. The extent to which these laws support the 
principle of free movement of branded goods is subjected to a critical scrutiny. 
Following some general considerations addressing the way in which trade mark 
proprietors may invoke their nationally registered trade marks to obstruct free 
movement of goods and whether such practice may be justified by virtue of the 
functions of trade marks, the principle of trade mark exhaustion, and the 
principles of international law; the Chapter analyses different forms of trade 
mark exhaustion, pointing out the specific form(s) of exhaustion employed in the 
EAC Partner States.  
B. The Principle of free movement of goods 
I. Legal basis 
1. The EAC Treaty (EACT) 
Article 76(1) EACT establishes a Common Market among the Partner States 
with a primary objective of achieving a single market in the EAC.100 A Common 
Market is generally ascribed to an area without frontiers in which free movement 
 
99   According to the delineation offered in Article 1 East African Community Treaty  
  (EACT), a protocol is any agreement among the EAC Partner States that supplements, 
amends or qualifies the EACT.  
100   See also Articles 2(2) and 5(2) of the EACT, which anchor the desire of the Partner 
States to establish an EAC Common Market. 
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of goods is, inter alia, ensured.101 In the specific context, Article 1 EACT 
portrays the EAC Common Market as the Partner States’ markets integrated into 
a single market in which there is a free movement of capital, labour, goods and 
services.  
2. The EAC Common Market Protocol (CMP) 
Article 76(1) of the EACT only demonstrated the desire of the EAC Partner 
States to establish a Common Market. The concrete establishment of such 
Market was dependent on the conclusion of a relevant Protocol by the Partner 
States pursuant to Article 76(4) of the EACT. A Protocol on the establishment of 
the EAC Common Market was approved on 1 November 2009 and came into 
force on 1 July 2010.102 The Protocol stipulates the realisation of accelerated 
economic growth and development through attainment of various freedoms103 
such as the free movement of goods as the impetus for the establishment of the 
Common Market.104 
3. The EAC Customs Union Protocol (CUP)105 
Article 6(1) of the CMP links the free movement regime to the Customs Union 
Protocol. In this regard, the “free movement of goods between the Partner States 
shall be governed by Customs Laws of the Community” as stipulated in Article 
39 of the CUP. Article 39(1) (a) to (f) of the CUP elaborates that the Customs 
law of the Community consists of the relevant provisions of the EAC Treaty; the 
CUP itself; regulations and directives made by the EAC Council; case law; 
Statutory instruments enacted by the EAC legislative Assembly; and the relevant 
principles of international law.  
In relation to relevant principles of international law, an attempt is made, in 
section C (II) of this chapter, to find out whether provisions of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the General 
 
101   M.A. Consulting Group, “Study on the Establishment of an East African Community 
Common Market”, (submitted to the EAC on 28th August 2007), at p. 44. 
102   Establishment of the EAC Common Market is viewed as “a transitional stage to and an 
integral part of the Community” (cf. Para 3(a) of the Preamble to the CMP). 
103   These freedoms are enumerated in Article 2(4) of the CMP. 
104   Cf. Article 4(2) and Para 6 of the Preamble to the CMP. 
105   The Protocol on the establishment of the East African Customs Union came into force 
on 1 July 2006. 
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Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)106 may be invoked to facilitate free 
movement of branded goods in the EAC Common Market. 
II. Trade mark rights in the Common Market  
Trade marks are essential aspects for the proper functioning of any Common 
Market. Practical experience shows that unless a special trade mark regime is 
established to cater for the interests of the common market, national trade mark 
regimes of the cooperating States will encourage imposition of some restrictions 
on the free movement of branded goods.107 While the Common Market among 
the EAC Partner States has been established, a common trade mark regime that 
may substantially contribute to proper functioning of such market has not yet 
been put in place. The absence of such regime means that the exercise of 
independent national trade mark rights is likely to come into conflict with the 
Common Market’s objectives of ensuring free movement of goods.  
The national trade marks characterising the EAC trade mark protection regime 
are not only territorial but also independent of each other.108 It is, thus, lawful for 
a trade mark proprietor to apply for registration of a single trade mark for 
identical goods in different countries.109 In the circumstances, a trade mark 
proprietor owning a trade mark registered in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda has 
some legal power not only to control the initial marketing, but also the further 
commercialisation, of the trade-marked goods and thereby dissecting the EAC 
Common Market into national markets. Goods marketed in one of these 
countries may not lawfully be re-imported in any of the rest countries. This legal 
possibility stands in contradiction with the noble purpose of the free movement 
principle enunciated in the EAC Treaty and the Protocols thereto.  
 
106   The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 30 October 1947 forms part of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”).   
107   Cf. chapter 6 which describes this problem in relation to the European Common Market. 
108   Regarding the territoriality principle of national trade marks cf. ECJ, Case C-9/93 IHT 
Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v Ideal-Standard GmbH [1994] ECR, I-02789, para.  
22.  
109   Cf. STUART, M., “The Function of Trade Marks and the Free Movement of Goods in 
the  European Economic Community”, 7(1) IIC 27, 34 (1976). 
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1. The Common Market Protocol 
One of the items of evidence that national trade mark laws may be invoked to 
restrict free movement of branded goods can be deduced from Article 29 of the 
CMP. The basic purpose of the Article is to guarantee protection of cross-border 
investments in each of the Partner States. Cross-border investment, as used in the 
Article, refers to “any investment by a national of a Partner State in the territory 
of another Partner State”.110 The term “investment” is employed in the Article to 
refer to “any kind of asset owned or controlled by an investor of a Partner State 
in another Partner State in accordance with the national laws and investment 
policies of that Partner States”.111 Intellectual property rights are mentioned as a 
possible investment area pursuant to the relevant national laws.112 In view of the 
foregoing provision, EAC nationals113 are entitled to have their intellectual 
property rights created and protected in accordance with the relevant laws in the 
Partner State(s).114 Viewed in this sense, Article 29 of the CMP allows circumve-
ntion of the principle of free movement of goods: It recognises the independent 
national trade mark regime of the partner states – a regime that facilitates 
multiple registrations of a single trade symbol as a national trade mark in 
different Partner States – without providing an alternative regime that is 
necessary to encounter the challenges, which the national trade mark systems 
pose on the EAC Common Market. Accordingly, Article 29 of the CMP 
contradicts the CMP’s general aim to establish a single market in which a stable 
regime for the free movement of goods is guaranteed. This mischief cannot be 
avoided, unless the Article is given a broad, purposive interpretation in the light 
of other provisions of the CMP, particularly Articles 33 and 36. While Article 33 
articulates some prohibited business practices, Article 36 enshrines some 
provisions relating to consumer protection.   
In relation to prohibited business practices, Article 33(1) of the CMP decrees 
that EAC Partner States “shall prohibit any practices that adversely affect free 
trade”. A Partner State enacting a piece of legislation that allows trade mark 
rights to be invoked to restrict free movement of goods fails to fulfil its duties 
under Article 33(1) of the CMP. Reliance on that law cannot be justified, unless 
 
110   Article 29(4) of the CMP. 
111   Article 29(4) of the CMP. 
112   Cf. Article 29(4) (f) of the CMP.  
113   Investor in the context of Article 29(4) of the CMP means a national of a Partner State 
who has made an investment in the territory of another Partner State. 
114   The legal stipulation in Article 29 of the CMP may also be enforced based on Article 
3(2)(a) of the CMP, which requires Partner States to avoid discrimination of nationals of 
other Partner States on grounds of nationality.    
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it is the only reasonable means to enforce the proprietor’s legitimate interests.115 
Disappointingly however, Article 33(1) seems to be toothless and hence incapa-
ble of enforcing the foregoing conclusion.116 Article 33 aims to capture some 
specific behaviour, among which unilateral conducts are excluded unless they 
relate to the abuse of dominant position.117 This implies that, under certain 
circumstances, proprietors are free to rely on their trade mark rights to obstruct 
free movement of goods irrespective of whether such reliance is necessary for 
the trade mark to perform its functions or for the proprietor to realise his other 
legitimate interests such as the right to be the first to sale the trade-marked 
goods.  
The practice of restricting free movement of goods on the pretext of protecting 
trade mark rights as explained above is contrary to the principle of consumer 
protection stipulated in Article 36 of the CMP. The Article requires EAC Partner 
States to create conducive environment for the realisation of fair and effective 
competition as a condition precedent “to provide consumers with greater choice 
among goods and services at the lowest cost”.118 The foregoing provisions foster 
free trade, the spirit of which may be realised through parallel importation.119 By 
allowing parallel imports, Article 36 tends to outlaw any restrictions imposed on 
trade-marked goods in a way that cannot be justified by the principles of trade 
mark law.120 However, unless the EAC Council issues a directive or regulation 
interpreting the provisions of Article 36 in line with the foregoing interpretation, 
 
115   A clear description of these interests is offered in section C (I) of this chapter.  
116   Article 33 of the CMP, basically incorporates competition rules. The extent to which 
  these rules may be based upon to facilitate free movement of trade-marked goods in the 
  Common Market is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 in the context of the EU Common 
Market.  
117   The Article is drafted to outlaw business practices emanating from agreements between 
  undertakings (including decisions by undertakings and concerted practices) which may 
affect trade between Partner States (and which have as their objective or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Community); mergers 
leading to the creation or strengthening of dominant positions, and the abuse of a 
dominant position by one or more undertakings within the meaning of Article 33(2) (a) 
to (c) of the CMP. 
118   Article 36(1) (b) of the CMP. 
119   “Parallel imports of genuine goods promote free trade, encourage competition and exert 
a salutary pressure for price levelling” (CORREA, C. M. & YUSUF, A. A. (eds.), 
 “Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement” (2nd ed.) 20 
Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2008)).  
120   The principles of trade mark law relevant for the free movement of branded goods are 
discussed in section C (I). 
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trade mark proprietors will still be able to circumvent the free movement 
principle in relation to branded-goods.121  
2. The Customs Union Protocol 
The EAC assumes, pursuant to Article 6 of the CPM, that the provisions of the 
CUP contain a sufficient, appropriate legal force for the regulation of the free 
movement of goods in the Common Market.122  Proponents of this assumption 
have put forth an argument that the legal regime for the elimination of internal 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers endorsed in the Customs Union Protocol was meant 
to facilitate the free movement of goods.123 While this assumption has a scintilla 
of truth, it is doubtful whether the regime has been tailored to the needs of the 
free movement of intellectual-property-imbedded goods: Tariffs are likely to 
affect the free movement of tangible goods, whereas non-tariff barriers are 
capable of affecting the free movement of both tangible and non-tangible goods 
including intellectual property rights. The question whether the EAC policy 
makers have interpreted the abolition of non-tariff barriers as a conduit pipe for 
the regulation of the free movement of trade-marked goods deserves an analysis.   
Article 13 of the CUP requires the EAC Partner States to eliminate “non-tariff 
barriers to the importation into their respective territories of goods originating in 
the other Partner States”. The term “non-tariff barriers” is operationally employ-
 
121   Enforcement of Article 36 of the CMP is done in accordance with the directives and  
regulations issued by the EAC Council (Article 36(2)). 
122   Specific evidence of this assumption is in the final report of the study for the 
establishment of the EAC Common Market where it is contended that the free 
movement of goods “has been effectively secured under the Customs Union Protocol” 
(cf. M.A. Consulting Group, “Study on the Establishment of an East African Community 
Common Market”, (submitted to the EAC on 28th August 2007), at p. 45. In this regard, 
it has been argued that the formation of the EAC Customs Union did not follow the 
integration sequences laid down by trade theories according to which Customs Unions 
are customarily preceded by arrangements for Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and Free 
Trade Area (FTA); and superseded by a Common Market (CM) and finally Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) (cf. M.A. Consulting Group, ibid., p. 10). This is supported 
by the contention that cooperation under the auspices of the Customs Union went 
beyond free trade in goods for it encompassed some areas of cooperation with relevance 
to Common Market such as free movement of persons, services and capital; cooperation 
in monetary and fiscal matters; coordination of macroeconomic policies; strengthening 
of the organs and institutions of the Community; and cooperation in sectoral areas (cf. 
M.A. Consulting Group, ibid., p. 22). 
123   Cf. M.A. Consulting Group, “Study on the Establishment of an East African Community  
  Common Market”, (submitted to the EAC on 28th August 2007), at p. 22. 
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ed in the CUP to refer to “laws, regulations, administrative and technical 
requirements other than tariffs imposed by a Partner State whose effect is to 
impede trade”.124 While the national trade mark laws of the EAC Partner States 
must be regarded, based on their capability to restrict free movement of goods, as 
a category of non-tariff barriers, the EAC policy makers’ attention has hitherto 
not been drawn to this reality.     
According to an EAC report released in 2007, intellectual property rights are 
not regarded among the factors that pose some dangers to the free movement of 
goods and which are supposed to be categorised as non-tariff barriers.125 This 
practical reality contradicts the EAC Partner States’ agreement to report on 
existence of non-tariff barriers guided by the non-tariff barriers categorisation 
codes of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) among which intellectual 
property issues feature.126  
C. Possible solution to the mischief 
I. Principles of trade mark law 
The potential of trade marks to impede free movement of goods “is primarily 
debated in the context of parallel importation,127 i.e. attempts made by trade 
mark proprietors to seal off national markets as an element in price 
discrimination strategy”.128 The question that stems from the principles of trade 
 
124   Article 1 of the CUP. 
125   The prevailing view of the stake holders in the EAC regards the following as the leading 
forms of non-tariff-based impediments: police road blocks, standards, sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary requirements, customs procedures and documentation, etcetera cetera 
(cf.M.A. Consulting Group, supra, p. 17). 
126   Cf. IHIJA, S. N., “Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers” – a 
   project undertaken on behalf of the East African Community & East African Business 
  Council in 2009 (see particularly p. 11)  
<http://www.eac.int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4:ntbs-   
monitoring-mechanism&catid=3:key-documents&Itemid=141> (Status: 30 July 2012).    
127    “Parallel Importation occurs when an intellectual property owner or his licensee sells 
  protected goods in one market under such circumstances that those goods can be 
purchased there for export and imported into another market for sale against the wishes 
of the intellectual property owner and in competition with similar goods enjoying  
equivalent protection in the second market” (HAYS, T., “Parallel Importation under the 
European Union Law” 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004).  
128    Cf. KUR, A. “Strategic Branding: Does Trade Mark Law Provide for Sufficient Self 
  Help and Self Healing Forces?” in: GOVAERE, I. & ULLRICH, H. (eds.), “Intellectual 
   Property, Market Power and the Public Interest” 191 (P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels; New 
  York 2008). The electronic copy of the publication under reference is available at 
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mark law is whether the reliance on the national trade mark rights to impede free 
flow of goods to the scale of the entire EAC Common Market is legally 
justifiable. As a matter of principle, it is sensible to inquire whether such 
restriction on the free movement of goods is necessary for the trade mark 
concerned to perform its functions. Additionally, it is also logical to find out 
whether such restrictions would be justified on the basis of the principle of 
exhaustion – a principle that tends to describe the extent of trade mark proprie-
tor’s monopoly in relation to commercialisation of branded goods.  
1. Trade mark functions 
A trade mark protection regime is not a self-enclosed system but a system that 
involves “entire markets” – national and global – as a playground of marketers, 
manufacturers and consumers, just to mention but a few, and should for that 
matter be justified on various grounds.129 Thus, an array of functions a trade 
mark may possibly perform can be singled out: (1) to identify the actual physical 
origin of goods and services, (2) to guarantee the identity of the origin of goods 
and services, (3) to guarantee the quality of goods and services, (4) to serve as a 
badge of support or affiliation, and (e) to enable the consumer to make a lifestyle 
statement.130 This enumeration should not be regarded profound, but just as a 
suggestive “template” of guidelines for the assessment of specific issues of trade 
mark law. For the purpose of this chapter only two functions, namely, the 
guarantee of origin and quality, are detailed.  
a) Trade mark as a badge of origin 
A trade mark is primarily expected to identify the actual physical origin of goods 
and services. This function has been categorised by the ECJ as essential function 
of a trade mark.131 The ECJ has, however, clarified that a trade mark’s function 
 
  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311243> (Status: 30 July 2012).   
129   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 22 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
130   A detailed analysis of these functions is made in PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: A 
Practical Anatomy” 23-27 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003). 
131   ECJ, Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 01139, 
  para. 7. Cf. also ECJ, Case C-487/07, L'Oréal SA and Others v Bellure NV and Others 
  [2009] ECR I-05185, para. 58.  
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is not confined to the actual origin of goods or services132 for it may also be used 
to distinguish different products or services of a single (origin) trade mark 
proprietor.133  
b) Trade mark as a guarantee of quality 
Consumers are basically interested in the quality of goods rather than their trade 
origin.134 This view is in line with the opinion of Attorney General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer who once remarked:  
It seems to me to be simplistic reductionism to limit the function of the trade mark to an 
indication of trade origin.... Experience teaches that, in most cases, the user is unaware of 
who produces the goods he consumes. The trade mark acquires a life of its own, making a 
statement, as I have suggested, about quality, reputation and even, in certain cases, a way 
of seeing life.135  
The consumer’s decision to purchase the goods is dictated by previous experie-
nce. The trade mark’s guarantee-of-quality function becomes self evident when 
the mark enables relevant consumers to identify the differences between the 
products or services that it designates from goods which come, or from services 
provided, from a different source and to develop an impression that all the 
“products or services that it designates have been manufactured, marketed or 
supplied under the control of the owner of the mark and that the owner is 
responsible for their quality”.136 The consumer’s mind can, therefore, reiterate, as 
Lord Mackenzie Stuart sums it up well, that “[t]his mark, this brand has always 
served me well in the past. Therefore I can rely on it once again”.137  
In view of the foregoing, a trade mark may be regarded as performing another 
sub-category of a guarantee-of-quality function, namely, to raise consumer’s 
trust in relation to the goods or services.138 This becomes eminent when a trade 
mark has been developed to a level that attracts consumers’ trust in it due to the 
 
132   ECJ, Case C-487/07, L'Oréal SA and Others v Bellure NV and Others [2009] ECR I- 
  05185, para. 58. 
133   FEZER, K.-H., “Markenrecht” (13th ed.) 81(Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich 2009). 
134   TRITTON, G., “Parallel Imports in the European Community”, A paper prepared for the 
   Intellectual Property Institute – London, 1997. 
135   ECJ, 12 November 2002, Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed 
  [2002] ECR I-10273, para. 46. 
136   ECJ, 5 March 2003, Case C-194/01 Unilever NV v OHIM (not reported in the ECR), 
  para. 43. Cf. also ECJ, Case C-39/97, Canon [1998] ECR I-5507, para. 28.  
137   STUART, M., “The Function of Trade Marks and the Free Movement of Goods in the 
European Economic Community”, 7(1) IIC 27, 31 (1976). 
138   FEZER, K.-H., “Markenrecht” (13th ed.) 82(Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich 2009). 
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assurance it has given them that the proprietor cannot betray this trust since 
he/she is economically interested in maintaining the value of the mark.139 In this 
regard, the consumer will say to himself: “I need not investigate the attributes of 
the brand I am about to purchase because the trade mark is a shorthand way of 
telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed 
earlier”.140 
The distinction between a trade mark’s functions of identifying an actual, 
physical origin of goods or services or of guaranteeing that the goods or services 
are of a certain quality is very fine. From the point of view of the guarantee of 
quality function, trade mark binds the trade mark owner (as a brand exploiter) to 
his customers. On the other hand, the guarantee of identity of origin function 
“sees trade marks as a sort of buffer which stops competing businesses getting 
too close together”.141 Analysed from a different point of view, this distinction 
would be seen just a matter of theoretical exercise that does not emulate the 
practical reality: If consumers are interested in origin of the goods or services it 
is normally because the origin imports an expectation about some quality of the 
goods or services concerned.142 
c) Trade mark functions and markets compartmentalization 
It is clear from section B (II) of this chapter that, in theory, a person may secure 
registration of a single trade mark in all EAC Partner States. It is also 
accentuated in the same Section that this kind of registration virtually provides a 
trade mark proprietor with a legal power to impose some constraints on the 
movement of his own goods from one national market to another. This 
necessitates an inquiry as to whether the trade mark proprietor’s power to 
impede free movement of goods can be justified in view of trade mark functions. 
 
139   DAVIS, J., “To Protect or Serve? European Trade Mark Law and the Decline of the 
Public Interest”, 25(4) E.I.P.R. 180, 182 (2003). 
140   LANDES, W. M. & POSNER, R. A., “Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective” 30 
   J.L. & Econ. 265, 269 (1987). 
141   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy” 26 (Oxford University Press, 
   Oxford 2003). 
142   CORNISH, W.R. & PHILLIPS, JENNIFER, “The Economic Function of Trade Marks: 
An analysis with Special Reference to Developing Countries”, 13(1) IIC 41, 43 (1982). 
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aa) Guarantee of origin 
A tenable argument premised on the position that a legal monopoly associated 
with a trade mark only serves to indicate the origin of the proprietor’s goods 
and/or services may be advanced to the effect that reliance on trade mark rights 
to impede free movement of goods in the EAC Common Market, whereby such 
use is not necessary for the trade mark to perform the origin function, would be 
outlawed.  Thus, it would be impossible for a single undertaking to seal off the 
national markets of the EAC Partner States based on multiplicity of trade mark 
registrations. Further commercialisation of the trade-marked goods would not be 
objected since the trade mark on the goods still genuinely indicates the proprietor 
as the source of the goods and not the parallel importer who gets access to the 
goods after the initial commercialisation by the owner of the trade mark.  
However, there is a motivation to circumvent the guarantee of origin function: 
The practice of obtaining different registrations in various States for a single 
trade mark and for the same goods and/or services impacts positively on the 
proprietor’s business since he can sell identical goods at different prices in 
different Partner States – a business scheme whose determinant factors may, 
inter alia, depend on transport and other costs. Thus, traders devise some legal 
means allowing them to rely on their trade marks to create trade barriers against 
entry into the national market of similar goods, bearing identical trade mark, 
from a different country.  
It is commonplace that traders who want to benefit from a trade mark 
monopoly are incorporated in some forms of legal personality, such as limited 
liability companies. In the circumstances, whenever a company plans for a 
business establishment in a location other than the home country will probably 
establish a manufacturing and/or a distributing subsidiary which will be the trade 
mark owner in that country. Thus, the doctrine of trade mark origin is rendered 
redundant and does not come to the rescue of the free movement of goods since 
the identical trade mark is registered in the name of the subsidiary company in 
each of the EAC Partner States. This is because a subsidiary’s legal personality 
is distinct from that of the parent company. As a corollary to this, each 
subsidiary will have a right to claim a right of origin in relation to the goods it 
manufactures or distributes. This has the legal effect that a subsidiary company 
may legally object when goods are imported into the territory where it is 
established. The sound reason for such objection is obvious: The subsidiary did 
not mark the goods with the indication of origin that they bear and which it owns 
for its territory. 
However, economic perspectives in relation to the discrimination over the 
trade mark ownership (exemplified in the above scenario) would not justify 
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compartmentalisation of the national markets of the EAC Partner States.143 Two 
arguments supporting this conclusion loom high: (a) the goods emanate from a 
single commercial group or linkage, and (b) the trade marks are just used to 
inform consumers the differences in the legal personalities of the companies 
constituting the group.144   
bb) Guarantee of quality 
The last paragraph of section C (I)(1)(b) of this chapter clarifies that, if 
consumers are interested in origin of the goods or services it is normally because 
the origin imports an expectation about some quality of the goods or services 
concerned. This implies that the trade mark proprietor has a right to prohibit 
further commercialisation of goods which have been subjected to a poor storage 
or any condition that result in deterioration of the quality after those goods have 
left the proprietor’s sphere of control. Thus, quality control of branded goods is 
in the consumer interests, hence overrides the EAC principle of free movement 
of goods. The prevailing opinion in this connection holds that:  
Trade marks enable entrepreneurs to reap the fruits of their commercial efforts, and they 
thereby encourage further investment in the quality and variety of goods offered. This 
benefits consumers, who also profit from the massive reduction of search costs entailed by 
the use of trade marks, an aspect which, from the perspective of information economics, 
figures as the primary objective and justification for trade mark protection.145  
It must be accentuated that trade mark rights are essential for the attainment of a 
system of fair competition in the products’ (or services’) relevant market. Such a 
system of competition would be distorted, unless competitors are “able to attract 
and retain customers by the quality of their goods or services, which is made 
 
143   The US legal position may serve as a role model in this respect: A US trade mark  
proprietor cannot restrict parallel imports of trade-marked goods, provided that “the 
mark on the goods is an application of a foreign trade mark and the foreign and the US 
trade mark owners are the same entity or are in a parent-subsidiary relationship or are 
subject to common ownership or control” (cf. HAYS, T., “Parallel Importation under the 
European Union Law” 11 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004).  
144   Cf. CORNISH, W.R. & PHILLIPS, JENNIFER, “The Economic Function of Trade   
Marks: An analysis with Special Reference to Developing Countries”, 13(1) IIC 41, 45 
   (1982). 
145   Cf. KUR, A., “Strategic Branding: Does Trade Mark Law Provide for Sufficient Self 
Help and Self Healing Forces?” in: GOVAERE, I. & ULLRICH, H. (eds.), “Intellectual 
Property, Market Power and the Public Interest” 192 (P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels; New 
York 2008). 
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possible only by distinctive signs allowing them to be identified”.146 Thus, the 
trade mark’s function of guaranteeing a quality is best realised through strong 
distribution systems based on the trade mark proprietor’s ability to oppose 
marketing, by parallel traders, of lesser quality goods or the marketing of 
identical trade-marked products sold through unauthorised distribution systems 
and which do not enjoy “after-sales services”.147   
2. The Principle of trade mark exhaustion 
The principium of trade mark exhaustion is one of the legal mechanisms 
employed to ensure that trade mark rights are only used in consonance with the 
functions intended of them. One of the legal pronouncements of the 20th century 
regards exhaustion of trade-mark rights as: 
[A] figurative expression of the principle that it is incompatible with the limited purpose 
of the trademark monopoly for a trademark owner to impede on grounds of trade mark law 
the marketing of goods which have initially been marked and placed on the market with 
the trademark owner’s consent.148  
This liberal pronouncement, which was rendered in the course of the court’s 
interpretation of the German Trade Mark Act, has since been reduced to a 
limited form commensurate with Germany’s obligations under the European 
law.149  
a) Forms of trade mark exhaustion 
The principle of trade mark exhaustion confines a proprietor’s trade mark 
monopoly right within a certain geographical area.150 The specific scale of this 
 
146   ECJ, Case C-2006/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273, 
para. 47. 
147   HAYS, T., “Parallel Importation under the European Union Law” 9 (Sweet & Maxwell,  
  London 2004). 
148   Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) 02.02.1973 Case: I ZR 85/71 
CINZANO, 4(3/4) IIC 432 (1973). 
149   Before its amendment to comply with Article 7 of the TD (which is similar to Article 13 
of the CTMR) which requires Member States to observe the principle of regional 
exhaustion (cf. section C (I)(2)(d) of this chapter), the German Trade Mark Act enforced 
the principle of international exhaustion. 
150   This is in line with the position that since the “function of the trade mark is to be 
assessed in reference to a particular territory” (ECJ, Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale 
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area has to be stipulated in the law governing the trade mark rights concerned. 
The conditions for trade mark registration and the extent of exclusive rights 
stemming thereof are also determined by the same law which sets out the 
geographical scale relevant for exhaustion of trade-mark rights.151  
The territorial linking of the principle of exhaustion may take one of the three 
forms, namely, national, international and regional trade mark exhaustion.  
b) National exhaustion 
Trade mark law of a particular country is said to enforce the principle of national 
exhaustion if it does not grant the proprietor of trade mark rights some powers to 
restrict others from further commercialising goods bearing the proprietor’s trade 
mark, where the proprietor or any other person permitted by him had initially 
placed those goods on the national market in the country where the trademark 
rights are protected.152 The principle of national exhaustion is essentially recogn-
ition of the reality that intellectual property laws of country A exist independe-
ntly of intellectual property laws of country B or country C. It is natural that 
intellectual property laws of country A should have no legal effects on the 
extinction of intellectual property rights created in accordance with the laws of 
country B or country C and vice versa. Thus, any event taking place in country B 
or country C in relation to goods bearing a trade mark registered in country A 
should have no legal impact on the rights protected in country A. The proprietor 
of a trade mark in country A is thus empowered by the principle of national trade 
mark exhaustion to prohibit marketing in country A of the goods he has 
consensually put on the market of country B or country C.153  
The economic justifications of the principle of national exhaustion are 
associated with the need to reserve the national market for the proprietor against 
parallel importers of the goods marketed outside the national territory of a 
country in which the proprietor’s trade mark is protected. As with any other form 
 
Heiztechnik GmbH v Ideal-Standard GmbH [1994] ECR, I-02789, para. 48), so should 
the principle of exhaustion of trade mark rights.  
151   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A. & STAUDER, D., “Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in a 
Global Economy – Transit and other ‘Free Zones”, in: PRINZ ZU WALDECK UND 
PYRMONT, W., et al. (eds.), “Patent and Technological Progress in a Globalized 
World, Liber Amicorum for Joseph Straus” 653et seq. (Springer, Berlin 2009). 
152   Cf. SLOTBOOM, M. M., “The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights – Different 
  Approaches in EC and WTO Law”, 6 JWIP 421 (2003).  
153   Cf. HAYS, T., “Parallel Importation under the European Union Law” 8 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2004).  
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of exhaustion, national trade mark exhaustion safeguards the interests of a trade 
mark holder by limiting the rights of third parties to use the trade mark. In this 
sense, the national exhaustion principle guarantees a reward to a trade mark 
proprietor for his investment by extending to him a right to be the first to place 
the goods bearing the trade mark on the national market.154  
This is in line with the hypothesis advanced in section B (II) of this chapter 
that, relying on the principle of national trade mark exhaustion and the right to 
have multiple trade mark registrations in various countries, trade mark 
proprietors are able to foreclose the ability of third parties to engage on further 
commercialisation of trade-marked goods after the first marketing by the 
proprietor of the said goods in any part of the EAC territory. Indeed, a proprie-
tor’s goods bearing a trade mark registered in Tanzania cannot be lawfully 
marketed in Tanzania if the first sale takes place in Kenya or in Uganda. Thus, 
national exhaustion principle is likely to affect trade between the EAC Partner 
States.155 Such rule of exhaustion does not encourage parallel importation of 
branded goods, and thus making it difficult for the consuming public to have 
access to cheaper products due to higher prices resulting from the absence of 
competition through parallel trade and inter-brand competition.156  
c) International exhaustion  
When international exhaustion is applicable to a certain trade mark, the 
geographical confinement of the rights concerned does not matter. All that a 
trade mark proprietor is required to do in order to exhaust his trade mark rights is 
just to place the goods bearing his trade mark on any part of the world.157 It does 
not make any difference if this part of the world is the market in a developing, 
least or fully developed country. It follows that, unless the condition of the goods 
 
154   Cf. “The Economic Consequences of the Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the area of 
   Trade Marks: Final Report for DG XV of the European Commission” – A study report 
prepared (in 1999) by the National Economic Research Associates (NERA), SJ Berwin, 
and IFF Research (henceforth, the NERA report)), p. i.   
155   As a matter of principle, the Protocol on the Establishment of the EAC Common Market 
aims to remove trade barriers between Partner States. However, this aim may not be 
realised due to the absence of the nexus necessary to achieve this end insofar as the 
relationship between trade marks and the free movement of goods is concerned 
(cf.section B (II) of this chapter).   
156   Commission of the European Communities, “Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights” – A 
Working Document from the Commission Services of 21 June 1999, at p.3.  
157   Cf. TORREMANS, P., “Intellectual Property Law” (5th ed.) 448 (Oxford University 
   Press, Oxford 2008).  
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is altered, the principle of international exhaustion has the consequences that a 
proprietor of a national trade mark cannot prohibit the importation into the 
domestic market of the goods he has marked abroad and placed them on the 
market there.158  
While international exhaustion of trade mark rights is a tool that diminishes 
the ability of trade mark proprietors to dissect the global market into national 
markets, it also serves as a legal mechanism that destabilises price differences 
across regions or countries159. This is achieved through arbitrage. Where a trade 
mark proprietor adopts differential pricing as a marketing tool, arbitragers learn 
closely the trade mark proprietor’s business scheme to identify the markets 
where branded goods are sold at the lowest price and the highest price. After 
mastering the business scheme, arbitragers buy the lowest price products and 
compete with the trade mark proprietor’s goods in the highest price market.   
The principle of international exhaustion may thus be criticised mainly 
because “it is not able to take account of differences in intellectual property 
regimes, nor of the policy decisions that favour isolated markets”.160 Moreover, 
only those firms with the capability to respond to the global market according to 
differing national tests may benefit from the rule of international exhaustion. 
Opponents of this rule argue that insofar as the world market is not unified in a 
single commercial, economic and regulatory framework international exhaustion 
should be avoided.161 By the same token, if the low-quality goods are parallel 
imported to compete with the higher-quality goods, consumers would be 
confused since both products bear identical trade marks. To avoid consumer 
confusion the trade mark proprietor would be inclined to set up some control 
mechanism, which may turn out to be costly, and thus outweigh the whole 
concept of differential pricing. On the other hand, “parallel imports conducted by 
different agents and through different ports, are likely to confuse customs 
officials and make it more difficult to identify counterfeits, thus increasing the 
flow of the latter”.162  
A common argument for maintaining differential pricing (which works 
successful under legal conditions of national or regional exhaustion163) is that 
 
158   Cf. The judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court in Maja case, 66(7) GRUR 372 
   (1964). 
159   More on differential pricing, see SZYMANSKI, S., “International Exhaustion: A 
Review of Economic Issues” (Intellectual Property Institute, London 1999). 
160   HAYS, T., “Parallel Importation under the European Union Law” 7 (Sweet & Maxwell, 
   London 2004).  
161   Cf. The NERA report, p. 52. 
162   Cf. The NERA report, p. 53. 
163   Regional exhaustion is covered in section C (I)(2)(d) of this chapter. 
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countries have different levels of tax rates, environmental standards, and 
advertising costs, just to mention but a few.164 A trade mark proprietor has to 
take into account all these factors and accordingly determine which price in a 
given market will minimally or sufficiently reward him. 
It is questionable whether adoption of international trade mark exhaustion in 
the EAC would be an economically justifiable policy decision. If one considers 
the level of economic development of the individual EAC Partner States (all of 
whom, except Kenya, are categorised by the United Nations Organisation as 
least developed countries (LDCs))165 and their combined GDP and average GDP 
per capita,166 it would be apparent that the rule of international trade mark 
exhaustion would not have any positive impact on the EAC. 
Admittedly, the principle of international exhaustion is in the general interests 
of free trade and competition and thus in the interests of consumers.167 The 
question lies however with the preparedness and the ability of the EAC Partner 
States to take advantages of this free trade scheme. With their unstable and 
undeveloped economies, EAC States are not able to attract any meaningful 
parallel imports of trade-marked goods from developed economies.168 This 
would be one of the grounds for excluding international exhaustion in the EAC, 
and instead devise a form of trade mark exhaustion that would be instrumental in 
enabling EAC firms becoming more competitive. Moreover, the appropriate 
form of trade mark exhaustion should comply with the fundamental principles 
underlying the functioning of EAC Common Market.   
d) Regional Exhaustion 
At the present time, the principle of regional exhaustion of trade mark rights is 
only observed in the European Union. Pursuant to this principle, the placing of 
 
164   Cf. The NERA report, p. 52. 
165   The list of LDCs is available at <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/> (Status: 30 
   July 2012). 
166   EAC Partner States have a combined GDP (Market Prices) of $79.2 billion and average 
GDP per capita of $685 (Source: EAC Facts & Figures Report (2011)) (information 
available also at <http://eac.int> (Status: 30 July 2012).   
167   EFTA Court 03.12.1997 E-2/97 “Mag Instrument“, 29(3) IIC 316 (1998), para 19.  
168   This conclusion derives from the fact that the practice of parallel importation is 
dependent on differential pricing, whereby goods placed on the low-price market are 
exported to compete with the goods a trade mark proprietor places on the higher-price 
market. Thus, moving from the premises that the purchasing power of EAC citizens is 
very low, it is economically illogical to envisage a scenario in which goods put on the 
higher-price market could be parallel traded in the EAC at a large scale. 
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trade-marked goods on any part of the respective regional bloc exhausts the trade 
mark rights irrespective of whether the trade mark concerned is a nationally, 
regionally or internationally registered trade mark. Legal, economic and practical 
justifications of this principle are discussed in chapter 6 infra. 
3. Trade Mark Exhaustion in the EAC  
a) The general rule 
aa) The Tanzanian law 
The exclusive rights which a proprietor of a trade mark registered in Tanzania 
enjoys do not extend to: 
goods which have been sold or offered for sale in Tanzania under the trade mark by the 
proprietor or any associated company of the proprietor, wherever incorporated or with the 
proprietor’s consent, unless the condition of the goods is modified or impaired after they 
have been sold or offered for sale.169 
Two legal concepts may be extracted from the above quotation, namely, (1) 
“goods which have been sold”, and (2) “goods which have been offered for 
sale”. Concept (1) is a practical translation of the legal position that a trade mark 
only extends to its proprietor a limited monopoly in relation to the goods or 
services and therefore corresponds with the classical principle of trade mark 
exhaustion. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether concept (2) is designed to 
preserve interests of the trade mark proprietor. The court in Tanzania has not yet 
had an opportunity to expound the meaning of the term “goods which have been 
offered for sale”. Nonetheless, the term cannot be taken to refer to a scenario in 
which a trade mark proprietor may have already parted with possession of his 
trade-marked goods by way of sale. Thus, the inclusion of the term in Section 
32(3) (c), of the Trade and Service Marks Act,170 as a condition for trade mark 
exhaustion, takes away the right to enjoy specific subject matter of a trade mark 
by the proprietor.171 Put into the context of the tenet of national exhaustion, the 
principle of specific subject matter of a trade mark connotes a trade mark 
proprietor’s right to be the first to market his trade-marked goods in Tanzania.172 
 
169   Sec 32(3) (c), Trade and Service Marks Act No 12/86. 
170   Act No. 12/86 of the Laws of Tanzania. 
171   The concept “specific subject matter” and the phrase “goods which have been offered 
for sale” are discussed in Chapter 6 infra. 
172    The principle has been employed, in the EU’s context, to mean that when a trade 
between Member States may be affected by a proprietor who relies on his right, such 
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The proprietor might not be able to enjoy the specific subject matter of his trade 
mark should his intellectual property rights be declared exhausted on the sole 
ground that he has directly or constructively173 offered the trade-marked goods 
for sale without actually selling them. This can be explained in the following 
manner: Assume that company X offers its trade-marked spare parts for sale in 
Tanzania. While the spare parts are still packed in the stores, X discovers some 
defects in the spare parts and decides to recall them. After rectifying the defects, 
X changes the marketing strategy and decides to market the recalled spare parts 
in markets other than Tanzania. Assume further that company Y buys the spare 
parts sold by X in Ghana intending to parallel import the same into Tanzania. 
Even if company X has not yet enjoyed the specific subject matter in relation to 
those spare parts insofar as the Tanzania market is concerned, X cannot enjoin Y 
from putting the spare parts on the Tanzanian market: The first act of offering for 
sale done prior to the recall of the spare parts had exhausted X’s respective trade 
mark rights. 
bb) The Kenyan and Ugandan laws 
While the position excluding trade mark proprietor from controlling goods 
already sold is expressly stated under the Tanzanian law, it is only by necessary 
implication one would conclude that such position is stipulated under the Kenyan 
and Ugandan laws. According to the pertinent provisions,174 a proprietor cannot 
control tradability of the after-market goods, unless he is allowed by a contract 
concluded before the initial marketing of the goods concerned. The contract 
binds buyers only in relation to some matters, which if undertaken would be 
detrimental to the proprietor’s investment.175 This contractual weaponry should 
 
reliance must be justified on the grounds of protecting the specific subject-matter of the 
right concerned. The principle, therefore, aims to prevent trade-mark rights to be used to 
“partition off national markets and thereby restrict trade between the Member States, in a 
situation where no such restriction was necessary to guarantee the essence of the 
exclusive right flowing from the trade mark (cf. ECJ, Case C-16/74 Centrafarm BV et 
Adriaan de Peijper v Winthrop BV [1974] ECR 01183, para. 11). 
173    Constructive offer of the goods refers to a scenario whereby the trademark proprietor 
does not directly offer the trade-marked goods for sale but authorises another person to 
do so. 
174   S. 9(1), K. & Secs 36 & 40, U. 
175   Acts which a trade mark proprietor may prohibit by contract are described under S.9(2), 
K. & S. 36, U.: They include application of a trade mark to proprietor’s goods after the 
buyer has altered their condition or the original labelling on the goods.   
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be regarded as an exception to the general rule regarding exhaustion after the 
goods had been sold.176  
b) Exception to the general rule   
aa) The Tanzanian law 
An explicit stipulation in the Tanzanian trade mark law rules out exhaustion of 
trade mark rights in respect of goods whose condition is modified or impaired 
after those goods had been sold.177 This exception can be collaborated by the 
provisions of Section 32(2), T. The provisions regard a proprietor’s trade mark 
rights as not exhausted, particularly, when: (1) a trade mark is applied to the 
goods after alteration of the state or condition, get-up or packaging of these 
goods; (2) a trade mark which the proprietor applied to the goods is altered or 
obliterated; (3) Other matter are added to the goods, bearing a trade mark, in 
such a way as to suggest that the matter was so added by the proprietor of the 
trade mark or with his consent; (4) another trade mark is added to the branded 
goods; and (5) some description labels are added to the goods in a way that 
injures the acquired reputation of the trade mark concerned. 
bb) The Kenyan and Ugandan laws  
As opposed to the Tanzanian position, the Kenyan and Ugandan laws incorpo-
rate a limited exception to the general principle of trade mark exhaustion. The 
factors mentioned in (aa) above whose proof justifies a trade mark proprietor to 
control the goods he had initially sold, are also enshrined in the Kenyan and 
Ugandan laws.178 Whereas by virtue of the Tanzanian law these factors apply 
automatically, the Kenyan and Ugandan laws require a proprietor to conclude a 
contract (prior to selling the goods) with the buyers, so that when the buyers 
breach the conditions stipulated in the contract, exhaustion of trade mark right 
will be regarded not to have taken place. Thus, in absence of contractual 
relationship, the principle of exhaustion may prohibit the proprietor of a trade 
 
176   A position suggesting that Kenya and Uganda observe the principle of international trade 
mark exhaustion is outlined in section C (I) (4) (b) of this chapter. 
177   S. 32(3) (c), T. 
178   S. 9(2), K. & S. 36, U. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
65 
 
mark registered in Kenya and Uganda from intervening in further commerciali-
sation of the goods whose condition has been altered after the initial marketing.  
c) Conclusion thereof 
Basically, the above exception may be seen as a conduit pipe through which the 
quality function of a trade mark is guaranteed. The Tanzanian trade mark 
legislation caters fully to this guarantee.179 This is opposed to the Kenyan and 
Ugandan laws, which makes the quality control issue dependent on a contract. 
Insofar as a trade mark proprietor is presumed to have no power to block sales of 
goods whose condition has been altered, in absence of a contract to that effect, 
the Kenyan and Ugandan trade mark laws do not attach a sufficient weight to the 
quality function of a trade mark.  
4. Place of sale for the purpose of exhaustion 
a) The Tanzanian law 
In order for trade mark rights to be exhausted within the ambit of Section 32(3) 
(c), T., a sale of goods (bearing a trade mark protected in Tanzania) must take 
place on the Tanzanian territory. Thus, the immediately preceding provision 
enforces the principle of national exhaustion of trade mark rights.  
b) The Kenyan and Ugandan laws 
The Kenyan and Ugandan laws do not expressly stipulate a place where the sale 
of branded goods should be undertaken for the proprietor to exhaust his trade 
mark rights. In this regard, these laws are imprecise: They do not convey an 
immediate understanding as to the form of exhaustion relevant for trade mark 
 
179   The Tanzanian law takes the issue of quality control further to the realm of assignment 
of  trade marks. Accordingly:  “A licence contract shall be invalid in the absence of 
relations or stipulations between the registered proprietor of the trade or service mark 
and the proposed registered user, ensuring effective control by the registered proprietor 
of the quality of the goods or services of the proposed registered user in relation to 
which the trade or service mark is to be used” (S. 44(1), T.). 
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rights protected in Kenya or in Uganda. This begs a question whether such 
impreciseness may be justified under the provisions of the TRIPs agreement. 
The TRIPs agreement is commendable for being the most successful legal 
instrument that sets minimum intellectual property norms with which contracting 
parties have to comply.180 However, the agreement does not endeavour the same 
spirit with respect to the principle of trade mark exhaustion. Article 6 TRIPs 
gives a lee way to each contracting state to decide on the form of trade mark 
exhaustion. The Article does not oblige contracting parties to stipulate the 
principle of trade mark exhaustion in their trade mark laws nor does it require 
them to specify a form of exhaustion that is to be observed.  
On the other hand, where a particular law (such as the Kenyan or Ugandan 
trade mark law) does not literary and expressly mention the principle of trade 
mark exhaustion, an inference can be drawn from Article 16 TRIPs that such a 
law enforces the principle of international exhaustion. This surmise may be 
deduced from the regime of parallel importation, which flourishes only if the 
extent to which trade mark rights are protected is clearly demarcated. Article 16 
entitles a trade mark proprietor to exclude third parties from using in trade a sign 
similar or identical to the proprietor’s trade mark only if the use of the sign in 
relation to goods or services which are similar with or identical to those of the 
trade mark proprietor causes consumer confusion.181 Thus, “to the extent that 
products are identical and of equal quality, the concept of trademark protection 
in the TRIPs Agreement does not allow the ban of parallel imports”.182  
A note of caution insofar as the foregoing conclusion is concerned looms 
high: Article 16, including other provisions in the TRIPs agreement, does not 
prohibit contracting parties to extend to trade mark proprietors protection beyond 
the TRIPS’ minimum rights.183 Thus, the above interpretation of Article 16 is not 
mandatory; countries may still qualify it by incorporating in their national laws 
the principle of national exhaustion or that of regional exhaustion. The absence 
of express stipulation of the principle of exhaustion in the Kenyan and Ugandan 
laws must thus be interpreted to mean that the legislative authorities in Kenya 
and in Uganda have decided to comply with the minimum provisions of Article 
 
180   Cf. SOUTH CENTRE, “The TRIPs Agreement – A Guide for the South: The Uruguay 
   Round Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights” xi (South Centre, 
   Geneva 2000).  
181   See the standards of proof of the likelihood of confusion in section E (II) of chapter 4 
below. 
182   COTTIER, T., “Trade and Intellectual Property Protection: Collected Essays” 160 
   (Cameron May Ltd, London 2005). 
183   Cf. Article 1(1) of TRIPs. 
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16 TRIPs. Hence the principle of international trade mark exhaustion applies to 
trade mark rights protected in these countries.184   
II. Relevant principles of international law 
Kenya and Uganda implement the principle of international exhaustion, whereas 
Tanzania observes the doctrine of national trade mark exhaustion.185 The 
stipulation of the principle of national exhaustion in the Tanzanian trade mark 
law does not support the regime of the free movement of branded goods in the 
EAC Common Market.186 Does it mean that the rule in the Tanzanian law 
contravenes the provisions of TRIPs Agreement or of GATT? 
 1. TRIPs Agreement 
a) Legislative freedom under Article 8 TRIPS  
Article 8(1) of TRIPS allows contracting parties to formulate or amend their 
laws and regulations in order to “promote the public interests in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development” provided 
that the laws or regulations are consistent with the provisions of the TRIPs 
agreement. By virtue of its Article 6, TRIPs leaves the regulation of the principle 
of trade mark exhaustion to the Member States.187 Tanzania has therefore taken 
advantage of this freedom to put in place a national exhaustion principle. This 
law thus complies with the TRIPs agreement notwithstanding the adverse effects 
it has on the movement of branded goods in the EAC Common Market.  
b) The chapeau 
The restrictions that trade mark proprietors in Tanzania are able to impose on the 
free movement of trade-marked goods in the EAC common market may be 
adjudged as being contrary to the overall spirit of the TRIPS Agreement whose 
 
184   Cf. COTTIER, T., “Trade and Intellectual Property Protection: Collected Essays” 160 
   (Cameron May Ltd, London 2005). 
185   See section C (I)(4) of this chapter. 
186   Cf. section C (I)(2)(b) of this chapter. 
187   Article 6 of TRIPS is further analysed in section C (II)(1)(d) of this chapter. 
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preamble’s chapeau demonstrates the contracting parties’ desire to reduce 
“distortions and impediments to international trade”. The chapeau closes with an 
ostensibly strong message to legislative authorities of the contracting parties: 
measures and procedures to enforce trade mark rights should not “themselves 
become barriers to legitimate trade”. Since intellectual property rights are not 
considered as barriers to legitimate trade within the ambit of the last part of the 
preamble’s chapeau, but the measures and procedures to enforce them,188 it is 
hardly possible to find a contravention of the chapeau by the national legislature 
which enacts a law empowering trade mark proprietors to exclude trade-marked 
goods from the local market pursuant to the principle of national exhaustion. 
c) The national trade mark exhaustion meets TRIPS’ minimum standards 
The spirit underlying the TRIPS agreement is to enshrine minimum provisions, 
with which the Member States have to comply.189 In view of the discussion on 
the provisions of Article 16(1) TRIPS,190 the principle of international trade mark 
exhaustion constitutes minimum standards within the ambit of the trade mark 
regime endorsed in the agreement.191 The fact that the principle of national trade 
mark exhaustion stipulated in the Tanzanian Trade and Service Marks Act may 
be invoked to frustrate free movement of trade-marked goods does not mean that 
this legislation abrogates the TRIPS obligations. While for instance, the absence 
of express stipulation of the principle of exhaustion in the Kenyan and Ugandan 
laws must be interpreted to mean that the legislative authorities in Kenya and in 
Uganda have decided to comply with the minimum provisions of Article 16 
TRIPs,192 incorporation of a national trade mark exhaustion in a trade mark 
instrument should be regarded to be within a legislative freedom extended to the 
Member States by virtue of Article 1(1) TRIPS.193  
 
188   Cf. CORREA, C. M., “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement” 3 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007).   
189   Cf. SOUTH CENTRE, “The TRIPs Agreement – A Guide for the South: The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights” xi (South Centre, 
Geneva, 2000).  
190   Cf. Section C (I)(4)(b) of this chapter. 
191   The key trade mark provisions of the TRIPS agreement are contained in Articles 15 to 
21. 
192   Cf. COTTIER, T., “Trade and Intellectual Property Protection: Collected Essays” 160 
   (Cameron May Ltd, London 2005). 
193   Article 1(1) of TRIPS provides, in part, that “Members shall give effect to the provisions 
of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law 
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d) The debate on Article 6 TRIPS 
The principle of national exhaustion may further be justified in light of the 
provisions of Article 6 TRIPS. The Article has wittingly excluded the possibility 
of the doctrine of exhaustion being invoked in relation to a cause of action the 
settlement of which is pursued within the framework of TRIPS,194 save where 
the issue of exhaustion is raised in relation to the principle of national treatment 
and the most favoured nation respectively contained in Articles 3 and 4 
TRIPS.195 Commentators have offered a purposive construction of Article 6 
TRIPS to the effect that the gist of the Article was to provide the contracting 
states with unhampered freedom to determine a form of trade mark exhaustion to 
be incorporated in the national trademark legislation.196 However, once a 
contracting party had opted for any form of exhaustion, is then obliged to offer 
the same standards to all persons without any discrimination. In this sense, 
reliance on the principle of exhaustion to frustrate the free movement of goods 
could not be justified under TRIPS if it contravened the national treatment197 and 
the most favoured nation198 principles contained in the Agreement. However, as 
these principles are applied in TRIPS based on the nationality of persons and not 
the origin of goods199 it is very difficult to envisage a scenario in which a parallel 
importer may avoid hurdles to the Tanzania’s market access caused by the 
principle of national exhaustion. 
On the other hand, it has been observed that the hiatus, in relation to a specific 
principle of trade mark exhaustion, left in Article 6 of TRIPS, especially the 
 
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.” 
194   Articles 63 and 64 of TRIPS deal with conflicts avoidance and settlement of disputes 
related to TRIPS.  
195   BRONCKERS, M.C.E.J., “The Exhaustion of Patent Rights under WTO Law”, 32(5) 
JWT 137, 152 (1998). 
196   Cf. C. M. CORREA, “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement” 78 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007).  
197   Pursuant to the TRIPS’ national treatment principle “Each Member shall accord to the 
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
nationals with regards to protection of intellectual property...” (cf. Article 3(1) of 
TRIPS). 
198   The most favoured nation principle as incorporated in Article 4 of TRIPS has the effect 
that: “With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall 
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members”.  
199   Cf. HEATH, C., “The Most-Favoured Nation Treatment and Intellectual Property 
  Rights”, in: HEATH, C. and SANDERS, K. (eds.), “Intellectual Property and Free Trade 
  Agreements” 139 (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2007).   
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unambiguous exclusion of the application of the principle insofar as settlement 
of disputes in the context of TRIPS is concerned, does not exclude issues 
concerning trade mark exhaustion from being addressed in the context of GATT 
provisions.200 While it has been reiterated that TRIPS and GATT may be applied 
cumulatively,201 provisions of the former are regarded as a permissive regime of 
intellectual property rights subject to the prescriptive regime contained in the 
provisions of the latter.202 Thus, “the basic GATT principles are made applicable 
to the TRIPS Agreement and any conflict between the Members’ obligations 
under TRIPS with any other covered Agreement will be governed by the GATT 
rules”.203  
2. The GATT 1994 
The general objective of GATT is to establish a multilateral trading regime 
among the contracting parties in order to realise trade liberalisation.204 In this 
connection, GATT lays down some standards that the contracting parties are 
obliged to observe.205 Insofar as the free movement of goods is concerned, the 
most pertinent standards include the national treatment, the most favoured nation 
principle and prohibition of quantitative restrictions on trade. Since it negatively 
affects the free movement of goods in the EAC common market, the principle of 
national exhaustion of trade mark rights observed in Tanzania can hardly be 
justified unless it complies with the GATT standards. The analysis in this regard 
follows below.  
 
200   Cf. CARVALHO, N.P. de, “The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs” 144 
  (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2006). 
201   Cf. HEATH, C., “The Most-Favoured Nation Treatment and Intellectual Property 
  Rights”, in: HEATH, C., and K. SANDERS (eds.), “Intellectual Property and Free Trade 
  Agreements” 142 (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2007).   
202   VERMA, S.K., “Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade – Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement” 29(5) IIC 534, 553 (1998). 
203   VERMA, S.K., “Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade – Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement” 29(5) IIC 534, 553 (1998). 
204   DHANJEE, R. & CHAZOURNES, L. B. de “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
  Property Rights (TRIPS): Objectives, Approaches and Basic Principles of the GATT and 
of Intellectual Property Conventions”, 24(5) JWT 6 (1990).  
205   All individual EAC Partner States are contracting parties to the Agreement establishing 
the WTO in which the GATT forms part (cf. KIEFF, F. S. & NACK, R., “international, 
   United States and European Intellectual Property: Selected Source Material 2007-2008” 
31-34 (Aspen Publishers, New York 2006). 
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a) The national treatment  
Article III GATT expounds the principle of national treatment. Part III.4 of the 
Article stipulates that: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal 
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the 
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
A violation of the above Article “presupposes, among other things, that the 
imported trade-marked products are “like” domestic products and accorded “less 
favourable” treatment”.206 By empowering a trade mark proprietor to prohibit the 
marketing of goods (bearing a national trade mark registered and protected in 
Tanzania) initially marketed in EAC Partner States other than Tanzania while at 
the same time allowing him to market other batches of similar goods on the 
Tanzanian market, the national trade mark exhaustion may be regarded as a 
contravention of the GATT’s national treatment principle. The behaviour which 
the national treatment principle in GATT proscribes is the discrimination 
between imported and national goods. To the extent that the trade mark 
proprietor seeks to exclude from the local market imported goods in favour of 
the local goods, the behaviour amounts to discrimination and thus may be 
regarded to contravene the provisions of Article III GATT.207 
b) The most favoured nation principle 
The most favoured nation principle is reflected in Article I (1) of the GATT 1947 
as follows: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, 
 
206   EHRING, L., “De facto Discrimination in WTO law: National and Most-Favoured- 
  Nation Treatment – or Equal Treatment?”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/01 of 2001, 
available at <http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/> (Status: 30 July 2012). See 
also TREBILCOCK, M. J. & HOWSE, R., “Regulation of International Trade” 100 
(Routledge, London and New York 2005).  
207   Cf. VERMA, S.K., “Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade – Article 
6 of the TRIPS Agreement” 29(5) IIC 534, 553 (1998). 
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and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.  
In essence, GATT’s most favoured nation principle aims to eliminate discrimina-
tion between foreign goods brought to a local market in the third country. The 
principle guarantees that “like products originating in, or destined for, different 
countries” will enjoy equivalent conditions of competition.208 In practice, it is 
very difficult to spot a situation in which a trade mark proprietor may invoke the 
principle of national exhaustion in a way opposed to the most favoured nation 
principle.209 A scenario under which application of the principle is possible may 
be illustrated in the following manner: Suppose that a word trade mark, say 
PUNCHO, is registered in Tanzania and in Kenya for confectionery products and 
owned by different proprietors. Assume further that another word trade mark, 
say, COCOMEAL, is owned by a single proprietor and registered in Uganda also 
for confectionery products. 
In the circumstances, the owner of the PUNCHO trade mark in Tanzania may 
invoke the principle of national exhaustion of trade mark rights to prohibit the 
proprietor of PUNCHO trade mark registered in Kenya from importing into 
Tanzania confections bearing the mark (i.e. PUNCHO). However, although the 
PUNCHO mark is registered for confectionery products, the proprietor of this 
mark in Tanzania has no right to prohibit importation into Tanzania of similar 
products with a different trade mark (say COCOMEAL) other than PUNCHO.  
In this way, the principle of national exhaustion allows the trade mark proprie-
tor to discriminate between like, foreign goods (i.e. products from Uganda 
bearing COCOMEAL trade mark and goods from Kenya with PUNCHO trade 
mark) and hence a contravention of the most favoured nation principle. Pursuant 
to the most favoured nation principle, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted to goods (bearing COCOMEAL trade mark) imported into 
Tanzania from Uganda must immediately and unconditionally be extended to 
 
208   Cf. BOSSCHE, P. van den, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: 
Text, Cases and Materials” (2nd ed.) 324 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2008).  
209   “... cases where the MFN principle could be invoked are mostly those that do not relate 
to intellectual property rights” (cf. HEATH, C., “The Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 
and Intellectual Property Rights”, in: HEATH, C. and SANDERS, K. (eds.), 
“Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements” 142 (Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland 2007).  
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like foreign products (bearing the trade mark PUNCHO) imported to Tanzania 
from Kenya.  
Although from its general legal context the principle of national exhaustion of 
trade mark rights may not be invoked in a way that contravenes the most 
favoured nation principle,210 the above illustration depicts some special circum-
stances in which the principle of national exhaustion may be used to discriminate 
between like foreign products brought to a local market in the third country. It 
thus suffices to mention that a measure, including one pursued on the pretext of 
national exhaustion, may contravene the most favoured nation principle as a 
matter of law or as a matter of fact or  both.  To put it simply: 
A measure may be said to discriminate in law (or de jure) in a case in which it is clear 
from reading the text of the law, regulation or policy that it discriminates. If the measure 
does not appear on the face of the law, regulation or policy to discriminate, it may still be 
determined to discriminate de facto if, on reviewing all facts relating to the application of 
the measure, it becomes clear that it discriminates in practice or in fact.211    
The conflict between the most favoured nation principle and intellectual property 
rights (such as a trade mark) may be resolved under the general exception clause 
enshrined in Article XX (d) of GATT outlined below.212 
c) Prohibition of quantitative restrictions under Article XI GATT 
Invoking the principle of trade mark exhaustion to prohibit free movement of 
goods in the EAC common market is contrary to Article XI (1) GATT, which 
prohibits contracting parties from imposing non-tariff barriers to international 
trade. The Article stipulates that:  
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import and export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
 
210   Essentially, the principle of national exhaustion allows a trade mark proprietor to 
discriminate between trade-marked goods sold abroad and those marketed in the national 
market making it possible for the proprietor to prohibit marketing in the domestic market 
of the goods he sold abroad (cf. section C (II)(2)(a) of this chapter). The most relevant 
principle of exhaustion insofar as the most favoured national principle is concerned is 
the principle of regional trade mark exhaustion (cf. section C (I)(2)(d) of this chapter). 
   Regional exhaustion allows a trade mark proprietor to discriminate between goods he 
markets in the national markets of the regional bloc’s Member States and those he 
markets outside the regional bloc and hence a contravention of the most favoured nation 
principle.   
211   Cf. Footnote 8, in: BOSSCHE, P. van den, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
   Organization: Text, Cases and Materials” (2nd ed.) 324 (Cambridge University Press, 
   Cambridge 2008).  
212   Article XX (d) GATT is analysed in section C (II)(2)(d) of this chapter. 
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or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product in the territory of 
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined 
for the territory of any contracting party.  
The provisions of Article XI (1) GATT imply therefore that the national 
exhaustion principle applicable in Tanzania, which does not permit importation 
into Tanzania of the goods bearing a trade mark protected in Tanzania previously 
marketed in other EAC Partner States, may be regarded “as a measure having an 
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction”.213 However, it must be noted that 
Article XI (1) GATT is a general clause, which is subject to exceptions under 
Article XIX GATT. Pursuant to provisions of the latter Article, measures 
amounting to quantitative restrictions may generally and as of right be resorted 
to by a contracting party who can demonstrate that the measure is necessary to 
avoid some serious injury which the imports may cause to an established 
industry: A measure geared towards protection of the exclusive rights of a trade 
mark proprietor does not fall in the foregoing exception.214 Such measure would 
fall under GATT’s general exception clause analysed below. 
d) The general exception clause under Article XX GATT 
In view of the discussion in the above sections,215 it goes without saying that the 
principle of national exhaustion contravenes the national treatment and the most 
favoured nation rules on one hand, and is non-tariff barrier on the other, if it is 
invoked to restrict parallel importation. This general rule, must however be 
analysed in light of the provisions of Article XX(d) GATT, which provides a 
safety valve through which contracting parties may avoid the WTO 
obligations,216 to observe the above principles.217 Article XX (d) provides that:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute ... disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
 
213   Cf. YUSUF, A. A. and HASE, A. M. von, “Intellectual Property Protection and 
   International Trade: Exhaustion of Rights Revisited”, 16(1) World Competition 115, 129 
   (1992). 
214   Cf. VERMA, S.K., “Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade – Article 
6 of the TRIPS Agreement” 29(5) IIC 534, 554 (1998). 
215   Cf. sections C (II)(2)(a) – (c) of this chapter. 
216   Cf. RUSE-KHAN, H. G., “A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO Law”, Max 
   Plank Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series 
   No. 08-02, p. 15.The paper is available at: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309526> (Status: 
30 July 2012).  
217   i.e. the principles outlined in sections C (II)(2)(a) – (c) of this chapter. 
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(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including..., the protection of patents, trade marks 
and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
The exception in Article XX GATT is “permissive but cautious towards IPR 
regulatory measures considered susceptible of hampering free trade and 
competition”.218 Application of Article XX (d) GATT is subject to two-tiered 
provisos,219 namely, those contained in the preamble to Article XX GATT 
(henceforth, the chapeau),220 and those contained in paragraph (d) of Article XX. 
In line with the analysis of the provisos as offered below, the provisions of the 
chapeau are logically taken into account after the provisions of paragraph (d) of 
Article XX GATT have been analysed notwithstanding the fact that the 
chapeau’s literary position precedes that of paragraph (d).221  
aa) Provisos under Paragraph (d) of Article XX GATT 
Provisional justification of a measure which is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the GATT depends on the country introducing the measure concerned being able 
to prove two elements, namely, that (1) the measure is one designed to secure 
compliance with the law or regulation which is not inconsistent with some 
provisions of the GATT; and that (2) the measure is necessary to secure such 
compliance.222  
Incorporating in a trade mark law, and enforcing, the principle of national 
trade mark exhaustion may be considered as a measure which aims to secure 
compliance with intellectual property laws. Since intellectual property laws are 
not generally inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT, the necessity of such 
 
218   CORREA, C. M. & YUSUF, A. A. (eds.), “Intellectual Property and International Trade 
   – The TRIPS Agreement” (2nd ed.) 8 (Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 
   2008). 
219  Cf. BOSSCHE, P. van den, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, 
Cases and Materials” (2nd ed.) 629 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008).   
220  “The chapeau can be generally described as a safeguard against (protectionist) abuse of 
the ability to justify WTO inconsistencies under Art. XX GATT and so to defer from 
WTO obligations.” Cf. RUSE-KHAN, H. G., “A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space 
   in WTO Law”, Max Plank Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law 
   Research Paper Series No. 08-02, p. 17. 
221   Cf. RUSE-KHAN, H. G., “A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO Law”, Max 
   Plank Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series 
   No. 08-02, p. 17. 
222   Cf. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
   Frozen Beef, T/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 
2001:I, 5, para. 157.  
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measure in achieving the desired end results is a decisive factor to a finding on 
whether the measure should be allowed.  
The WTO Appellate Body has offered a circumscription of measures regarded 
“necessary” within the ambit of Article XX (d) GATT in the following manner: 
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision 
as “necessary” in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could 
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with 
other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, the contracting party is bound to use, 
among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions.223  
On the other hand, Mark Stucki offers a criterion to be observed when it comes 
to determining a necessity of a particular form of trade mark exhaustion. He 
argues that, if a trade mark law which exceeds TRIPS’ minimum standards by 
offering intensified protection of trade marks is invoked to bar the free 
movement of goods, such particular law “would not be necessary to protect 
trademarks in the sense of Article XX (d) GATT”.224 Putting it more specifically, 
he further opines that “ one could assume that the minimum standards of the 
TRIPS-Agreement define the degree of necessity of “tolerated” trade mark 
protection, and that increased protection (which is... tolerated under TRIPS) 
would hardly ever pass the ‘test of necessity’”.225  
One may thus rightly submit that, by having the effect of restricting free 
movement of trade-marked goods in the EAC, the Tanzania’s principle of 
national exhaustion may not pass the necessity test: The principle goes beyond 
the minimum standards enshrined in Article 16 TRIPS, which defines the scope 
of trade mark protection.226 Thus, the restriction on the free movement of goods 
pursuant to principle of national exhaustion “could hardly be considered as 
necessary to secure the protection of trademark rights”.227 In view of the WTO 
Appellate Body decision quoted above,228 the Tanzania’s principle of national 
exhaustion could be allowed to operate in a way infringing GATT provisions, 
 
223   Cf. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, T/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 
5, para. 165. 
224   STUCKI, M., “Trademarks and Free Trade” 51 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1997). 
225   STUCKI, M., “Trademarks and Free Trade” 51 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1997). 
226   Cf. the discussion on Article 16(1) of TRIPS offered in section C (I)(4)(b) of this 
chapter. 
227   STUCKI, M., “Trademarks and Free Trade” 51 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1997).  
228   Cf. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, T/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 
5, para. 165. 
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only if it were the only reasonable measure with a least degree of inconsistence 
with GATT provisions available: The reality of the matter is that the principle of 
international trade mark exhaustion, which is pro-GATT provisions, is available.  
bb) Provisos under the chapeau 
One of the conditions to which application of the chapeau is subjected requires 
discriminatory measure complained of to be perpetuated between countries 
where same conditions prevail. By having the effect of harmonising national 
intellectual property laws, TRIPS Agreement has made protection standards 
prevailing in each WTO Contracting Parties to be minimally the same. Thus, any 
form of trade mark exhaustion enshrined in the contracting party’s domestic 
trade mark law, which discriminates between the contracting parties or which 
disguisedly imposes restrictions on international trade would hardly fall in the 
exceptions under Article XX (d) GATT, since this would be a measure applied 
between WTO contracting parties with the same prevailing legal conditions. 
In this regard, by the time when all WTO contracting parties will have 
transposed the TRIPS Agreement’s minimum provisions into domestic law, any 
form of trade mark exhaustion susceptible of discriminating the contracting 
parties, or which can disguisedly be invoked to restrict trade between the WTO 
Members will not likely to be exempted under the provisions of paragraph (d) of 
Article XX GATT.229 Insofar as the principle of national trade mark exhaustion 
applicable in Tanzania may potentially serve as disguise restriction on 
international trade, it may not be accommodated in the general exceptions under 
Article XX (d) GATT. 
D. Concluding remarks 
To address the negative effects of the independent national trade mark systems 
of the EAC Partner States on the Common Market’s principle of free movement 
of goods, one should move from the premises that the national trade mark regime 
basically aims to foster the national interests of preserving local industries from 
competition. However, since the EAC Common Market has been established,230 
individual interests of the EAC Partner States must be subsumed under the EAC 
interests. Indeed, the EAC Treaty already defines the Community interests 
 
229   STUCKI, M., “Trademarks and Free Trade” 50 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1997). 
230   On the establishment of the EAC Common Market, see section B(I) of this chapter.   
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which, as matter of principle, should either override or co-exist with the national 
interests depending on the effects of the latter on the former. Where reliance on 
the national interests severely affects the EAC interests231 as is the case with the 
principle of national exhaustion, the Community interests must prevail. Thus, the 
nexus between the national interests and the Community interests insofar as the 
common market for branded products is concerned is missing. A trade mark 










231   Establishment of the EAC Common Market is an example of these interests (cf. Article 
76, EAC Treaty). 
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Chapter 4:  Overview of the European Community Trade Mark 
System 
A. Introductory remarks 
The Community Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR) was enacted in 1993232 to 
establish the European Community Trade Mark (CTM) system, which became 
operational on April 1, 1996. The system permits a single registration to be 
obtained in respect of a trade mark application processed by a single office that 
makes a single process resulting in a single registration covering the whole 
territory of Europe.233 The CTM can only be obtained by registration.234  
In this Chapter, some detailed issues relating to the life of a CTM, from the 
application stage throughout the granting of a registration and thereafter, are 
discussed. The chapter can, ideally, be divided into two main parts. The first part 
is devoted to substantive issues, whereas the second is directed to procedural 
issues. Central for the substantive part are some issues relating to a CTM 
registration such as the requirements of graphical representation and the 
condition that a sign must be distinctive in order to avoid being refused 
registration based on absolute grounds for trademark refusal. The substantive 
part addresses also some relative grounds for trademark refusal as well as the 
CTM infringement and the limitations posed against the CTM rights. The same 
part outlines some duties in relation to CTM and defines some key terms which 
are useful for the determination of precedence of trademark rights in the context 
of a CTM proprietorship. The second part of the chapter covers issues relating to 
the procedure for filing CTM applications, opposition against CTM registration 
and a Search procedure (as a means by which earlier trademark rights may be 
discovered). An analysis in the second part extends to some legal issues that may 
lead a CTM being cancelled either through revocation or invalidity proceedings. 
The second part concludes with a discussion on how international trademark 
registrations with effect in the Community are handled.  
 
232   As Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 published in OJ L 11, 14.1.1994, p. 1. This 
Regulation was repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 
   February 2009 on the Community trade mark (codified version). 
233   The rights attached to the CTM are rights in rem. Cf. Article 19(1) of the CTMR. 
234   Cf. Article 6 of the CTMR. 
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To give life to the discussion contained in the chapter, a brief introduction is 
offered on the office charged with a primary duty to ensure that the substantive 
principles and the procedure outlined in the CTMR are observed during the 
processing of CTM applications as well as opposition and cancellation 
proceedings.   
B. Office responsible for CTM system 
Article 2 of the CTMR establishes the office for the harmonisation in the internal 
market (trademark and designs), (hereinafter the Office or OHIM), as the chief 
office responsible for community trade mark registrations. As a body of the 
Community, OHIM enjoys a legal personality entitling it to acquire or dispose of 
real or movable property and be party to judicial proceedings while enjoying the 
most “extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons” in each of the Member 
States.235  It carries out community objectives, which are in line with community 
law governing the internal market. OHIM is therefore expected to guide the 
national authorities as to how the community law in relation to trade mark 
registration is to be translated and carried out. 
Within OHIM’s functional structure established under Article 130 of the 
CTMR, five units are directly responsible for decisions affecting CTM 
registrability, namely, the examination, opposition, cancellation, administration 
and appellate divisions. Examiners, in the examination division, are responsible 
for examining absolute grounds for trademark refusal,236 whereas the Opposition 
Divisions are responsible for decisions on oppositions against CTM registra-
tion.237 The Cancellation Divisions are responsible for all decisions regarding 
application for revocation or application for declaration of invalidity.238 An 
Administration of Trade Marks and Legal Division is responsible for deciding on 
all legal issues that do not fall within the competence of the above three 
divisions. Thus, the Administration Division is particularly responsible to take 
decisions on procedural matters.239 It is also duty bound to take decisions in 
respect of administrative issues such as those regarding “entries in the Register 
of Community trade marks”.240 At the top of these four divisions are the Boards 
 
235   Cf. Article 115 of the CTMR. 
236   Cf. Article 131 of the CTMR. 
237   Cf. Article 132 of the CTMR. 
238   Cf. Article 134 of the CTMR.   
239   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 95 (Sweet 
   & Maxwell, London 2005).   
240   GASTINEL, E. & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade Mark” 
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of Appeal, which are responsible for deciding appeals resulting from, inter alia, 
the examiners’ decisions as well as appeals against the decisions of Opposition 
Divisions and Cancellation Divisions.241 An appeal involving a complex legal 
problem will normally be submitted before the enlarged Board of Appeal.242 
While the Boards of Appeal are the final decision making authority within the 
organisational structure of OHIM, their decisions can only be challenged before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (formerly designated as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)) and the General Court (GC) attached to the 
CJEU (formerly known as the Court of First Instance (CFI)).243 Article 257 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for the 
possibility that the Boards of Appeal become judicial chambers attached to the 
GC, “maintaining their seat in Alicante but outside OHIM’s structure”.244    
C. Subject matter of CTM protection 
Article 4 of the CTMR states, in relation to a definition of a CTM, that a sign 
which a trademark may consist of is “any sign capable of being represented 
graphically, particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, 
numerals, the shape of goods or their packaging, provided that such signs are 
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of 
other undertakings”.   
Article 4 of the CTMR, therefore, incorporates graphical representation and 
distinguishing capability of a sign as formal and substantive requirements for 
CTM registration. 
The definition under Article 4 of the CTMR complies with the minimum 
registration requirements enshrined in Article 15 of the agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). By stipulating that 
“Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of 
constituting a trademark”, Article 15 TRIPS accommodates the substantive and 
 
   52 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
241   Cf. Article 135 of the CTMR. 
242   Cf. Article 135(2) & (3) of the CTMR. 
243   Cf. Articles 251 and 256 of the TFEU 
244   BENDER, A. and KAPFF, P. von, “Born to be free – the Community Trade Mark in 
   Practice”, 32(6) IIC 625, 626 (2001), footnote 6. 
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formal requirements for trade mark registration inscribed in Article 4 of the 
CTMR.245  
I. Substantive requirement – the capability to distinguish 
It is generally accepted that many signs are capable of distinguishing goods and 
services.246 The requirement of distinctiveness in accordance with Article 4 of 
the CTMR is rather easy to meet. In this connection, Davies states that “[t]he 
Criterion which has to be applied is that of an abstract capability of distinguish-
ing goods or services, which means that the sign has to be considered apart from 
the goods or services to which it relates.”247 In practice, “no signs are per se 
excluded from being registered as a trade mark under Article 4 of the CTMR”.248 
The fact that capacity to distinguish is the core element in the definition under 
Article 4 of the CTMR reiterates the historic basis for trademark protection, 
which is to protect broadly trademarks as indicators of origin.249 However, a non-
specific subject matter considered to be concept-related, cannot be registered as a 
CTM for it has no capability to distinguish. In the Dyson case250 a transparent bin 
or collection chamber forming part of the external surface of a vacuum cleaner 
was held to be unregistrable. The ECJ’s decision in this case was, inter alia, 
based on the ground that a transparent bin or a collection chamber is a concept 
(i.e. a mere property of the vacuum cleaner concerned) which could not be 
regarded as a sign under Article 4 of the CTMR, since it encompassed, “in a 
 
245   Cf. JACONIAH, J., “The Requirements for Registration and Protection of Non-
Traditional Marks in the European Union and in Tanzania”, 40(7) IIC 756 (2009). 
246   CORNISH, W. & LLEWELYN, D., “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights” (6th ed.) 696 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007). 
247   DAVIES, I. M. (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 
36 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998). 
248   DAVIES, I. M. (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 
36 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998). See also Case C-273/00, Ralf Sieckmann [2002] 
   ECR I-11737, para. 39 & Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n. Memex 
   [2003] ECR I-14313, paras. 34 and 35. See further Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. 
   Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, para. 23 and Case C-49/02, Heidelberger 
  Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-6129, para. 22, which, in addition to reiterating the 
graphical representation and capability to distinguish as basic conditions a sign must 
fulfil in order to be registered, mention that the subject-matter of trademark application 
must be a “sign”.  
249   CORNISH, W. & LLEWELYN, D., “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights” (6th ed.) 688 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007). 
250   ECJ, 25 January 2007, Case C-321/03, Dyson Ltd [2007] ECR I-00687, paras. 37 to 40. 
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general and abstract manner, all the conceivable shapes” of such a transparent 
bin or collection chamber.   
II. Formal requirement – the graphical representation 
The requirement that a registrable sign must be capable of being represented 
graphically, as stipulated under Article 4 of the CTMR, is reinforced under 
Article 26 of the CTMR, which requires an applicant for CTM registration to 
furnish OHIM with a representation of the trademark.251  The legal significance 
of the requirement for such a representation is mirrored by the fact that an 
application for trade mark registration may “claim special graphic features or 
colours, the use of small and capital letters and three dimensional marks” only 
through graphical representation.252  
Graphical representation required under Article 4 of the CTMR does not mean 
actual reproduction of a sign in the register. Nevertheless, this is one methodo-
logy. The second method is to provide some contours representing the sign and 
some description enough to make the trademark examiner and other interested 
parties know what is claimed and the extent of the consequential monopoly.253    
III. Essence of the formal requirement 
A trademark protection regime must, as a matter of principle, encourage and 
foster the principle of legal certainty.254 A registered trade or service mark 
affords to its proprietor a monopoly over the exclusive use of the signs 
constituting such a trade or service mark.255 The use of a registered trade or 
service mark by third parties having no authorisation from the owner infringes 
the exclusive right(s) bestowed upon the right holder. The legal certainty, in 
 
251   Article 26(1) (d) of the CTMR. 
252   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 60 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000). See also Rule 3(1) of the CTMIR. 
253   DUMFARTH,P.,“Prozessuale und materiellrechtliche Aspekte des Widerspruchs-
verfahrens der Gemeinschaftsmarkenverordnung” 39 (Trauner, Linz 2008). Cf. also 
FEZER, K.-H., “Die Grafische Darstellbarkeite eines Markenformats” 44, in: 
BOMHARD, V. von, PAGENBERG, J. & SCHENNEN, D., (eds.), “Harmonisierung 
des Markenrechts: Festschrift für Alexander von Mühlendahl zum 65.  Geburtstag am 
20. Oktober 2005” (C. H. Verlag, München 2005). 
254   See the opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in case C-273/00, Ralph  
Sieckman [2002] ECR I-11737.  
255   Cf. Articles 9 and 8 of the CTMR. 
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relation to trade or service mark protection, should enable a person to know, 
through an inspection of the register the nature and scope of the signs protected 
as trade or service marks. This position is in line with a view that:  
… the trade mark register is not supposed to be the result of an academic exercise in 
turning intangible concepts such as sounds and scents into words and pictures: it is a 
practical tool for any businessman who wants to go into business and who wants to know 
if he will get into legal trouble if he gives his goods a particular name, appearance, colour 
or smell. If the register cannot give him that information, it has failed in its primary 
objective.256  
The legal monopoly with respect to a trade or service mark is not granted 
automatically. Such monopoly is contingent upon the applicant furnishing the 
examiners with information sufficient to establish clearly what the signs are, 
which constitute a service or trade mark in question. The clarity and preciseness 
of this information make others aware of what they must refrain from doing in 
relation to a registered trade or service sign. This is the major reason why 
graphical representation (under the CTMR) of a sign in the register is mandatory. 
IV. Formal and substantive requirements vis-à-vis non-traditional marks 
The standard required for the advancement of legal certainty under the CTMR is 
based on graphical representation. However, the CTMR does not give an exact 
and precise definition as to what the phrase “graphical representation” means. It 
only provides instances of signs that are capable of this kind of reproduction and 
representation.257 Thus, it is pertinent to find out whether and how some new 
forms of trade symbols such as smells, sounds, colours and three dimensional 
marks258 are responsive of the formal and substantive requirements for trademark 
registration under the CTMR.259  
 
256   Cf. PHILLIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: A Practical Guide” 65 (OUP, New York 2003). 
257   Cf. Article 4 of the CTMR. 
258   These signs are often referred to as non-traditional marks. For instance, while Sehirali 
Çelik uses the phrase in the article entitled „An overview of Turkish Case-Law on   
Trademark Disputes with Special Consideration Regarding the Rules of the European 
   Court of Justice“, in 39(3) IIC 326 (2008); Ströbele refers to the same concept by using 
the phrase ‘new trademark forms’ in his article entitled “The Registration of New 
Trademark Forms”, in 32(2) IIC (2001). 
259   For an extensive discussion on graphical representation of the non-traditional marks see 
  JACONIAH, J., “The Requirements for Registration and Protection of Non-Traditional 
   Marks in the European Union and in Tanzania”, 40(7) IIC 756 et seq. (2009). Cf. Also 
   BENDER, A., “Die grafische Darstellbarkeit bei den neuen Markenformen” 157 et seq., 
   in: BOMHARD, V. von, PAGENBERG, J. & SCHENNEN, D. (eds.), “Harmonisierung 
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However, it is important to mention one fact in the passing: there are no 
separate criteria for assessing the registrability of non-traditional signs.  EU law, 
for example, does not require authorities to apply a stricter assessment of the 
registrability of new types of marks than it does for traditional marks.260 
1. Smells 
The EU trademark jurisprudence confirms that smells and sounds can be regis-
tered and function as trademarks. The case of Ralf Sieckmann261 is recorded to 
have broken new ground as far as registration of intangible mediums such as 
smells are concerned. As it was the first in a number of ECJ decisions dealing 
with unconventional trademarks, it has become the leading decision also with 
regard to sounds, colours and colour combinations262, where initially, the 
capability of being represented graphically was also considered as problematic, 
although there was little doubt as to such signs being generally capable of 
distinguishing goods or services. In the case concerned, the applicant, Mr. 
Sieckmann, had offered to the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (Deutsches 
Patent- und Markenamt) the following modes of representation of his olfactory 
mark: 
Trade mark protection is sought for the olfactory mark deposited with the Deutsches 
Patent- und Markenamt of the pure chemical substance methyl cinnamate (= cinnamic acid 
methyl ester), whose structural formula is set out.263 
In addition, Mr. Sieckmann had offered to deposit a sample of the smell for 
which registration was sought. It seems, in light of the first question that the 
German Patent and Trade Mark Office referred to the ECJ, that the opinion 
 
   des Markenrechts: Festschrift für Alexander von Mühlendahl zum 65.  Geburtstag am 
20. Oktober 2005” (C. H. Verlag, München 2005).  
260   ECJ, 8 April 2003, Joined Cases C-53/01 to 55/01, Linde AG, Winward Industries Inc. & 
  RadoUhren AG [2003] ECR I-03161, para.49.  
261   ECJ, 12 December 2002, Case C-273/00, Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-11737. 
262   See for example Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n [2003] ECR I-
14313, para. 28; ECJ, 24 June 2004, Case C-49/02, Case C-49/02, Heidelberger 
Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-06129, para. 25; Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v. 
Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, para. 28.  
263   He added that “samples of this olfactory mark can also be obtained via local laboratories 
listed in the Gelbe Seiten (Yellow Pages) of Deutsche Telekom AG or, for example, via 
the firm E. Merck in Darmstadt.” He also gave the structural formula C6H5-CH = 
CHHOOCH3 as a part of such description (Case C-273/00 Ralph Sieckmann [2002] 
ECR I-1173, para. 11).  
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prevailed prior to Sieckmann264 that odours could neither be reproduced directly 
nor be perceived visually. In order to obtain clarification on this point, the 
German Patent and Trade Mark Office posed the question to the ECJ whether, in 
the light of Article 2 TD (which corresponds to Article 4 CTMR), smells which 
can in no way be perceived visually could be presumed to be capable of 
graphical representation if they are reproduced indirectly through certain aids.  
Based on a purposive interpretation of Article 2 TD, the ECJ concluded that 
since the list of signs capable of graphical representation contained in the Article 
does not claim to be exhaustive, odours and smells are not specifically excluded. 
For that matter, although smells are invisible, still they can be represented 
graphically “particularly by means of images, lines or characters”. However, 
such representation must be “clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, 
intelligible, durable and objective”.265  
Consequently, not each mode of representation will constitute an acceptable 
graphical representation of an olfactory sign. Concerning the modes of 
representation offered by Mr. Sieckmann,266 the ECJ insists that “[in] respect of 
an olfactory sign, the requirements of graphic representability are not satisfied by 
a chemical formula, by a description in written words,267 by the deposit of an 
odour sample or by a combination of those elements”.268 With regard to those 
representations, it is further observed that: 
 Only few people would recognise in a formula the subject matter of a 
trademark application (in this case an odour).  
 Description of an odour is graphic representation which is not “sufficie-
ntly clear, precise and objective”.269 Moreover, “such a description is 
 
264   However, the USA Patent Office has been registering olfactory signs and sounds, and 
the UK Patent and Trademark Office has been registering smell marks, before the 
Sieckmann decision cf. Case C-273/00 Ralf Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-11737, para.59).  
265   Case C-273/00 Ralph Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para. 55. 
266   Although description of an odour is graphic, it is not sufficiently clear, precise and 
objective (Case C-273/00 Ralph Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para. 70). 
267   This position is contrary to that reached by the OHIM Board of Appeals in 
    Vennootschap onder Firma Senta Aromatic Marketing’s Application, Case R 156/1998-
2 [1999] ETMR 429; and Myles Ltd’s Application, Case R 711/1999-3, [2003] ETMR 
718 (OHIM) in which the description in words ‘the smell of fresh cut grass’ and ‘the 
scent of raspberries’ were respectively held to be sufficient graphical representation 
since the smells concerned were well-known to the extent that any one perusing the 
register would easily recognise the smell concerned, hence further graphical 
representation were considered unnecessary.  
268   Case C-273/00 Ralph Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para. 73.  
269   Case C-273/00 Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para. 70. 
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imbued with subjectivity and can be interpreted in a subjective way, that 
is, differently by different people”.270  
 Due to the fact that “an odour sample is not sufficiently stable or 
durable”, deposit of such sample does not constitute a graphic represent-
ation for the purpose of Article 2 of the Directive”.271 
Viewed in light of the ECJ’s observation above, “graphic representation seems 
sensibly to be limited to clear and easily determined means of describing 
sensations which can be appreciated by smell”.272 The chance for such 
registrations to succeed is however minimal. Although OHIM had previously 
allowed registration of the  smell of fresh-cut grass for tennis balls,273 it rather 
seems that, in view of the Sieckmann case, “unless and until there is a further 
ruling, no more smell marks can validly be registered in the EU”.274  
2. Sounds 
Regarding sound marks, the ECJ, in Shield Mark BV case,275 intimated that since 
sound signs are not by nature incapable of distinguishing the goods or services of 
one undertaking from those of other undertakings, Article 4 of the CTMR “must 
be interpreted as meaning that sounds may constitute a trade mark, on condition 
that they may also be represented graphically”.276 Because in the Sieckmann case 
the ECJ had expounded the protectable subject matter enlisted in Article 4 of the 
CTMR to include signs which cannot be perceived visually but may be perceived 
through surrogate graphical representations,277 the Shield Mark case held that 
although sound signs are a category of marks that cannot be perceived visually, 
they may be registered as CTM provided that other conditions (such as graphical 
representation) are met.278   
 
270   Case C-273/00 Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para. 65. 
271   Case C-273/00 Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para 71. 
272   W. CORNISH & D. LLEWELYN “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights” 691, 6th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007).  
273   Cf. Vennootschap onder Senta Aromantic Marketing’s Application [1999] ETMR 429. 
274   FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 32 (Jordan Publishing, 
Ltd., Bristol 2005). 
275   Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n [2003] ECR I-14313. 
276   Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n [2003] ECR I-14313, paras. 36 and 
   37. 
277   Case C-273/00 Ralph Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-1173, para 55. 
278   Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n [2003] ECR I-14313, paras. 34 and 
   35. 
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Having established the view that sound signs are potentially capable of 
distinguishing goods or services within the ambit of Article 4 of the CTMR, the 
court proceeded with the decision as to which mode of graphical representation 
is suitable for such signs. The referring court had enumerated different forms of 
representation279 and invited the ECJ to respond particularly on the suitability of 
those forms in respect of sound signs. In response thereto, the ECJ moved from 
an analogy that graphical representation (which may be effected by means of 
images, lines or characters) must be “clear, precise, self-contained, easily 
accessible, intelligible, durable and objective”280. It consequently concluded that: 
In the case of a sound sign, those requirements are not satisfied when the sign is 
represented graphically by means of a description using the written language, such as an 
indication that the sign consists of the notes going to make up a music work, or the 
indication that it is the cry of an animal, or by means of a simple onomatopoeia, without 
more, or by means of a sequence of musical notes, without more. On the other hand, those 
requirements are satisfied where the sound is represented by a stave divided into measures 
and showing, in particular, a clef, musical notes and rests whose form indicates the relative 
value and, where necessary, accidentals.281  
The ECJ did not rule upon the appropriateness of a sonogram as a means to 
represent sounds (e.g., the cry of animals)282. Hence, for the time being it is 
unclear in view of the Shield Mark case whether and how sound signs other than 
those consisting of a musical tune can meet the requirements for graphical 
representation, and thus for registration and protection as trademarks. 
3. Colours 
The EC trade mark regime283 provides for a possibility to register a single colour. 
The ECJ in case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau 
addressed the question whether “a colour per se, not having any shape or 
contour” can constitute a trade mark within the meaning of the EC trademark 
directive. In response thereto, the ECJ clarified that a colour may be registered as 
a CTM, provided it meets the substantive and formal requirements for 
 
279   Such as musical notes; a written description in the form of an onomatopoeia; a written 
   description in some other form; a graphical representation such as a sonogram; a sound 
recording annexed to the registration form; a digital recording accessible via the internet; 
a combination of those methods; some other form and, if so, which? 
280   Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n [2003] ECR I-14313, para. 55. 
281   See Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n [2003] ECR I-14313, para. 2 of 
the operative part. 
282   Although the question had been posed; see above, note 273. 
283   Article 4 of the CTMR. 
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registration.284 This clarification has now settled the position of EC law also with 
respect to the registration of a single colour mark: If used in relation to goods, a 
colour can serve as a trademark. Distinctiveness of a single colour is thus derived 
from prior use. In this sense, a colour per se cannot be inherently distinctive, 
unless some exceptional circumstances apply to it such as where the classes of 
goods (or services) in respect of which the mark is protected are very narrow and 
the goods are sold (or the services are offered) in a specific market.285  
Distinctiveness is not the sole decisive requirement for the registration of a 
colour mark. A colour mark must additionally fulfil the requirements regarding 
the capability to be represented graphically in a manner that is clear, precise, 
self-contained, intelligible, durable and objective.286 A mere reproduction of a 
colour on a paper does not satisfy the requirement of graphical representation. 
However, the legal requirements are satisfied by a designation of a colour based 
on international identification code of the respective colour.287  
The graphical representation of combination of colours may, as well, present 
some difficulties. The ECJ’s holding in Heidelberg Bauchemie GmbH288 
confirms that colours or combinations of colours may serve a trademark purpose. 
In this regard, however, a trademark proprietor must limit, through graphical 
representation, the extent of his protectable subject matter so as to meet the 
precision and durability requirements of the formal procedure for trademark 
registration.289 Graphical representation is not met by “the mere juxtaposition of 
two or more colours, without shape or contours, or a reference to two or more 
colours in every conceivable form”.290 This is due to obvious reasons:  
Such representations would allow numerous different combinations, which would not 
permit the consumer to perceive and recall a particular combination, thereby enabling him 
to repeat with certainty the experience of a purchase, any more than they would allow the 
competent authorities and economic operators to know the scope of the protection 
afforded to the proprietor of the trade mark.291  
 
284   Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, para. 1 
of the operative part. 
285   Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, paras. 
66 and 67. The concept of distinctiveness is discussed below in section D (I) (2) of this 
chapter. 
286   Cf. Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, 
para. 1 of the operative part. 
287   Cf. Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, 
para. 1 of the operative part. 
288   Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-6129, paras. 40 and 41. 
289   Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-6129, para. 32.  
290   Cf. Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-6129, paras. 34 and 
35. 
291   Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-6129, paras. 34 and 35. 
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Accordingly, the court rightly held that: 
Colours or combinations of colours which are the subject of an application for registration 
as a trade mark, claimed in the abstract, without contours, and in shades which are named 
in words by reference to a colour sample and specified according to an internationally 
recognised colour classification system may constitute trade mark... where:  
 It has been established that, in the context in which they are used, those colours 
or combinations of colours in fact represent a sign, and  
 The application for registration includes a systematic arrangement associating 
the colours concerned in a predetermined and uniform way.292 
D. Grounds for Trade Mark Refusal 
To qualify for registration, a CTM must be subjected to absolute and relative 
grounds for trademark refusal. These grounds are respectively discussed in 
sections D(I) & (II) of this chapter. 
I. Absolute Grounds 
While many signs may be used to market some products or services, not each of 
these trade symbols may withstand the rigorous registrability test stipulated 
under Article 7 of the CTMR. The Article serves as an absolute bar to 
registration of signs, which do not meet the requirements of Article 4 of the 
CTMR; or signs and indications which are generic, descriptive, non-distinctive 
and those signs covered under Articles 7(1) (f) – (k) of the CTMR. In summary, 
subparagraphs (f) to (k) prohibit the registration of signs which contravene 
public policy and/or good morals of the society; signs, the use of which is 
considered to be unauthorised use of emblems, badges or hallmarks; and 
geographical indications for wine not having that origin. 
1. Requirements of Article 4 of the CTMR 
Article 4 stipulates that, to constitute a CTM, a sign must meet both formal 
(capability to be represented graphically) and substantive (capability to 
distinguish goods and services) requirements. Article 7(1) (a) incorporates these 
requirements as absolute grounds for CTM refusal. Thus, the formal and 
 
292   Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH [2004] ECR I-6129, para. 1.  
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substantive requirements for trademark registration under Article 4 of the CTMR 
each form a distinct absolute ground.293  
2. Distinctiveness 
The general principle underlying trademark protection is hinged on the 
requirement of distinctiveness. In this regard, the importance for trade signs to be 
distinctive is substantiated by the fact that a proprietor of a non-distinct symbol 
would unreasonably “prevent other producers from conveying important 
information to consumers” if he were allowed to monopolise the symbol by way 
of trade mark registration.294 Pursuant to Article 7(1) (b) of the CTMR, 
“trademarks which are devoid of any distinctive character” cannot be registered. 
This prohibition reflects the historic basis for trademark protection, namely “to 
protect marks as, in a broad sense, indicators of origin”.295 Indeed, the limitation 
as to the signs capable of serving as trademarks contained in Article 7(1), 
highlights the significant role of the trade mark protection regime to prevent the 
grant monopoly rights in certain non-distinctive signs: If trade mark law did not 
put such a limit, consumers would, in reality, make many ignorant or blind 
purchase decisions due to want of concrete information regarding the origin and 
quality of the products. The limitation as to signs which can serve as trademarks 
provides a rational basis for economic justification of a trademark protection 
regime.296  
The main concern under Article 7(1) (b) of the CTMR is “not whether the 
sign has the potential of being distinctive, but if the trade mark as applied for is 
distinctive with respect to the goods and services to which it relates”.297  
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) has also elucidated on 
the concrete distinctiveness required under Article 7(1) (b) by offering the 
following analysis:  
 
293   Cf. Philips v Remington [1998] ETMR 124, 141.   
294   Cf. HORTWITZ, J. A., “Conflicting mark: embracing the consequences of the European 
  Community and its unitary trademark regime” 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L.245, 254 
   (2001).  
295   CORNISH, W. & LLEWELYN, D., “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade 
   Marks and Allied Rights” (6th ed.) 688 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007).  
296   Cf. HORWITZ, J. A., “Conflicting marks: Embracing the consequences of the European 
Community and its unitary trademark regime”, 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 245, 253 
   (2001). 
297   DAVIES, I. M., (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 
37 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998).  
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Single tones or trivial sounds would not be perceived as distinctive signs, and the same 
would apply to a lengthy musical peace or a long play, even if it includes words. 
Following the principle of availability, sounds that would be regarded as common to the 
trade and required by other traders could not be registered as trademarks, for example, the 
sound of glass breaking in relation to “windscreen repair services” or well known classical 
music pieces in relation to “dancing tuition” services. However, many sounds have no 
particular descriptive relationship with the proposed goods or services and would be 
considered prima facie acceptable, for example, the sound of a “wolf howling” in relation 
to alcoholic beverages.298  
The British Sugar plc case299, while interpreting Section 3(1) (b) of the United 
Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994, which is similar to Article 7(1) (b) of the 
CTMR, elucidated the phrase “devoid of any distinctive character”. According to 
the case, the phrase “devoid of any distinctive character” stands alone as a 
ground of exclusion from registration. It is nevertheless fallacious to discern that 
symbols which are not completely descriptive and therefore, not prohibited under 
Article 7(1) (c) of the CTMR, are distinctive. The phrase devoid of any 
distinctive character may still apply even where the signs concerned are neither 
descriptive nor generic.300 The recurrent objection against registration of 
trademarks on the “devoid of distinctive character” ground is in relation to 
surnames. In view of the holding in Unilever Plc’s Application301 where 
registration of MISTER LONG regarded as surname in the United Kingdom was 
in issue; words possessing surnominal significance are “neither automatically 
eligible nor automatically ineligible for registration”. Registration of names, and 
particularly of common surname, will generally be withheld unless it is clear to 
the registry that the name concerned has acquired distinctive character, hence its 
registration is not likely to extend unfair advantage to the first applicant for such 
a name.302 
To establish whether a particular sign is devoid of any distinctive character (in 
relation to goods and services) it is inevitably needed to show that such sign has 
no potential characteristics that would allow the relevant consumers to draw a 
 
298   Cf. the analysis by WIPO’s Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial 
  Designs and Geographical Indications on the “Relation of Established Trademark 
   Principles to new types of Marks”, Seventh Session (May 7 to 11, 2007) contained in 
   SCT/17/3 dated 30 March 2007; available at 
   <www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_17/sct_17_3.pdf> (status: 30 July 2012). 
299   British Sugar plc v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281. 
300   CORNISH, W. & LLEWELYN, D., “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights” (6th ed.) 696 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007).  
301   [1999] E.T.M.R. 406 
302   Cf. ECJ, 16 September 2004, Case C-404/02, Nichols plc [2004] ECR I-08499, para.12. 
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distinction between the trade mark proprietor’s goods and/or services and the 
products and/or services from a different commercial source.303  
OHIM Examination Guidelines, particularly Guideline 8.3,304 also clarify the 
phrase “devoid of any distinctive character”. It stipulates that:  
The trademark must not be devoid of any distinctive character and must therefore, do more 
than describe the goods or services, whether in words or graphically. A word such as 
‘wine’ in respect of wine is devoid of distinctive character. A trademark consisting one or 
two letters or digits, unless represented in an unusual fashion, would, except in special 
circumstances, be considered devoid of distinctive character. ... Simple signs such as 
circles or squares, whether on their own or in conjunction with descriptive elements, are 
generally considered to be devoid of distinctive character. Single, especially primary 
colours, of simple designs are usually devoid of distinctive character. Where a trade mark 
consists of a combination of several elements which on their own would be devoid of 
distinctive character, the trade mark taken as whole may have distinctive character. 
However, if a trade mark comprises nothing more than a combination of [a description, a 
generic sign or a functional shape] it is likely to be devoid of distinctive character. 
It is noteworthy that the distinctiveness requirement is contained in both Articles 
4 and 7(1) (b) of the CTMR. One may thus question whether, in view of the 
concept of distinctiveness as stipulated under Article 7(1) (b), the fusion of the 
requirements of Article 4 into Article 7(1) (a) is merely a repetition of the 
concept that any registrable mark must be capable of distinguishing goods or 
services of one origin from those tracing their origins from different sources; or 
whether the concepts in the two provisions differ. The EC legislature seems to 
have already provided an answer to this question, vide Article 7(3) of the CTMR. 
Within the ambit of this Article, the provisions of Article 7(1) (b), (c) and (d) do 
not, but only 7(1) (a), apply while assessing registrability of a sign which upon 
being used on the market acquires a secondary meaning in relation to goods and 
services corresponding to those in respect of which a CTM registration is 
sought.305 This clarification throws some light to the main difference between 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 7. In the circumstances, a sensible conclusion 
may be drawn to the effect that while Articles 4 and 7(a) of the CTMR connote 
“a general, absolute, abstract capacity to distinguish products of different 
 
303   Celltech R&D Ltd v. OHIM, 37(2) IIC 225, 226 (2006).   
304   OHIM OJ 9/96, p. 1331. 
305   Acquisition of a distinctive character as a consequence of the use of a mark requires that 
at least a significant proportion of the relevant section of the public identifies products or 
services as originating from a particular undertaking because of the mark (cf. CFI, 29 
April 2004, Case T-399/02, Eurocermex v OHIM (‘Botella Corona’) [2004] ECR II- 
391, para. 42). That use must be demonstrated in substantial part of the Community 
where the mark is devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1) 
(b) of the CTMR (cf. CFI, 15 December 2005, Case T-262/04, BIC SA v OHIM [2005] 
ECR II-5959, para. 62). 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
94 
 
origins,” Article 7(b) refers to CTM’s distinctiveness in view of the class of 
goods or services marketed under the CTM in question.306 Thus, by incorpora-
ting the provisions of Article 4, Article 7(1) (a) intends fundamentally to bar 
registration of signs, which are generally considered to be incapable of serving as 
a trademark, whereas the prohibition enshrined under Article 7(1) (b), (c) and (d) 
excludes from registration signs, which do not meet a specific condition 
enshrined under Article 4 of the CTMR, namely, the capability to distinguish.307  
Judged in terms of cogency, the stipulation on distinctiveness under Article 4, 
being an abstract requirement, must be observed just as a matter of theory,308 
whereas that under Article 7(1) (b) of the CTMR may be waived provided that 
Article 7(3) applies to the mark in question.309    
The concept of “fair play underscores the purpose and necessity of trademark 
law”.310Article 7(1) of the CTMR is a vehicle through which a fair play in the 
marketplace may be brought about. Indeed, the need for symbols to be 
distinctive is reinforced by the fact that the owner of non-distinctive signs would 
prevent other business operators from conveying products or services informa-
tion to consumers. While monopolisation of a non-distinctive trade sign would 
unfairly shield the proprietor against competition, “consumers would have great 
difficulty in identifying alternatives from the non-distinctive mark owner’s 
goods, and in turn, would end up making misinformed purchases”.311 Thus, by 
prescribing some guidelines for registrability of a CTM, Article 7(1) tends to 
balance the public interests against an unwarranted trademark monopoly.  
Frequently, the ECJ has held that “in order to determine whether a sign 
presents a characteristic such as to render it registrable as a trade mark, it is 
 
306   Cf. SAT.1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH v. OHIM [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 57. 
307   Cf. MANIATIS, S. M., (2003), “Whither European Trade Mark Law? Arsenal and 
Davidoff: The Creative Disorder Stage”, 7 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 99, 109 (2003). 
308   Since it has been held that “there is no class of marks having a distinctive character by 
   their nature or by the use made of them which is not capable of distinguishing goods or 
   services” within the meaning of Article 4 of the CTMR (Cf. Case C-299/99, Koninklijke 
   Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd. [2002] E.C.R. I-05475,
  para. 39).  
309   Article 7(3) excludes application of Article 7(1) (b) by allowing registration of a mark, 
which would otherwise be prohibited under Article 7(1) (b). 
310   HORWITZ, J. A., “Conflicting marks: Embracing the consequences of the European 
   Community and its unitary trademark regime”, 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 245, 249  
  (2001). 
311   HORWITZ, J. A., “Conflicting marks: Embracing the consequences of the European 
   Community and its unitary trademark regime”, 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 245, 252 
   (2001). 
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appropriate to take the view point of the relevant public”.312 Consequently, each 
of the grounds for trademark refusal stipulated under Article 7 (1) attracts varied 
public interests; hence, these grounds have to be considered differently.313 It has, 
for instance, been held that the public interest underlying Article 7(1) (b) of the 
CTMR cannot be severed from the trademark’s basic function, which is “to 
guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or 
end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the 
product or service from others, which have another origin”.314 This position 
tends to highlight that the public interest underlying Article 7(1) (b) is to prohibit 
registration of signs, which are devoid of any distinctive character315 – a solitary 
fact, which renders the signs concerned incapable of performing the trademark’s 
basic function.  
3. Descriptiveness 
Signs or indications are descriptive “if they are inevitably suggested by some 
quality of the product or business”.316 The general prohibition under Article 7(1) 
(c) of the CTMR applies to the signs, which exclusively serve to describe or 
indicate the goods and services by referring to the nature (and/or properties of 
the use intended) of the goods concerned.317 In case the “mark does no more than 
describe the type or quality of product on offer”, it is descriptive of those 
products, and hence cannot fulfil the function of indicating the origin of that 
 
312   Cf. Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer [1999] E.C.R. I-3819, para. 26; and Case C-104/01, 
Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793, para. 46.  
313   Cf. ECJ decision, April 29, 2004, joined cases C-456 P and C- 457/01 P, Henkel KGaA 
v. OHIM [2004] ECR I-05089, paras. 45 and 46. 
314   Cf. Hoffmann-La Roche [1978] E.C.R. 1139, para. 7 and Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd. [2002] E.C.R. I-5475, para. 30. 
315   The public interest demand that symbols which lack distinctive character should not be 
registered as trademarks (cf. SAT.1 [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, para. AG19). In view of 
“legal certainty and sound administration” stressed in Canon [1998] E.C.R. I-5507, para. 
28, it is important to exclude non-distinctive marks from registration since their 
registration could be challenged. 
316   MCKEOUGH, J., STEWART, A. & GRIFFITH, P., “Intellectual Property in Australia” 
(3rd ed.) 458 (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sidey 2004). The sign “soap” for instance, is a 
descriptive term; hence, cannot be registered for soap business. Nevertheless, such a sign 
   upon passing a test of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning may be distinctive 
   in respect of clothing (CORNISH, W. & LLEWELYN, D., “Intellectual Property: 
   Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Allied Rights” (6th ed.) 689 (Sweet & Maxwell, 
   London 2007). 
317   Telefon & Buch VerlagsgmbH v. OHIM [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 3. 
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product.318 The CTMR319 does not allow such signs to be monopolised by way of 
trademark registration. It prefers that the signs of this kind320 be freely available 
to all instead of being reserved for one undertaking alone. There could, for 
instance, be good reasons for disallowing a monopoly in respect of descriptive 
word mark ‘green’ for any environmental conservation-related activity.321 In a 
different scenario, a combination of descriptive words may be registered as a 
CTM if it creates an impression which is different from that produced by the 
literal meaning of the word elements of the combination.322  
Refusal of trademark registration will therefore be justified if the sign 
concerned induces the public, “immediately and without further thought, to 
perceive a description of the goods and services for which registration is 
sought”.323 To identify whether a particular trade symbol is descriptive of the 
goods’ or services’ nature, quality or properties, the examiner has to make an 
assessment in light of the extent to which the consumers are likely to associate 
such symbol with the goods or services marketed under it. In FON WIRELESS 
Limited case,324 for instance, the sign FON was denied registration. The 
registration had been sought in relation to communications software, wireless 
communication systems and devices, transmission equipment for communication 
via internet, on-line or via computer network (class 9); provision of communica-
tions services (class 38); and design and development of communications 
software and equipment (class 42). The board of appeal held that “the sign 
‘FON’ was a German way of writing ‘PHONE’ which is derived from the old 
Greek word ‘PHON’ which means sound” and used in German as an 
abbreviation for word Telefon (Telephone). It was found that when “FON” used 
for the goods and the services in relation to which it was applied for, it would 
serve as a description of the nature or of the intended purpose of the goods 
and/or the services concerned.  
 
318   MCKEOUGH, J., STEWART, A. & GRIFFITH, P., “Intellectual Property in Australia” 
   (3rd ed.) 523 (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sidey 2004).  
319   Article 7(1) (c) of the CTMR. 
320   Descriptive signs and other indications mentioned in Article 7 (1) (c) of the CTMR. 
321    F. GIOIA, “Alicante and the Harmonization of Intellectual Property Law in Europe” 
41(1) CML Rev. 975, 981 (2004). 
322   Cf. ECJ, 12 February 2004, Case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie BV v Benelux-
Merkenbureau, [2004] ECR I-01699, para. 43. Cf. also the decision of OHIM’s Board of 
Appeal in Case R 0793/200-1. 
323   OHIM, 29 April 2008, Case R 49/2008-4 D.C.M.S., Inc. (‘DATA CENTER WORLD’), 
para. 11.  Cf. also CFI, 20 March 2002, Case T-355/00, DaimlerChrysler AG v OHIM 
(‘Tel Aid’) [2002] ECR II-1939, para. 28.  
324   OHIM, 29 April 2008, Case R 1744/2007-5, FON WIRELESS Limited. 
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In D.C.M.S., Inc case325 a firm position regarding descriptiveness of 
neologism signs was reiterated. There, OHIM’s Board of Appeal stated that “a 
sign consisting of neologism or a word composed of elements each of which is 
descriptive of the characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which 
registration is sought”, itself remains descriptive of those goods or services 
within the meaning of Article 7(1) (c) of the CTMR.326  Consequently, the sign 
‘DATA CENTER WORLD’ (Whose registration was sought in respect of Class 
35 (i.e. provision of extensive information about the field of data bases, a 
substantial area of information technology on a professional organised basis)) 
could not be registered for it consists of a combination of elements each of which 
is descriptive of the services covered by the said sign. Such a sign (i.e. the word 
mark ‘DATA CENTER WORLD’) is not an allusive combination of words to 
which a meaning different from its individual elements can be attached. Thus, 
the word ‘WORLD’ contextualised in light of “the elements ‘DATA CENTER’ 
clearly refers to an event where information and services in the field of data 
centres is the subject matter”.327 The relevant public (i.e. English speaking 
people) would therefore perceive the expression as referring to services in 
respect of which registration of the sign was sought (i.e. provision of extensive 
information about the field of data bases, a substantial area of information 
technology on a professional organised basis) rather than the company owning 
the mark.   
Similarly, in Telefon & Buch Verlagsgmbh v. OHIM328 an application for 
registration of “UNIVERSALTELEFONBUCH and UNIVERSAL COMMUNI-
KATIONSVERZEICHNIS” trademarks was refused under Article 7(1) (c) 
because they tended to describe the goods and services. Registration of the marks 
was sought in respect of “recorded media for data processing installations and 
apparatus, in particular tapes, discs, CD-ROMs (class 9); printed matter, 
reference works (class16); publishing services, in particular the publication of 
texts, books, magazines, newspapers (class 41); editing of written texts (class 
42)”. Semantically construed, the German words in the mark mean universal 
telephone directory and universal communication directories. In view of this 
translation, the court observed that the mark described the goods and services in 
respect of which registration was sought. 
 
325   OHIM, 29 April 2008, Case R 49/2008-4 D.C.M.S., Inc. (‘DATA CENTER WORLD’). 
326    OHIM, 29 April 2008, Case R 49/2008-4 D.C.M.S., Inc. (‘DATA CENTER WORLD’), 
para. 12. 
327   OHIM, 29 April 2008, Case R 49/2008-4 D.C.M.S., Inc. (‘DATA CENTER WORLD’), 
   para. 20. 
328   [2001] 3 C.M.L.R 3. 
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Jurisprudence regarding trademarks prone to be barred from registration under 
Article 7(1) (c) is very rich also in respect of geographical designations.329 
According to ECJ’s decision in Windsurfing Chiemsee case330, the prohibition 
against registration of geographical names stipulated under Article 7(1) (c) of the 
CTMR applies in two main scenarios, namely; where the relevant class of 
persons associate the place designated by the geographical name in question with 
the category of goods; and where, currently, there is no such association, the 
possibility that the geographical name may be used in future by the “undertaki-
ngs concerned as an indication of the geographical origin of that category of 
goods”.  
An exception to the general rule regarding prohibition of registration of 
descriptive terms applies with respect to collective marks. Collective marks are 
normally registered to describe some quality and characteristics of goods. Regist-
ration of geographical names or indications of origin as Community collective 
marks is nevertheless allowed under Article 66(2) of the CTMR. This is not a 
contravention of the provisions of Article 7(1) (c) of the CTMR. Article 7(1) (c) 
proscribes registration of a descriptive term, as a trade mark, only to avoid a 
monopoly right to exclude others, which is customarily extended to a distinctive 
mark, being unfairly conferred to a proprietor of a descriptive sign: A registrant 
of a Community collective mark has no right to prevent third parties entitled to 
use a geographical name from using a Community collective mark based on such 
a geographical name.331  
Even where indications which designate the geographical origin of goods are 
excluded from registration based on Article 7(1) (c), such exclusion cannot be 
 
329   For extensive coverage on the registrability of geographical designations and how they 
   can be used to challenge registration of CTMs and vice versa, see BEIER, F.-K., “Der 
Schutz geographischer Herkunftsangaben in Deutschland” 65(4) GRUR 169 et seq. 
   (1963); HACKER, F., et al, “Das Verhältnis zwischen Marken und geographischen 
    Herkunftsangaben (Q 191)”, 55(8/9) GRUR Int 697 et seq. (2006);  HEATH, C., 
   “Parmigiano Reggiano by another Name: the ECJ’s Parmesan Decision”, 39(8) IIC 951 
et seq. (2008); and EVANS, G.E., “The Comparative Advantages of Geographical 
Indications and Community Trade Marks for the Marketing of Agricultural Products in 
the European Union”, 41(6) IIC 645 et seq. (2010).  
330   Joined cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und Vertriebs 
GmbH v. Boots- und Segelzubehor Walter Huber and Attenberger [1999] E.C.R. I-2799, 
para. 37. 
331   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Die Gemeinschaftsmarke” 29 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 
1998). Cf. also the last sentence of Article 67(2) of the CTMR pursuant to which any 
person whose goods or services originate in the geographical area concerned has a right 
to become a member of the association owning the Community collective mark. This is 
one of the conditions to which the use of collective mark is subjected. 
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endorsed if the indication of geographical origin fulfils the conditions enshrined 
under Article 7(3).332  
The public interests underlying Article 7(1) (c) is to the effect that 
“descriptive signs or indications relating to characteristics of goods or services in 
respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all”.333 The public 
interest stipulated under Article 7(1) (c) is nonetheless distinguishable from that 
accompanying registrability of some special categories of marks, such as a 
colour, which is assessed in light of the provisions of Article 7(1) (b). The public 
interest appreciated in Libertel334, for instance, was hinged on the need not to 
unduly restrict the availability of colours for other traders providing goods or 
services of the type in respect of which registration is sought. Thus, the public 
interest regarding restorability of colour marks envisages the fact that because 
there is a limited number of colours, giving a blanket monopoly in respect of 
colour marks would unnecessarily restrict other traders from enjoying the 
marketing advantage of a particular colour. Jeremy Phillips is more elaborate on 
the point. He states that: 
The notion of avoidance of undue restriction is an interesting one, since in Libertel it 
appears to have evolved as response to the fact that the range of colours is itself the object 
of the limitation. If all telephone equipment is black, a trader who chooses to sell 
telephones that are orange may rightly be able to claim that his use of orange serves the 
function of indicating the identity of the origin of his telephone without actually 
inconveniencing any of his competitors. Yet by the time there are eight or nine makes of 
coloured telephone on the market, each having argued that its choice of colour is a unique 
means of identifying the source of that product, we suddenly find that we are approaching 
a situation in which subsequent market entry is barred to others because no telephone 
colour remains (except perhaps black for “generic” phones) that is not either (i) 
monopolised by an existing trader or (ii) similar to a colour monopolised by an existing 
trader.335 
Some legal opinion tends to draw a sharp distinction between the public interest 
underlying Article 7(1) (b) (i.e. the need not to unduly restrict availability of 
marks) and Article 7(1) (c) (i.e. signs or indication may be freely used by all).336 
Nevertheless, a critic’s eye may spot a point where the public interests in the two 
provisions converge. It is no doubt true that within the ambit of Article 7(1) (c) 
trade signs which exclusively serve to designate geographical origin of the goods 
 
332   These conditions relate to the concept of secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness 
which is considered in section D (I) (7) infra. 
333   Cf. Windsurfing Chiemsee [1999] E.C.R. I-2799, at [25]; Linde and others [2003] E.C.R. 
I-3161, para. 73 and point 2 of the operative part. 
334   Libertel Groep [2003] ECR I-3793, paras. 44 to 60. 
335   PHILLIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law and the Need to Keep Free”, 36(4) IIC 389, 393(2005). 
336   See SAT.1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH v. OHIM [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, para. AG26. 
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or services are excluded from registration because the public interest behind such 
a provision is to let indicators of geographical origins available for the use by 
other traders. However, a broad view would lead to a conclusion that, as the case 
is with the colour mark, geographical indications are limited in number;337 hence, 
a blanket monopolisation would unduly restrict a particular section of the society 
from using such indications in the marketplace. Thus, the distinction between the 
public interests under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 7(1) are more semantic 
and apparent than real.338  
4. Generic Signs 
Generic signs are, by their general nature, distinctive but due to excessive 
generic use in the course of time and trade lose their distinctiveness.  A term 
which is initially non-descriptive of the goods or services for which it is used 
may later acquire a meaning that makes it generic. This phenomenon can be 
explained: “Just as a descriptive sign can become distinctive by its use as a trade 
mark, so a trade mark can lose distinctiveness through misuse as a product 
description”.339 This opposite trail, in relation to generic marks, becomes 
eminent when trademarks of new products appearing in the market for the first 
time are not referred to by the generic name; but later on the trademarks become 
customary in the language to the extent that consumers do no longer regard the 
marks as a designation of origin, rather as the name of the products. Essentially, 
success of numerable trademarks increases a chance for these marks to lose 
distinctiveness and thus becoming generic. Famous examples regarding this fact 
can be cited: “SELLOTAPE, ASPRIN, ESCALATOR, HOOVER, FRIGI-
DAIRE, TERYLENE, FORMICA and THERMOS”.340  
Article 7(1) (d) of the CTMR bars registration of generic trademarks. 
According to the Article, “trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or 
indications, which have become customary in the current language or in the bona 
fide and established practices of the trade” shall not be registered.  
 
337   Since in a particular geographical location there can only be one geographical 
designation/or indication, such indications are even fewer than colours. 
338   Both colour and geographical designations need to acquire secondary meaning in respect 
of goods and services as condition for the grant of a trademark monopoly to individuals.  
339   Cf. FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 35 (Jordan Publishing, 
Ltd., Bristol 2005). 
340   Cf. SHYLLON, F., “Intellectual Property Law in Nigeria” 189 IIC Studies Vol. 21 
(Verlag C. H. Beck, München 2003). 
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Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., case341 demonstrates one of the instances where 
the ECJ ceased an opportunity to discuss the issue concerning registration of a 
generic sign. A question regarding restorability of a word mark “BRAVO” arose 
in the above case. The German Patent and Trade Mark office refused registration 
of the word “BRAVO” for typewriters. The court based its decision on Article 
3(1) (d) of the Community trade mark directive, which is similar to Article 7(1) 
(d) of the CTMR, on the ground that such word constituted a term of praise or an 
advertising slogan in respect of “writing implements” whose source of supply 
was sought to be designated by the word mark in question. The case went up to 
the German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht). The federal court 
encountered some difficulties in interpreting the provisions of Article 7(1) (d) of 
the CTMR, and thus asked the ECJ to throw some light on the matter. The 
federal court framed the following question:  
Is Article 3(1) (d) of First Council Directive ... to be interpreted restrictively, contrary to 
the wording thereof, as meaning that only signs or indications which directly describe the 
specific goods and services in respect of which registration is sought, or the essential 
characteristics of features thereof, are affected by the bar to registration? Or is the 
provision to be construed as meaning that, in addition to generic signs and names, signs or 
indications which have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and 
established practices of the trade in the relevant or a similar sector as advertising slogans, 
indications of quality or of incitements to purchase etc., without directly describing 
specific characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought, 
may likewise not be registered?”342  
In response thereto, the ECJ reasoned that the reliance on the provisions of 
Article 7(1) (d) of the CTMR only excludes “registration of a trade mark where 
the signs or indications of which the mark is exclusively composed have become 
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of 
the trade to designate the goods or services in respect of which registration of 
that mark is sought”.343  
Regarding registrability of the word mark “BRAVO”, some authorities have 
been quick to point out that the sign, in principle, is regarded as an exclamation 
mark in most languages of the EC Member States. While it may be unsound to 
deny registration of the sign for “typewriters”, it would be tenable to withhold 
 
341   Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt 
[2001] E.C.R. I-6959. 
342   Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt 
[2001] E.C.R. I-6959, para. [16]. 
343   Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt 
[2001] ECR I-6959, para. 31. 
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the grant of monopoly for “goods or services in the field of sports where the 
exclamation was used habitually”.344            
5. Shape Marks 
Shapes of goods may constitute a sign registrable as a trademark within the 
meaning of Article 4 of the CTMR. However, for a shape to be registered, 
besides meeting the requirements of graphical representation and capability to 
distinguish, it must not be one of the signs excluded from registration by Article 
7(1) (e) of the CTMR. Thus, the three-dimensional shape of a product mark 
must, like any other category of trade mark, be examined for compliance with all 
the conditions listed in the Article mentioned in the immediately preceding 
sentence, and that these conditions must be construed and applied in the light of 
the public interest underlying each one.345 Article 7(1) (e) of the CTMR states 
that “signs which consist exclusively of the shape which results from the nature 
of the goods themselves346 or which is necessary to obtain a technical result347 or 
which give substantial value to the goods” cannot be registered.348 The Article 
concerns therefore, certain signs which, as a matter of principle, should not 
constitute trademarks and hence cannot be accommodated in a CTM register.349 
In this way, Article 7(1) (e) contributes to the realisation of one of the principal 
aims of the trade mark protection regime, namely, to prevent monopolisation of 
 
344   MANIATIS, S., “Trade Marks in Europe: A Practical Jurisprudence” (1st ed.) 229 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006).   
345   ECJ, 8 April 2003, joined cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG, Winward Industries Inc. 
& RadoUhren AG, [2003] ECR I-03161, para. 76. 
346   A shape of a bicycle tube is an example of the shape resulting from the nature of the 
goods themselves. It would be unfair to grant a monopoly to one individual for such a 
shape. Granted, that kind of monopoly would unreasonably contravene the legitimate 
expectations of other traders to legitimately use such a shape in course of their business. 
347   The shape under this category would be the shape of a propeller shaft or a fan. These 
instruments have to retain their form in order to function as they should.  
348   This refers to the aesthetic appearance of the mark. While it is true that such an aesthetic 
appearance may be instrumental to enable a consumer reach a particular conclusion as to 
whether he may buy the goods or not, still such aesthetic features are not protectable as 
trademarks. However, such a shape may be protected under other branches of 
intellectual property such as design law. Moreover, pursuant to the Statement No 5 of 
the Joint Statements ([1996] O. J. O.H.I.M 613.); “Article 7(1) (e) applies to both the 
shape of the goods and that of their packaging, although this is not expressly 
mentioned in the provision” (cf. DAVIES, I. M. (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European 
Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 39 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998). 
349   Case C - 371/06 Benetton Group SpA v G-Star International BV [2007] ECR I-
07709,para. 26. 
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certain shapes whose elements cannot be isolated from the products bearing 
those shapes and hence the need for the shapes concerned to be freely accessible 
by competitors.350 Concept-related shapes may be singled out as an example of 
the shapes covered under Article 7(1) (e) of the CTMR: This kind of shapes 
cannot be regarded a trade mark sign per se for they are more related to technical 
solutions (such as technical inventions whose protection is the concern of patent 
law) or functional characteristics of a product (which makes the shape generic 
and thus unregistrable as a trade mark).351 
A proper decision by a trade mark examiner to refuse registration of a shape 
which results from the nature of the goods themselves within the ambit of Article 
7(1) (e) of the CTMR cannot be overruled. Rigorous examination is required 
before the examining officer concludes as above: It is not an easy task to 
determine that a particular shape results from the nature of the goods, unless the 
goods concerned are the products of nature, such as pineapples and coconuts.352 
Whereas a sign consisting of the shape of coconut for coconuts would be a shape 
which results from the nature of the goods themselves, the three-dimensional 
appearance of a bar of soap with longitudinal curved indents in the sides cannot 
be held to result from the nature of the soap itself.353 Assuming that the word 
‘nature’ is to be taken literally, an orange’s shape cannot be registered (for 
oranges) as a CTM for it results from the nature of oranges. Nevertheless, if the 
goods were orange juice, it is likely that an orange shape would, subject to the 
provisions of Article 7(1) (b) & (c) of the CTMR respectively,354 be registered. 
Similarly, since “a liquid can have any shape, the shape of a container for liquids 
does not arise from the nature of the goods themselves” hence such a shape can 
be registered as a CTM.355  
In its judgment in Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer 
Products Ltd356, the ECJ has commented upon the clause excluding from 
 
350   DAVIES, I. M. (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 
39 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998). 
351   Case C- 321/2003 Dyson Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2007] ECR I-00687, para. 29. 
352   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 205 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).   
353   CFI, 16 February 2000, Case T-122/99, The Procter & Gamble Company v OHIM 
  (SOAP), [2000]E.C.R. II – 265; [2000] E.T.M.R. 580.  
354   In connection with this provision and since an orange’s shape is naturally descriptive of 
orange juice and hence, not inherently distinctive; such a shape would only be registered 
for orange juice business upon acquisition of secondary meaning. 
355   GASTINEL, E. & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade Mark” 
74 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
356   ECJ, 18 June 2002, Case C-299/99 Philips v Remington. The material facts of the case 
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protection product shapes consisting exclusively of the shape of goods, which is 
necessary to attain a technical result.357 In the previous literature, it had 
frequently been held that “a shape is only necessary to obtain a certain technical 
result when there are no equivalent alternatives to it for obtaining the same 
technical result”.358 However, in Philips v. Remington, the ECJ clarified that the 
ground for refusal or invalidity of registration based on technical functionality of 
a shape cannot be overcome by establishing that there are other shapes which 
allow the same technical result to be obtained. The configuration of the electric 
shaver that was the object of the underlying conflict was therefore found to be 
excluded from protection. The same conclusion was drawn by the Grand Board 
of Appeal at OHIM regarding the LEGO building block and confirmed by the 
CFI.359 Where shapes are excluded for technical reasons, this applies even where 
people are inclined to think that the respective shape “looks good”, for such a 
shape “is not there to indicate a connection with a trade mark owner but to do a 
job of work”.360 
 
  reveal that the bone of contention in the case was the use, by manufacturing and selling, 
by Remington, of an electric razor (in the UK) whose shape was similar to Phillips’ 
shape mark (registered in the UK) made up of three rotary shaving heads set in an 
equilateral triangle on the shaving surface of the shaver. Basing on its trademark rights 
in the shape and configuration of the head of an electric shaver, Phillips sued 
Remington for trademark infringement. Remington counterclaimed and sought 
revocation of Phillips’ registered rights in respect of the contentious shape. The High 
Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patents Court) (United 
Kingdom) ordered revocation of Phillips’ trade mark on the ground that the subject 
matter of trademark protection was devoid of any distinctive character and consisted of 
“a sign which served in trade to designate the intended purpose of the goods and of a 
shape which was necessary to obtain a technical result and which gave substantial value 
to the goods”. Phillips appealed, against the High Court’s decision, to the Court of 
Appeal (England and Wales) (Civil Division), which decided to refer the case to the ECJ 
as the arguments of the parties raised questions relating to the interpretation of Article 
3(1) (e) of the TD. 
357   The concept ‘shape of the good necessary to obtain a technical result’ may be likened 
“to the must-fit exclusion in design-right protection” where “[There] is no design 
freedom if a shape is dictated by the external need of fitting in with other part” (cf. 
HAYS, T., “Distinguishing Use Versus Functional Use: Three Dimensional Marks” 97, 
in: PHILLIPS, J. & SIMON, I. (eds), “Trade Mark Use”, (Oxford University Press, New 
  York 2005). 
358   DAVIES, I. M., (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 
39 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998).  
359   Case T-270/06, LEGO Juris A/S v. OHIM., [2008] ECR II-03117, para. 13. Regarding 
the decision of the Grand Board of OHIM, cf. Case R856/2004 G, LEGO Juris A/S v 
   MEGABRANDs Inc., [2007] ETMR 169. 
360   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 146 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
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Shapes further remain unregistrable if they exclusively give substantial value 
to the goods. A product shape “gives substantial value to the goods if the shape 
in itself has intrinsic value, for example, if the product has a particularly 
elaborate design”, in which case “protection may often be sought for the design 
as such”.361  
Three dimensional shapes must, therefore, “satisfy the general tests of 
distinctiveness, under which inherent objections are balanced against evidence of 
use as an indication of origin” and that “shape, just as much as other product 
ingredients such as colour, patterning or smell, is not inherently distinctive as a 
mark” for “whatever form it takes, it will usually require considerable evidence 
of use before it can be registered”.362  
Thus, where the shape possesses special characteristics as a result of which 
the public perceives such shape as departing from the usual and expected shape 
of the category of the product concerned it can neither be held to be part of the 
public domain nor denied registration. These special characteristics may be 
achieved through an application to the respective product shape or its packaging 
of two-dimensional features such as verbal or figurative elements and colours363 
necessary to trigger a special impression produced by the three dimensional 
architecture.364 
6. Further absolute grounds – Article 7(1) (f) – (k) 
Article 7(1) (f) of the CTMR prohibits the granting of legal monopoly in respect 
of signs whose registration would be contrary to public policy or accepted 
principles of morality; whereas Article 7(1) (g) of the CTMR excludes from 
registration as a CTM those trade symbols which are of such a nature as to 
deceive the public, for instance, as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of 
the goods or services.  
Whether or not some signs contravene public policy or morality, it is the 
question for the court to address. The use of religious symbol such as “hallelu-
 
361   DAVIES, I. M. (ed.), “Sweet & Maxwell’s European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook” 
39 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998).  
362   CORNISH, W. & LLEWELYN, D., “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights” (6th ed.) 707 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007). 
363   However, it was held in Case C-299/99 Philips v Remington (para. 49) that the EU law 
does not require that “the shape of the article in respect of which the sign is registered 
must include some capricious addition”.  
364   Cf. WIPO Document No. SCT/17/3 at 4. 
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jah”365 in relation to women clothing would obviously contravene both moral 
and public policy in the Christian community. Similarly, the use of Islamic name 
such as “Muhammad” as a Beer brand would unquestionably offend against the 
morality of people and public policy in the Muslim communities. In recent times 
the public policy principle acclaims strict adherence by trade mark practitioners 
and courts of law. In Phillips case,366 for instance, Attorney-General Ruiz-Jarabo 
opined that the word mark Babykiller for pharmaceutical products that are used 
for abortion was infringing on the accepted sentiments of right-thinking 
members of the society. Thus, justification for the exclusion from registration of 
signs that contravene the good morals of the society may be grounded on the fact 
that such signs “would cause offence to a section of the public” particularly 
where issues regarding sex, race, general matters of taste and decency or 
religious belief are reflected by a subject matter of trademark registration.367  
There are some good reasons to exclude deceptive trade signs from registra-
tion: Since deceptive marks may claim the nature, quality or geographical origin 
which they do not have, consumers may be misled and turn to the goods or 
services marketed under the deceptive mark with a certain level of expectation 
based on their previous experience as far as the claimed nature, quality or 
geographical origin are concerned.368 Therefore, a deceptive mark is only 
concerned with the deceptiveness which is inherent in the sign itself. This is 
opposed to the deceptiveness which ensues in the relevant market where the use 
of similar or identical trade signs deceive (or rather, misleads) the consuming 
public.  
Article 7(1) (h) and (i) of the CTMR outline some signs that cannot be 
registered as a CTM, unless a competent authority consents to the registration. 
While paragraph (h) prohibits registration of state emblems, official hallmarks, 
and emblems of intergovernmental organisations within the meaning of Article 
6ter of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 
1883 as last revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967 (hereinafter the Paris 
Convention)369; paragraph (i) protects symbols of public interest,370 other than 
 
365   ISAACS, N., “Law of Trade Marks” 38 (CLT Professional Publishing, Birmingham 
  1996). 
366   Phillips v. Remington [2001] E.T.M.R. 509, 516. 
367   Cf. KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 212 
  (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005). 
368   The OHIM’s Board of Appeal found the sign “POLYblend” to be deceptive for ‘raw 
  natural resins’ as these materials could not be a mixture of polymers but the consumer 
may still think that the products which are marketed under the sign “POLYblend” were 
made of mixed polymers (cf. OHIM, Case R-0924/2006-1). 
369   Paragraph (1) of Article 6ter of the Paris Convention provides in part as follows: 
  “(a) The countries of the Union agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration, and to 
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those already protected under paragraph (h), such as the Red Cross symbol. 
However, a cross containing some colour other than the red colour cannot be 
denied registration based on Article 7(1) (i), provided that words other than the 
“Red Cross” appear on it.371   
A judgment of the CFI in Concept – Anlagen case372 expounds on the 
practical application of Article 7(1) (h). The appellant in the case sought to 
register a figurative mark which included a ring of twelve stars which made it 
look like the emblem of the European Union. Rejecting the application for 
registration, OHIM reasoned that since the EU emblem was reproduced in the 
mark applied for, “the impression that a mark sought designated a suborganisa-
tion of the European Union” was inevitable.373 As far as the emblems under 
Article 6ter (a) and (b) of the Paris Convention are concerned, the prohibition 
does not apply if a registered trademark does not mislead the public as to the 
existence of connection between the user and the organisation. A decision by 
OHIM to allow registration of trademarks prohibited under Article 7(1) (h) and 
Article 7(1) (i) of the CTMR should analogically find justifications under Article 
6ter (1)(c) of the Paris Convention. Within the ambit of the second sentence of 
Article 6ter (1) (c): 
… it is permissible, in the case of the emblem of an international organisation, to allow 
registration of a mark if it is not of such a nature as to suggest to the public that a 
connection exists between the organisation concerned and armorial bearings, flags, 
emblems, abbreviations and names or if such registration is probably not of such a nature 
as to mislead the public as to an existence of a connection between the user and the 
organisation.374    
 
   prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without authorisation by the competent 
   authorities, either as trademarks or as elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings, 
flags, and other State emblems, of the countries of the Union, official signs and 
hallmarks indicating control and warranty adopted by them, and any imitation from a 
heraldic point of view. (b) The provisions of subparagraph (a), above, shall apply equally 
to armorial bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations, and names, of international 
intergovernmental organisations of which one or more countries of the Union are 
members, with the exception of armorial bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations, 
and names, that are already the subject of international agreements in force, intended to 
ensure their protection.” 
370   These symbols include badges, emblems or escutcheons which are of particular public 
interests (cf. Article 7(1) (i) of the CTMR). 
371   See OHIM’s Board of Appeal decision in Case R 315/2006-1 (D&W Repair) where a 
cross containing a different colour and the word “REPAIR” used in relation to spare 
parts was held not to contravene the Red Cross emblem. 
372   CFI, 21 April 2004, Case T-127/02, Concept – Anlagen u. Geräte nach ‘GMP’ für 
  Produktion u. Labor GmbH v. OHIM, not reported in the ECR. 
373   See CFI, 21 April 2004, Case T-127/02, para. 6. 
374   CFI, 21 April 2004, Case T-127/02, para 63. 
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Literally interpreted, no sign can be registered within the ambit of Article 7(1) (j) 
of the CTMR, as a CTM for wines if such sign contains or consists of a 
geographical indication which tends to identify wines not having that origin. For 
this prohibition to apply, it is not necessary to prove that the use of false 
geographical indication is likely to mislead consumers. The only decisive factor 
is the falsehood implied in the relevant geographical indication. 
7. Acquired distinctiveness and public policy 
Article 7(3) of the CTMR stipulates that the absolute grounds against trademark 
registration provided for under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) must not be observed 
where trade signs which were otherwise descriptive or generic acquire a 
secondary meaning, which when associated with the goods and services in 
respect of which registration of the signs in question is sought makes those signs 
distinctive. The question may thus arise as to whether the public interest 
enshrined in Article 7(1) of the CTMR is not observed under Article 7(3).375 A 
sound response would negate this question on two main grounds. Firstly, it is 
axiomatic that “a mark may be distinctive by nature or by ‘nurture’”.376 
Similarly, distinctiveness of a trademark may be inherent or acquired.377  Secon-
dly, acquired distinctiveness, otherwise known as secondary meaning, can only 
be appreciated after the mark has been used in the market. 
The ECJ has once, in relation to acquired distinctiveness, opined that: 
In determining whether a trade mark has acquired distinctive character following the use 
which has been made of it, the competent authority must make an overall assessment of 
the evidence that the mark has come to identify the product concerned as originating from 
a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish that product from goods of other 
undertakings. If the competent authority finds that a significant proportion of the relevant 
class of persons identify goods as originating from a particular undertaking because of the 
trade mark, it must hold the requirement for registering the mark to be satisfied. Where the 
competent authority has particular difficulty in assessing the distinctive character of a 
mark in respect of which registration is applied for, Community law does not preclude it 
 
375   Jeremy Phillips posed, and addressed the same question: “what happens to “Need to 
   Keep Free” in the Face of Conflicting Public Interests? It is not known what happens to 
the public interests in keeping a sign free once a sign that is barred from registration 
under “keep free” principles subsequently achieves registrability on the basis that it has 
acquired distinctiveness through use. Does it evaporate in the mists of time? Is it 
displaced by a higher public interest...?” (PHILLIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law and the Need 
to Keep Free”, 36(4) IIC 389, 394 (2005).   
376   FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 32 (Jordan Publishing, 
  Ltd., Bristol 2005). 
377   Cf. Articles 7(1)(b) and 7(3) of the CTMR.  
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from having recourse, under the conditions laid down by its own national law, to an 
opinion poll as guidance for its judgment.378 
Distinctiveness that is ascertainable as above can be judged in light of several 
surrounding circumstances such as the goodwill a mark has given to the business 
in the relevant market.379 Thus, acquired distinctiveness is surely evidence that 
justifies the trademark protection regime which tries to avoid trademarks being 
dumped in the trademark register without the said mark being used in the 
marketplace.380  It follows that Article 7(3) of the CTMR is designed to protect 
another category of public interest, namely prohibition against free riding the 
reputation of the mark developed in relation to particular goods or services. 
Reputation or goodwill of a mark does not emerge abruptly; it takes time for a 
person to create stronger business goodwill in the mind of the consuming public. 
Such process involves substantial investment in promotional activities for the 
said mark.381 It would be untenable to allow a third party to benefit from the 
goodwill in question, to which he has not made any contribution. Thus, the grant 
of a trademark monopoly on the basis of Article 7(3) (i.e. acquired distinctive-
ness) cannot be tantamount to the waiver of the public interests enshrined in 
Article 7(1) of the CTMR, but tends to define the scope of such interests. The 
public interest under Article 7(1)(b), for instance, applies as long as a particular 
sign lacks some concrete distinctiveness, while that under Article 7(1)(c) 
becomes relevant to a mark which is descriptive of goods or services. None of 
these two situations arises under Article 7(3). A mark to which the Article 
applies is distinctive and does not exclusively define the nature or quality of 
goods or services.  
An important point regarding registrability of a sign as CTM under Article 
7(3) looms high: acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning, required for the 
 
378   Cf. Joined cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und 
Vertriebs GmbH v. Boots- und Segelzubehor Walter Huber and Attenberger 
[1999]E.C.R. I-2799, operative part of the judgment. More on surveys and opinion polls 
as evidence of distinctiveness refer to NIEDERMANN, A., “Surveys as evidence 
inproceedings before OHIM”, 37(3) IIC 260 et seq. (2006).  
379   A sign acquires distinctiveness or secondary meaning when the consumers begin to 
believe that goods or services commercialized with the mark have one origin.  
380   Inherent, as opposed to acquired, distinctiveness is the quality associated with the mark 
itself which makes it unique in the context of the goods or services it markets.  
381   Such promotion may involve selling the products at loss, so that when the brand 
becomes stronger through acquired distinctiveness, the trademark proprietor may be able 
to recoup the business by selling at higher price. Incidentally, through extensive 
marketing and advertisement, the trademark proprietor teaches the relevant “consuming 
public that the sign, when used by him, is his way of demonstrating that goods or 
services bearing it originate with him”(cf. PHILLIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law and the Need 
to Keep Free”, 36(4) IIC 389, 392 (2005). 
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registration of a trade symbol which was otherwise devoid of distinctive 
character in some parts of the Community, must substantially be appreciated in 
those parts of the Community. This argument stems from the provisions of 
Article 7(2) of the CTMR, which bars registration of a sign as a CTM even 
where the mark lacks distinctiveness, or is generic, descriptive382 or customary in 
view of some circumstances obtaining only in a single part of the Community. 
While Article 7(2) incorporates the requirement that a registrable sign must 
possess distinctive character throughout the Community, the provisions in the 
Article enforce the “principle of unitary character” of the CTM.383 
It is important to note that the provisions of Article 7(3) of the CTMR do not 
apply to shape marks. In view of the ECJ’s decision in Benetton/G-Star384 “the 
shape of a product which gives substantial value to that product cannot constitute 
a trademark385 where, prior to the application for registration, it acquired attract-
iveness as a result of its recognition as a distinctive sign following advertising 
campaigns presenting the specific characteristics of the product in question”. 
To the extent that Article 15(1), second sentence of TRIPs, assumes that every 
medium is eligible for registration provided it is distinctive, the legal protection 
of three dimensional marks under the CTMR must be subjected to scrutiny. 
Whereas Article 4 of the CTMR already confirms that three dimensional shapes 
may be registered, such registration is only possible if these shapes are not 
specifically excluded from registration on the basis of absolute grounds under 
Article 7(1) (e) of the CTMR according to which signs resulting exclusively 
from the nature of the goods, which are necessary to obtain a technical result, or 
which give substantial value to the goods cannot be registered. Article 7(3) of the 
CTMR which permits registration of a sign based on a secondary meaning does 
not render the same result in respect of signs excluded from registration under 
Article 7(1) (e) of the CTMR. This position is a partial deviation from the 
 
382   Where combination of words are, for instance, descriptive in one of the EU’s languages 
used for trade in one of the Member States, such word combination are ineligible to be 
registered as a CTM (cf. Article 7(2) and Case C-1112/99, Toshiba Europe GmbH v. 
Katun Germany GmbH [2001] ECR I-7945).  
383   CFI, Case T-91/99, Ford Motor Company v. OHIM [2000] E.C.R. 1925, paras. 24 and 
25. 
384   ECJ, 20 September 2007, Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v G-Star International 
BV [2007] ECR I-07709, para. 28. The case concerns interpretation of Article 3(1) (e) 
of the TD, which is similar to Article 7(1) (e) of the CTMR. It was a reference made in 
the 
  course of the proceedings between the parties regarding the marketing by Benetton of an 
  item of clothing which, by of its shape, infringes two shape marks registered by G-Star 
  (cf. para. 2 of the judgment). 
385   On the basis of acquired distinctiveness under Article 7(3) of the CTMR. 
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provisions of second sentence of Article 15(1) of TRIPs whose literal import 
necessitates a conclusion that the shapes described under Article 7(1) (e) of the 
CTMR may be registered just upon meeting the distinctiveness test. The 
problematic aspect of those exceptions is that registration is not warranted even 
where the shapes referred to in Article 7(1) (e) of the CTMR acquire a secondary 
meaning. However, “[according] to the position adopted by the European Union, 
there is no conflict between this regulation [the CTMR] and the obligations 
under TRIPs, because shapes falling under the reservation clause cannot be 
regarded as “signs” in the meaning of the definition laid down in the first 
sentence of Article 15(1)”.386  
It follows that the above position as adopted by the EU can only be justified 
under the public interests rather than the basic function of trademark; for 
“consumers are capable of recognizing the distinctive character of a product’s 
shape”, to the extent that they may even be confused as to the origin of two 
identically shaped products which bear different word marks.387  
II. Relative grounds for refusal 
Six types of relative grounds for refusal to register a CTM may be identified 
pursuant to Article 8(2) – (5) of the CTMR. These are: (1)earlier trademark 
registrations or applications, (2)earlier trademark registrations or applications 
with reputation, (3)earlier well-known marks, (4)agents’ mark, (5)earlier unregi-
stered trademarks, and (6)earlier signs used in the course of trade, except for 
signs with only local significance.388  
According to Article 8(1) of the CTMR, relative grounds for trade mark 
refusal may be invoked by third parties to oppose registration of a CTM 
registration.389 Since the relative grounds for trademark refusal define the scope 
of a trademark monopoly, they are thus discussed in section E below in the 
context of CTM infringement. 
 
386   KUR, A., “TRIPs and Trademark Law”, in: BEIER, F., & SCHRICKER, G. (eds.), 
  “From GATT to TRIPs – The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights” 100 IIC Studies Vol. 18 (VCH, Weinheim 1996). 
387   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 143 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
388   Cf. also Rule 15(2) (b) of the CTMIR. 
389   For the extensive discussion on opposition procedure and grounds for opposition cf. 
  PAGENBERG, J., “Das Widerspruchsverfahren der Gemeinschaftsmarke – Neue 
  Strategien im Markenrecht”, 1998 GRUR 288.  
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E. CTM infringement 
Article 9 of the CTMR stipulates some circumstances under which CTM 
infringements may be presumed or proved. On the other hand, Article 8 of the 
CTMR strengthens the rights granted under Article 9 of the CTMR by allowing 
the right holder to prohibit registration of a sign the use of which would, but for 
registration, infringe his earlier rights. In order to determine whether a CTM has 
been, or is likely to be, infringed, various factors such as whether the use of a 
CTM by a third party falls within the scope of the exclusive rights that a CTM 
bestows upon the proprietor and the limitation posed against these rights have to 
be considered.  
I. Scope of CTM protection 
1. Article 9 of the CTMR 
The scope of a CTM protection is systematically described under Article 9(1) 
(a), (b) and (c) of the CTMR.  
According to Article 9(1) (a) of the CTMR, the CTM proprietor is entitled to 
interdict the use, in trade, by third parties, of any sign, which is identical to his 
trademark, where such use is in relation to goods or services, which are identical 
with those for which the proprietor’s CTM was registered. A sign may be 
regarded as identical with a registered CTM if “it reproduces, without any 
modification or addition, all the elements constituting the trade mark or where, 
viewed as a whole, it contains differences so insignificant that they may go 
unnoticed by an average consumer”.390 To put it simply, infringement under the 
paragraph will require the plaintiff to prove double identity, i.e. identity of the 
sign and the CTM as well as identity of goods or services marketed under the 
sign and the CTM. For a CTM proprietor to be able to prohibit the use of another 
sign within the ambit of Article 9(1) (a) of the CTMR, such a sign and the 
proprietor’s mark must correspond in all aspects. If there is any difference 
between them, then the action must be decided under Article 9(1) (b). However, 
where an infringer reproduces in his sign a part of a registered CTM, he cannot 
be held liable under the double identity doctrine of infringement, notwithstand-
 
390   ECJ, 20 March 2003, Case C-291/00 LTJ Diffusion SA v Sadas Vertbaudet SA [2003]  
  ECR I-02799, para. 54. 
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ing the proof that the part which was reproduced in the infringing sign is “the 
most prominent part” of a CTM.391  
A CTM proprietor enjoys some powers, pursuant to Article 9(1) (b) of the 
CTMR, to preclude third parties from using “any sign where, because of its 
identity with or similarity to the Community trade mark and the identity or 
similarity of the goods or services covered by the Community trade mark and the 
sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public”. It follows 
that,392 where a CTM was registered to designate some goods, it may be 
infringed by an identical sign used in relation to similar goods, an identical sign 
used in relation to similar services, a similar sign in relation to similar goods, and 
a similar sign in relation to similar services. And, where registration of a CTM 
covers some services, infringing such a CTM would require an identical sign to 
be used for similar services, an identical sign to be used for similar goods, a 
similar sign to be used for identical goods, a similar sign to be used for similar 
services, and a similar sign to be used for similar goods.393   
Article 9(1) (c) of the CTMR, empowers a CTM proprietor to prohibit third 
parties from using  
…any sign which is identical with or similar to the Community trade mark in relation to 
goods or services which are not similar to those for which the Community trademark is 
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Community and where use of that sign 
without the due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the Community trade mark. 
Likelihood of confusion – a concept referred to in section E (II) of this chapter – 
needs not be proven in order to substantiate trademark infringement claims 
brought under Article 9(1) (a) of the CTMR, since the law presumes existence of 
trademark confusion in every double identity cases.394  Given the special 
protection of a CTM395 enshrined under Article 9(1) (c) of the CTMR – a 
 
391   Cf. PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 314 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
392   Notwithstanding the language employed in Article 9(1) (b) of the CTMR, which does 
not lead to a clear, immediate understanding of the scope of the provision. 
393   ANNAND, R. & NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade Mark” 
162 (Blackstone Press, London 1998). 
394   Thus, liability for double identity cases (i.e. identical signs for identical goods) attaches 
strictly (ANNAND, R., & NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade 
Mark” 162 (Blackstone Press, London 1998). The double identity cases are therefore 
helpful in particular in curbing “counterfeit or piracy cases” (KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, 
“The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by Article Guide” 33 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2000).  
395   Article 9(1) (c) of the CTMR extends special protection to the CTM because it goes 
beyond the conventional trademark protection enshrined in the TRIPs Agreement. 
Article 16(1) of the Agreement limits trademark protection to the same scope of Article 
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protection beyond the requirements of double identity or similarity as a yardstick 
for infringement – proof of likelihood of confusion is not required for the 
trademark infringement to be upheld.396 However, for an infringement to be 
upheld under the provisions of Article 9(1) (b) of the CTMR, the CTM 
proprietor must prove the likelihood of confusion in light of the likelihood of 
association.397  
2. Article 8 of the CTMR 
While the holder of rights stipulated under Article 8(2) (a) and (b) of the CTMR 
enjoys a right to prohibit unauthorised use of these rights based on Article 9(1) 
(a) and (b), he is as well allowed to interdict any attempt by third parties to 
register, as a CTM, any sign which is identical to or confusingly similar with 
these rights. The rights covered under Article 8 (2) (a) and (b) of the CTMR are 
earlier Community and national Trademark registrations as well as earlier 
Community and national trademark applications.398  
The above analogy may as well be extended to Article 8(3) of the CTMR 
which regulates registration of a sign by an agent or representative of the right 
holder. Under the normal state of things an agent or a representative acts on 
behalf, and on the authority, of the principal. Thus, the use of the proprietor’s 
mark by the agent or representative, in the course, and within the scope, of 
 
9(1) (a) and (b) of the CTMR by stipulating that: “the owner of a registered trademark 
shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent 
from using in the course of identical or similar signs for goods or services which are 
identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such 
use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for 
identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The right 
described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the 
possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use”. 
396   ECJ, 11 November 1997, Case C- 251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG [1997] ECR I-06191, 
paras. 20 and 21. 
397   ECF, Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budějovický Budvar,  OJ C 6, 8.1.2005, pp. 
5 and 6, para. 63. 
398   While Article 8(2) (a) mentions the following earlier rights: (i) Community trade marks; 
(ii) trade marks registered in a Member State, or, in the case of Belgium, the Netherlands 
or Luxembourg, at the Benelux Trade Mark Office; (iii) trade marks registered under 
international arrangements which have effects in a Member State; (iv) trade marks 
registered under international arrangements which have effect in the Community, Article 
8(2) (b) mentions applications for the trade marks referred to in Article 8(2) (2). 
However, only applications which mature to registration can entitle the applicant to 
object to registration of identical or similar signs. 
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agency-principal relation, cannot amount to a CTM infringement under Article 9 
of the CTMR. However, Article 8(3) of the CTMR foresees some activities by an 
agent which would be detrimental to the interests of the principal as far as 
trademark rights are concerned. Thus, pursuant to the immediately preceding 
Article, the agent will be acting outside the scope of his agency if, without 
proper authorisation, he seeks to register the principal’s trademark. Hence, the 
principal is entitled to oppose an attempt by the agent to register the trade-
mark.399   
This protection against the “disloyal agent or representative” that the 
proprietor of earlier CTM enjoys, under Article 8(3), is based on   “a status-
inherent obligation – which applies even without explicit agreement – to look 
after the business owner’s interests”.400 Such inherent obligation necessitates a 
conclusion that “without authorization, the agent should not be able to appropri-
ate any right in a mark which the business owner previously claimed for himself 
and which typically is of no interest to the agent before he becomes the business 
owner’s representative”.401  
Article 8(3) of the CTMR implements in part the provisions of Article 6septies 
of the Paris Convention only to the extent the said provision in the Paris 
Convention gives the rightful owner the right to oppose registration of 
trademarks filed without his consent. The CTMR does not however provide for 
the business owner’s right to recovery of damages. The express relief in this 
respect is available under Article 18 of the CTMR which provides that:  
Where a Community trade mark is registered in the name of the agent or representative of 
a person who is the proprietor of the trade mark, without the proprietor’s authorisation, the 
latter shall be entitled to demand the assignment in his favour of the said registration, 
unless such agent or representative justifies his action.  
Article 8(5) of the CTMR strengthens protection of CTM or national trademarks 
with reputation. Thus, owners of these trademarks enjoy some right to exclude 
third parties, not only from using them, but also from having the said trademarks 
being registered in the third parties’ names. Article 8(5) of the CTMR guarantees 
protection for trademarks with reputation even where the infringing sign is 
intended to be registered for goods which are not identical or similar to those for 
which the trademark with reputation is registered. Thus, Article 8(5) of the 
CTMR can be applied along with Article 9(1) (c) of the CTMR described above. 
 
399   Corollary to this, the principal is entitled to prohibit the use of his mark by the agent 
pursuant to Article 11 of the CTMR.    
400   INGERL, R., “Revised Regulation Governing Agents’ Marks under the New German 
Trademark Act” 29(6) IIC 664, 665 (1998). 
401   INGERL, R., “Revised Regulation Governing Agents’ Marks under the New German 
Trademark Act” 29(6) IIC 664, 666 (1998). 
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Hence, discussion on a trademark with reputation, in accordance with Article 
9(1) (c) of the CTMR, addressed below under section 4.5.4 dealing with CTM 
with reputation, should be taken to refer to both Articles 9(1) (c) and 8(5). 
Trademarks considered to be well-known in a Member State, within the 
meaning of Article 8(2) (c) of the CTMR, are distinguishable from trademarks 
with reputation under Articles 8(5) and 9(1) (c) of the CTMR. According to 
Article 8(2) (c) of the CTMR, an earlier but well-known mark402 within the 
prescription set out in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention403 entitles its proprietor 
to oppose a similar mark.404 The only decisive factor is whether the respective 
trade mark is well known in the country where protection is sought or in a 
substantial part of it405 and that the infringing mark is used for goods or services 
similar with those covered by the well-known mark.406 Coca-cola and Puma or 
BMW trademarks for instance, may be mentioned as examples of well-known 
trademarks.  
 
402   Article 8(2) (c) of the CTMR defines earlier but well known trademarks as “trade marks, 
which on the date of application for registration of the Community trade mark, or where 
appropriate, of the priority claimed in respect of the application for registration of the 
Community trade mark, are well known in a Member State, in the sense in which the  
words ‘well known’ are used in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.” 
403   Article 6bis(1) of the Paris Convention provides that “the countries of the Union 
undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested 
party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark 
which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, 
of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to 
bewell known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the 
benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions 
shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any 
such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith”.  
404   Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 16 of TRIPs strengthens protection of well-known marks 
by stipulating that: “2. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to services. In determining whether a trademark is well known, Members shall 
take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, 
including knowledge in the Member State concerned which has been obtained as a result 
of the promotion of the trademark. 3. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of  
  which a trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to 
thosegoods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or services and 
the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of 
the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use”.      
405   ECJ, 22 November 2007, Case C-328/06, Alfredo Nieto Nuño v Leonci Monlleó 
Franquet [2007] ECR I-10093, para. 21. 
406   However, Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement requires a well-known mark to be 
registered in order to be protected against an infringing mark used for dissimilar goods 
or services.   
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Unregistered trademarks or other signs such as company names, trade names, 
business signs, titles of protected literally or artistic works and the right to a sign 
under passing-off are all together regarded as ‘unregistered and earlier signs used 
in trade’.407 These rights entitle the owner to register a similar mark. Conseque-
ntly, the owner may, based on his unregistered and earlier signs used in trade, 
oppose any attempt by third parties to register a CTM which is similar to the 
earlier rights. However, the earlier rights protected under Article 8(4) of the 
CTMR are not mentioned in Article 42(2) and (3) of the CTMR in connection 
with the requirement of proof of use. Since enforceability of the earlier rights is 
contingent upon their use, evidence regarding the “use must be submitted in the 
reasoning of the opposition in the form that can be verified”.408  
The earlier rights protected under Article 8(4) of CTMR must be of more than 
mere local significance. Although there is hitherto no ECJ’s decision clarifying 
the phrase “rights of more than mere local significance”, it may be assumed that, 
in view of analogous ECJ’s decisions,409 the earlier rights concerned will fulfil 
the requirements of the quoted phrase if they are known by a big section of the 
people. One may thus question as to what happens when the earlier rights 
concerned are of local significance. The response to this query depends on the 
national law under which the rights concerned are protected. Unless the 
respective national law prohibits, the earlier rights of a mere local significance 
will, pursuant to Article 111(1) of the CTMR, entitle the proprietor to prohibit 
the use of a similar CTM in the territory where the said earlier rights enjoy 
protection.410  
These rights should predate the date of application for registration of a future 
CTM and the priority date which the application for registration of junior CTM 
claims.    
 
407   “Opposition Guidelines” (Part 1), 16 (OHIM 2007). 
408   PAGENBERG, J., “Opposition Proceedings for the Community Trademark – New 
Strategies in Trademark Law” 29(4) IIC 406, 409 (1998). 
409   Cf. for instance, Case C-375/97, General Motors Corporation v Yplon SA [1999] ECR I-
05421 (paras. 26, 28 and 31), which implies that an earlier right could be of more mere 
local significance if it is known by a significant number of people in just a part of one of 
the EU countries. 
410   Different points, which are relevant to the earlier rights of a mere local significance and, 
which may be debated here, are reserved for the discussion in Chapter 5 infra in relation 
to the interface between CTM and national trademark rights.  
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II. Likelihood of confusion 
Likelihood of confusion is central for determining whether some use made of a 
particular sign by a third party is within the scope of the exclusive rights, of the 
CTM registrant, described under Article 9(1) (b) of the CTMR.411 The concept 
“likelihood of confusion” is given statutory recognition under Articles 8(1) (b) 
and 9(1) (b) of the CTMR.412 It must, however, be made clear at the outset that 
while likelihood of confusion serves as a relative ground for trademark refusal, it 
is also a condition for finding trademark infringement under Article 9(1) (b) of 
the CTMR as it constitutes the specific condition for the protection afforded by a 
CTM.413 This implies that the meaning ascribed to the phrase “likelihood of 
confusion” in course of CTM infringement proceedings does not differ from the 
way OHIM interprets the phrase, as a relative ground for a CTM refusal, during 
trade mark examination or opposition proceedings.414 Indeed, this approach 
cannot be questioned, since a CTM proprietor has right under both Articles 9(1) 
(b) and 8(1) (b) of the CTMR respectively to prevent anyone from using his 
mark, or anyone else applying to register a trademark the use of which could be 
prevented in view of the essential function of a trademark.415  
1. CTM function and likelihood of confusion 
Registration of a CTM guarantees that wherever such a mark is used, it will be 
used as an indication of origin.416 This conclusion is supported by various 
decisions of the ECJ,417 which altogether confirm that: 
 
411   ECJ, 11 November 1997, Case C- 251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG [1997] ECR I-06191, 
para. 22. Cf. also HIDAKA, S., et al, “A sign of the times? A review of key trade mark 
decisions of the European Court of Justice and their impact upon national trade mark 
jurisprudence in the EU”,  94(5) TMR 1105, 1129 (2004). 
412  Article 8(1) (b) of the CTMR stipulates that: “upon opposition by the proprietor of an 
  earlier trade mark, the trademark applied for shall not be registered if because of its 
  identity with or similarity to the earlier trademark and identity or similarity of the goods 
or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part 
of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; likelihood of 
confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark”. Article 9(1) 
  (b) is reproduced in section E (I) (1) of this chapter.  
413   Cf. recital 8 of the CTMR. 
414   Cf. “Opposition Guidelines” (Part 2 Chapter 2A) 3 (OHIM 2004). 
415   The phrase “essential function of a trade mark” is elucidated in chapter 6 infra. 
416   Cf. recital 8 of the CTMR. 
417   Cf. Case C-120/04, Medion AG [2005] ECR I-08551, para. 23; Case C-371/02, 
  Björnekulla Fruchtindustrier [2004] ECR I-05791, para. 20 and Case 39/97, Canon 
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The essential function of the trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the 
marked product to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of 
confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin. For 
the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted 
competition, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have 
originated under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their 
quality.418  
Such a guarantee is diminished where the use of a sign by another – not 
authorised by the CTM proprietor – carries with it the risk that the public might 
believe that the goods and services marketed under the sign and those marketed 
under the CTM come from the same or economically linked companies, for such 
use would constitute a likelihood of confusion. The same holds true even where 
the public is of the view that the goods or services do not originate from the 
same entity stricto sensu, but only from economically linked undertakings, as 
there could still be a risk of confusion in this scenario too.419 The controlling 
requirement here is the likelihood that the public believes that a single entity is 
responsible for the goods or services.420 It can generally be assumed that, “there 
can be no such likelihood of confusion where it does not appear that the public 
could believe that the goods and services come from the same undertaking or, as 
the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings”.421 However, trade-
mark infringement might also be upheld even where the use of an infringing sign 
does not interfere with the trademark’s function at the point of sale, but does so 
after the sale. Post sale confusion ensues where “those who are confronted with 
the goods after they have left the infringer’s point of sale, are likely to interpret 
the sign, as it is used by the infringer, as designating or tending to designate the 
undertaking from which the infringer’s goods originate”.422 
 
  [1998] ECR I-05507, para. 28.  
418   Cf. Case C-10/89, HAG GF (HAG II) [1990] ECR I-3711, paras. 13 and 14.  
419   This view is in line with a distinction between direct and indirect risks of confusion 
drawn by the ECJ in the following words: “there is a risk of confusion between two trade 
marks not only when the public might mistakenly assume that the goods concerned 
come from one and the same undertaking (direct risk of confusion) but also when the 
mistaken assumption relates to the existence of an organizational or economic link 
between the undertakings concerned, such as licensing agreement under which one 
undertaking is authorized to manufacture a product with the same properties as the 
product of the other (risk of confusion in the broadest sense)” (cf. Case C-317/91 
Deutsche Renault AG v AUDI AG [1993] ECR I-06227, para. 36). 
420   Cf. “Opposition Guidelines” (Part 2 Chapter 2A) 7 (OHIM 2004).  
421   Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha [1998] ECR I-05507, para. 30. 
422   ECF, Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budějovický Budvar,  OJ C 6, 8.1.2005, p. 
5– 6, para. 60. 
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2. In whose view is the likelihood of confusion determined? 
Since the risk of confusion is eminent “when there is a likelihood that the public 
might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same 
undertaking, or as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings”,423 
an assessment of the likelihood of confusion is therefore done in accordance with 
how the relevant public perceives the signs in relation to products or services in 
issue. Such an assessment takes into account all circumstantial factors relevant to 
each case, namely, the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and 
the similarity of the goods or services.424 Confusion is further assessed on the 
basis of how an average consumer425 would behave given two or more products 
of different origin but using identical or confusingly similar marks. It must be 
conceded that an average consumer perceives a mark as a whole and does not 
proceed to analyse its various details although he may break it down into word 
elements which, for him, suggest a concrete meaning or which resemble words 
known to him.426 The average consumer is presumed to be reasonable, fully 
informed, observant and circumspect.427 
However, the level of attention that the ideal consumer pays varies depending 
on the type of goods or services concerned.428 If the goods in question are 
everyday consumer goods, the consumer involved here would not be adjudged as 
unreasonable or uninformed or not circumspect merely because he has mista-
kenly turned to some fake products assuming the same to be the ones, he usually 
purchases under the mark accustomed to him. Since such a consumer has some 
preconceived knowledge about the characteristics of the goods, he is accustomed 
 
423   CIF, 6 May 2008, Case T-246/06 Redcats SA v OHIM, [2008] ECR II-00071, para. 29. 
424   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-150/04, Mülhens GmbH & Co. KG v OHIM [2007] ECR II-
02353, para. 26. 
425   The word “‘consumer’ is to be understood in the wide sense of the term, and should not 
be restricted to those persons who actually and physically consume the product. In that 
respect, reference can be made to the term ‘consumer protection’ which covers all parts 
of the consuming public. Because of the nature of the goods or services to which a mark 
is applied can vary considerably, actual and/or potential consumers can be different in 
each case. Groups of actual and/or potential consumers may be identified with the help 
of parameters such as the target group for the goods and services in relation to which the 
mark is used or the group of actual purchasers” (cf. “Opposition Guidelines” (Part 2 
Chapter 2A) 14 (OHIM 2004). 
426   CFI, 27 February 2008, Case T-325/04, Citigroup, Inc. v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00029, 
para. 78. 
427   CIF, 6 May 2008, Case T-246/06, Redcats SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00071, para. 30. 
428   CFI, 15 January 2008, Case T-9/05, Hoya Kabushiki Kaisha v OHIM [2008] ECR II-
00003, para. 29. 
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to; he is likely not to notice a slight dissimilarity between the infringing sign and 
the CTM.  
In contrast, the result would not be the same as above where the products to 
which the infringing sign and a CTM are applied, though same or similar, are 
intended for consumption by a specific class of people who have a specialised 
knowledge regarding the products in connection with which the sign and the 
CTM are used. This may particularly be the case where the products concerned 
are some raw materials such as unprocessed plastics out of which the specialists 
who are engaged in further processing of the materials would manufacture semi-
processed plastics and plastic substances.429 Since these raw materials are not in 
common use, the specialists concerned (i.e. the average consumers) are reason-
ably expected to demonstrate a sufficient attentiveness when choosing the 
products.430  
Suppose the goods at issue are, antitussive medicines, food supplements and 
vitamin preparations, the relevant public would definitely comprise of a 
consumer, who, even where presumed attentive and informed about the 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical and nutraceutical products, which he 
purchases in order to improve his health, it would still be extremely difficulty 
(due to the often foreign and scientific sounding names of these products) for 
him (as non-specialised person) to remember them correctly.431 However, this 
scenario can be distinguished from the cases involving some very expensive 
products such as furniture. Under the latter, “the process of comparison and 
reflection before the choice is made” requires a higher level of attention. An 
average consumer does not regularly buy such expensive items and hence he is 
expected to be cautious by maintaining a higher level of attentiveness (than his 
normal level of attention) when purchasing those goods.432  
Thus, a higher level of attention will be imputed to the consumer in every case 
concerning expensive, infrequent or risky purchases.433 
 
429   CFI, 17 April 2008, Case T-389/03, Dainichiseika Colour & Chemicals Mfg. Co. Ltd. V 
  OHIM, [2008] ECR II-00058, paras. 57 to 59. 
430   CFI, 17 April 2008, Case T-389/03, Dainichiseika Colour & Chemicals Mfg. Co. Ltd. V 
  OHIM [2008] ECR II-00058, para. 100. 
431   See the decision of the second Board of Appeal (OHIM), 30 April 2008, Case R 
  1630/2006-2, Matthias Rath v Portela & Ca., S.A., para. 59.  
432   CFI, 16 January 2008, Case T-112/06, Inter-Ikea Systems BV v OHIM [2008] ECR II-
00006, para. 37. 
433   “Opposition Guidelines” (Part 2, Chapter 2D) 11 (OHIM 2007). 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
122 
 
3. Thresholds of likelihood of confusion 
For a CTM infringement to be affirmed under Articles 9(1) (b) and 8(1) (b) of 
the CTMR, likelihood of confusion will not be presumed, as the case would be 
where the goods and services as well as the conflicting signs were identical, but 
must be proved.434 As the ECJ has held repeatedly, “even where a mark is 
identical to another with a highly distinctive character, it is still necessary to 
adduce evidence of similarity between the goods or services covered”, since “the 
likelihood of confusion presupposes that the goods or services covered are 
identical or similar”.435 Likelihood of confusion is thus appreciated globally by 
taking account of several factors including, but not limited to, “the degree of 
similarity between the signs and the goods or services”.436  
a) Similarity of trademarks  
In order to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion the conflicting 
marks have to be compared in terms of their visual, aural and conceptual 
similarity.437 The distinctive and dominant components of the signs in question 
may be taken into account to determine the overall impression of such similarity. 
aa) Visual similarity 
As regards the visual comparison between the opposing signs, the visual 
similarity of the dominant elements of the earlier trademark is a decisive factor 
in founding the likelihood of confusion. In a case involving LES PAGES 
JAUNES (as a CTM) and PAGESJAUNES.COM (as an infringing sign); the 
expression “pages jaunes” could constitute a dominant element of the CTM and 
the sign. Hence, the dominant element makes the sign and the mark visually 
 
434   However, an argument that likelihood of confusion must not be proven in relation to 
confusingly similar marks may be accentuated: Since from etymological point of view 
the term “likelihood of confusion” may be treated as a risk or a danger of confusion, 
actual confusion is not a condition for affirming a likelihood of confusion, even though 
evidence of actual confusion would favour a finding of a likelihood of confusion (cf. 
“Opposition Guidelines” (Part 2, Chapter 2D) 17 (OHIM 2007). 
435   Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha [1998] ECR I-05507, para. 22. 
436   ECJ, 11 November 1997, Case C- 251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG [1997] ECR I-06191, 
  para. 22. 
437   ECJ, 12 June 2007, Case C-334/05 P, OHIM v Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas [2007] I- 
  04529, para. 35.  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
123 
 
similar, notwithstanding the fact that the CTM comprises of “three words with a 
total of five syllables” in contrast to the infringing sign, which consists of one 
word of six syllables.438 It follows that a finding of a likelihood of confusion 
based on visual similarity cannot be overruled on the ground that the dominant 
word element included in the infringing sign (such as “pages jaunes”) is a non-
distinctive or is a generic term forming part of the CTM. In this regard, it has 
been held that “even in a case involving an earlier mark of weak distinctive 
character, there may be a likelihood of confusion on account, in particular, of a 
similarity between the signs and between the goods or services covered”.439 This 
is because a weak distinctive character of an element of a complex mark may 
make an impression on consumers and be remembered by them.440 However, 
where a visually descriptive, dominant element (common to both the CTM and 
an infringing sign) leads to a finding of likelihood of confusion, such a finding 
cannot, by itself, confer on the CTM proprietor some exclusive rights on the use 
of such a dominant element. This could also be the case, for instance, where 
LINK (as a CTM) and WORLDLINK (as an infringing sign) are the subject of a 
dispute. In this scenario the word LINK would be held to be a dominant, visual 
element notwithstanding the fact that the term LINK lacks sufficient 
distinctiveness for “banking services for the dispensing of cash; fund transfer and 
payment services; financial services”.441 Nevertheless, the court would not 
hesitate to uphold the likelihood of confusion between the infringing sign and the 
CTM, while leaving open the possibility of other proprietors to use the term 
LINK in relation to future trademark or applications.442  
In assessing visual similarity, the figurative elements of a CTM used along 
with a word element are often considered to be marginal, especially where such 
word elements are predominantly similar to the infringing sign. Suppose that 
“amply” (a CTM) and “amplitude” (an infringing sign) are in issue. Assume 
further that the CTM is composed of some figurative elements of ordinary 
turquoise-blue printed letter. These elements cannot be considered dominant 
 
438   Cf. CFI, 13 December 2007, Case T- 134/06, Xentral LLC v OHIM [2007] ECR II-
05213, paras. 53, 57 and 58. 
439   Case T- 134/06, Xentral LLC v OHIM [2007] ECR II-05213, para. 70. 
440   Case T- 134/06, Xentral LLC v OHIM [2007] ECR II-05213, para. 54. 
441   CFI, 27 February 2008, Case T-325/04, Citigroup, Inc. v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00029, 
para. 67. 
442   CFI, 27 February 2008, Case T-325/04, Citigroup, Inc. v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00029, 
para. 98. 
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features of the CTM apart from the word “amply” itself, since the CTM is, with 
the exception of a single letter (y instead of i) included in the infringing sign.443  
The CFI’s jurisprudence reveals that the verbal element will not always be 
automatically considered where a mark in question consists of both verbal 
elements and figurative elements. This is due to the reasoning that in a complex 
mark the figurative elements may occupy a position equivalent to the verbal 
element. In Inter-Ikea Systems BV, the court considered the figurative elements 
of the contested mark444 and found that those elements possessed a relatively 
high degree of intrinsic distinctiveness due to the “small squares regularly 
aligned to evoke a sense of order or modularity”.445 Thus, a distinctive figurative 
trademark cannot be held to be visually similar to earlier word mark on the 
ground that the trademark applied for uses in its figurative element the term 
which is visually similar to that used in the earlier mark.   
bb) Aural or phonetic similarity 
Pronunciation of the word elements of the opposing signs may determine the 
extent of the likelihood of confusion. In Quelle AG446 the earlier figurative 
national mark which had a word element MARS and the trademark NARS (the 
Community trademark applied for) were in dispute. Assessing aural similarity, 
the court found that the letters a, r, and s were phonetically common to the word 
elements of NARS and MARS. In spite of the fact that consumers usually attach 
more weight to the first part of the word, the phonetic difference to the first 
letters of the signs in question could not reverse a finding of aural similarity. 
Thus, minor phonetic difference does not “counteract the similarity arising from 
the identity between the most significant parts, in terms of number of letters, of 
the conflicting signs”.447  
 
443   CFI, 15 January 2008, Case T-9/05, Hoya Kabushiki Kaisha v OHIM [2008] ECR II-
00003, paras. 36 to 41. 
444   Whereas the sole element of the earlier mark was the term “ikea”; the contested mark 
was a complex mark composed of the verbal element “idea” and a figurative element. 
Such figurative element took the form of a grid with rounded corners made up of 15 
small squares: 14 white squares and one black square, presented diagonally in the upper 
left corner.  
445   CFI, 16 January 2008, Case T- 112/06, Inter-Ikea Systems BV v OHIM [2008] ECR II-
00006, paras. 44 to 61. 
446   CFI, 8 February 2007, Case T-88/05, Quelle AG v OHIM [2007] ECR II-00008. 
447   CFI, 8 February 2007, Case T-88/05, Quelle AG v OHIM [2007] ECR II-00008, para. 
63. 
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The CFI’s judgment dealing with the marks AMPLITUDE/Amply448 stresses 
that visually dissimilar syllables may be phonetically similar when used in 
different languages. Thus, the court found that the first two syllables of the 
marks in question created phonetically similar impression due to the fact that “in 
Spanish, the letters ‘y’ and ‘i’ are both pronounced like the vowel ‘i’”. Despite 
the fact that consumers were likely to reinforce in their minds such phonetic 
similarity, the addition of syllables ‘TUDE’ doubled the length of the mark 
applied for and thus weakening the phonetic similarity.449 Diminishing the likeli-
hood of confusion on phonetic similarity basis, the court held that, “in Spanish, 
the main stress, in respect of the two marks at issue, is on the penulti-mate 
syllable”. Accordingly, in the word element amply, the main stress is on the 
syllable ‘am’ and, in the word element amplitude, the main stress is on the 
syllable ‘tu’. Since “in Spanish, the stressed syllable ‘tu’ in the mark applied for” 
(is one of the syllables added to the common root of the conflicting marks, and) 
“is longer than the stressed syllable ‘am’ in the earlier mark”, the court ruled in 
favour of phonetic difference.450       
Where the conflicting marks consist of the same number of letters and contain 
the same sequence of vowels, the court may rely on the sound of a consonant in 
the marks to determine the phonetic similarity or difference of the marks.451 
Thus, the consonants d and k in the idea/ikea marks were held to be different 
because the former is voiced epical consonant and the latter is a voiceless dorsal 
consonant. Consequently, there is no aural similarity between the marks 
concerned unless such marks contain in their word elements an “identical 
sequence of at most three matching sounds”.452  
Phonetic comparison “must be made with regard to all the languages spoken 
by the relevant public”453, i.e. all EC languages, “and not with regard only to 
 
448   CFI, 15 January 2008, Case T-9/05, Hoya Kabushiki Kaisha v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00003. 
449   CFI, 15 January 2008, Case T-9/05, Hoya Kabushiki Kaisha v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00003, paras. 42 to 44. 
450   CFI, 15 January 2008, Case T-9/05, Hoya Kabushiki Kaisha v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00003, para. 46. 
451   CFI, 16 January 2008, Case T- 112/06, Inter-Ikea Systems BV v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00006, para. 64. 
452   CFI, 16 January 2008, Case T- 112/06, Inter-Ikea Systems BV v OHIM [2008] ECR II-
00006, para. 66. 
453   Since “the protection afforded to the earlier mark covers the whole Community; what 
must be considered is the perception which the consumer of the goods at issue has of the 
marks at issue within the whole of that territory”. Cf. CIF, 6 May 2008, Case T-246/06, 
Redcats SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00071, para. 31.  
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French and English”.454 International character of the market intended for the 
goods bearing the conflicting marks may also play a decisive role (as to which 
language is applicable) as far as aural similarity in relation to the likelihood of 
confusion is concerned. In GAVALLIA/GALVALLOY case,455 the OHIM’s 
board of appeal based only on French rules of pronunciations to determine 
phonetic similarity of the two opposing marks. However, on appeal, the CFI 
found the two marks to be aurally similar on the basis of English pronunciation. 
The court reasoned that since the marks were intended to be used in the steel 
industry, the market in that industry was highly internationalised to the extent 
that only English was the corresponding consumer language in such market.456  
It is important to note that “the degree of phonetic similarity between two 
marks is of less importance in the case of goods which are marketed in such a 
way that, when making a purchase, the relevant public perceives visually the 
mark” by which those goods are designated.457 Hence, an assessment of 
conceptual similarity comes into play to determine the intersection of the 
phonetic (or aural) and visual similarity. 
cc) Conceptual similarity 
Conceptual similarity between the sign and the CTM is assessed in the light of 
the impression which such marks call to the relevant consumer’s mind. In a 
scenario involving PAGESJAUNES.COM (as an infringing sign) and LES 
PAGES JAUNES (as a CTM), confusion would be discerned on the basis of 
conceptual similarity. This finding would not be reversed by the fact that the 
CTM, by using LES at the beginning, differs from the infringing sign, which 
uses .COM at the end. Thus, comparison of the sign and the CTM may indicate 
that they both refer to yellow (pages) or paper-based directories, notwithstanding 
the ending of .COM to the infringing sign for such an ending does not alter the 
meaning of the expression PAGES JAUNES (which is dominant element to both 
 
454   CIF, 6 May 2008, Case T-246/06, Redcats SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00071, para. 45. 
455   CFI, 14 February 2008, Case T-189/05, Usinor SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00022, paras. 
58 to 61.   
456   According to the court, the relevant public were French speaking consumers with 
  knowledge of English language (cf. Case T-189/05, Usinor SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00022, paras. 59 and 65). 
457   Cf. CFI, 8 February 2007, Case T-88/05, Quelle AG v OHIM [2007] ECR II-00008, 
Para. 69. 
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marks) but merely suggests that the goods marketed under the infringing sign 
can be “consulted or bought over the internet”.458  
In order to conceptualise a mark consisting of a prefix and suffix, a relevant 
consumer will normally perceive such mark as a whole without resorting to a 
rigorous analysis of its various details. He may, nevertheless, perceive such a 
verbal sign by breaking it down “into verbal elements which, for him, suggest a 
concrete meaning or which resemble words known to him”.459 Thus, in 
GALVALLOY/GALVALLIA case, the court having determined that the 
relevant public was the French speaking with the knowledge of English 
language, concluded that such public would, in the mark applied for, “recognise 
the presence of the English word ‘alloy’, corresponding to ‘alliage’ in French, 
even if the first letter of that word ‘a’ has merged with the last letter of the prefix 
‘galva’, according to the usual process of haplology”.460 Moreover, “the 
evocative force of the suffix ‘allia’” in the earlier mark could trigger a perception 
in the mind of the relevant public that the suffix referred to the word ‘alliage’. 
Consequently, the possible interpretation, by the public would be that, “both 
signs referred to the concepts of galvanisation and alloy” and hence, (the 
opposing marks are) conceptually similar.461   
Determination of the conceptual similarity is only possible where both the 
opposing marks contain word elements capable of semantic meaning; for “there 
can be no conceptual similarity between a mark which conveys no clear meaning 
in any of the official languages of the European Union” and another mark whose 
verbal element carries some actual meaning in the minds of the EC public.462 
Thus, where the mark applied for (or the infringing sign) contains a word (such 
as idea) which has a real meaning for the European public, cannot be held 
conceptually similar to an earlier trademark containing neologism such as 
ikea.463 
Moreover, grammatical rules are taken into account to justify conceptual 
similarity (and/or dissimilarity). In WORLDLINK/LINK case, the CFI had to 
 
458   CFI, 13 December 2007, Case T- 134/06, Xentral LLC v OHIM [2007] ECR II-05213, 
  para. 62. 
459   CFI, 14 February 2008, Case T-189/05, Usinor SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00022, para. 
  62.  
460   CFI, 14 February 2008, Case T-189/05, Usinor SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00022, para. 
  65.   
461   CFI, 14 February 2008, Case T-189/05, Usinor SA v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00022, paras. 
  66 to 68. 
462   CFI, 16 January 2008, Case T- 112/06, Inter-Ikea Systems BV v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00006, para. 70. 
463   CFI, 16 January 2008, Case T- 112/06, Inter-Ikea Systems BV v OHIM [2008] ECR II- 
  00006, para. 71. 
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resort to the rules of English grammar and found that the element ‘world’ (in the 
trademark applied for) would be perceived by all consumers in the United 
Kingdom, “(on account of its position at the beginning) as an adjective meaning 
‘global’ and qualifying the element ‘link’” with the consequence that the 
conceptual importance of the word element ‘world’ would be less if compared 
with the word element ‘link’.464 Conceptually, therefore, the earlier mark link 
would literally be understood in its natural semantic meaning, whereas the mark 
applied for worldlink would be perceived by the relevant public as meaning 
‘global link’. Thus, the marks in question are conceptually similar for they are 
based on the same concept (link) only being distinguished by the addition of 
geographical qualifier (world). 
b) Similarity of goods and/or services 
Similarity between goods or services covered by the opposing marks may 
convey perception in the minds of consumers that the goods or services have the 
same origin or are marketed under one trademark. The provisions of Articles 
8(1) (b) and 9(1) (b) of the CTMR presuppose that likelihood of confusion will 
mainly base on the identity or similarity between goods and services covered by 
the opposing marks. Even where the mark applied for (or the infringing sign) is 
obviously identical (in terms of aural, visual and conceptual similarity) to a 
particularly distinctive CTM,465 it is still a condition to furnish evidence 
regarding the similarity between the goods or services covered by the opposing 
trademarks.466 It means therefore that slight similarity of the goods or services 
can be complemented by the high degree of similarity of the signs and vice 
versa.467  
The practice obtaining in some European jurisdictions468 in relation to the 
assessment of similarity of goods or services takes into consideration various 
factors, namely uses of the goods or services; users or consumers of the goods or 
 
464   CFI, 27 February 2008, Case T-325/04 Citigroup, Inc. v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00029, 
  para. 82. 
465   The distinctive character of an earlier trademark is taken into account “not in order to 
assess similarity of the goods, but in order to assess whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion” (cf. CFI, 12 June 2007, Case T-105/05, Assembled Investments (Proprietary) 
Ltd v OHIM [2007] ECR II-00060, para. 29). 
466   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-150/04, Mülhens GmbH & Co. KG v OHIM [2007] ECR II- 
  02353, para. 27. 
467   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-443/05, El Corte Ingles SA v OHIM, para. 40. 
468   Jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom (cf. FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and 
  Practice” (2nd ed.) 80 (Jordan Publishing, Ltd., Bristol 2005).  
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services; physical nature of the goods or acts of service; channels through which 
the goods or services reach the market; nature of the shops where goods are sold 
(whether the goods are sold in the super markets, in particular whether they are 
shelved close to each other and the impact the self-service practice of the 
supermarkets will have on the consumer’s confusion); and the extent to which 
the goods are in competition with each other.469    
It is, thus, clear that likelihood of confusion on the grounds of similarity 
between the goods or services is assessed by taking into consideration “all the 
relevant factors which characterise the relationship between” the goods or 
services such as “their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and 
whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary.”470 Other 
factors such as distribution channels and business outlets may also be taken into 
account.471 
The dictum stated in paragraph 109 in Koipe Corporación SL judgment472 
reiterates the fact that distribution channels may enhance the level of consumer 
confusion where the opposing marks consist of similar or closely similar 
figurative elements. Basing on the fact that “olive oil is most commonly 
purchased in supermarkets”, and given the fact that both CARBONELL (earlier 
mark) and la española (the mark applied for) use similar figurative elements and 
are applied to fat-related products, the court upheld the Board of Appeal’s 
findings of similarity between the goods marketed under the opposing marks. 
The court was of the considered view that in supermarkets, “the consumer is 
guided by impression than by a direct comparison of the various marks”. 
Consequently, in supermarkets the consumer normally examines the marks 
speedily and at the distance. In such circumstances and given the fact that an 
average consumer perceives a mark as a whole due to the wants of an analysis as 
to the mark’s various details, the “differences between the signs at issue are more 
difficult to distinguish and the similarities are more apparent”.      
In Assembled Investments (Proprietary) Ltd473 the articles of glassware and 
the wine were held to be different in terms of their nature and purpose of use 
 
469   Alison Firth mentions these factors and points out that the factors were cited in Canon 
Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc (Case 39/94, [1999] ETMR 1) (cf. 
FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 80 (Jordan Publishing, 
Ltd., Bristol 2005). 
470   CFI, 17 April 2008, Case T-389/03, Dainichiseika Colour & Chemicals Mfg. Co. Ltd. V 
  OHIM  [2008] ECR II-00058, para. 61. 
471   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-443/05, El Corte Ingles SA v OHIM [2007] ECR II-02579, 
  para.37. 
472   Cf. CFI, 12 September 2007, Case T-363/04, Koipe Corporación SL v OHIM [2007] 
ECR II-03355. 
473   CFI, 12 June 2007, Case T-105/05 Assembled Investments (Proprietary) Ltd v OHIM, 
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since “they are neither in competition with one another nor substitutable and not 
produced in the same area”. Regarding the fact that “wine and certain articles of 
glassware are sometimes sold in the same places, such as specialist wine 
retailers”; the court found that such use of the same distribution channel was “a 
negligible proportion of the overall sales of the articles of glassware concerned” 
which could not cause confusion.474  
Even where goods are regarded different in terms of their nature, purpose and 
method of use and for that matter not functionally complementary in the respect-
ive business sectors; may still be aesthetically complementally in the eyes of the 
relevant public. In the TOSCA BLU/TOSCA case475 in which goods in the 
fashion, body and facial care sectors were in dispute, it was held that such 
“aesthetically complementary nature must involve a genuine aesthetic necessity” 
to the extent that “one product is indispensable or important for the use of the 
other and consumers consider it ordinary and natural to use these products 
together”. Thus, image of the product is central to the determination of the 
question whether goods are aesthetically complementary.476 This is particularly 
the case where, coordinating the various components of the external (image) 
look of the goods, the consumer is likely to perceive a connection between the 
goods concerned.477  
The fact that goods appear in different classes does not necessarily lead to a 
conclusion that such goods are dissimilar.478 Nevertheless; classification of 
goods may remotely give a hint as to whether goods are similar. For instance, it 
has been held that since “goods in class 25 and those in class 18 are often made 
of the same raw material, namely leather or imitation leather”; such material 
similarity may be taken into account in assessing the similarity between the 
goods.479  
 
  [2007] ECR II-00060, para. 31. 
474   CFI, 12 June 2007, Case T-105/05 Assembled Investments (Proprietary) Ltd v OHIM, 
  [2007] ECR II-00060, para. 32.  
475   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-150/04 Mülhens GmbH & Co. KG v OHIM, [2007] ECR II- 
  02353, paras. 35 to 39. 
476   “Goods such as shoes, clothing, hats or handbags may, in addition to their basic 
function, have a common aesthetic function by jointly contributing to the external image 
of the consumer concerned” (cf. Case T-443/05 El Corte Ingles SA v OHIM [2007] ECR 
II-02579, para. 49). 
477   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-443/05 El Corte Ingles SA v OHIM [2007] ECR II-02579, at 
  [50]. 
478   “Classification of goods and services under the Nice Agreement is to serve exclusively 
administrative purposes” (cf. Case T-389/03 Dainichiseika Colour & Chemicals Mfg. 
Co. Ltd. v OHIM [2008] ECR II-00058, para. 62).  
479   CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-443/05 El Corte Ingles SA v OHIM [2007] ECR II-02579, 
para 42. 
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4. Likelihood of association 
Both Articles 8(1) (b) and 9(1) (b) conclude with a stipulation that “likelihood of 
confusion includes the likelihood of association”. Some concerns may be raised 
as to whether the two terms are applied interchangeably. One may be persuaded, 
as the English High Court did,480 to conclude that the term “likelihood of 
association” adds nothing to the phrase “likelihood of confusion”. Since 
likelihood of association is included in the likelihood of confusion, then likeli-
hood of confusion is a genus while the likelihood of association is a species. 
Thus, likelihood of association would be presumed in every scenario in which 
likelihood of confusion is proved. In this sense, proof of likelihood of association 
is not a conclusive evidence of likelihood of confusion. Since a species cannot 
anticipate a genus, a genus has to be proved, in which case a species will be 
presumed.481 Thus, “the mere association which the public might make between 
two trade marks as a result of their analogous semantic content is not in itself a 
sufficient ground for concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion” within 
the meaning of the CTMR.482  
While it can be conceded that likelihood of association is not an alternative to 
likelihood of confusion, the significance of the former must not be ignored as it 
serves to define the scope of the latter.483 To prove likelihood of association, one 
would be required to show that “on account of actual or likely use of the two 
marks, relevant consumers will be led to believe that the goods of the respective 
competitors are associated – perhaps because they have some common source – 
or that one set of goods represent an extension of the product line of the 
other”.484 Thus, establishment of likelihood of association is one step before 
establishment of likelihood of confusion.  
III. Trademark use as a condition for infringement  
Apart from a specific instance stipulated in Article 10 of the CTMR, under 
which the CTM proprietor is entitled to object to generic use of his trademark in 
 
480   See Wagamama Ltd v City Centre Restaurants plc [1996] ETMR 307 (HC). 
481   Cf. Three Stripes trade mark [2002] ETMR 553.  
482   ECJ, 11 November 1997, Case C- 251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG [1997] ECR I-06191, 
  para. 26. 
483   ECJ, 11 November 1997, Case C- 251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG [1997] ECR I-06191, 
  para.18. 
484   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 357 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
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reference works, which is not considered as a trademark use per se, a CTM 
infringement may only be justified if an infringing sign is used in the course of 
trade as a trademark.485  
The phrase “in the course of trade”, as it appears in Article 9(1), is not defined 
anywhere in the CTMR. However, from an etymological point of view,486 the 
phrase could mean that for a CTM infringement to take place, an infringing 
activity must be of a commercial nature undertaken “with a view to economic 
advantage, and not as a private matter”.487 Thus, the infringer must be trading in 
the goods or services in relation to which the CTM proprietor claims the sign has 
been misused. Article 9(2) of the CTMR specifies some modalities of using a 
CTM as well as some activities, which may constitute use of a sign “in the 
course of trade” and “in relation to goods”. It provides that: 
The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraph 1: (a) Affixing the sign to the 
goods or to the packaging thereof; (b) Offering the goods, putting them on the market or 
stocking them for these purposes under the sign, or offering or supplying services 
thereunder; (c) Importing or exporting the goods under that sign; (d) Using the sign on 
business papers and in advertising. 
The ECJ has given some guidance in relation to the use requirement as a 
condition for infringement. In Arsenal Football Club488 the ECJ concluded that 
the rights of the CTM proprietor are not unlimited since he may only prohibit the 
use of sign identical to his CTM for goods identical to those for which the CTM 
is registered, provided that the use of the sign would affect the interests of the 
CTM owner, namely, the functions of a CTM, particularly the essential function 
of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods.489  
 
485   A trademark is used as a trademark as such if it “is used for the purpose of 
distinguishing the goods or services in question as originating from a particular 
undertaking”. Cf. ECJ, Case C-63/97, BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-
00905, para. 38. Cf. also C-48/05, Adam Opel AG [2007] ECR I-01017 which held that 
“where a trade mark is registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles, the affixing by 
a third party, without authorisation of the proprietor of the trade mark, of a sign identical 
to that mark to scale models of that make of vehicle, in order faithfully to reproduce 
those vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models, do not constitute use of an 
indication concerning a characteristic of those scale models” (para. 45).  
486   i.e. Legislative history, in view of the fact that the original 1964 draft of the CTMR 
spoke of “use in commerce”.  
487   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 364 
  (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).   
488   ECJ, 12 November 2002, Case C-206/01Arsenal Football Club v Matthew Reed [2002]  
  ECR I-10273. 
489   Case C-206/01Arsenal Football Club v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273, paras. 51 
and 54. 
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In view of the doctrine of constructive trademark infringement established in 
the Arsenal Football Club case “even where a trader uses a sign and at the same 
time explicitly denies the connection with the mark with a reputation there may 
be a likelihood of confusion”490; hence a trademark proprietor must be able to 
prevent that use.491 In the above case, Mr. Reed was selling football souvenir and 
memorabilia with some signs referring to Arsenal. Meanwhile, Arsenal was as 
well engaged on the same business under several of its registered marks such as 
“Arsenal” and “Arsenal Gunners”. However, Mr. Reed had expressly disclaimed 
his commercial connection with arsenal football club by putting a large sign at 
his place of business which read: “the word or logo(s) on the goods offered for 
sale, are used solely to adorn the product and does not imply or indicate any 
affiliation or relationship with the manufacturers or distributors of any other 
product, only goods with official Arsenal merchandise tags are Arsenal 
merchandise”. The court nevertheless stamped the doctrine of constructive 
infringement by holding that “the use of that sign is such as to create the 
impression that there is a material link in the course of trade between the goods 
concerned and the trade mark proprietor”, notwithstanding the likelihood that 
consumers who come across the mark at the point of sale would not confuse the 
origin of goods whereas those coming across the mark after the goods had left 
the point of sale would be confused.492 Given this likelihood, the use of the mark 
in the circumstances such as those in Arsenal’s case would still be use of a 
trademark as a trademark as such in contravention of the CTM proprietor’s 
interests even where it is apparent that the use of the infringing sign “is 
perceived as a badge of support for or loyalty or affiliation to the trademark 
proprietor”.493 
IV. Protection of a CTM with reputation 
1. Reputation – what is it?  
Reputation is one of the elements that must be proved in order for the 
infringement under Article 9(1) (c) to apply. Reputation must be in relation to 
 
490   Cf. MANIATIS, S. M., (2003), “Whither European Trade Mark Law? Arsenal and 
  Davidoff: The Creative Disorder Stage”, 7 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 99, 142 (2003). 
491   Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273, para. 61. 
492   Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273, paras. 57 
  and 61. 
493   Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273, operative 
  part of the judgment. 
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goods and/or services. The term “reputation”, as used in the trademark context, 
refers to the “consequence of the fact that (i) consumers know that a trade mark 
is in use, (ii) competitors know that a trade mark is in use or (iii) consumers 
place a particular value on the trade mark in order to make or avoid making 
repeat purchases”.494 Reputation must be appreciated in the EU, and, presume-
bly, on the date of the purported infringement.495   
The absence of clear guidelines on how to categorise a CTM as a trademark 
with reputation renders it difficult for the proprietor to prove the existence of 
reputation in relation to his mark. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
any use of a particular mark will end up earning the mark concerned recognition 
in the commercial circles, however measurable and handful the reputation may 
be.  
The ambiguity surrounding the extent of the reputation required under Article 
9(1) (c) of the CTMR may be cleared up by distinguishing a trademark’s 
reputation from a trademark’s goodwill. It follows that: 
The existence of ‘reputation’ is the consequence of the fact that consumers know that a 
trade mark is being used somewhere in the world. In contrast ‘goodwill’ is the 
consequence that, because consumers in a particular jurisdiction know that a trademark is 
used (in other words, that it has a reputation), they base their decision to purchase goods or 
services to which that trade mark is attached on the fact that they are attracted to those 
goods or services by virtue of the positive effect of the reputation. In this sense, goodwill 
would appear to be related to the concept of ‘repute’, the main difference being that a trade 
mark’s ‘repute’ is its image in the eyes of the consumers while the ‘goodwill’ is the 
economic consequence of the trade mark having that image.496 
In order to enjoin a third party from using an infringing sign, the CTM proprietor 
is duty-bound to prove that his mark has a reputation in the Community. He may 
thus base on the following factors to discharge his obligation: 
(a) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (b) The duration and 
extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is 
used; (c) The duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (d) The 
geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (e) The channels of 
trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (f) The degree of recognition 
of the mark in trade areas and channels of trade used by the mark’s owner; and (g) The 
nature and extent of the same or similar sign by third parties.497 
 
494   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 370 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
495   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 383 
  (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).   
496   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 177 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
497   These factors are mentioned in ANNAND, R. & NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Community Trade Mark” 183 (Blackstone Press, London 1998). Cf. also Case C- 
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2. Infringing use in relation to a CTM with reputation 
Five types of use may be prohibited by the proprietor of a CTM with reputation. 
These are (i) the use which takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of 
a proprietor’s mark, (ii) the use which takes unfair advantage of the repute of this 
mark, (iii) the use which is detrimental to the distinctive character of the 
proprietor’s mark, (iv) the use which is detrimental to the repute of this mark, 
and (v) the use of the proprietor’s mark without any due cause. Pursuant to this 
categorisation, it is necessary to address the key terms such as unfair advantage, 
detriment and without due cause. 
a) Unfair advantage  
To contravene Article 9(1) (c) of the CTMR, the infringing sign must be used by 
a defendant in a way that enables him to take unfair advantage of the CTM’s 
repute or distinctive character. Thus, unfair advantage is the result of the 
infringer’s efforts and desire to free-ride “on the coattails of a famous mark or 
trading on its reputation”.498 Such a desire on the part of an infringer is not 
allowed in view of the need “to protect the proprietor against competitors 
wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark”.499  
The L'Oréal/Bellure case500 puts it clear that the phrase “taking unfair advant-
age of the CTM’s repute or distinctive character” does not address the harm 
caused to the mark with a reputation but the unfair advantage taken by the third 
party as a result of the use of the identical or similar sign as a result of which the 
public establishes a link between a trademark with reputation and the infringing 
sign, without confusing them. Thus, the phrase “covers, in particular, cases 
where, by reason of a transfer of the image of the mark or the characteristics 
 
75/97 General Motors Corporation v Yplon SA [1999] ECR I-05421 in which the ECJ 
has, for instance, required an earlier trademark with reputation to be known “by a 
significant part of the public concerned by the products or services covered by that 
trademark” (para. 26). However, clarifying on the extent of territorial recognition of a 
trademark with reputation, the ECJ pointed out that it was not a requirement that such a 
mark must have a reputation throughout the territory of the Member State, but only in a 
substantial part of it (para. 28), and that this substantial part may consist of just a part of 
one of the EU Member States (para. 31). 
498   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 384 
  (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).   
499   ECJ, Case C-63/97, BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-00905, para. 52. 
500   ECJ, Case C-487/07, L'Oréal SA v Bellure [2009] ECR I-05185, paras. 36, 37 and 41. 
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which it projects to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, there is 
clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation”.501 
b) Detriment 
Detriment to the distinctive character or the repute of the CTM signifies that the 
infringer’s activities harm or injure the CTM concerned in such a way that the 
CTM becomes “less attractive (tarnishing) or less distinctive (blurring)”.502 The 
Intel case503 elucidates on the concept of “detriment to the distinctive character 
of the earlier mark” – a concept which is interchangeably referred to as 
‘dilution’, ‘whittling away’ or ‘blurring’. According to the case, the concept is 
relevant when the ability of the earlier mark “to identify the goods or services for 
which it is registered and used as coming from the proprietor of that mark is 
weakened, since use of the later mark leads to dispersion of the identity and hold 
upon the public mind of the earlier mark” with the result that “the earlier mark 
which used to arouse immediate association with the goods and services for 
which is registered, is no longer capable of doing so”.504  
The concept “detriment to the repute of the mark” (otherwise referred to as 
‘tarnishment’ or ‘degradation’) was given a judicial interpretation in the L'Oréal 
case.505  According to the school of thought in this case, a detriment to the repute 
of an earlier mark “is caused when the goods or services for which the identical 
or similar sign is used by the third party may be perceived by the public in such a 
way that the trade mark’s power of attraction is reduced”. A particular example 
of this concept would be where the “goods or services offered by the third party 
possess a characteristic or a quality which is liable to have a negative impact on 
the image” of the earlier mark. 
 
501   Regarding how to determine the question whether the use of a sign takes unfair 
advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark, refer to Case C-487/07, 
L'Oréal SA v Bellure [2009] ECR I-05185, para. 44.   
502   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 384 
  (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).   
503   ECJ, Case C-252/07 Intel Corporation Inc. v CPM United Kingdom Ltd [2008] ECR I- 
  08823. 
504   Case C-252/07, Intel Corporation Inc. v CPM United Kingdom Ltd [2008] ECR I-08823, 
  para. 29. 
505   ECJ, Case C-487/07, L'Oréal SA v Bellure [2009] ECR I-05185, para. 40. 
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c) Without due cause 
The use of the term “without due cause” in Article 9(1) (c) implies that, under 
certain circumstances, a defendant is able to derive unfair advantage from, or to 
cause detriment to, the CTM in any of the ways explained above, without being 
held liable. To put it simply, a defendant can only be held liable if he fails to 
show due cause. A trademark use with due cause would therefore signify a 
different legal situation that may arise only when such a trademark use “can be 
justified by special circumstances which alter its basically illegal character”. This 
would be the case, for instance, when the user of the mark is under compulsion 
to use a CTM with reputation or any other sign confusingly similar to the CTM 
in such a way that he cannot honestly be asked to refrain from doing so, 
notwithstanding the damages the owner of the CTM would suffer from such use, 
or where the user is entitled to the use of this very CTM in his own right and 
does not have to yield this right to that of the owner of the CTM.506 
V. Limitations to CTM rights 
A CTM registration does not give a proprietor a monopoly over a mark in all 
circumstances. Third parties may, for instance, use the very CTM owned by an 
independent person without infringing it. This possibility is clearly described 
under Articles 12 and 13 of the CTMR, just to mention but a few.507 While the 
legal entitlement to use a CTM pursuant to Article 12 of the CTMR is grounded 
on the honest use of the CTM by third parties, the entitlement under Article 13 of 
the CTMR implements the doctrine of CTM exhaustion. The contents of the two 
Articles are addressed below. 
1. Honest use of a CTM 
Where third parties use a CTM in a way that is considered honest according to 
practice of the relevant industry and commercial circle, the proprietor is not 
entitled to interfere with such use. Three types of use of a CTM by third parties 
are presumed honest, unless proved otherwise. These are (i) the use of one’s own 
 
506   Cf. Benelux Court 01.03.1975 "Claeryn"/"Klarein" 7(3) IIC 420, 425 (176). 
507   The limitations discussed under this part do not include, for instance, limitation in 
consequence of acquiescence, which is discussed infra in the part addressing opposition 
proceedings. 
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name or address, (ii) descriptive use of the CTM, and (iii) use of a CTM to 
indicate the intended purpose of a product or service.  
a) Use of one’s own name and address 
According to Article 12(a) of the CTMR, a CTM does not empower the 
proprietor to bar third parties from using in the course of trade their own names 
or addresses. The provision allows persons other than a CTM proprietor to use in 
relation to trade their personal designations, even where the designations 
concerned are identical or confusingly similar to the CTMR.508 
A school of thought advocated for by the Council of the European Union and 
the Commission of the European Communities509 set forth a qualified interpreta-
tion510 of Article 12(a) of the CTMR that the Article entitles only natural persons 
to exercise the right to the use of one’s own name or address. In view of this 
school of thought it may seem that, in most cases the natural persons concerned, 
should be trading as sole traders.511  
However, the ECJ provided a different interpretation which holds that, not 
only personal names, but also a trade name, may be based upon to enjoy the 
exception under Article 12(a) of the CTMR.512 
 
508   Case C-404/02 Nichols plc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2004] ECR I-08499, paras. 33 
and 34. 
509   This school of thought is contained in the joint declaration issued by the EU Council and 
the Commission of the European Communities, and recorded in the minutes of the 
Council when Community Trade Mark Directive (i.e. Council Directive89/104/EEC – 
harmonising trade mark law) was adopted. (See ECJ, Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch 
Inc. v Budéjovický Budvar, národní podnik, reported in the Official Journal C 219 , 
14/09/2002 P. 0004 – 0004, para. 78). 
510   “A qualified interpretation” in the sense that statements of the Council and the 
Commission are not part of the legal text, hence they are without prejudice to the 
interpretation of the relevant legal text by the ECJ (cf. ECJ, Case C-49/02 Heidelberger 
Bauchemie [2004] ECR I-06129, para. 17).   
511   However, following the same school of thought, some forms of legal incorporation may 
qualify to exercise the right to one’s name or address as per Article 12(a) of the CTMR. 
The specific example of this case would be where the incorporation concerned has no 
independent legal existence other than that of natural persons constituting it, as the case 
would be for a partnership registered in the United Kingdom. Under the immediately 
preceding example, partners of the firm would be allowed to adapt their own names 
(such as Brian & Smith solicitors) as the designation of their firm without any liability to 
the CTM proprietor (cf. Sections 1 and 5 of the UK Partnerships Act of 1890).   
512   See Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Budéjovický Budvar, národní podnik, OJ  C 
  219 , 14/09/2002 P. 0004 – 0004, para. 81. 
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b) Descriptive use of a CTM 
Article 12(b) stipulates that a CTM shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a 
third party from using in the course of trade “indications concerning the kind, 
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of 
production of the goods or of rendering the service, or other characteristics of the 
goods or service”. Article 12(b) of the CTMR is thus permissive of the 
descriptive use, made by third parties, of a protected CTM. An example of a 
descriptive use of a mark may be drawn from the fact that a juice manufacturer 
may not be prohibited from mentioning to consumers that his juice contains 
artificial sweetener of a certain type, even where, by so mentioning he makes use 
of a proprietor’s CTM registered for sweeteners. Accordingly, a third party may 
use in course of commercial negotiation, without infringing, a proprietor’s mark 
for the purposes of revealing the “origin of goods which he has produced 
himself”, provided he uses the proprietor’s mark “solely to denote the particular 
characteristics of the goods he is offering for sale so that there can be no question 
of the trade mark used being perceived as a sign indicative of the undertaking of 
origin”.513 
However, the descriptive use permitted under Article 12(b) seems to be 
controversial, since the descriptive use of CTM is likely to injure the proprietor’s 
interests, particularly, by interfering with the guarantee of origin intimated in 
paragraph 8 of the preamble to the CTMR. This fear is, nevertheless, arrayed by 
the proviso to Article 12, described in iv below, pursuant to which any purported 
descriptive use of CTM would be enjoined if it is not honest.514  
c) Use of a CTM to indicate intended purpose 
Within the ambit of Article 12(c) of the CTMR, a CTM does not bestow upon its 
proprietor a right to prohibit a third party from using in the course of trade the 
CTM “where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or 
service, in particular as accessories or spare parts.515 
 
513   Cf. Michael Hölterhoff v Ulrich Freisleben [2002] ECR I-04187, para.17. 
514   See in this respect Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co. V Putsch GmbH 
  [2004] ECR I-00691, para. 27. 
515   Cf. ANNAND, R. & NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade 
  Mark” 183 (Blackstone Press, London 1998).  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
140 
 
The ECJ decision, in Gillette case,516 reiterates that “use of the trade mark by 
a third party who is not its owner is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of 
a product marketed by that third party where such use in practice constitutes the 
only means of providing the public with comprehensible and complete 
information on that intended purpose in order to preserve the undistorted system 
of competition in the market for that product”. 
In the BMW517 case, the ECJ considered the question whether informative use 
of a trademark by a third party infringed the exclusive rights of a trademark 
proprietor. In the case at hand, the defendant used the BMW mark in advertisem-
ents to inform the public that he carries out the repair and maintenance of BMW 
cars or he has specialised, or is a specialist, in the sale or repair and maintenance 
of those cars.  The BMW Company objected to the defendant’s use of the 
trademark, since the defendant, who carries on a garage business, used in course 
of trade the proprietor’s mark.518 In the first place, the ECJ had to determine 
whether the defendant used a mark in dispute as a trademark as such. The court 
found that the mark was used as a mark519 even if infringement could only be 
upheld if the use complained of was not exempted under Article 12 of the 
CTMR.  
The end results of the case as far as the application of Article 12(c) of the 
CTM is concerned concurred with the opinion delivered by the Attorney General 
Jacobs520 who had opined that “if an independent trader carries out the 
maintenance and repair of BMW cars or is in fact a specialist in that field, that 
fact cannot in practice be communicated to his customers without using the 
BMW mark”.521  
Thus, the defendant’s use of the BMW mark in the BMW case was not only 
considered legitimate but also honest within the meaning of the proviso to 
Article 12 of the CTMR, as in the circumstances described in the case the 
defendant observed “a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of 
the trade mark owner”.522 
 
516   Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy [2005] ECR 
  I-02337, Para. 1 of the operative part. 
517   ECJ, Case C-63/97, BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-00905, para. 33. 
518   And given the fact that use of trademark in advertisements without authorisation is 
  prohibited under Article 9(2) (d) of the CTMR. 
519   ECJ, Case C-63/97 BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-00905, operative part at 
  [2]. 
520   Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 2 April 1998 in ECJ, Case C-
63/97 BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-00905. 
521   ECJ, Case C-63/97 BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-00905, para. 60. 
522   ECJ, Case C-63/97 BMW v Ronald Karel Deenik [1999] ECR I-00905, para. 61. 
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d) Proviso to Article 12 
The proviso to Article 12 of the CTMR requires activities considered to be 
limitative to the rights enjoyed by the CTM proprietor, as may be undertaken by 
third parties, to be pursued “in accordance with honest practices in industrial and 
commercial matters”.523 According to the ECJ, “the condition of ‘honest 
practice’ is, in essence, an expression of the duty to act fairly in relation to 
legitimate interests of the trade-mark proprietor”.524 Thus, the phrase “in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters” may be 
associated with the provisions of Article 10bis (2) of the Paris Convention.525  
According to the provisions “any act of competition contrary to honest practices 
in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition”. 
Consequently, Article 10bis (3) mentions three instances of behaviour 
considered as not honest. Two of these behaviours, being directly relevant to the 
discussion on Article 12 of the CTMR, are worthy of verbatim quoting:  
(1) all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 
(2)... 
(3) indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the 
public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for 
their purpose, or the quality, of the goods.  
In the light of the above explanation, it is safe to conclude that an act, which on 
its face value would be permitted under the provisions of Article 12(a), (b) and 
(c) of the CTMR, will nevertheless be interdicted if it amounts to an unfair 
competition within the meaning of the provisions of the Paris Convention quoted 
above. 
2. Exhaustion of CTM rights   
Article 13(1) of the CTMR provides for the doctrine of trademark exhaustion by 
stipulating that “a Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to 
prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the 
 
523   Cf. last sentence of Article 12 of the CTMR. 
524   Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Budvar, reported in the Official Journal C 219, 
14/09/2002 P. 0004 – 0004, para. 82. Cf. also Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen 
[2004] ECR I-00691, para. 24. 
525   Cf. ANNAND, R. & NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade 
Mark” 183 (Blackstone Press, London 1998).  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
142 
 
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent”. In view 
of the above quotation, Article 13(1) of the CTMR establishes the principle of 
regional exhaustion of CTM rights.  
Thus, the Article mirrors another instance where a CTM proprietor may not 
enjoin third parties from using his CTM in respect of goods and services, which 
have already been a subject of a sale done on the authority of a CTM owner. 
However, an exception, as contained in Article 13(2) of the CTMR, is applicable 
to the stipulation under Article 13(1) of the CTMR. The former Article excludes 
from application the provisions of the latter “where there exist legitimate reasons 
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially 
where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put 
on the market”.  
The doctrine of regional exhaustion is considered in details in the context of 
the regime for the free movement of goods discussed in chapter six infra. 
VI. Duties in relation to CTM 
1. Renewal of CTM registration 
As opposed to other industrial property rights, a registered CTM may be 
protected for an indefinite period.526 While the CTMR sets out an initial validity 
term of 10 years, it provides a CTM proprietor with a possibility of renewing his 
trademark for unspecified number of times.527 Thus, the right to enjoy CTM 
rights beyond ten years is subject to the CTM concerned being renewed by the 
proprietor, whereas the right to unhampered enjoyment of CTM rights within 
any five years of registration is subject to the CTM concerned being used in 
commerce.  
2. Obligation to use a CTM 
Article 15(1) of the CTMR requires that a genuine use be made of a CTM in the 
Community in connection with the goods and/or services in respect of which the 
 
526   Factually, CTM rights may be owned perpetually where the proprietor keeps on 
renewing the registration. Theoretically, however, a renewed CTM has a distinct legal 
existence as Article 47(5) of the CTMR provides that “renewal shall take effect from the 
day following the date on which the existing registration expires”.  
527   Cf. Article 46 of the CTMR. 
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CTM is registered. As a general rule, a CTM must be used within any five years 
following its registration. The Article was specially crafted to curb some 
incidences in which CTM holders would attempt to circumvent the use 
requirements by just using a CTM once in the first five years of its registration 
and suspend such use indefinitely, while retaining the CTM rights.528 Thus, 
within the ambit of the Article, some proper reasons for non-use must be given529 
or else the non-use or suspension of a CTM use for a consecutive period of 5 
years will render a CTM prone to revocation.530  Proper reasons for non-use are 
not expressly explained in the first sentence of Article 15(1). However, such 
reasons might exist in circumstances which are beyond the proprietor’s control 
such as where the government prevents sale or marketing of the goods or 
services under the trademark for certain duration of time.531 A rule of reason 
would generally exonerate a CTM proprietor from losing his CTM rights 
provided he is not at fault for the non-use.  
The ECJ jurisprudence addresses the requirement of genuine use of CTM. In 
Radetykz-Orden case,532 it was stated that genuine use was the opposite of a 
token trademark use actuated on the desire to preserve the rights conferred by the 
mark – a use which would be adjudged as inconsistent with the essential function 
of a trademark to serve as a guarantee of the identity of the origin of goods or 
services.533 Following the genuine use requirement, a CTM proprietor is obliged 
to use the CTM on the market for the goods or services protected by that CTM 
and not just internal use within the undertaking concerned.534  
 
528   Recital 9 of the Community Trade Mark Directive states clearly the essence of the 
genuine use requirement: “In order to reduce the total number of trademarks registered 
and protected in the Community and, consequently, the number of conflicts which arise 
between them, it is essential to require that registered trademarks must actually be used, 
or if not used be subject to revocation.” 
529   This right to be given an opportunity to give reasons for non use is reinforced under the 
provisions of Article 5C (1) of the Paris Convention, which stipulates that “[If], in any 
country, use of the registered mark is compulsory, the registration may be cancelled only 
after a reasonable period, and then only if the person concerned does not justify his 
inaction”. 
530   Cf. Article 51 of the CTMR. 
531   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 44 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).    
532   Case C-442/07, Verein Radetykz-Orden v Bundesvereingigung Kameradschaft 
‘Feldmarschall Radetzky‘ [2008] ECR I-09223, para. 13. 
533   On the concept of genuine use, cf. also Case C-495/07, Silberquelle GmbH v Maselli-
Strickmode GmbH [2009] ECR I-00137, para. 17; Case C-259/02, La Mer Technology 
Inc. v. Laboratoires Goemar SA [2004] E.C.R. I-1159, para. 1 of the operative part; 
Case C-40/01, Ansul [2003] ECR I-02439, paras. 35 and 36. 
534   Case C-442/07, Verein Radetykz-Orden v Bundesvereingigung Kameradschaft [2008] 
  ECR I-09223, para. 14. 
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Article 15(1) (a) of the CTMR, provides as well some explanations as to 
which use may constitute genuine use of a CTM. Accordingly, “use of the 
Community trade mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter the 
distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered” may still 
constitute a genuine use.535 Recognition of this mode of use is the logical 
consequence of Article 4 of the CTMR in the sense that a CTM is registered as 
long as it can distinguish goods or services it designates from goods or services 
designated by other signs.536 Hence, nothing would disqualify an italicised word 
mark, for instance, on non-use grounds where such word mark is used in a 
bolded font while retaining the distinctive character of the said italicised mark. 
Moreover, non-use may not be inferred from the fact that a CTM has been used 
only for export purposes.537 It will still constitute genuine use where the marked 
goods are not put on the European market but rather, being produced and the 
mark affixed in the EU Member State; the products were exported to be sold 
outside the EU borders.538  
Article 15(2) of the CTMR provides a liberalised scenario pursuant to which a 
genuine use may be confirmed. Within the ambit of the Article, a constructive 
use of trademark by a proprietor is recognised where a CTM is used by a third 
party upon consent by the proprietor. Such consent may be express or implied 
from the underlying circumstances of each case. There is consent, for instance, 
“where the proprietor is a holding company allowing its subsidiaries to use the 
trade mark”.539  
A CTM proprietor may consent to the use of his registered sign by issuing a 
license. License may be given for the use of a CTM in some parts of the 
Community. Thus, while a CTM must be valid for the whole Community, it is 
not necessarily that a license must cover the whole Community. Such license 
 
535   Such use is also considered as a genuine use under Article 5C paragraph 2 of the Paris 
Convention. 
536   However, there is no genuine trademark use where the trademark is used in relation to 
goods that are intended to be given as a gift to purchasers of some other goods marketed 
by the giver of the gifts, since in this scenario the items given free of charge “are not at 
all distributed with the aim of penetrating the market for the goods in the same class”. In 
other words, affixing a trademark to items given free of charge “does not contribute to 
creating an outlet for those items, or to distinguishing, in the interest of customer, those 
items from the goods of other undertakings” (cf. Case C-495/07, Silberquelle GmbH v 
Maselli-Strickmode GmbH [2009] ECR I-00137, paras. 21and 22).  
537   Cf. Article 15(1) (b) of the CTMR. 
538   Article 9(2)(c) of the CTMR, regards as an infringement a use of a registered trade mark 
by a third party not having consent of a CTM proprietor. Thus, since a CTM proprietor 
enjoys exclusive of a CTM for export goods, such use is logically considered genuine. 
539   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 44 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).  
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will remain valid even if it is issued in respect of a single Member State or part 
of it.540 Consequently, the use made by a licensee in respect of a part of a 
geographical area in a Member State, will be accredited to the CTM proprietor as 
far as the CTM use requirement is concerned.  
VII. Key principles relating to precedence of CTM rights 
1. Priority Right 
Semantically, the term “Priority” means the right to precede others in order, rank 
or privilege.541 The decisive factor in deciding which signs precede the other is a 
priority date recognized under the CTMR. Article 29 of the CTMR is a legal 
foundation of the CTM priority right, and is built on the corresponding 
provisions of the Paris Convention.542 The Article stipulates that:  
A person who has duly filed an application for a trade mark in or for any state party to the 
Paris Convention ... shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing a Community trade mark 
application for the same trade mark in respect of goods and services which are identical 
with or contained within those for which the application has been filed, a right of priority 
during a period of six months from the date of filing of the first application.543 
Where a priority claim is made,544 the mark concerned may only become vulne-
rable to applications or registrations made before the priority date. Thus, under 
Article 31 of the CTMR, the date of priority counts as the “date of filing of the 
Community trade mark application for the purpose of determining which rights 
 
540   Cf. Article 22(1) of the CTMR. 
541   <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/priority> (status: 30 July 2012).  
542   i.e. Article 4 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 
20, 1883 as revised. 
543   Article 29(1) of the CTMR.   
544   Priority right must be specifically claimed by including in the CTM application a 
declaration of priority and a copy of the previous application (cf. Article 30 of the 
CTMR). Pursuant to article 33 of the CTMR, priority claim may also be based on 
exhibition. However, priority right based on exhibitions differs from the one stipulated 
under article 29 of the CTMR. Whereas the latter is based on registration or application 
for registration, the former is based on exhibition of goods bearing the mark at an 
official or officially recognized international exhibition. To rely on the exhibition 
priority, a CTM applicant has to submit to OHIM evidence regarding the first date of the 
exhibition of the goods bearing the mark or of the services rendered under the mark 
during the exhibition. Thus, a CTM applicant will be required to submit a certificate 
issued by the competent authority of the exhibition stating the date on which the goods 
bearing the mark or the services rendered under the mark was first exhibited in 
connection with the goods or services. 
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take precedence”. In the circumstances, under the CTM system, as under any 
other trademark system “based on a first-to-file approach, the determination of 
the filing date has an overriding significance for both the applicant and holders 
of other rights, since priority and other precedence rights stemming from that 
date will affect the availability of the protected sign to third parties”.545  
2. Seniority right 
The right to priority stipulated under the CTMR should not be confused with the 
concept of “seniority” which is actually another form of precedence of rights.546 
Under the concept, an applicant for Community trade mark may claim seniority 
of a national mark registered in a member state pursuant to Arts 34 and 35 of the 
CTMR.547 Thus, “seniority is a mechanism which allows a trade mark owner to 
consolidate his existing trade mark registrations in Member States under the 
‘umbrella’ of a CTM registration”.548 Seniority right is, nonetheless, used in the 
CTMR for ease of distinguishing priority rights claimable under the Paris 
Convention and those which are purely the creation of the Community law in its 
relation to trade mark law of the member states.549  
F. CTM Application and Opposition proceedings 
Article 6 of the CTMR identifies registration as a sole means by which CTMs 
may be obtained and protected.550 The mere use of a certain symbol as a 
trademark does not entitle the one who has adopted and used that symbol to 
 
545   Blueco Limited’s application [1999] E.T.M.R. 398, para. 12. 
546   Timing is a demarcating line between the two seemingly same rights. While priority 
right is enjoyable within a certain period of time, the seniority right is limitless. Seniority 
right continues to be available to a proprietor of Community trade make even where the 
earlier national trade mark on whose basis seniority is claimable is surrendered or 
allowed to lapse (cf. Article 34(2)). Nevertheless, “failure to satisfy the requirements 
concerning the claiming of seniority of a national trade mark shall result in loss of that 
right for the application” (Article 36(6) of the CTMR).  
547   These two provisions are discussed exhaustively in chapter 5 infra.  
548   ANNAND, R. & NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade Mark” 
73 (Blackstone Press, London 1998). 
549   The interface between the CTM system and the trademark system of the Member States 
is addressed under chapter 5 infra.  
550   Cf. MARX, C., “Deutsches, europäisches und internationales Markenrecht“ (2nd ed.) 
404 (Wolters Kruwer Deutschland GmbH, Köln 2007).   
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obtain a CTM protection by way of a registration in respect of that particular 
trade symbol.  
I. CTM application 
Some preliminary issues regarding an application for a CTM, such as a right to 
apply for a CTM, an entitlement to file a CTM application as well as the 
languages to be used in respect of such an application, may be highlighted.  
In line with Article 5 of the CTMR, any person, whether natural or legal, has a 
right to become a proprietor of the CTM. Such a person cannot be disqualified 
from owning a CTM on the ground that he/she/it is not a citizen or resident of 
the European Union.551 The determination of the question, whether a particular 
body is a legal person entitled to own a CTM under the CTMR depends on how 
such a legal body is treated under a national law creating it. Thus, nothing will 
bar a legal person such as a company or a firm from owning a CTM, provided 
that a respective legal person enjoys under the national law, the right to conclude 
contracts, to sue and to be sued as well as to discharge any other legal oblige-
tions in its own name.552  
However, as regards a right to file a CTM application, the CTMR employs a 
different approach in two alternative ways. Any properly qualified trade-mark 
lawyer and a professional representative registered with OHIM is competent to 
file a CTM application, provided that he has secured a proprietor’s power of 
attorney as an evidence of consent to such a representation. Similarly, a 
trademark proprietor may not need to be represented before OHIM if he has 
knowledge and skills needed for the processing of a CTM application, provided 
that, where a person concerned is not an EU citizen, he fulfils  the condition of 
having business establishment in the EU. Thus, firms established outside the EU 
and, which have no business dealings within the EU, are incapable of filing a 
CTM application on their own.553 
A CTM application has to comply with the language requirement stipulated 
under Article 119 of the CTMR. Essentially, any application tendered before 
 
551   Prior to the amendment made to Article 5 of the CTMR by Council Regulation (EC) No 
422/2004 of 19.2.2004, not every natural or legal person could own a CTM. 
Proprietorship of the CTM was dependent on various factors such as nationality and 
place of domicile of the natural or legal persons concerned. For a detailed account on the 
legal position before the 2004 amendment, see MÜHLENDAHL, A., et al, “Die 
Gemeinschaftsmarke” 21 and 22 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1998).  
552   Cf. Article 3 of the CTMR. 
553   Cf. Articles 92 and 93 of the CTMR. 
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OHIM must bear one of the office’s five languages, namely, Italian, Spanish, 
German, French and English. The rule is that in addition to the language in 
which the application is submitted, a CTM applicant has to choose an alternative 
language, which may be used in other proceedings relating to the CTM such as 
opposition and cancellation proceedings. A CTM application may, nevertheless, 
be tendered in a language other than OHIM’s official languages provided a 
translation in one of the office’s working language is made. It may thus be 
pointed out that the language's rules under the CTMR are flexible. For instance, a 
language in which the CTM application was filed may still be used for some 
proceedings before OHIM such as opposition, revocation, or invalidity, where 
the CTM proprietor is the only party to the proceedings.554   
1. Procedure and contents 
A CTM application may be filed either at OHIM or at the central industrial 
property office of a Member State or at the Benelux Trade Mark Office. It is left 
open for the applicant to decide where to lodge his CTM application. 
Applications submitted to central offices of the Member States have the same 
status as those filed directly at OHIM in Alicante, Spain. According to Article 27 
of the CTMR, an application filed at the national industrial office or at the 
Benelux Trade Mark Office will acquire as its filing date the date on which all 
documents required by law to be included in the CTM application were filed at a 
relevant office provided that the application fee was paid within a month 
preceding the date when that application fulfilled the legal requirements. Unless 
applications, other than those filed directly at OHIM, are forwarded to OHIM 
within two weeks and, in any case, within a period not exceeding two months, 
such applications will be deemed to have been filed on the date on which the 
application reached OHIM.555 
A CTM application must contain some information prescribed under Article 
26 of the CTMR: a formal request for registration of a trade symbol as a CTM; 
identity of the applicant; information regarding the goods and services in respect 
of which registration of the trade symbol is requested; as well as a graphical 
representation of the trade symbol concerned.  
As far as the identity of the CTM applicant is concerned, it suffices to point 
out that both natural and artificial persons may become proprietors of a CTM and 
hence entitled to file a CTM application. Whereas names, addresses and 
 
554   Cf. ECJ, Case C-361/01 P Kristina KIK [2003] ECR I-08283, para. 17. 
555   Cf. Article 25 of the CTMR. 
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nationalities of the CTM applicants may serve to prove the applicants’ identity, 
names of legal persons are indicated by their official designations and those of 
natural persons are indicated by their surnames and given names.556  
Since the principle of trade mark certainty dictates that a CTM protection 
should only be in respect of goods and services specified in the application,557 a 
CTM applicant must expressly identify the goods and services which he intends 
to market or to offer using the mark applied for. He does so by classifying the 
goods and services in accordance with the “common classification referred to in 
Article 1 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of 
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 
1957, as revised and amended”.558 Moreover, in addition to paying a basic CTM 
application fee, the applicant is supposed to pay a “class fee for each class 
exceeding three to which the goods and services belong”.559    
Representation of the mark applied for is likely to be very easy, especially 
where the applicant is not interested in securing CTM registration in respect of 
some isolated graphical features or colours, in which case the mark will be 
reproduced in normal scripts. This kind of reproduction may involve “typing the 
letters, numerals, and signs in the application”.560 
2. Search procedure 
Article 38 CTMR provides for search procedure. The function of the search 
reports is to inform the applicant about prior rights which may conflict with the 
sign for which he has applied, so that he may take appropriate action even before 
publication. These search reports may result in the applicant withdrawing the 
application, if he finds there are clearly conflicting marks which will prevent him 
from obtaining a CTM registration and from using the mark in all Member 
States.561 Alternatively, he may amend the application, for instance by restricting 
the specification of goods and services in order to avoid a conflict of goods. 
Finally, he may take the matter up with the owner of the prior conflicting marks 
in order to seek an agreed solution. 
 
556   Cf. Rule 1 of the CTMIR. 
557   Cf. GASTINEL, E. & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade 
Mark” 98 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
558   Cf. Rule 2(1) of the CTMIR and Article 28 of the CTMR.  
559   Cf. Rule 4 of the CTMIR and Article 26(3) of the CTMR. 
560   Cf. Rule 3(1) of the CTMIR. 
561   Cf. KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 117 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).     
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It may be deduced from the provisions of Article 8(1) that the search for 
earlier rights will be carried out in respect of identical trademarks for identical 
goods or services; similar trademarks for identical goods or services; similar 
trademarks for similar goods or services; and identical trademarks for similar 
goods or services.562 While the search report may form the basis for an 
opposition against a CTM registration, the opposition and cancellation divisions 
are not obliged to observe the outcome of the search.563 Similarly, the search 
report may not serve as a conclusive evidence as to whether or not a certain trade 
mark has a reputation in the community within the ambit of Article 8(5) of the 
CTMR.564 
Before the revision of the Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94565 by the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 422/2004 of 19 February 2004,566 Article 39 of the 
revised Regulation required a mandatory national search to be carried out by the 
central industrial property office of all Member States participating in the 
system. For CTMs filed on or after 10 March 2008 (the date when the revisions 
of the Article came into force), the national search is no longer mandatory, but 
remains optional depending on the willingness of the CTM applicant to have a 
search conducted.  
The old search system applied to all CTM applications made before 10 March 
2008. Upon receipt of an application, OHIM was required to adhere to three 
basic steps, namely, to accord a filing date to a CTM application; to draw up “a 
Community search report citing those earlier Community trademarks or 
Community trademarks applications discovered”567 and to transmit a copy of the 
CTM application to the national trademark office of each Member State 
participating in the search system.568 The national office had to conduct a search 
 
562   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 80 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).  
563   Cf. Articles 132 and 134 of the CTMR. 
564   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 80 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).  
565   OJ L 11, 14.1.1994, p. 1. 
566   Some weaknesses inherent in the old search system led to the revision of Article 39 of 
the Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94. Lack of uniformity of national search reports is 
mentioned in the Commission report on the operation of the system of searches resulting 
from Article 39 of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94. Cf. Commission document COM 
(2002) 754 final, available at <http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/mark/ec1.pdf> (status: 30 July 
2012).   
567   The discovered earlier CTMs are those “which may be invoked under Article 8 against 
the registration of the Community trade mark applied for”. Cf. Article 39(1) of the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 as it stood before 10 March 2008.  
568   The copy of the CTM application is only sent to the trademark offices of the Member 
States which informed OHIM of their decision to operate a search in their registers of 
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and submit a search report to OHIM within three months from the day it received 
a copy of CTM application. The national search report fulfils two connected 
objectives: it reveals earlier national rights or national trademark applications 
which can be invoked against registration of the CTM.569  
According to the provisions of the revised Article governing the new search 
procedure, the search system is still very important: OHIM, upon according a 
filing date to the application, draws up a Community search report the same way 
it used to do in the old search system.570 Unless “at the time of filing a CTM 
application, the applicant requests that a search report also be prepared by the 
central industrial property offices of the Member States”, OHIM is no longer 
obliged to send a copy of CTM application to the national trade mark office of 
the Member States.571  
The new search system has made national searches optional. In order for a 
national search to take place three main conditions have to be fulfilled:  
 Application for national search must be made together with the 
application for CTM registration.  
 A request for a national search is only possible in the Member States 
which had informed OHIM that a national search report in respect of 
CTM application will be conducted by their central industrial property 
offices.572 Opting for a national search implies that all participating 
national offices will carry out the search. The applicant cannot decide to 
opt for few countries among the current 16 participating offices.  
 The national search fee has to be paid within the time limit for the 
payment of the filing fee. This time limit is one month. If the optional 
search fee is not paid in time, the national search cannot be conducted. 
However, some obligations that OHIM had in the old search system still apply in 
the new search system with slight modifications. For instance, under the old 
system OHIM had to transmit to the CTM applicant a Community search report 
and the national search reports, still it does the same under the new system. The 
only difference is the time limit within which OHIM has to transmit such reports. 
 
trademarks in respect of CTM. Cf. Article 39(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 
40/94 as it stood before 10 March 2008.  
569   Cf. Article 39(3) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 as it stood before 10 March 
  2008. 
570   Cf. Article 38(1) of the CTMR. 
571   Cf. Article 38(2) of the CTMR. 
572   By March 2008, only 16 European countries operated a national search in respect of 
CTM applications. These are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.   
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Since the old search system allowed the national offices to submit search reports 
to OHIM within three months, OHIM could transmit the search reports to the 
applicant within three months as well. However, where the optional search is 
preferred and granted under the new system, the national office has the 
maximum duration of two months within which it has to submit to OHIM the 
national search report. OHIM has therefore to transmit such national search 
reports immediately to the CTM applicant after receiving them.573   
Thus, both new and old search systems oblige OHIM to inform the proprietors 
of any earlier CTM rights or earlier CTM applications of the fact that a 
Community search report in respect of CTM application similar to, or closely 
resembling, theirs has been published.574 Publication of the CTM application is 
mandatory under Article 39 of the CTMR. Such publication allows proprietors of 
earlier rights to challenge registration of the published CTM application on the 
basis of relative grounds for trademark refusal.  
II. Opposition against CTM registration 
Where, in the opinion of OHIM, a particular sign has met the requirements of the 
CTMR,575 such a sign will be registered as a CTM, provided no objection against 
its registration has been raised, or where such objection has been raised, it has 
not been successful, or has been withdrawn; and the registration fee has been 
paid.576  
Opposition is a procedure which enables proprietors of earlier trademark 
rights to oppose registration of junior marks. The opposition proceedings are 
therefore “concerned with the ability of an applicant to acquire proprietary rights 
in the mark for which he sought registration”.577 Oppositions may generally be 
based on relative grounds for trademark refusal mentioned under Article 8 of the 
CTMR. While third parties are not entitled to institute opposition proceedings 
before OHIM, they may still raise an objection against CTM registration. As a 
 
573   See article 38(6) of the CTMR (new system) and Article 39(5) of the Council Regulation 
(EC) No 40/94 as it stood before 10 March 2008 (old system), respectively. 
574   Cf. Article 38(7) of CTMR.  
575   These requirements include those respectively described under Articles 4, 7, 8, 25 and 
26 of the CTMR; namely, subject matter of the CTM registration, absolute grounds for 
refusal of registration, relative grounds for refusal of registration and conditions with 
which applications must comply.  
576   Cf. Article 45 of the CTMR. 
577   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy” 425 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
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matter of law, a third party objection must be based on absolute grounds for 
trademark refusal. Hence, the objection procedure is distinguishable from 
opposition procedure in various ways which are discussed below. 
1. Objection procedure 
Since the CTM system is designed to accommodate the highest degree of 
transparency, third parties are allowed to submit their observations to OHIM 
where they think that a CTM applied for may not be registered because one or 
more of the absolute grounds for trademark refusal are applicable to the said 
mark. Following the publication of a CTM application, Article 40 of the CTMR 
entitles a prescribed group of third parties578 to communicate to OHIM their 
written observations pointing out some absolute grounds under Article 7 of the 
CTMR that are likely to defeat registration of the CTM applied for.  
The aim of these observations is to move OHIM to reopen the examination 
procedure to see whether the absolute grounds of refusal put forward preclude 
registration of the mark claimed. Based on a need to comply with the European 
Convention on Human Rights579 enshrining a right to be heard, the above 
observations have to be communicated to the CTM applicant for possible 
comments. However, the right to submit observations is separable from the right 
enjoyed by the parties to the proceedings before OHIM.  
Within the letters of the last sentence of Article 40(1) of the CTMR, persons 
submitting observations to OHIM are not parties to the proceedings before it.580 
Since third parties have relatively limited and weaker rights in relation to CTM 
proceedings,581 their observations cannot, in most cases, pose an insurmountable 
 
578   These are “any natural or legal person and any group or body representing 
manufacturers, producers, suppliers of services, traders or consumers” (cf. Article 40(1) 
of the CTMR). 
579   See in particular Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights signed in 
  Rome on 4 November 1950.  
580   Recall should thus be had to the position that pursuant to article 59 of the CTMR, an 
action may be brought before the Board of Appeal only by a party to a proceeding before 
OHIM. Additionally, under Article 65(4) of the CTMR, an action before the CTM courts 
is available only to parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal which led to 
the contested decision (cf. CFI, 9 April 2003, Case T-224/01, Durferrit GmbH v. OHIM 
[2003] ECR II-01589, para. 74). 
581   In view of the fact that they are not considered as parties to any proceedings before 
OHIM (cf. Article 40(1) of the CTMR). However, as of recent time, third party 
observers have regained some rights which they could not enjoy previously. For 
instance, Communication No. 1/00 of the president of OHIM dated 25 February 2000 
concerning observations under Article 41 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 had 
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threat to the registrant, since the CTM examiner will have considered all relevant 
absolute grounds before the publication of the CTM application.582 On the 
contrary, an opposition right remains the main stumbling block, which the CTM 
applicant must overcome in order to secure a CTM registration.583  
2. Grounds for opposition 
Proceedings relating to oppositions against CTM registrations are regulated 
under Articles 41 and 42 of the CTMR as well as under Rules 15 to 22 of the 
CTMIR.  
Pursuant to Article 41 of the CTMR,584 an opponent has a maximum period of 
three months, counted from the date of the publication of a CTM application,585 
 
limited the observer’s rights only to the submission stage; meaning that he was not 
entitled to be informed specially on the action taken by OHIM in response to his 
observation, even if the observer retained a right to be informed on the OHIM’s receipt 
of his observation and a confirmation that the applicant will receive such observation. 
While the above Communication remains OHIM’s key document setting out the 
procedure of the Office concerning third party observations, it was amended in part by 
Communication No 3/02 of the President of the Office of 5 March 2002. According to 
this new communication, the observer is not only entitled to know the contents of the 
communication made to the CTM applicant by OHIM, but also to be informed about the 
action taken by the Office against the applicant. 
582   Regarding this position see Articles 37(1) and 41(1) of the CTMR which indicate that in 
the normal examination procedure and before the opposition stage, “OHIM 
automatically examines whether registration of the mark claimed is precluded by an 
absolute ground of refusal” (cf. CFI, 9 April 2003, Case T-224/01, Durferrit GmbH v. 
OHIM [2003] ECR II-01589, para. 72). 
583   A rough statistical data may reveal that “more than 20 per cent of CTM applications do 
not result in the registration of a CTM because of what happens during opposition 
proceedings” (cf. GASTINEL, E. & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the 
Community Trade Mark” 110 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
584   Article 41(1) of the CTMR provides that: 
  Within a period of three months following the publication of a Community trade mark 
application, notice of opposition to registration of the trade mark may be given on the 
grounds that it may not be registered under Article 8:  
  By the proprietors of earlier trade marks referred to in Article 8(2) as well as licensees 
authorised by the proprietors of those trade marks, in respect of Article 8(1) and (5); By 
the proprietors of trade marks referred to in Article 8(3); By the proprietors of earlier 
marks or signs referred to in Article 8(4) and by persons authorised under the relevant 
national law to these rights. 
585   Publication date includes the date of republication of an amended application allowed 
under Article 43(2) of the CTMR (cf. Article 41(2) of the CTMR). On how the time 
limits enshrined in the CTMR are calculated see MÜHLENDAHL, A., et al, “Die 
Gemeinschaftsmarke” 94 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1998). 
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within which to oppose registration of the CTM in the form it is applied for.586 
Such opposition may be based on prior rights established under Article 8 of the 
CTMR587 mentioned in Section D(II) and discussed in Section E(I)(2) of this 
chapter.588   
3. Entitlement to file a notice of opposition  
Given the various potential prior rights that may be invoked against a CTM 
application, the CTM applicant’s chances of success plummet, whereas the 
position as to who may enjoy the locus standi to oppose is certain and stable. As 
a general rule, only a proprietor of earlier rights589 is automatically entitled to 
lodge a notice of opposition590 by advancing an argument that a particular trade 
symbol should not be registered as a CTM in view of  his “pre-existing 
 
586   BASTIAN, E.-M., KNAAK, R. & SCHRICKER, G., (eds.) “Gemeinschaftsmarke und 
  Recht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten“ 87 (Verlag C. H. Beck, München 2006).   
587   On the basis of these prior rights, opposition proceedings are seen as a peculiar danger to 
the success of the CTM application. Since there are numerous prior rights, opposition to 
a CTM registration may base on a source in respect of which the applicant had no 
knowledge of its existence at the time when he filed his application. In the 
circumstances, even where the applicant is presumed to have acted with due diligence in 
searching for possible prior rights, he cannot discover some of the potential rights that 
end up ruining his chances of securing a CTM registration. This is the case particularly 
because some prior rights other than trademarks may entitle their owners to object 
registration of a CTM. These rights may, for instance, include copyrights or design 
rights. Moreover, oppositions may base on the “use of prior unregistered rights which 
cannot be searched and identified”; or may as well base on “prior and yet unpublished 
application to register a mark” (Cf. PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: a Practical 
Anatomy” 428 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003). 
588   For an extensive discussion on the various prior rights stipulated under Article 8 of the 
CTMR cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., et al, “Die Gemeinschaftsmarke” 36 (Staempfli Verlag 
AG, Bern 1998). 
589   While persons other than the proprietor may lodge an opposition notice, where such 
notice is based on the grounds stipulated under Article 8(3), which deals with agent’s 
mark, only the proprietor of the trademark is entitled to oppose registration of the mark 
concerned.  
590   Thus, on the basis of this general rule, OHIM will always assume that the one lodging 
opposition notice is the proprietor of the earlier rights, hence no obligation on the part of 
owner of earlier rights to state in the opposition notice that he is the proprietor (cf. 
“Opposition guidelines” (part 1) 20(OHIM 2007)). However, pursuant to Rule 15(2) (h) 
& (i) of the CTMIR, an opponent who acts as a licensee or an authorised person has to 
include in the opposition notice his particulars such as a name and address as required 
under Rule 1 (1) (b) of the CTMIR.  
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conflicting right”,591 namely; an earlier mark or particular sign used in 
business.592 As an exception to the general rule, some categories of persons other 
than the proprietor may also enjoy the locus standi to oppose a CTM registration 
provided a relevant conditionality is met. Accordingly, within the ambit of 
Article 41(1) (a) licensees of trademark rights based on registrations or 
applications for registration as stipulated under Article 8(1) and (5) of the CTMR 
may file a notice of opposition in their own names, provided they are authorised 
by the owner. Similarly, on the authority of Article 41(1) (c) of the CTMR, 
persons authorised under the relevant national law to enjoy some rights in 
relation to earlier marks or trade symbols as described under Article 8(4) of the 
CTMR, are entitled to lodge a notice of opposition on their own.593  
4. Opposition proceedings 
After the notice of opposition has been received and examined by OHIM and 
found to be admissible pursuant to Rule 17 of the CTMIR, both parties are 
informed on the time limits of the opposition proceedings. The first stage of the 
proceedings is the “cooling-off stage” during which parties can negotiate aiming 
to secure an amicable solution or agreement.594 This stage lasts for two months 
with a possibility of extension of the period for up to 22 months and thus making 
the maximum duration for cooling-off to be 24 months.595 After the expiry of the 
 
591   Cf. GASTINEL, E. & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade 
Mark” 110 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
592   These trademarks and signs may cumulatively be summed up as follows: “earlier 
identical trade marks for identical goods or services; earlier identical trade marks for 
similar goods or services; earlier similar trade marks for similar goods or services; 
earlier similar trade marks for identical goods or services; earlier identical trade marks 
for not similar goods or services; earlier similar trade marks for not similar goods or 
services; earlier trade marks, where an agent or representative of the proprietor applies 
for registration thereof without the consent of the latter; earlier non-registered trade 
marks or other signs used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance” 
(cf. KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 84 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).  
593   As an example of the rights protectable under the national law, one would cite Section 
5(4) of the 1994 UK’s Trade Mark Act which offers trademark protection under the law 
of passing off. One of the successful opposition based on passing off is Case R-
906/2001-1, Real Time Consultants v Manpower (Da Vinci device), O.J. OHIM 7-8/02, 
p.1427.  
594   Cf. Article 43(4) of the CTMR and Article 18(2) of the CTMIR, which entitle OHIM to 
“invite the parties to make a friendly settlement”.    
595   Nevertheless, any party to the opposition proceedings can bring to an end the cooling-off 
stage by sending a letter to OHIM. This possibility allows the parties to enjoy a freedom 
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cooling-off stage, the parties are given four months to litigate the opposition. Out 
of these four months, the opponent gets two months to build up his case by 
submitting to OHIM all evidence, facts and observations on whose basis his 
opposition was tendered;596 whereas the CTM applicant will be given two 
months as well to respond to the opponent’s evidence and arguments.   
5. Strategies and defences 
Opposition proceedings manifest a tug of war-like scenario. Where an opposition 
is lodged against a junior mark on the ground that the opponent owns an 
identical or similar senior mark or rights, the CTM applicant is entitled to attack 
his attacker by asking for evidence of genuine use made of the opponent’s mark 
within the past five years. According to Rule 22(3) of the CTMIR it may suffice 
to discharge his obligation to provide proof of use of his mark if the opponent 
indicates the “place, time, extent and nature of use of the opposing trade mark 
for the goods and services in respect of which it is registered and on which the 
opposition is based”. Evidence of such proof is particularly confined to the 
“submission of supporting documents and items such as packages, labels, price 
lists, catalogues, invoices, photographs, newspaper advertisements and statem-
ents in writings”.597 Where the opponent opts to give statements in writings, they 
must be sworn or affirmed statements or statements having a similar effect under 
the law of the Member State in which the statement is made.598 Should the 
opponent fail to provide proof of use, he should then provide proper reasons for 
non-use; or else his opposition will fail.599  
The case of Fiat veicoli Industriali S.P.A: (Iveco S.P.A.) v. Volkswagen AG600 
demonstrates an instance in which an opposition against a CTM application was 
rejected by OHIM’s Opposition Division on the ground that the opponent’s mark 
was not put to genuine use as required under Article 42(2) of the CTMR. In this 
case, in order to sustain its opposition against registration of LUPO mark by 
Volkswagen, Fiat (the opponent) was required to furnish evidence of use of the 
mark (LUPO). The opponent (Fiat) failed to adduce satisfactory evidence 
 
to go fast to the adversary stage (cf. Communication No 1/06 of the President of the 
Office of 2 February 2006 on extensions of the cooling-off period, which can be found at 
<http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/pdf/co1-06en.pdf> (status: 30 July 2012). 
596   Cf. Rule 19 of the CTMIR. 
597   Cf. Rule 22(4) of the CTMIR. 
598   Cf. Article 78(1) (f) of the CTMR. 
599   Cf. Article 42(2) of the CTMR. 
600   [2000] E.T.M.R. 320. 
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resolving the question whether Fiat had used the mark LUPO within five years 
preceding publication of the Volkswagen’s CTM application.601   
Moreover, the applicant may dispute the opponent’s opposition by relying on 
Article 54(2) of the CTMR which bars a holder of senior trademark rights from 
opposing registration of a junior mark where the proprietor of senior mark 
acquiescence for a continuous period of five years in the use of his rights by third 
parties including a CTM applicant who later on seek to register the junior mark 
in his name.602   
To carry forward the “tug-of-war concept”, the CTM applicant is entitled to 
attack his attacker by alleging that the goods and services in respect of which the 
applicant seeks registration of the CTM applied for are different from those in 
respect of which the opponent’s mark is protected.603 Where the danger of 
confusion is not dependent on the similarity between the junior and senior marks 
as well as similarity of the goods and services marketed under them, as the case 
is, for instance, with the well known or famous marks, the applicant may 
advance an argument disputing such a fame or a degree of knowledge on the part 
of consumers as far as the mark claimed to be famous or well known is 
concerned. While the opponent’s proprietary interests in a mark, particularly a 
famous or well known mark, is hinged on goodwill generated by a respective 
mark, hence a reason to object free riding of the same, it must also be recalled 
that the logical basis for opposition is to avoid consumer confusion where the 
earlier and junior trademark rights are more or less the same. Thus, the oppose-
tion will generally fail if the opponent is unable to prove to the satisfaction of the 
Opposition Division the existence of eminent danger of confusion. 
The opposition proceedings in Brauerei Beck GmbH & Co case604 support the 
foregoing conclusion. In this case, the CTM applicant (Warsteiner) sought 
registration of the word mark ISENBECK for beer. The opponent (Brauerei 
Beck) opposed the registration on the basis of its earlier mark BECK’s on the 
 
601   The use evidence submitted by Fiat include a price list, newspaper advertisements and 
invoices which all together referred directly or indirectly to a trademark LUPO. The 
opponent also submitted lists of vehicles sold, evidence of use and a renewal certificate 
of mark “LUPETTO” which would be confused with LUPO – a contested mark. 
Nevertheless, the evidence revealed that the opponent did not use the mark within the 
five years period required under the law.    
602   For the extensive discussion on the legislative history of the doctrine of acquiescence 
stipulated under Article 54 of the CTMR, cf. FERNANDEZ-NOVOA, C., “Die 
Verwirkung durch Duldung im System der Gemeinschaftsmarke”, 45(4) GRUR Int 442 
(1996).  
603   See Article 8(1) (a) of the CTMR. 
604   Brauerei Beck GmbH & Co. v. Warsteiner Brauerei Haus GmbH & Co. KG [1999] 
E.T.M.R. 225. 
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ground that the applicant’s mark was likely to be confused by the opponent’s 
mark. The opponent argued that since it was also a proprietor of another 
trademark HAAKEBECK, public would take it for granted that beers whose 
names end with the suffix BECK were part of the family mark used to market 
beers brewed by the opponent. In disregarding the opposition, the Board of 
Appeal stated as follows:  
While the products on which each mark were identical, there was no likelihood of 
confusion between them. There was little similarity between the marks in their 
appearance, or conceptual content. Even where there is an element which is common to 
the two marks (in this case, the word BECK), there is no likelihood of association between 
them unless the public understands that the element which is common refers in each case 
to the proprietor of the earlier mark, which could not be said to be the case here where 
ISENBECK would not convey the message of “a beer brewed by BECK”. The claim that 
the public would assume there to be a series of beers brewed by Brauerei Beck on account 
of the use of “-beck” suffix would be disregarded in the absence of evidence as to whether, 
and if so to what extent, the HAAKEBECK mark was used.  
It is noteworthy that where the opponent loses the case, he will be obliged to pay 
all costs of the suit. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 85(1) of the CTMR, 
“the losing party in opposition proceedings shall bear the fees incurred by the 
other party as well as all costs, without prejudice to Article 119(6)605 of the 
CTMR, incurred by him essential to the proceedings”.606 Similarly, costs may 
also be apportioned. This is possible if both parties lose in part. Rules of equity 
require each party to bear its costs “unless the goods and services on which one 
party loses are clearly negligible”.607      
The Opposition Division is duty-bound to issue a reasoned decision at the end 
of opposition proceedings. Such a decision is notified upon the parties. A party 
aggrieved by the decision of the Opposition Division has a right under Article 58 
of the CTMR to appeal against that decision.608 Such an appeal lies with the 
Boards of Appeal.  
 
605   According to this Article, a party opposing registration of a particular CTM may be 
required, under the circumstances prescribed in the Article, to produce a translation of 
his application at his own expense. 
606   See Brauerei Beck GmbH & Co. v. Warsteiner Brauerei Haus GmbH & Co. KG [1999] 
E.T.M.R. 225, 232. 
607   Cf. “Opposition Guidelines” (Part 1: Procedural Matters) 58 (OHIM 2007). 
608   Where an appeal is properly lodged, it “shall have suspensive effect” (cf. Article 58 of 
the CTMR). 
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G. Cancellation of CTM rights 
Cancellation is a legal concept, according to which CTM rights may either be 
revoked or invalidated.609 Revocation invalidates the CTM rights from the day 
on which such rights are revoked, whereas, as a result of successful invalidity 
proceedings, the respective rights are taken to have been non-existent from the 
time when registration certificate was issued by OHIM. Availability of the 
cancellation procedure under the CTMR affords to a person who would have 
objected to the registration of the mark, but for the limitation of time, an 
opportunity to challenge the validity of a CTM.610 Grounds for CTM revocation 
and invalidity are discussed below.  
I. Revocation 
The use of a CTM as described above, is central for determining the question 
whether a pertinent trade sign is prone to be revoked or not. Article 51 of the 
CTMR provides in no uncertain terms that “the rights of the proprietor of the 
Community trade mark shall be declared to be revoked on application to the 
Office or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings” on the 
basis of non-use or, where allegations of non-use are rebutted by the proprietor, 
on the basis of improper use of a CTM. 
1. Non-use    
In order for a non-use of a trademark to constitute a ground for revocation of a 
CTM, the proprietor must not have complied with the provisions of Article 15 
requiring him to put a mark on a genuine use within five years following 
registration. While Article 51(1) (a) of the CTMR reiterates the genuine use 
requirement, it additionally provides that even where there are no proper 
explanations for non-use of a CTM within the statutory period of five years, “no 
person may claim that the proprietor’s rights in a Community trade mark should 
be revoked” provided that “during the interval between expiry of the five-year 
 
609   Cf. Article 56(3) of the CTMR.  
610   This is particularly the case where invalidity issues are the basis for the cancellation 
  proceedings. Cf.  BASTIAN, E.-M., KNAAK, R. & SCHRICKER, G. (eds.), 
“Gemeinschaftsmarke und Recht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten“ 88 (Verlag C. H. Beck, 
München 2006).    
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period and filing of the application or counterclaim, genuine use of a trade mark 
has been started or resumed”. Moreover, according to the rule laid down in the 
preceding Article, resumption of trademark use done within a period of three 
months after an application for revocation has been lodged or a counterclaim to 
that effect has be requested, may salvage the CTM from revocation only if its 
proprietor had not made such resumption or commencement of use after being 
tipped of the impending revocation application or counterclaim action.611 In 
other words, the proprietor must be judged to have resumed or commenced a 
trade mark use in good faith.612  
2. Improper use of a CTM 
A CTM may not only be revoked on the basis of non-use, but also on the basis of 
improper use. Article 51(1) (b) of the CTMR provides as a ground for revocation 
where because of certain acts or omissions of the proprietor with respect to the 
CTM use, the CTM is understood by the public as a “common name in the trade 
for a product or service in respect of which it is registered”. To put it simply, 
improper use of a trade mark may turn a mark which was once distinctive into a 
generic mark. It is, nonetheless, incumbent upon the proprietor to salvage his 
trademark from becoming a generic name. He may do so by engaging on 
extensive marketing of the trademark while at the same time reinforcing the fact 
that his sign is not a generic but a brand name. The proprietor may additionally 
use the symbol ®, which is customarily accepted to signify that the trademark 
bearing it is registered or protected. Where piracy is a reason for the trademark 
losing its distinctiveness, the proprietor may reverse the situation by instituting 
legal proceedings against infringers. The outcome of the court proceedings will 
send a clear message to the consuming public that the trademark belongs to a 
particular source of products, in contrast to merely serving as a name of the 
products concerned.613   
 
611   Cf. BOMHARD, V. von, “Dormant Trademarks in the European Union – Swords of 
Damocles?” 96(5) TMR 1122, 1125 (2006). 
612   The ECJ’s jurisprudence reveals that, whereas in considering the question whether an 
alleged trade mark use is “genuine use” such consideration must be directed to the use 
made of the mark before the filing date of an application for revocation, trademark use 
after this period may be taken into account, provided that according to the circumstances 
of the case, such use does not reflect an intention on the part of the proprietor to defeat 
that application for trademark revocation (cf. ECJ, Case C-259/02 La Mer Technology 
Inc. v. Laboratoires Goemar SA [2004] E.C.R. I-1159, para. 2 of the operative part. 
613   SHYLLON, F., “Intellectual Property Law in Nigeria” 189 IIC Studies Vol. 21 (Beck, 
München 2003). 
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However, the generic nature of a CTM under Article 51 of the CTMR must be 
distinguished from a generic mark addressed in the provisions of Article 7(1) (d) 
of the CTMR. While the former trade mark becomes generic due to inactivity or 
acts of the proprietor, the proprietor is not an instrumental in making the mark in 
the latter category generic. The mark in the latter category is inherently generic 
and its registration may be objected on the basis of absolute grounds described 
above.  
Another mode of improper trade mark use which renders a CTM liable for 
revocation is stated in Article 51(1) (c) of the CTMR. The provisions warrant 
revocation of a CTM “if, in consequences of the use made of it by the proprietor 
of the trade mark or with his consent in respect of the goods or services for 
which it is registered, the trade mark is liable to mislead the public, particularly 
as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of those goods or services”. 
However, there is a notable difference between the provisions of Article 51(1) 
(c) of the CTMR, which, accordingly, deals with the trade mark  liable to 
mislead the public following the use made of it, and the legal import of Article 
7(1) (g), addressing the trade signs which have potentialities to mislead the 
public ab initio. As a matter of law, the former provisions serve as a ground for 
revocation, while the latter serve as an absolute ground for refusal to register a 
trade sign as a CTM. 
II. Invalidity 
The rights of a CTM proprietor are not immune from being challenged. Third 
parties are empowered by the provisions of Articles 52 and 53 of the CTMR to 
challenge the legality of a registered CTM under certain circumstances. Two 
options are available to the one who seeks to challenge the existence of CTM 
rights: 1. He may lodge his claim for invalidity directly with OHIM asking the 
Office to cancel the CTM, or; 2. if the CTM proprietor institutes infringement 
proceedings before a CTM court, the defendant may counterclaim by pleading 
that the registration of the CTM is invalid.614 The substantive justifications for 
invalidity proceedings are not based on whether such proceedings are instituted 
before OHIM or the CTM court; but rather on the existence of substantive and 
relative grounds for invalidity.  
 
614   Cf. Article 99(1) which stipulates as follows: “The Community trade mark courts shall 
treat the Community trade mark as valid unless its validity is put in issue by the 
defendant with a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity”. 
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1. Absolute grounds for invalidity 
Article 52 of the CTMR describes various legal scenarios whose proof renders a 
CTM absolutely invalid. Essentially, the CTM is to be declared invalid if the 
subject matter of the CTM registration did not meet the requirements of Article 7 
of the CTMR.615 Thus, where the absolute grounds for trademark refusal skipped 
the mind of OHIM, and the registrar proceeded to register a sign as a CTM, 
Article 52 of the CTMR transforms the absolute grounds for trademark refusal 
under Article 7 of the CTMR into absolute grounds for invalidity.  
A CTM registered in breach of Article 7(1) (b) (c), or (d) may not be 
invalidated on absolute grounds, if a sign covered by such a CTM has acquired a 
secondary meaning.616 In other words, “a trademark which is not distinctive, or is 
generic or descriptive, has nevertheless been registered, it cannot be declared 
invalid if, as a result of the use which has been made of it, it has, after 
registration, acquired a distinctive character in relation to the goods or services 
for which it is registered”.617  
As a matter of principle, a proprietor should always act honestly when 
registering his trade mark. Thus, a CTM registration secured based on a bad faith 
will not withstand invalidity proceedings instituted on the basis of absolute 
grounds mentioned under Article 52(1) (b) of the CTMR. The “bad faith” 
mentioned in the above provision, have been interpreted to refer to a scenario 
where a CTM applicant is taken to have proceeded with the CTM registration 
notwithstanding a clear or imputed knowledge as to prior use of another 
trademark similar with or identical to his. 618  However, the practice of OHIM’s 
Boards of Appeal in relation to invalidity based on ‘bad faith’ shows that good 
faith will always be presumed unless the contrary is proved. The burden to 
render such proof is primarily placed on the cancellation applicant.619 
 
615   Article 7 of the CTMR deals particularly with signs which are incapable of 
distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from those marketed or offered by 
other undertakings. For the discussion on the Article cf. sction D(I) of this chapter.   
616   Cf. Section D (I) (7) of this chapter. 
617   GASTINEL, E., & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade Mark” 
171 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
618   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 103 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).    
619   Cf. the following decisions of the OHIM’s Boards of Appeal: R 0336/2007-2 CLAIRE 
FISHER / CLAIRE FISHER; R 255/2006-1 JOHNSON PUMP; R 1264/2006-2 
KREMOVY; and R 1265/2006-2 SMETANOVY.  The decisions are cited in OHIM’s 
Boards of Appeal: Yearly Overview of Decisions 2007, at p. 20, available at 
<http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/pdf/BoAcaselaw2007_en.pdf> (status: 30 July 
2012). 
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According to Article 52(3) of the CTMR, a CTM need not be invalidated in 
totality. Thus, a CTM may be invalidated partially. Partial invalidation is 
possible where for instance the mark is found not to be distinctive in respect of 
some goods covered by registration, hence it will be invalidated to the extent of 
its non-distinctiveness, while remaining valid in respect of the goods or services 
in connection with which it is distinctive. Thus, invalidity based on bad faith 
may deny the CTM’s use only in respect of limited number of goods covered by 
the bad faith “scandal”. 
It is not an easy task to determine whether an application for CTM registration 
was made in bad faith.620 Nevertheless, the Colour of Elegance case621 throws 
some light on a legal interpretation of the phrase “bad faith”. The case considers 
some fundamental issues such as “whether an application to register the 
Community trade mark THE COLOUR OF ELEGANCE for clothes should be 
withdrawn for bad faith” or “whether the proprietor of the trade mark 
ELEGANCE acted dishonestly by seeking to register the COLOUR OF ELEGA-
NCE to prevent a competitor from launching an advertising campaign under that 
name”.622 Accordingly, the Deutscher Bundesgerichtshof (i.e. the Germany 
Federal Supreme Court) held that: 
A trade mark application in bad faith is to be presumed if the application is an abuse of the 
law or dishonest. The applicant for a sign, however, is not acting dishonestly simply 
because he knows that another is using the same sign in Germany for the same goods 
 
620   The concept “bad faith” “is the functional equivalent to “fraudulently obtained 
registrations” under the Lanham Act”. The concept “fraudulent registrations” under the 
Act has been construed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as an 
“intentional deceitful practice or act designed to obtain something to which the person 
practicing such deceit would not otherwise be entitled. Specifically, it involves a wilful 
withholding from the Patent and Trademark Office by an applicant or registrant of 
material information or fact which, if disclosed to the Office, would have resulted in the 
disallowance of the registration sought or to be maintained” (Cf. PETRIN, M., 
“Cancellation of Fraudulent Trademark registrations under the Lanham Act and the 
European Community Trade Mark Regulation” 11(2) Intell. Prop. L. Bull. 161, 165 
(2006-2007)). 
621   Germany, Bundesgerichthof (Colour of Elegance) (I ZR 29/02), 37(2) IIC 226, 228 
  (2006).  
622   The case concerns essentially a bad faith claim grounded on unfair competition. The 
plaintiff was using his unregistered mark ELEGANCE in Germany for a long time. 
When he got to know that the defendant was about to launch advertising campaign using 
a mark similar to the one adopted and used by the plaintiff in respect of goods identical 
or confusingly similar to those of the plaintiff; the plaintiff processed the registration of 
the said mark. However, the defendant went on to carry out his advertisements even after 
the mark has been registered. The plaintiff sued, and in course of the proceedings, the 
defendant entered a plea of counterclaim on the grounds that registration of the mark 
was secured on the basis of a bad faith. (Cf. 37(2) IIC 226 (2006).  
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without having acquired formal trademark rights. However, the case may be different if 
there are particular circumstances on the part of the holder of the sign that cause the 
registration of the sign to appear dishonest within the meaning of the said provisions.623 
Such circumstances could be that the sign holder, knowing the established interests of the 
prior user and without sufficient objective grounds, has the same or a confusingly similar 
sign registered for the same or similar goods with the aim of interfering with latter making 
use of the designation. Competitive dishonesty can also be found in a trade mark 
applicant’s misappropriating the blocking effect that is created upon registration of the 
trade mark and that in terms of competition law is of itself unobjectionable, as a means of 
competition. 
The “bad faith” doctrine is regarded to be a narrow concept within the ambit of 
the CTMR.624 Due to the lack of specific meaning of the phrase, efforts to 
expound it antithetically are on record. The OHIM’s cancellation board has for 
example held “bad faith” to be the opposite of “good faith” signalled by an 
inference that a scheme used to secure a CTM registration was haunted by an 
actual or constructive fraud, or “an intention to mislead or deceive another 
including any sinister motive”.625   
The facts of the BE NATURAL case 626 may throw some more light as to the 
meaning of the bad faith doctrine. A defendant, a UK resident, was a distributor 
of some “confectionary and health food bars” manufactured by an Austrian 
company (i.e. the applicant in the invalidity proceedings before OHIM) and sold 
under the mark “BE NATURAL”. The applicant had registered the mark in 
Austria intending to register the same in the UK. Meanwhile, the UK distributor 
attempted to secure a UK registration of the mark BE NATURAL in his name 
without success because the UK Trade Mark Office had concluded that the 
distributor did not have a right to register the mark in question. However, the 
distributor sought, and succeeded, to secure a CTM registration for the said 
mark. OHIM cancellation division upheld the applicant’s arguments supporting 
cancellation of the distributor’s CTM. In view of the fact that the distributor’s 
application for the registration of the mark in the UK was refused, it was held 
 
623   The provisions concerned are Articles 52(1) (b) and 3(2) (d) of the CTMR and the 
Community trade mark directive respectively. Germany law on trade mark and other 
distinctive signs implements Article 3(2) (d) of the directive in its Sections 8(2), (10) 
and 50(1). 
624   i.e. Article 52(1) (b) of the CTMR. 
625   See OHIM, Cancellation Division, Decision in BE NATURAL, C000479899 (25 
October 2000). See in particular paragraph 10 of the decision where OHIM adds that 
“bad faith can be understood as a “dishonest intention” ... that ... may be interpreted as 
an unfair practices involving lack of any honest intention on the part of the applicant of 
the CTM at the time of filing”. 
626   OHIM, Cancellation Division, Decision in BE NATURAL, C000479899 (25 October 
  2000), paragraph 4. 
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that the distributor’s application to register the mark as a CTM was actuated by 
bad faith, particularly since he knew that, in his agent-principal relationship, the 
principal intended to register the mark; the distributor (i.e. an agent) wanted to 
pre-empt his principal/employer from registering the mark in the UK.      
2. Relative grounds for invalidity 
Relative grounds upon which a CTM may be declared invalid by OHIM or a 
CTM court are provided for under Article 53 of the CTMR. These are essentially 
the earlier rights mentioned in Article 8(2) to (4) of the CTMR, which entitle 
owner of a respective rights to oppose registration of a particular sign as a 
CTM.627 Similarly, earlier rights such as a right to a name, a right of personal 
portrayal, a copyright; or an industrial property right “which may prohibit the use 
of a trademark pursuant to domestic system of law which governs that earlier 
right”628 are also relative grounds for invalidity. However, the holder of the 
above earlier rights is not entitled to challenge a later CTM if he had expressly 
consented to its registration. It is important to note, where more than one earlier 
right forms part of the relative grounds for invalidity, such rights must be 
outlined in the first application for invalidity or in the first counterclaim in the 
infringement proceedings. Thus, a person invoking one or some of these grounds 
cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of a CTM basing on some grounds 
which were not invoked in the previous proceedings relating to the same CTM.  
III. Effects of CTM revocation and invalidity 
According to Article 55 of the CTMR, the rights which a CTM proprietor enjoys 
under the Community trade mark regulation, in particular the exclusive rights 
provided for under Article 9, are regarded not to have been effective as from the 
date of application for revocation or of the counter-claim. As one author points 
out, “the retroactive effect of any revocation of CTM rights does not affect 
decisions in infringement actions, which have become final and have been 
enforced prior to the revocation of CTM rights, subject to the application of 
relevant provisions of national law as to the remedies which might be available 
 
627   See section D of this chapter, for a discussion on relative grounds for refusal to register a 
sign as a CTM. 
628   GASTINEL, E., & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade Mark” 
172 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
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as a result notably of unjust enrichment, or negligence, or bad faith on the part of 
the proprietor of a CTM”.629 Similarly, a CTM revocation does not render void 
contracts whose conclusion predates the decision revoking the CTM, provided 
that the decision to revoke was reached well after the relevant contractual 
obligations have been discharged.630  
The consequences of revocation and invalidity explained above may be 
distinguished in a peculiar sense: “the rights of the proprietor shall be declared to 
be revoked if the trademark or its proprietor no longer complies with the 
provisions laid down in the basic Regulation and in the Implementing Regula-
tion. The trademark shall be declared invalid if the trademark or its proprietor 
did not comply with the said provisions as from the date of filing of the 
application”.631 As a point of convergence, both proceedings for CTM revocation 
and those for declaration of invalidity are put into legal machinery in a similar 
manner: the CTM may be revoked or declared invalid by the CTM court 
pursuant to a counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in infringement 
proceedings. The CTM may as well be revoked or declared invalid by OHIM 
(acting through a Cancellation Division).632 
H. International Registration Procedure under the CTMR 
Trademarks “registered under international arrangements, which have effect in a 
Member State” or, which have effect in the EU, are mentioned in the CTMR as 
relative grounds for CTM refusal633 and as a basis for opposition634 and 
revocation635 of a CTM.  
 
629   GASTINEL, E., & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade Mark” 
160 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
630   Nevertheless, “repayment of amounts paid under such contracts may, in certain 
circumstances, be claimed on grounds of equity” (cf. GASTINEL, E., & MILFORD, M., 
“The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade Mark” 160 (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague 2001). 
631   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article 
byArticle Guide” 100 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000). 
632   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 136 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).   
633   Cf. Article 8(2) (a) (iii) & (iv) of the CTMR. 
634   Article 41(1) (a) of the CTMR. 
635   Article 51 of the CTMR. 
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Since the European Community is a signatory to the Protocol,636 international 
trademark registrations637 are, in the CTM context, governed by the Madrid 
Protocol.638 Trademark rights under the CTMR or applications for CTM 
processed by OHIM may be extended to other geographical territories outside 
the European Community.639 Similarly, protection under the CTMR may be 
extended to trademarks that were initially registered outside the jurisdictional 
territory of OHIM. These possibilities are discussed infra.640 
I. EC as a designated territory 
A process of designating the EC under the international trademark registration 
scheme established under the Madrid Protocol is initiated by the right holder (R) 
himself. Where the basis for R’s application is a trademark registered in the 
country signatory to the Madrid Protocol, that basis is technically referred to as a 
basic registration; and where R bases his application for international registration 
on a pending trademark application at the trademark office in his country, his 
basis is technically known as a basic application. The trademark office in R’s 
country is referred to as the office of origin. The office of origin works in 
cooperation with the WIPO office responsible for international registration 
 
636   See the Proposal for a Council Decision approving the EC accession to Protocol 
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning International Registration of Marks, 
adopted on June 27, 1989.  
637   The term “international registration” should not be confused with the term “global 
trademark” as some listeners would tend to think. While the former refers to the system 
of trademark registration established under the Madrid Protocol, there is hitherto no 
international trademark regime that would confer global and unitary rights in respect of a 
single trademark symbol, which the latter connotes.   
638   The Madrid Protocol, (relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the International 
  Registration of Marks concluded in 1891), which came into force on 1 April 1996. 
639   Cf. Article 145 of the CTMR. 
640   The discussion is, however, not intended to be exhaustive as far as the international 
registration system is concerned. Since, only the interface between the Madrid Protocol 
and the CTM system is briefly addressed, technical issues, such as the consequences of 
cancellation of the national trademark on whose basis the international registration was 
secured, are not within the ambit of the discussion under this part. For an extensive 
discussion on the international registration with effect in the EU, please refer to the 
following literature: BASTIAN, E.-M., KNAAK, R. & SCHRICKER, G. (eds.), 
“Gemeinschaftsmarke und Recht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten“, 48-52 (Verlag C. H. Beck, 
München 2006); EISENFÜHR, G. & SCHENNEN, D., “Gemeinschaftsmarkenverord-
nung“ (3rd ed.) 1285-1340 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln 2010); and ANNAND, R. & 
NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade Mark” 275-278 
(Blackstone Press, London 1998).  
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which is referred to as the international bureau. Thus, to realise his endeavour of 
designating the EU, R is required to ask the international bureau, (by either 
sending the application, containing the names of the countries where R wants his 
trademark to be protected, directly to the international bureau or channelling 
such an application through the national trademark office), to facilitate 
registration of the trademark in the countries that R has designated in the 
application. In case R designates the EU, he will get an automatic trademark 
protection covering the 27 Member States. In other words, such a designation 
has the effect of an application for a CTM.641  
One of the consequences of treating international registration designating the 
EU as an application for CTM is not only that OHIM takes charge of the 
procedural aspects of such processing, but also such an application is subjected 
to the very provisions of the CTMR regarding the formal and substantive 
requirements for trademark refusal.642 As far as an examination as to absolute 
grounds for refusal to which an international registration is subjected are 
concerned, OHIM may, depending on the outcome of the examination, react as 
hereunder: 
 If, in OHIM’s view, the basic application or the basic trademark 
registration (whichever in the case) does not meet the registration 
requirements under the CTMR, OHIM will issue ex officio notice of 
provisional refusal of the international registration.643 
 In the event that the examination of absolute grounds reveals that the 
subject matter of international application contains an element which is 
not distinctive, the inclusion of which would make the scope of 
protection of the international registration doubtful, OHIM’s ex officio 
notice may require the applicant to disclaim such an element as required 
under the provisions of Article 37 of the CTMR.  
 Sometimes, the ex officio notice of provisional refusal of granting 
protection to the mark concerned is followed by a final refusal of 
international protection if the applicant does not take reasonable steps to 
furnish OHIM with a statement disclaiming a non-distinctive element in 
his trademark.644  
 
641   Cf. Article 3(4) and 3ter (2) of the Madrid Protocol. 
642   Cf. Article 154 of the CTMR. 
643   Cf. Article 5(1) & (2) and Rule 17(1) of the Madrid Protocol and the Common 
Regulation to the International Bureau. See also Rule 113 of the CTMIR. 
644   Pursuant to Rule 115(1) of the CTMIR, ex officio notice of provisional refusal is issued 
in the event the international application is opposed. 
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International application must comply with the language requirement to the same 
extent a normal CTM application does.645 Failure to satisfy the language 
requirement triggers OHIM provisionally to refuse the international registration. 
The applicant must overcome all the impediments contained in the notice of 
provisional refusal; otherwise OHIM enters a final decision refusing the grant of 
international registration.646 One of these impediments may be a notice of 
opposition levelled against the international application.647  
As it is for opposition, the interested parties have a right under Article 158 of 
the CTMR to commence proceedings before OHIM with intention to invalidate 
the effect of international registration in the European Community. The 
procedure leading to this invalidation is equivalent to that of CTM revocation or 
invalidation.648  
Regardless of whether protection of international registration is refused by 
OHIM or the effect of international registration ceases, still the applicant has two 
alternative remedies: he may either convert the international registration into the 
national trademark application in accordance with the provisions of Articles 112 
and 114 of the CTMR;649 or designate the EC Member State which is party to the 
Madrid Protocol or the Madrid Agreement.650 A national trademark application 
or an application designating a member state pursuant to a conversion of an 
international registration designating the Community retains a priority date of the 
international registration.651 
II. CTM registration or application as a basis for international registration 
The CTMR provides for a procedure pursuant to which an application for CTM 
registration or a CTM registration itself may result in an internationally protected 
trademark. Article 146(1) of the CTMR is clear to this effect: “international 
applications pursuant to Article 3 of the Madrid Protocol based on an application 
for a Community trade mark or on a Community trade mark shall be filed at the 
Office”. The applicant for international registration need not wait until the CTM 
 
645   The OHIM’s language regime is regulated under Article 119 of the CTMR and Rule 126 
of the CTMIR.  
646   Cf. Rule 112(4) of the CTMIR. 
647   Cf. Article 156 of the CTMR. 
648   Cf. Articles 51 to 53 of the CTMR. See also Section 7 supra, which addresses 
cancellation of CTM. 
649   See Chapter five infra, where the doctrine of CTM conversion is addressed. 
650   See Rules 122 and 123 of the CTMIR.   
651   Cf. Articles 3(4) and 3ter(2) of the Madrid Protocol.  
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registration is granted. He only needs to state whether a CTM application forms 
a basis for international registration or he waits until the CTM is granted. OHIM 
will act and submit an application for international registration to the interna-
tional Bureau according to the trademark proprietor’s wishes. In addition to 
observing the OHIM’s official languages, the applicant for international 
registration must ensure that a translation in the language allowed under the 
Protocol is submitted. This is a case where the application submitted to OHIM is 
in a language (though OHIM’s language) other than those allowed under the 
Madrid Protocol.652  
However, “where a mark that is the subject of a national or regional registra-
tion in the Office of a contracting party is also the subject of an international 
registration and both registrations stand in the name of the same person, the 
international registration is deemed to replace the national or regional 
registration”.653   
This legal assumption does not apply if both registrations are not identical in 
terms of ownership, goods or services and where the national or regional 
registration is not senior to international registration. On this understanding, an 
international registration granted based on national or regional application for 
trademark registration is not useful in the context of replacement.  
Although replacing national or regional registration with international 
registration results in an ostensible cheapness of renewal fees, it is advisable not 
to forgo earlier national or regional rights until such a period when dependency 
of rights lapses.654  Moreover, relying on a CTM application or registration to 
secure international registration is not completely a safe venture to undertake. In 
practice many months will elapse before OHIM publishes the examination 
report. Moreover, a greater proportion of CTM applications are opposed.655 The 
likelihood of the international trademark registration being opposed is 
exacerbated by the fact that, in practice, OHIM does not substantively examine 
on relative grounds (for conflict with earlier marks),656 but simply carries out a 
 
652   While OHIM’s languages are English, French, German, Italian and Spanish (cf. Article 
119(2) of the CTMR), the Protocol’s languages are English, French and Spanish (cf. 
Rule 6(b) of the Common Regulations under the Agreement and the Protocol). 
653   Article 4bis (1) of the Protocol. 
654   Cf. FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 258 (Jordan 
Publishing, Ltd., Bristol 2005).  Regarding dependency of rights refer to Article 6(2) and 
  (3) of the Madrid Protocol. 
655   Cf. FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 260 (Jordan 
Publishing, Ltd., Bristol 2005).   
656   With regard to international registration, OHIM only checks the application in relation to 
entitlement to file on the basis of indication made in the OHIM form EM2 or WIPO 
Form MM2(Cf. Rule 103(2)(f) of the CTMIR).  
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search and reports the outcome.657 Given the fact that the EU membership ranges 





657   Cf. Article 38 of the CTMR. 
658   Cf. FIRTH, A., et al, “Trade Marks – Law and Practice” (2nd ed.) 260 (Jordan 
Publishing, Ltd., Bristol 2005).  
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Chapter 5:  Interplay between Community trade mark and 
trademark systems of EU Member States 
A. Introduction 
Trade mark directive (henceforth, TD)659 and Community Trade Mark 
Regulation (henceforth, CTMR)660 describe the interplay between CTM and 
trademark systems of the EU Member States. The TD aims to harmonise 
trademark laws of the EU countries. It requires all Member States to align their 
laws with its provisions so that fundamental principles governing registrability of 
signs as national trademarks in the Member States do not differ from those 
contained in the CTMR.661 For its part, the CTMR introduces a regional trade-
mark regime with the unitary rights valid throughout the European Union.662 The 
CTMR does not replace, but supplements, the national trademark systems of the 
Member States.663 Under certain circumstances, rights established under the 
national systems may prevail over those established under the CTMR and vice 
versa.664 This is only one of the legal tactics employed in the CTMR to make 
sure that the system established under it remains unitary while in certain 
instances resorting to the rules established under the national laws, such as those 
relating to enforcement of CTM rights.665 
 
659   Directive No 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
  2008 (codified version), which repeals the First Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC of 
21 December 1988 to approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to 
Trademarks. 
660   Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
mark (codified version), which repeals Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 
December 1993 on the Community trade mark. 
661   See, for example, Article 2 of the TD requiring a registrable sign to be capable of being 
represented graphically. The same requirement is enshrined under Article 4 of the 
CTMR.  
662   Cf. EDENBOROUGH, M., “The Free Movement of Trade Marked Goods in the 
European Community”, in: POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P., & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), 
“The Community Trade Mark: Regulations, Practice and Procedures” (2nd ed., Release 
#4) XII.7 (INTA, New York 2005). 
663   The CTMR is independent of the TD. Its entire body of rules binds on all the EU 
Member States.  
664   An instance of this scenario would be where earlier national trademark rights are relied 
upon to cancel a registered CTM, or where the CTM is relied upon to revoke a national 
trademark which was registered after the CTM’s registration was secured. 
665   Cf. Article 14 of the CTMR. 
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This chapter reviews some essential aspects of the CTM system, namely, 
seniority right, trademark conversion, and co-existence of CTM and national 
trademark rights. A space is also allocated in this chapter for a brief discourse on 
the impact that enlargement of the European Union has on the CTM system. The 
chapter further addresses the CTM enforcement regime. In this regard, the 
chapter covers institutions responsible for CTM enforcement and their powers, 
the law applicable to actual or threatened infringements, and the question of how 
judgments on CTM matters are recognised and enforced.  
B. Essential aspects of Community trade mark system 
The term “essential aspects of CTM”, as used in this chapter, encompasses (i) the 
principle of co-existence of trademark rights protected under the national law 
and those protected under the CTMR; (ii) the principle of seniority of trademark 
rights; and (iii) the principle of trademark conversion.  
I. Co-existence of trade marks 
The question of co-existence of trademarks in the EU is the centrepiece of the 
system established under the CTMR. It had already been envisaged in the early 
phases of the adoption of the CTMR that since some enterprises would not find 
any economic motives to get their trademarks protected throughout the 
Community, national trademark systems should be left to co-exist with the 
CTM.666 The CTMR stipulates a need to maintain a legal space within the 
national trademark systems in order to accommodate interests of persons who 
would just like to have a national legal security of their marks. It further sets out 
some mechanism to promote interests of proprietors who would like to extend 
their trade activities to the scale of the Community.667  
The principle of co-existence affords to beneficiaries of the trademark systems 
in the EU an opportunity to choose from different trademark regimes under 
 
666   Cf. Article 6 of the pre-draft of the Regulation Relating to the Community Trade Mark 
of April 1977 (Document No. III/ex X1/C/268/77-E).  The Article stipulated that: “This 
regulation shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to maintain their 
national laws relating to trade marks”. See also recital 6 of the CTMR, which insists on 
the need of co-existence of national and Community trademark rights. 
667   SANDRI, S., “Community Trade Marks and Domestic Laws”, in: FRANZOSI, M. (ed.) 
(1997), “European Community Trade Mark” 415 (Kluwer Law International, Boston 
1997). 
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which their trade marks may be protected. Trademark proprietors in the EU may 
apply for registration of their trademarks at national, regional and/or interna-
tional levels. A trademark owner who does not want to trade beyond the national 
borders may opt for the national trademark registration. Those who attach great 
importance to the extension of their business beyond the national boundaries are 
likely to opt for a Community trademark registration. 
An applicant for a trade mark registration has a number of factors to consider 
before opting for a particular registration scheme. The CTM would, for instance, 
be more cost effective than where a trademark proprietor attempts to register his 
trademark in each of the Member States aiming to secure multiple trademarks. 
Although the multiple national registrations in the Member States would 
substantially be equal to the CTM since all the EU countries have incorporated 
the TD provisions in their municipal trademark laws, this stratagem is more 
costly than obtaining a CTM. Where a trademark proprietor opts for a multiple-
registration ruse, some duties in relation to maintenance of the trademark rights 
concerned such as the requirement of trademark use, renewal, and other proceed-
ings relating to trademark cancellation and infringements have to be undertaken 
in each single country where a trade mark is registered.668 In contrast, 
proceedings relating to CTM are centralised and undertaken in a single 
procedure or process. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that a trademark proprietor may 
initially register his trademark, in a single Member State, as a national trade 
mark and apply for registration of the same mark as a CTM and vice versa. The 
principle of co-existence concerns a scenario in which a single trademark owned 
by a single, legal or natural person gets double protection as a national trademark 
and as a CTM.669  
The double registrations of a trademark are likely to burden a trademark 
proprietor who has to maintain both national and CTM registrations. This burden 
may, nonetheless, be alleviated by the principle of seniority right, which allows 
the national trade mark and CTM registrations to be consolidated into one.    
 
668   Cf. POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P. & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “the Community Trade 
Mark: Regulations, Practice and Procedure” (2nd ed., Release #4) 14 (INTA, New York 
2005)  
669   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., OHLGART, D. C. & BOMHARD, V. von, “Die 
Gemeinschaftsmarke” 10 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1998). 
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II. Seniority  
The principle of seniority facilitates the “merger of Community trade marks and 
identical earlier national registrations of the same mark for the same owner and 
for the same goods and services”.670 Seniority is neither defined in the TD nor in 
the CTMR. While the CTMR makes reference to the right of seniority, the term 
is not mentioned in the TD. This omission is not accidental. The tenet of 
seniority is propounded under the CTMR671 to improve the CTM system in 
contrast to the national trademark systems. The principle of seniority motivates 
owners of earlier national trademarks to apply for registration of their mark as 
CTMs. The purpose of seniority right is “to make the Community trade mark an 
attractive option for persons who have already registered a particular trade mark 
in a number of Member States” and thus allowing the persons concerned an 
opportunity to take advantages of the CTM system stemming from financial 
savings and administrative convenience, which they would not otherwise enjoy 
“if they had to maintain their national registrations in addition to a Community 
trade mark”.672 The principle, therefore, acts as a magnet that attracts proprietors 
of earlier national trademark to consolidate their national rights into a CTM 
without relinquishing the said national rights.  
The legislative intent behind incorporation of seniority right in the CTMR is 
to enable owners of existing national trademarks to be the first to apply for 
registration of a corresponding CTM,673 since trademark proprietors “might be 
reluctant to abandon their national registrations unless they could be certain of 
retaining whatever rights they enjoyed as a result of those national registra-
tions”.674  Some fundamental issues in relation to the principle of seniority, such 
as the requirements for seniority, examination of seniority claim, and the merits 
and demerits of claiming a seniority right, are discussed below. 
 
670   Cf. Communication No 2/00 of the President of the Office of 25 February 2000 
concerning seniority examination, available at   
<http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/communications/02-00.htm> (status: 30 July 
2012).  
671   Cf. Articles 34 and 35 of the CTMR.  
672   Cf. OHIM, Decision of the First BoA of 15 May 1998, Case R 5/97-1 (VICEROY), at 
  [29]. 
673   Cf. FRANZOSI, M. (ed.), “European Community Trade Mark” 427 (Kluwer Law 
  International, Boston 1997). 
674   Cf. OHIM, Decision of the First BoA of 15 May 1998, Case R 5/97-1 (VICEROY), at 
  [29]. 
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1. Requirements for seniority   
In order to enjoy the seniority right, the owner of an earlier trademark must claim 
it. Such a claim must indicate (1) the status of earlier national trademark (i.e. the 
basis for a seniority right) and, (2) a proof that the earlier national trade fulfils 
the requirements of “triple identity rule”. 
a) Status of the earlier national trademark    
In order to form a basis for seniority claim, a trademark concerned must be a 
national trademark, which is earlier than the CTM claiming such seniority. This 
implies that the earlier national trademark must have a filing date and priority 
date (where it is claimed) which is earlier than the filing date of the application 
for the CTM or the priority date which the CTM claims.675  Whereas under the 
national laws of some EU Member States, such as Germany, unregistered 
trademark rights are recognised,676 such rights cannot confer on the proprietor a 
seniority right however senior and prior the unregistered trademarks may be. 
Only earlier and registered national trademark rights may be used as a base to 
claim a seniority right.  
b) Triple identity rule 
Three basic requirements, which Classical scholars categorically refer to as a 
“triple-identity rule”,677 must be fulfilled in order to establish an entitlement to 
the right of seniority. Elements of the rule are analysed below.  
 
675   MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Seniority” (ECTA’s special newsletter no. 30 of May 1996) 19 
(European Communities Trade Mark Association (ECTA) Secretariat, The Hague 1996). 
676   Cf. Section 4(2) of the German Law on Trade Marks and other Distinctive Signs of 
1994, as amended severally. 
677   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Seniority” (ECTA’s special newsletter no. 30 of May 1996) 
17 (European Communities Trade Mark Association (ECTA) Secretariat, The Hague 
1996); BOMHARD, V. von & PETERSENN, M., “Seniority under European 
Community Trademark Law”, 92(6) TMR 1327, 1328 (2002); ANNAND, R. & 
NORMAN, H., “Blackstone’s Guide to the Community Trade Mark” 103 (Blackstone 
Press, London 1998).   
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aa) Identity of the marks    
Seniority right may only be validly claimed where the national trademark and the 
CTM are same. In contrast, where the CTM is just similar to the earlier national 
trademark, seniority claim will fail since, similarity is different from identity.  
bb) Same owner 
The second limb of the triple-identity rule reiterates the requirement of identity 
between the owner of the earlier national trademark and the owner of the CTM. 
In other words, the seniority claim may hold water only if the two marks are 
subject to a single ownership.  
cc) Identical goods and/or services 
The third appendage of the “triple-identity” rule dictates that, goods and services 
covered by the earlier national trademark must be identical with those covered 
by the CTM registration or by the CTM application. The enumeration of goods 
and services in the national trademark register is regarded as a maximum list in 
respect of which the earlier national trademark is registered and protected. Thus, 
a CTM or an application for a CTM registration protected or seeking protection 
only in respect of some of the goods and services covered by the national 
trademark may be considered to have met the requirement of identity of goods 
and services for seniority purposes. However, such a requirement is not met 
where a CTM or an application for a CTM exceeds the list of goods and services 
covered by the earlier national trademark. In the event the CTM or an application 
for a CTM exceeds the list of goods and services covered by the earlier national 
trademark, such goods or services in excess cannot be covered by the seniority 
right.678  To put it simply, “where the specifications differ, seniority can be 
claimed only with respect to the overlapping goods and services covered by the 
CTM and the national mark”.679 Hence, a trademark proprietor is allowed to 
claim partial seniority. 
 
678   MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Seniority” (ECTA’s special newsletter no. 30 of May 1996) 29 
  (European Communities Trade Mark Association (ECTA) Secretariat, The Hague 1996). 
679   BOMHARD, V. von & PETERSENN, M., “Seniority under European Community 
  Trademark Law”, 92(6) TMR 1327, 1330 (2002). 
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Partial seniority claims are allowed in recognition of some difficulties, which 
trademark applicants or their representatives face while attempting to offer a 
precise delineation of the identical goods and services, in view of the fact that it 
might appear that the language of the earlier national registration differs from 
that of the CTM application. Consequently, OHIM is prepared to accept general 
or unspecified claims like “seniority is claimed for all the goods which are found 
in the earlier mark to the extent that they are also found in the application”.680 
2. Examination of seniority claim 
Seniority claim may be lodged together with the application for CTM 
registration. OHIM is expected to act promptly, not only to examine the CTM 
registrability requirements, but also to examine whether the requirements for 
seniority claim have been met. However, in the light of a big number of seniority 
claims presented before the Office each year,681 OHIM has previously endorsed a 
policy allowing a CTM registration before examining the seniority claim.682 
OHIM will, nevertheless, need some sound reasons before it decides to defer the 
examination of seniority claim to the time after the publication of a CTM 
application or registration (whichever is the case). It is, for instance, accepted 
 
680   Cf. Communication No 1/97 of the President of the Office of 17 June 1997 concerning 
examination of seniority claims (paragraph 2, point III), available at 
<http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/communications/01-97.htm> (status: 30 July 
2012).   
681   The 1996 OHIM’s statistical data show that 25 per cent of all CTM applications during 
that year claimed one or more seniorities (cf. Communication No 6/98 of the President 
of the Office of 14 November 1998 concerning examination of seniority claim (para. 1, 
point I), available at <http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/communications/06-
98.htm> (status: 30 July 2012)). However, as an indication that proprietors of earlier 
national trademarks have been striving to merge their national marks with the CTM 
registrations by claiming seniority rights since the inception of the CTM system, the 
number of seniority claims dropped to 20 per cent of all applications in 2000 (cf. 
Communication No 2/00 of the President of the Office of 25 February 2000 (para. 1, 
point I), available at <http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/communications/02-
00.htm> (status: 30 July 2012)).  
682   Due to a large number of applications received in 1997, for instance, OHIM suspended 
the examination of seniority claim under Article 34 in order to concentrate all human 
resources on the processing of CTM applications from the application to the registration 
stages. Such a decision did not affect seniority examination under Article 35 of the 
CTMR, (see Communication No 6/98 of the President of the Office cited above). 
However, having reduced the CTM processing workload, OHIM resumed examination 
of seniority under Article 34 in 2000 (see Communication No 2/00 of the President of 
the Office, cited above). 
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that a full-scale examination of seniority claims under the ‘triple-identity rule’ 
presents some difficulties, complexities and consumes a lot of time, hence the 
delay in processing applications for CTM. In these circumstances, deferral of the 
examination of seniority is not fatal as the “rights arising from seniority claims 
under Article 34 of the CTMR exist only after registration of the CTM and the 
surrender or lapse of the registration which is the subject of the seniority 
claim”.683 Thus, under certain circumstances, suspension of seniority 
examination may not be adverse to, but pro, the proprietors’ interests of securing 
exclusive rights in the CTM which would otherwise be delayed by the 
examination of seniority.684  
In practice, and as far as seniority examination in respect of the “triple-
identity rule” (same goods, same proprietors and same trademarks) is concerned, 
OHIM examines one element only, namely, identity of trademarks. This practice 
takes into account the fact that changes affecting identity of goods and identity of 
proprietors, regarding both the earlier national trademark and the CTM 
registration, may occur between the time of tendering the seniority claim to the 
Office and the time when the proprietor may not renew the national registration 
in order to let it lapse.685 However, it does not mean that the other two elements, 
namely, identity of ownership and identity of goods and services, are less 
important. These elements must be specified in the seniority claim as well. Any 
obvious omission will render the seniority claim unsuccessful.   
3. Merits and demerits of seniority right 
a) Merits 
Seniority right is accompanied by some appreciable advantages. The proprietor 
will enjoy double protection – first, in the country where earlier trademark rights 
existed, and second, at the Community level based on the CTM that assumed 
seniority right. Consolidation of earlier national trademark into a CTM is not a 
waiver of the national rights. The legal protection of the earlier national 
trademark remains intact. Such protection is not subjected to renewal require-
ments under the national law, provided the consolidated CTM is renewed as per 
 
683   Communication No 2/00 of the President of the Office, cited above. 
684   According to Article 9(3) of the CTMR, proprietary interests in a CTM can only be 
asserted against third parties after publication of a relevant CTM.  
685   For further justifications regarding the practice, see Communication No 2/00 of the 
  President of the Office, cited above.  
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the CTMR requirements.686 Thus, claiming a seniority right minimises renewal 
and other administrative costs, since the trademark proprietor needs only to 
maintain the CTM.687 The principle of seniority right may, therefore, be seen as a 
contract between OHIM and the proprietors of earlier national rights seeking 
protection of these rights as CTMs. Under the terms of such a contract, the 
proprietor of a national trademark enjoys the right to seniority only if he forbears 
to renew the earlier national trademark, or if he allows it to lapse. As a 
consideration for such forbearance or abandonment, the national trademark will 
be deemed under the CTMR to remain validly registered under the national law 
of the Member State concerned.688 
b) Demerits  
Under certain circumstances, seniority right may be compromised. This is 
particularly a case inscribed under Article 34(3) of the CTMR. According to the 
Article, “[the] seniority claimed for the Community trade mark shall lapse if the 
earlier trade mark the seniority of which is claimed is declared to have been 
revoked or to be invalid or if it is surrendered prior to the registration of the 
Community trademark”. Pursuant to the forgoing provision, the fate of the 
seniority right claimed before a CTM registration is dependent on the continued 
validity of the earlier national trademark, which serves as the foundation for such 
seniority. Any successful legal action (such as invalidity and revocation 
proceedings) challenging the validity of the earlier national trademark underta-
ken before the seniority claim has been accepted by OHIM, will result into the 
loss of the seniority right. While the proprietor has a right to surrender or to 
decide not to renew the earlier national trademark right even before the CTM is 
registered, in the event he does so before the seniority claim is accepted he will 
lose the seniority claim.689 
The CTMR does not guarantee that a CTM consolidating the earlier national 
trademark cannot be challenged. Registration of a CTM can be challenged based 
on earlier trademark rights. Even where these earlier rights are not earlier than 
the national trademark on whose basis the seniority right was claimed, the 
 
686   Cf. Article 47 of the CTMR. 
687   Cf. AIDE, C.M. & DITTMER, S., “Registration and Enforcement of European 
  Community Trade Marks: A Practical Guide”, 14 I.P.J. 283, 292 (1999-00).  
688   Cf. Article 34(2) of the CTMR. 
689   Cf. DURAN, L. & ANNAND, R.E., “Seniority”, in: POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P. 
& GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “the Community Trade Mark: Regulations, Practice and 
Procedure” (2nd ed., Release #4) VI.38 (INTA, New York 2005). 
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validity of the CTM concerned can still be questioned.  Imagine a scenario in 
which two national trademarks (i.e. NTM1 and NTM2), which were registered in 
different Member States in 1970 and 1993 respectively, are in issue.  Suppose 
further that in 1994 the proprietor of NTM1 successfully registered a CTM and 
claimed the seniority right of his 1970 national trademark. Under this scenario, 
the proprietor of NTM2 may challenge the validity of a CTM even if NTM2 is 
very junior to NMT1. NTM2 can, thus, be based upon as a relative ground for a 
CTM refusal.690 This is the result of the territoriality principle of trade mark 
rights, which holds a particular national trade mark as valid only in the country 
where such mark is registered. 
In view of the above conclusion, it is clear that seniority right is not entirely a 
safety valve, since various national trademarks unknown to the proprietor of 
NTM1 may be based upon to challenge his CTM. In the circumstances where the 
CTM is challenged as above, the principle of trademark conversion enables the 
proprietor to transform his CTM registration into national registrations.  
III. Trade mark conversion 
A CTM proprietor has a right to convert his CTM registration or application into 
national trademark applications in the Member States where similar trademarks 
do not exist. The right and the procedure leading to conversion are regulated 
under Articles 112 to 114 and 159 to 161 of the CTMR as well as Rules 44 to 47 
and 122 to 124 of the CTMIR. It is important to note that: 
The national trade mark application resulting from the conversion of a Community trade 
mark application or a Community trade mark shall enjoy in respect of the Member State 
concerned the date of filing or the date of priority of that application or trade mark and, 
where appropriate, the seniority of a trade mark of that State claimed under Articles 34 or 
35.691  
1. Grounds for conversion 
a) Withdrawal of a Community trade mark application 
An applicant for a CTM registration has a right, pursuant to Article 43(1) of the 
CTMR, to withdraw his application. This may happen, for instance, where a 
 
690   Cf. in this respect Article 8 of the CTMR. 
691   Cf. Article 112(3) of the CTMR. 
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CTM applicant learns about the existence of some prior rights after he had 
already applied for a CTM registration. Article 112(1) (a) of the CTMR permits 
a person who has withdrawn his application for a CTM registration to convert 
the application into applications for national trademarks.  Only a CTM 
application, to which a filing date has been assigned, in accordance with Article 
26(1) of the CTMR, may confer a right of trademark conversion. A CTM 
application may, nevertheless, retain an original filing date only if the trademark 
proprietor pays a basic application fee within a month following a date, on which 
the competent office received the application. Thus, a trademark application 
withdrawn before a basic application fee is paid does not confer a right of 
conversion to the trademark proprietor. Under certain circumstances, a CTM 
applicant may be deemed to have withdrawn his application.692 A constructive 
withdrawal, for instance, will be confirmed if the class fees,693 or if the 
registration fee is not paid within a prescribed period, or when a central 
trademark office of the Member State fails to forward to OHIM a CTM 
application channelled through it.694 
b) Cessation of effects of Community trade mark 
A CTM shall cease to have effect if it is not renewed, if it is surrendered, or if it 
is cancelled.695 If the effects of a CTM cease, the proprietor has a right, under 
Article 112(1) (b) of the CTMR to convert it into national applications for 
trademark registration.  
c) Refusal of registration 
A trademark must be refused registration, unless it fulfils the conditions for CTM 
registration.696 Article 112(1) (a) permits a proprietor whose CTM application 
has been refused registration to convert the refused application into applications 
for national trademark registrations. It is important to note that registration of a 
 
692   Cf. Articles 36(5) and 45 of the CTMR. 
693   Cf. Article 36(1) (c) of the CTMR requiring fees to be paid for each class applied for. 
694   Cf. Article 25(3) of the CTMR. See also McGOVERN, P., “Conversion”, in:  
POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P. & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “the Community Trade 
Mark: Regulations, Practice and Procedure” (2nd ed., Release #4) IXA.8 (INTA, New 
York 2005).  
695   See, respectively, Articles 47, 50 and 55 of the CTMR.  
696   See the grounds for trademark refusal in section D of chapter 4. 
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trademark can be approved in part (i.e. in respect of some of the goods and 
services). If this happens, the proprietor shall have the right to convert the mark 
into national applications for the goods and services in connection with which a 
CTM registration has been refused. 
d) Successful cancellation proceedings 
A CTM registration may be cancelled either by being revoked or by being 
invalidated.697 Cancellation of a CTM may be based on some grounds available 
in a single Member State. In the circumstances, the proprietor can be allowed to 
convert his CTM into national registrations in the Member States where grounds 
for cancellation do not exist.  
2. Grounds for excluding conversion 
a) Non-use of a Community trade mark 
Article 15 of the CTMR warrants revocation of a CTM, which has not been put 
to genuine use.698 According to Article 112(2) (a) of the CTMR, a CTM revoked 
on non-use grounds does not confer on the proprietor a right of conversion.  
b) Grounds for refusal available in one Member State 
Within the ambit of Article 112(2) (b) of the CTMR, a CTM cannot be converted 
into a national trademark in the Member State where, due to some grounds for 
trademark refusal or for revocation or for invalidity available in this Member 
State, the subject matter of a CTM registration would not have been registered as 
a national mark. However, such a trademark can be converted into national 
trademarks in other Member States where no such prior rights exist. 
 
697   See respectively Articles 51 and 52 of the CTMR. 
698   Regarding the use requirement, see section E (VI) (2) of chapter 4. 
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C. Enlargement of the European Union and Community trade marks 
Any accession to the European Union by new Member States impacts on the 
CTM.699 Arrangements have to be made to ensure that the unitary character of a 
CTM and the rights protected in the new Member States before accession date 
are not affected.  To facilitate integration of national trademark systems of new 
Member States into the CTM system, two solutions were conceived, namely, 
automatic extension of earlier CTMs and the “possibility for the holders of 
earlier national rights in the new Member States to prohibit the use of such 
extended Community rights in case of conflict”.700 
I. Automatic extension of Community trade marks 
A registered CTM, or an application for a CTM registration made, before the 
date of accession of a new Member State, extends automatically to the territory 
of this new Member State. This is what Article 165(1) of the CTMR stipulates. 
1. Absolute grounds for trademark refusal 
Accession of new Member States to the EU results in “potential conflicting 
additional new prior” or earlier trademark rights.701 It might happen that, in the 
light of a language in use in the acceding State, a registered CTM becomes 
descriptive of the goods or services it markets. Under the general rules,702 this 
CTM must be cancelled. However, a special provision was enacted in the CTMR 
to the effect that, no registration of a CTM applied for before the date of 
accession may be refused on the basis of absolute grounds for trade mark refusal, 
which becomes relevant upon accession of this new Member State.703 This does 
not, nevertheless, “mean that Community trade mark of this nature, once 
 
699   Cf. GASTINEL, E. & MILFORD, M., “The Legal Aspects of the Community Trade 
Mark” 143 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001).  
700   Cf. Communication No 05/03 of the President of the Office (i.e. OHIM) of 16 October 
2003, available at <http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/communications/05-03.htm> 
(status: 30 July 2012).  
701   Cf. GEVERS, F. & PIRE, J. L., “European Union, Enlargement to ten new Member 
States and the impact on the Community trade mark” in: POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, 
P., & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “the Community Trade Mark: Regulations, Practice and 
Procedure” (2nd ed., Release #4) XIII.7 (INTA, New York 2005).  
702   Cf. Article 7(1) of the CTMR. 
703   Cf. Article 165(2) of the CTMR. 
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registered will necessarily create a monopoly in a descriptive word in the new 
Member States where the absolute ground for refusal existed before 
enlargement”.704 Thus, depending on the meaning that the word mark conveys to 
the mind of the consuming public in the acceding State, a CTM may be outlawed 
in this State, without affecting the validity of a CTM and the use of that CTM in 
other Member States.    
2. Opposition against registration of Community trade marks 
A CTM applied for during a period of six months prior to the date of accession 
may be opposed by a proprietor of an earlier national trademark protected in the 
acceding State. This may happen only if the earlier national trademark was 
acquired in good faith and has a filing date or priority date (if claimed), which is 
earlier than that of the CTM application.705 This kind of opposition need not 
conform to the provisions of Article 41 of the CTMR requiring an opposition to 
be lodged within three months after publication of the CTM application.  
3. Cancellation of Community trade marks 
If an application for CTM registration is not opposed as above, no cancellation 
proceedings may be instituted against it on the basis of absolute and relative 
grounds for invalidity available in the new Member State. Similarly, a counter 
claim for the invalidity of a CTM cannot be approved if the ground for the 
counter claim becomes relevant due to some facts discovered in the acceding 
Member State.706 To put it simply, “extended CTMs can only be cancelled on the 
basis of a ground that was valid at the time before enlargement (meaning that 
they cannot be cancelled on the basis of grounds that become applicable merely 
because of accession)”.707 
 
704   Cf. FOLLIARD-MONGUIRAL, A. & ROGERS, D., “the Community trade mark and 
  designs system and the enlargement of the European Union”, 26(2) E.I.P.R. 48, 49 
  (2004).  
705   Cf. Article 165(3) of the CTMR. 
706   Cf. Article 165(4) of the CTMR. 
707   Cf. Communication No 05/03 of the President of the Office (i.e. OHIM) of 16 October 
2003, available at <http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/aspects/communications/05-03.htm> 
(status: 30 July 2012). 
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II. Preservation of earlier rights under national law 
Pursuant to Article 165(5) of the CTMR, a proprietor of an earlier national 
trademark whose registration was secured in good faith and prior to the 
accession date may prohibit the use of a CTM in the territory of the acceding 
state. The right to prohibit the use of a CTM on the basis of an earlier national 
right confirms what is already contained in Articles 110 and 111 of the CTMR. 
Article 110 reiterates that by acceding to the CTMR, a new Member State does 
not jeopardise the right existing under its laws pursuant to which claims for 
infringement of earlier rights recognised under the CTMR708 may be enforced 
against the use of a later CTM.  For its part, Article 111 envisages a scenario in 
which a national registration affirms validity of earlier rights even where such 
rights apply only to a particular locality. Where this is a case, the owner of 
national earlier rights has a right to oppose the use of a CTM in the territory of 
the acceding state in which his rights enjoy protection. Even where the owner of 
earlier rights confined to a particular locality can no longer oppose the use of a 
later CTM because five years within which, pursuant to Article 111(2), he is 
entitled so to oppose have elapsed,709 the CTM proprietor will be allowed to use 
his CTM in the territory concerned without affecting the rights of the proprietor 
of the earlier national rights. The territory where the earlier national rights are 
protected will become a no-man’s land, since the CTM proprietor will be able to 
use his CTM in the territory without prohibiting the use, by the owner, of the 
earlier national rights identical or similar to a CTM.  
D. Enforcement of Community trade mark rights 
The interrelationship between the CTM system and the national trademark 
systems of the Member States may, as well, be explained in light of the CTM 
enforcement regime provided for under the CTMR. The CTMR establishes a 
legal system devoted solely to the enforcement of CTM rights.710 The system, 
however, depends so much on the various legal systems of the Member States 
for its effectiveness. It identifies among national institutions of the Member 
States courts, which are competent to deal with the CTM enforcement issues. 
Since various laws such as the national law of the Member States or the Brussels 
 
708   Cf. Articles 8 and 52(3) of the CTMR. 
709   Cf. Article 111(2) of the CTMR. 
710   Cf. Title X of the CTMR.  
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Regulation, in addition to the CTMR, have to be applied to CTM infringement 
suits, the enforcement system lacks sufficient certainty, clarity and predictability. 
I. Application of Brussels Regulation 
Article 94(1) of the CTMR identifies Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (henceforth the Brussels Regulation) 
as a key piece of legislation applicable to issues regarding CTM enforcement. 
Before the Brussels Regulation came into force, the Convention on Jurisdi-
ction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at 
Brussels on 27 September 1968 (as amended severally) (henceforth, the Brussels 
Convention) applied to CTM enforcement disputes. This was made possible by 
Article 90 of the Council Regulation No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the 
Community trade mark (before its replacement by Article 94 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
mark). The consolidated version of the Brussels Convention, published in OJ EC 
C 27/1998, p. 1, was replaced (except between the EU Member States and 
Denmark) by the Brussels Regulation. According to paragraph 22 of the 
preamble to the Brussels Regulation, the Brussels Convention applies to the 
relationship between the EU Member States and Denmark. 
The legislative purpose of Article 94(1) of the CTMR is to ensure that the 
provisions relating to CTM enforcement contained in the CTMR do not conflict 
with those contained in the Brussels Regulation. The Article stipulates as 
follows: 
Unless otherwise specified in this Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 shall apply to 
the proceedings relating to Community trade marks and applications for Community trade 
marks, as well as to proceedings relating to simultaneous and successive actions on the 
basis of Community trade marks and national trade marks. 
Article 94(1) of the CTMR is, therefore, a default rule. Where the CTMR is 
silent on certain aspects of CTM enforcement, the provisions of the Brussels 
Regulation have to be applied. To put it tritely, the application of the Brussels 
Regulation is subject to what is stipulated elsewhere in the CTMR. Thus, the 
rules enacted at Brussels711 are excluded in cases covered by the CTMR’s own 
system.712  
 
711   As contained in the Brussels Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000. 
712   Cf. FAWCETT, J. J. & TORREMANS, P., “Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law” 320 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998). 
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It is important to note that the Brussels Regulation deals with enforcement 
issues touching on any commercial and civil matters. Since the CTMR enshrines 
specific provisions regulating CTM enforcement, the legal maxim lex specialis 
derogat legi generali may be based upon to qualify application of the Brussels 
Regulation to CTM enforcement. Article 94(2) (a) of the CTMR, for instance, 
expressly excludes Articles 2, 4 and 5(1), (3) – (5) of the Brussels Regulation 
from being applied to the CTM disputes. 
II. Community trade mark courts 
Article 95 of the CTMR establishes Community trade mark courts. Pursuant to 
the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, Member States are directed 
to designate a limited number of national courts and tribunals of first and second 
instances to serve as Community trade mark courts. It is considered that 
designation of limited number of CTM courts may “encourage uniform 
application of the CTM Regulation and, hence, further promote the uniformity of 
the CTM system”.713  
States which were already EC Members in 1994 when the system established 
under the CTMR became operational, were thus required to designate the CTM 
courts in their territories by 14 March 1997 (i.e. within three years after the CTM 
system came into force).714 Since new EU Member States must accept the acquis 
communautaire of the EU law as it stood on the accession day, it cannot be 
doubted that these States are as well obliged to nominate few courts within the 
national court system to serve as CTM courts.  
Germany complied with the provisions of Article 95(1) of the CTMR by 
designating 18 Regional Courts (Landgericht) to serve as CTM courts of first 
instance and 18 Higher Regional Courts (Oberlandesgericht) to operate as CTM 
courts of second instance. This designation does not interfere with the powers of 
the German Federal Patent Court, which enjoys an exclusivity of a mandate to 
deal with appeals emanating from decisions of the German Patent and Trade 
Mark Office, for the court deals with the CTM only when it comes to 
“opposition against registration of a national trademark ... based on a Commu-
nity trade mark with an older priority”.715 On its part, the United Kingdom 
 
713   Cf. FAMMLER, M. & AIDE, C., “Enforcement of CTM in the EU: the real test of their 
commercial value”, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 135, 140 (2004). 
714   Article 95(2) of the CTMR. 
715   Cf. RADEN, L. van, “Community Trademark Courts – German Experience”, 34(3) IIC 
270 et seq. (2003). 
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designated only four courts to serve as CTM courts. The courts are the High 
Court of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Court of Session of 
Scotland (in the first instance). The Court of Appeal of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and the Scottish Court of Appeal are designated for the second 
instance.716 
CTM courts would therefore be required to carry out some duties entrusted to 
them under the CTMR.717  The stipulation in the CTMR, pursuant to which 
Member States have to appoint some national institutions to deal with CTM 
rights, has been criticised since the use of national language in the proceedings 
relating to CTM does not necessarily have to be renounced.718  
National courts of the Member States, other than those expressly designated 
as the CTM courts, are, under certain circumstances given power to deal with 
disputes concerning infringement and validity of CTMs. It follows from the 
wording of Article 95(5) of the CTMR that in the event a Member State 
concerned does not designate some local courts to serve as CTM courts, the 
normal national courts with jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning infringement 
and validity actions of the national trademark rights are given power to hear 
disputes concerning CTM rights. Indeed, Article 95(5) of the CTMR extends the 
national court’s “jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione materiae in the case of 
proceedings relating to a national trade mark” to proceedings relating to CTM.   
1. Jurisdiction over infringement and invalidity proceedings 
The CTMR delineates jurisdiction of the CTM courts in relation to CTM 
disputes.719 The term jurisdiction is normally employed to refer to some powers 
entitling legal authorities, particularly courts of law, to adjudicate over disputes 
prescribed in the instrument granting the pertinent powers. A response to the 
question whether a particular court has some powers to deal with a CTM 
depends on whether a dispute in question relates to infringement, or whether it 
concerns validity of a CTM. Both alternatives are addressed under Article 96 of 
the CTMR.  
 
716   Cf. M. FAMMLER & C. AIDE, “Enforcement of CTMS in the EU: the real test of their 
commercial value”, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 135, 140 (2004). Cf. also 
<http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/mark/ctmcourts_addreses.pdf> (status: 30 July 2012). 
717   Cf. Article 95(1) of the CTMR. 
718   Cf. RADEN, L. Van, “Community trademark courts – German Experience”, 34(3) IIC 
270, 276 (2003). 
719   Cf. Articles 96 to 100 of the CTMR. 
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a) Infringement actions 
Article 96(a), (b) and (c) of the CTMR establishes competence of CTM courts in 
relation to various actions. These courts may, for instance, adjudicate on an 
action concerning infringement of a CTM, or an action the result of which would 
be a declaratory judgment confirming that the plaintiff does not infringe a 
particular CTM. Similarly, CTM courts have powers to deal with actions 
concerning “threatened infringement relating to Community trade mark”.720 It is 
important to note that for CTM courts to have powers to deal with actions of 
threatened infringements or those concerning a declaration of non-infringement, 
the national law of a Member State in which a respective CTM court is situated 
must be permissive.721 This implies that the CTM courts, being established under 
the national law on one hand, and being part of the national legal system on the 
other, have to take account of the national law with the result that in the event of 
a conflict with the Community law (i.e. the CTMR) such as where the national 
law ousts jurisdiction of the national courts in respect of certain aspects of CTM 
enforcement, the national law will prevail over the Community law granting 
powers in respect of those aspects.    
EU jurisprudence confirms that an application for a CTM registration confers 
a property right even before such an application matures to registration. Article 
9(3) of the CTMR reiterates this position. It provides that “Reasonable 
compensation may... be claimed in respect of matters arising after the date of 
publication of a Community trade mark application, which matters would, after 
publication of the registration of the trade mark, be prohibited by virtue of that 
publication”. Analogous to this reality, is the legal position stipulated under 
Article 96(c) of the CTMR, which empowers a CTM court to adjudicate on some 
conflicts arising out of the use by third parties of a plaintiff’s sign, while the said 
sign was a subject of a CTM application at the time when the defendant applied 
the sign to his goods. While there is nothing in the CTMR to prohibit the CTM 
courts from dealing with infringing use of a sign which is a subject of a 
published CTM application, the courts have unhampered liberty to defer such 
actions to a future date after a registration certificate is issued.722  
 
720   Cf. Article 96(a) of the CTMR. 
721   Cf. Articles 96(a) and (b) of the CTMR.  
722   Cf. Article 9(3) of the CTMR, last sentence. 
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b) Validity of a Community trade mark 
OHIM and CTM courts enjoy concurrent competence to deal with CTM 
revocation and invalidity proceedings. Where the actions relating to revocation 
and declaration of invalidity of a CTM have not yet been raised before the CTM 
courts by way of counterclaim, OHIM has an exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
the fate of a CTM insofar as the counterclaim is concerned.723 OHIM’s decision 
on a counterclaim has a res judicata effect. Where OHIM determines a dispute 
relating to revocation or a declaration of invalidity of a CTM, finally and 
conclusively, the counterclaim in relation to the same issues as determined by 
OHIM and in relation to the same parties may not be pleaded successfully in an 
infringement action before the CTM courts.724  
The CTM courts cannot deal with revocation or invalidity proceeding suo 
motu. They must, while dealing with infringement suits, proceed on an 
assumption that a registered CTM is valid.725 Presumption of CTM validity is 
nonetheless rebuttable. A defendant may, in an infringement action, plead a 
defence of counter claim putting a validity of a CTM concerned in issue.726 In 
this scenario, a CTM court seized of the matter, by virtue of Article 96(d) of the 
CTMR, must conduct a trial within a trial – a stance which may lead to a 
declaration of invalidity (or confirmation of validity), or revocation of the CTM 
rights concerned. However, where the CTM proprietor requests, a CTM court 
may, as an option, decide not to conduct the “trial within a trial”, and, instead, 
stay the main proceedings with the order being given to the defendant requiring 
him to submit his counterclaim to OHIM. The court will, however, be waiting 
for the outcome of the counterclaim to proceed with the infringement action. If 
the defendant does not take the counterclaim to OHIM, the CTM court will deem 
such a claim to have been withdrawn.727   
2. International jurisdiction 
Article 97 of the CMR, which describes international jurisdiction of CTM courts, 
determines jurisdiction based on three main factors, namely, a close connection 
 
723   Cf. Article 51 to 53 of the CTMR. 
724   Cf. Article 100(2) of the CTMR. 
725   Cf. Article 99(1) of the CTMR. 
726   “The validity of a Community trade mark may not be put in issue in an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement” (cf. Article 99(2) of the CTMR). 
727   Cf. Article 100(7) of the CTMR. 
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of the parties and the courts, the factors contained in the Brussels Regulation, 
and a place where a harmful act takes place.  
a) Connection of parties and courts  
Article 97 (1) to (3) of the CTMR devises a certain logical approach to the 
question of jurisdiction, by granting powers to the CTM courts on account of 
domicile or establishment of the defendant or the plaintiff. Where these two 
elements cannot be traced in the EU, a CTM court of general jurisdiction has to 
be identified. The following checklist is instrumental for the determination of 
international jurisdiction stipulated in the above provisions: 
 Is the defendant’s place of domicile traceable in one of the Member 
States? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the CTM court of the 
Member State concerned will have powers to determine the dispute in 
issue (cf. Article 97(1)). 
 If the answer to the above question is in the negative, the question 
whether a defendant is commercially established in one of the Member 
States has to be determined. If it is found that the defendant is 
established in the EU, the CTM court in the Member State where the 
defendant is established have power to deal with a dispute in issue (cf. 
Article 97(1)).  
 If it appears that the defendant is neither domiciled nor established in 
the EU, the place of domicile or the place of establishment of the 
plaintiff will be decisive as to the CTM courts with jurisdiction to 
litigate on issues concerning a CTM. The result here will be that the 
CTM courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or 
established will have powers to deal with a CTM by virtue of that 
domicile or establishment (cf. Article 97(2)).  
 Suppose that both the defendant and the plaintiff have neither their 
domicile nor establishment in the EU. The CTM courts of Spain (which 
have general international jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that Spain is 
the Member State in which OHIM has its seat) will have powers to deal 
with any action relating to a CTM (cf. Article 97(3)). 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
194 
 
It should be noted that the above checklist must be observed strictly and 
consecutively.728  
b) Factors contained in the Brussels Regulation 
Article 97(4) of the CTMR provides a special category of jurisdiction to a CTM 
court which, pursuant to the checklist in (i) above, would not have jurisdiction to 
deal with a dispute concerning a CTM, but for the agreement reached between 
the parties;729 or, because the defendant has entered an “appearance before a 
different Community trade mark court”.730 In essence, Article 97(4) provides a 
supplemental jurisdiction to CTM courts. It states clearly that the provisions of 
Articles 23 and 24 of the Brussels Regulation may be taken into account to 
determine a court with competence to deal with CTM suits.  
The following checklist, which is based on the provisions of Articles 23 and 
24 of the Brussels Regulation, may aid a CTM court to establish whether it is 
competent to deal with a dispute relating to CTM infringement: 
 Have the parties to the suit concluded an agreement indicating their 
preference as to a suitable forum to deal with the dispute? If the answer 
is ‘yes’, then this forum has a full legal mandate to deal with a dispute.  
 Is there any forum which may constructively be deemed as a place of 
domicile of the defendant so as to confer jurisdiction on the CTM courts 
of this forum? Article 24 of the Brussels Regulation, may be applied to 
confer jurisdiction on the courts before which a defendant enters an 
appearance. However, a note of caution looms high here: the rule laid 
down in Article 24 cannot be relied upon to confer jurisdiction on a 
court if the defendant entered appearance solely to contest jurisdiction 
of the said court. 
As an advantage of the party autonomy enshrined in Article 23 of the Brussels 
Regulation, litigants are able to “avoid the compartmentalization of the dispute 
 
728   Cf. JENKINS, N., “Litigation: Jurisdiction and procedure” in: POULTER, A., 
BROWNLOW, P. & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “the Community Trade Mark: Regulations, 
Practice and Procedure” (2nd ed., Release #4) XI.5 (INTA, New York 2005). 
729   Cf. Article 77(4) (a) of the CTMR. 
730   Article 97(4) (b) of the CTMR. 
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in many legal systems” and hence, the possibility to “foresee the applicable 
law”.731 
c) Place where harmful act takes place 
Article 97(5) of the CTMR provides an alternative approach to the question of a 
court with jurisdiction to deal with disputes concerning CTMs. Pursuant to this 
provision, an infringement suit may be brought in a forum in which a harmful act 
takes place, irrespective of whether the defendant or the plaintiff is domiciled or 
established in the forum. However, this source of jurisdiction, entitles the CTM 
courts of the forum where an infringement takes place to deal only with the suits 
concerning actions described under Article 96 of the CTMR,732 but subject to the 
exception stipulated under Article 97(5) of the CTMR. According to this 
exception, the court which assumes jurisdiction by virtue of Article 97(5) has no 
power to deal with “actions for a declaration of non-infringement of a 
Community trade mark”.  
3. Delimitation of jurisdiction 
Article 98 of the CTMR distinguishes the powers of the courts having 
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 97 (1) to (4), and those of the courts having 
jurisdiction to deal with CTM disputes based on Article 97(5). If the CTM court 
finds that it has jurisdiction based on the sole fact that the harmful act has taken 
place in its own territory in accordance with Article 97(5), its competence will be 
limited to the events of infringement or to acts of threats of infringement 
committed in that territory only.733  
However, a different result might be confirmed if the CTM court decides that 
it has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 97(1) to (4).734 The extent of jurisdiction 
is not limited to the events of infringements or acts of threat of infringement of a 
registered CTM or in respect of a sign whose application for registration is 
already published that take place in the country where the said CTM court is 
 
731   PERTEGAS, M., “Intellectual property and choice of law rules”, in: MALATESTA, A. 
(ed.), “The unification of choice of law rules on torts and other non-contractual 
obligations in Europe” 236 (CEDAM, Padova/Milan 2006). 
732   Cf. Section D (II)(1)(a) of this chapter. 
733   Cf. Article 98(2) of the CTMR. 
734   See section D (II)(2)(a) & (b) of this chapter. 
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situated. These courts have a mandate under Article 98(1) to deal with any 
infringement acts, which take place in any EU Member State. It follows naturally 
that an action can be brought before a German court, where the defendant is 
domiciled or established, in respect of an act of infringement committed in 
England. 
4. Related, simultaneous and successive actions      
The courts dealing with trademark disputes are required under the law735 to 
decline their power to deal with the disputes arising out of claims, which are 
related. Thus, “actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”.736 This 
may happen in two scenarios, namely, where only the CTM rights are in issue, or 
where the CTM rights and the national rights are in question, given that the CTM 
and the national trademark both are similar, owned by a single person and used 
in relation to similar/identical goods and/or services. 
a) Similar Community trade mark claims   
When it comes to specific claims regarding CTM infringement, Article 104 of 
the CTMR, stipulates the conditions which must be fulfilled before a CTM court 
is obliged to renounce its jurisdiction. The Article reads as follows: 
A Community trade mark court hearing an action referred to in Article 96, other than an 
action for a declaration of non-infringement shall, unless there are special grounds for 
continuing the hearing, of its own motion after hearing the parties or at the request of one 
of the parties and after hearing the parties, stay the proceedings where the validity of the 
Community trade mark is already in issue before another Community trade mark court...737  
CTM courts and OHIM work closely. For instance, OHIM is also required to 
stay proceedings relating to revocation or declaration of invalidity, if these issues 
are already before a CTM court, being brought there by way of a counter-claim 
defence.738 However, the fact that the CTM court is obliged to stay the 
 
735   Cf. Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels Regulation, as well as Articles 104 and 109 of the 
CTMR.   
736   Article 28(3) of the Brussels Regulation. 
737   Article 104(1) of the CTMR.  
738   Article 104(2) of the CTMR. 
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proceedings does not mean that the court is barred from ordering “provisional 
protective measures for the duration of the stay”.739 
Article 104 of the CTMR takes the cause of legal certainty by reinforcing the 
idea that favours avoidance of contradictory judgments and unfounded legal 
proceedings. Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 104 of the CTMR do not 
apply in relation to a declaration of non-infringement. The provisions only apply 
in respect of counterclaim, which might have effects of revoking, or which might 
lead to the declaration of invalidity of, the rights concerned.  
b) Related Community trade mark and national trademark claims 
Article 109 of the CTMR describes some instances under which simultaneous 
and successive actions based on a CTM or national trademarks may oblige a 
CTM court to decline its own jurisdiction in favour of another CTM court first 
seized of the matter. Article 109(1) for instance, proceeds on hypothetical facts 
reflecting a scenario under which simultaneous proceedings are brought before 
courts of two different Member States. While the infringement claims brought 
before one of the courts is based on a CTM, the other claim is based on a 
national trademark. For the rule under Article 109(1) of the CTMR to apply, two 
alternative questions must be answered in affirmative:740 (a) Do the CTM and the 
national trademark concerned fulfil the “triple-identity” rule? The question seeks 
to determine whether the marks and the goods or services and the owners are the 
same. (b) Are the CTM and the national trademark concerned identical and 
protected for similar goods or service? If no, are the CTM and the national 
trademark concerned similar and protected for identical goods or services?    
An affirmative response to question (a) will mean that the “court other than 
the court first seized shall of its own motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that 
court” and where the jurisdiction of the court first seized of the matter is 
challenged, the other court may stay its proceedings pending determination of 
the jurisdictional question. The positive response to question (b) will mean that 
the court other than the one first seized of the matter will not be obliged to 
decline its jurisdiction, but may deem it wise to stay the proceedings.  
Interpretation of Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels Regulation may also serve 
as guidance for the interpretation of Article 109 (1) (a) & (b) of CTMR. Article 
27 leads to a conclusion that jurisdiction is to be declined even where the CTM 
court first seized of the matter has not yet determined its jurisdiction. As a matter 
 
739   Article 104(3) of the CTMR. 
740   Cf. Article 109(1) (a) & (b) of the CTMR. 
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of principle, the courts second seized of the matter cannot determine their 
jurisdiction, unless the court first seized has already determined that it has no 
power to deal with the suit. The matter becomes more complicated as a list of 
various courts which might have declined their jurisdictions, by paying 
patronage to this rule, have to be established according to a cascading order, with 
the consequence that each court has to determine whether it has jurisdiction upon 
a negative conclusion regarding the jurisdiction by the court first seized of the 
matter. This likelihood raises a cause for concern given that whilst courts are 
busy determining their jurisdiction, an abeyance of proceedings will not be 
avoided. If several courts are required to decide, consecutively, on jurisdictional 
issues (as explained above), the enforcement system established under the 
CTMR cannot avoid criticisms for it condones dilatory measures, to an extent 
which could eventually jeopardise the attractiveness of the Community trade 
mark.  
Article 28 deals with the situation where the court first seized of the dispute 
has already established its jurisdiction and is already considering the claim, 
under which event this court should be left alone to deal with matter.  
On the other hand, successive actions – one based on the CTM and another 
based on the national trademark and vice versa – may trigger a court hearing an 
infringement suit to reject the second claim.741 The scenario, which is reflected 
under Article 109(2) & (3) of the CTMR describes the reality that a proprietor of 
a CTM and of a corresponding national trademark registration may seek to 
sanction infringement of trademark either by (a) suing in the national court for 
infringement of the national trademark corresponding to the CTM, or by (b) 
suing for the infringement of the CTM corresponding to the national trademark.  
If, pursuant to alternative (a) the court dealing with the matter has finally and 
conclusively pronounced a judgment on merits of the case, such a decision has a 
res judicata effect with respect to any claim that would be brought before the 
court by the proprietor in respect of infringement perpetuated by the same 
defendant. It is no defence for a plaintiff to plead that the judgment on merits 
serving as a res judicata was in respect of an infringement of a national 
trademark and that the current claim is based on an infringement of a CTM. The 
overriding point, which guides the court in rejecting the claim, is the fact that the 
national trademark and the CTM are actually the same, falling under a single 
ownership. Alternative (b) means the opposite of alternative (a). Here the claim 
already determined on merits was based on a CTM infringement, which will 
 
741   Cf. FAWCETT, J. J. & TORREMANS, P., “Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law” 338 (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford 1998). 
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serve as a res judicata against filing a claim regarding the same infringement, 
but this time based on the national trademark.   
Article 109(2) & (3) does not envisage a situation where the infringement 
suits are instituted concurrently, for if this were the case, then the situation 
depicted in the provision would hardly happen since the court would be required 
to decline its own jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized of the matter as 
per Article 109(1). What must be made clear is that the provisions of Article 
109(2) & (3) equate claims arising out of an infringement of national trademark 
and a CTM as a single claim and thus restricting splitting a single claim into two. 
This is essentially a recognition and practical application of the principle of “res 
judicata”. Recognition of the principle under the enforcement system established 
under the CTMR removes in part the likelihood of having conflicting decisions 
since several courts may have jurisdiction to try similar or one and the same 
claim. On the other hand, such recognition confirms that even if the enforcement 
mechanism established under the CTMR subjects itself to the jurisdiction of 
various courts, those courts are regarded as one and same court – a fact which re-
affirms the unitary characteristics of a registered CTM.    
5) Jurisdiction to award temporary reliefs 
The CTMR, in its Article 103, uses the phrase “provisional and protective 
measures” to refer to the term “temporary relief”. The phrase “provisional, 
including protective, measures” within the meaning of Article 103(1) of the 
CTMR is regarded to refer to measures which, in matters within the scope of the 
CTMR, “are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard 
rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case”.742  
Both the national courts and the CTM courts have concurrent jurisdiction to 
grant “provisional, including protective, measures in respect of a Community 
trade mark or a Community trade mark application as may be available under the 
law of that state in respect of a national trade mark”. The courts’ power to grant 
temporary relief cannot be assailed solely on the ground that a CTM court of 
another Member State has a jurisdiction to deal with the substance of the 
matter.743  
 
742   Cf. Case C-391/95 van Uden Maritime [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 37. Cf. also Case C- 
261/90 Mario Reichert v Dresdner Bank AG [1992] ECR I-02149, para. 34. 
743   Cf. Article 103(1) of the CTMR. 
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While an agreement between the parties can exclude jurisdiction of the courts, 
which seek to determine the suits finally and conclusively, courts’ power to grant 
temporary relief is an inherent mandate which cannot be ousted by an agreement 
since, where granted, a temporary relief does not determine the matter finally 
and conclusively. 744  
However, Article 103(2) of the CTMR delimits the extent of the effects of the 
temporary reliefs that may be granted pursuant to Article 103(1) of the CTMR. 
Consequently, the decisive factor as to whether a court considering granting the 
provisional and/or protective measure has power to grant the corresponding 
relief with effects beyond the Member State in which the court has its seat, 
depends on whether the said court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter based 
on the establishment or domicile of the defendant or the plaintiff.745 If the court’s 
source of jurisdiction is other than the foregoing,746 then the resulting order will 
have effects only to the scale of a single Member State where the court issuing 
such an order is situated. 
III. Applicable law 
1. Rome II Regulation 
The general choice of law rule in intellectual property infringement actions in 
Europe is contained in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (henceforth, Rome II).747 According to the Article 
“the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement 
of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which 
protection is claimed”.748 The Article provides further that “in the case of a non-
contractual obligation arising from an infringement of a unitary Community 
intellectual property right, the law applicable shall, for any question that is not 
 
744   Cf. Case C-391/95 van Uden Maritime [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 48. 
745   It must be recalled that constructive domicile or establishment of the parties can be 
inferred where the parties concerned enter into an agreement requiring them to submit 
their dispute to the courts of the country stipulated in the agreement, or where the 
defendant voluntarily submits himself before the courts of a Member State. See in this 
respect, section D (II) (2) (a) and (c) of this chapter. 
746   Such as where the jurisdiction is based on Article 97(5) of the CTMR, i.e., the place 
where an act of infringement or an act of threatening infringement takes place. 
747   According to its Article 32, Rome II entered into force on 11 January 2009 in respect of 
all provisions except Article 29, which entered into force on 11 July 2008. 
748   Article 8(1) of Rome II. 
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governed by the relevant Community instrument, be the law of the country in 
which the act of infringement was committed”.749 
Article 8(1) of Rome II, therefore, adapts the lex loci protectionis rule to the 
enforcement of national intellectual property rights. To put it in the context of 
national trademark rights, the Article implies that the law of the Member State 
where the relevant rights are protected will determine the conditions for 
trademark protection and the law to be applied to the trademark enforcement.750 
This conclusion enforces the principle of territoriality of intellectual property, 
trademark rights in particular, according to which, trademarks can only be valid 
in the territory of the state for which they are granted.751  
In spite of its unitary character, it is tenable to submit that the CTM can also 
benefit from the lex loci protectionis rule.752 It may certainly be argued that the 
CTM rights “are not infringed in the Community but rather in the Member States 
of the Community, and cannot be enforced in the Community but only in the 
Member States”.753    
To the extent that Article 8(2) of Rome II recognises national law of the 
Member State as a substantive law applicable to enforcement of Community 
intellectual property rights, which are not governed by the relevant Community 
instruments, it supplements the enforcement provisions of the CTMR as the 
discussion below under section D(III)(2)(c) of this chapter depicts. 
2. Community Trade Mark Regulation 
a) General applicable law  
Article 14 of the CTMR entrusts regulation of the effects of CTM rights to the 
provisions of the CTMR alone. According to a declaration contained in the 
Article, CTM courts have to apply to CTMs procedural law and infringement 
law the same law that applies to national trademarks. Article 14 of the CTMR 
 
749   Article 8(2) of Rome II. 
750    Cf. ECJ, Case C-9/93 IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v Ideal Standards GmbH 
[1994] ECR I-02789, para. 2 of the summary of the judgment.   
751   LUNDSTEDT, L., “Jurisdiction and the Principle of Territoriality in Intellectual 
Property Law: Has the pendulum swung too far in the other direction?”, 32(2) IIC 124 
(2001). 
752   Article 8(2) of Rome II confirms this conclusion. 
753   Cf. KNAAK, R., “The legal enforcement of the Community trademark and prior national 
rights”, 29(7) IIC 754 (1998). 
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does not, however, give a clear picture as to whether it is the national law or the 
CTMR that has a primacy over the other.   
Certainly, CTMR must be identified as the law applicable to the protection of 
the rights established under it. Article 101 of CTMR establishes a set of norms 
which are applicable to disputes concerning CTM rights. While the CTM courts 
are required to apply the provisions of CTMR as a primary law governing issues 
relating to CTMs, where CTMR is silent on certain aspects the courts are given 
mandate to apply not only the law of the country in which the court is established 
but also the private international law of this Member State.754 Furthermore, in the 
event CTMR does not provide to the contrary, a CTM court is required to resort 
to the “rules of procedure governing the same type of action relating to a national 
trade mark in the Member State where it has its seat”.755   
The fact that Article 101 of CTMR creates a pointer to the national laws of the 
Member States means that these laws are (in addition to the CTMR) the lex loci 
protectionis, which may be applied to determine a fate of CTM rights.756  Article 
101(2) of the CTMR does not identify one specific set of national laws, as it also 
makes reference to private international law of the country where the CTM court, 
before which infringement claim is instituted, is situated.  
b) The law applicable to sanctions 
The practical application of Article 101 of CTMR described above can be 
demonstrated by a discourse on Article 102 of CTMR which identifies the law 
applicable to sanctions. Article 102(1) alone may suffice to indicate how CTMR 
and the national law may be applied simultaneously. The provision allows a 
CTM court to issue a perpetual injunction based on CTMR, with a possibility of 
resorting to the rules of national law if that would be an efficient way of making 
the injunction enforceable in the country where the CTM court is situated. 
Indeed, CTM courts are obliged to grant injunctive relief “unless there are 
circumstances specific to the case which would allow a conclusion that further 
infringements will not occur”.757 Civil imprisonment or a penalty may be 
regarded as some of the measures the CTM court may undertake pursuant to the 
 
754   Article 101(1) & (2) of the CTMR. 
755   Cf. Article 101(3) of the CTMR. 
756   Cf. See section D (III) (1) of this chapter for the justification of the application of lex loci 
protectionis rule to the CTM enforcement. 
757   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights – Is Injunctive 
Relief Mandatory?” 38(4) IIC 377, 380 (2007). 
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law of a Member State concerned.758Any measures which the CTM court opts 
for, must ensure that the injunction is complied with “even if the national law 
includes a general prohibition of infringement of Community trade marks and 
provides for the possibility of penalising further infringement or threatened 
infringement, whether intentional or due to gross negligence”.759 It follows 
therefore that, the measures to be taken by the CTM courts within the meaning of 
Article 102(1) of CTMR, should ensure compliance with the injunction even 
where the said measures could not, pursuant to the national law, be taken “in the 
case of corresponding infringement of a national trade mark”.760  
The foregoing conclusion is in line with the provisions of the enforcement 
directive,761 which harmonises the means of enforcing intellectual property 
rights, such as “the arrangements for applying provisional measures, which are 
used to preserve evidence, the calculation of damages, or the arrangements for 
applying injunctions”.762 Article 3 of the directive provides that: 
Member States shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to 
ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights... Those measures, procedures 
and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or 
costly, or entail unnecessary time-limits or unwarranted delays.763  
On its part, Article 102(2) tries to capture all conceivable aspects of enforcement 
other than by way of permanent injunctions. The Article identifies the law 
applicable to infringement aspects or aspects of threat of infringement to be the 
law of the country where the “acts of infringement or threatened infringement 
were committed, including the private international law”.  
c) Efficacy of lex loci delicti rule 
To a passive observer, the legislative techniques employed under Article 102 
would seem a perfect solution to the CTM enforcement since infringements are 
likely to be perpetuated in some demarcated, territorial precincts where the lex 
 
758   KOOIJ, P.A.C.E. van der, “The Community Trade Mark Regulation: An Article by 
Article Guide” 166 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000).  
759   ECJ, Case C-316/05, Nokia Corp. v Joacim Wärdell [2006] ECR I-12083, para. 3 of the 
operative part.  
760   ECJ, Case C-316/05, Nokia Corp. v Joacim Wärdell [2006] ECR I-12083, para. 4 of the 
operative part. 
761   Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, contained in OJ L 195, 2.6.2004, p. 
16–25. 
762   Cf. Paragraph 7 of the preamble to the enforcement directive. 
763   Article 3(1) of the enforcement directive. 
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loci protectionis sufficiently provides a remedy. And, indeed, the rule laid down 
in Article 8(2) of Rome II does not conflict with Article 102(2) of CTMR, since 
the former Article confirms, more precisely, what is already contained in the 
latter. While Article 102(2) refers to the law of the Member State where 
infringing act takes place including the private international law of this State, 
Article 8(2) of Rome II refers only to the general law of the Member State where 
incidence of infringement takes place. This reference in Rome II implicitly 
extends to private international law of the Member State concerned, for it is a 
national law which determines a country’s private international law. However, a 
critical, legal analyst cannot take it for granted that the rules laid down in the 
above Articles do not lead to any irreconcilable legal implications.  
The fact that the law of the Member State is applicable to a CTM if the act 
infringing the CTM concerned is carried out in this Member State, means that 
the law of this particular Member State becomes lex loci protectionis. Thus, all 
CTM courts in the EU will be forced to apply this lex loci protectionis. This 
cannot pose any legal problem if the infringement takes place only in one 
country. However, neither CTMR nor Rome II has provided a proper solution in 
case several infringing acts are traced in different Member States. In the latter 
scenario, a CTM court will find itself obliged to apply laws of different Member 
States to a single infringement suit.   
IV. Recognition and enforcement of Judgments 
There is no provision in CTMR dealing with the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments issued by the courts with competence to deal with disputes arising out 
of exploitation of a CTM. However, the Brussels Regulation is applicable based 
on the general reference in Article 94 of CTMR. Article 33(1) of the Brussels 
Regulation directs the EU Member States to acknowledge and enforce judgments 
issued in any Member State.764  
In some instances, however, a judgment for the enforcement of a CTM issued 
by a court in one Member state may not be recognised in other Member States. 
This would be the case, for example, if by recognising such a judgment the 
institutions concerned would be in breach of the odre public, which must be 
observed in the Member State concerned.765 More the same, an ex-parte 
judgment issued against a defendant who can justify his non-appearance, before 
 
764   Cf. WURTENBERGER, G., “Enforcement of Community Trade Mark Rights”, 4 I.P.Q. 
402, 412 (2002). 
765   Cf. Article 34 of the Brussels Regulation. 
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the court, to take part in the proceedings which culminated in the judgment 
sought to be enforced may be disregarded by the authorities in the country where 
enforcement is sought. As a valid ground for opposing enforcement of a foreign, 
ex-parte judgment, the judgment debtor may adduce evidence revealing the fact 
that he was not served with the plaint in sufficient time, hence was not able to 
arrange for his defence. However, the court of the Member State in which 
enforcement of the judgment is sought will have to inquire into the veracity of 
the defendant’s averment, since if it is obvious that the defendant had an 
opportunity to challenge the judgment766 but did not do so in time, the opposition 
against recognition and enforcement cannot be successful.767 The opposition 
against recognition and enforcement would be successful if the judgment debtor 
is smart enough to prove that the foreign judgment conflicts with a judgment 
issued, between the same parties and the same cause of action, by a court in the 
territory where enforcement is sought.768  
The judgment debtor would, nevertheless, achieve the same results as above, 
if he can substantiate the fact that the foreign judgment conflicts with another 
judgment between the same parties issued by a court in another Member State or 
another third country. However, rejection of enforcement of the latter judgment 
irreconcilable with the former depends on whether the former judgment has 
already been enforced in the Member State where such enforcement was 
requested. If the former judgment has not yet been enforced, the law of the 
Member State where enforcement is (or would be) preferred has to be examined 
to find out whether the enforcement of the former judgment is (or would be) 
permissible.769    
It should, however, be noted that the findings contained in a foreign judgment, 
which is a subject of recognition and enforcement proceedings in another EU 
Member States, are sanctity. Thus, the judgment debtor cannot challenge the 
substance of a foreign judgment,770 nor can he ask the court in the Member State 
where enforcement is sought to vary the facts on which the court of the Member 
State of origin based its jurisdiction771 since the court in the country of 
 
766   Three common ways to challenge a judgment may be identified: (1) review (i.e. a court 
considering its own judgment/decision), (2) revision (a superior court in the hierarchy 
considering the appropriateness of a judgment by the lower court without issuing a 
judgment but directing the lower court to deal with a judgment in a certain specified 
way), and (3) appeal (a superior court considers an application to challenge a decision of 
the lower court and issues a judgment on merits of the appeal).  
767   Cf. Article 34(2) of the Brussels Regulation. 
768   Article 34(3) of the Brussels Regulation.  
769   Article 34(4) of the Brussels Regulation. 
770   Article 36 of the Brussels Regulation. 
771   Article 35(2) of the Brussels Regulation. 
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enforcement has no power to review the jurisdiction of the court issuing a 
foreign judgment, with the consequence that the odre public, as a ground to 
exclude recognition and enforcement of judgment, may not be relied upon to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin.772  
E. Concluding remarks  
The discussion in this chapter reveals that the establishment of the European 
Community trade mark system required a somewhat complicated legal formula 
in order to achieve a viable interplay between this newly established unitary right 
and the different national trade mark rights created and protected in the Member 
States. While the devised formula enables trade mark proprietors in the EU to 
own both national and CTM registrations in respect of one and same sign, it also 
gives them a liberty to switch from the national-based protection regime to the 
CTM regime and vice versa if they wish to have national registration being 
integrated in CTM registration or vice versa, provided both national and CTM 
registrations concern the same mark owned by the same person and registered 
for identical or similar goods. In view of this aspect of the formula, it is certain 
that seniority right and the right of a trade mark conversion will continue to be of 
paramount importance as long as the national trade marks and CTMs still co-
exist.  
While the devised formula deserves compliments for its tactical approach to 
the complicated question of enforcement of CTM rights, the formula renders the 
enforcement mechanism less predictable since various national laws must be 
interpreted by national authorities, each in its own jurisdiction, in relation to 
CTM infringement. Thanks to the Rome II Regulation which, to a certain extent, 
clears the ambiguity by pointing directly to the law of the country where 
respective rights are protected and where infringement takes place as the law 
applicable to enforcement of industrial property. The CTM enforcement 
mechanism may be even better if the EU could introduce a regulation on 
intellectual property enforcement in addition to the EU’s enforcement directive 
which is already at work to harmonise national measures regarding enforcement 






772   Article 35(3) of the Brussels Regulation. 
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Chapter 6:  Free movement of branded goods in the European 
Union 
A. Introduction 
This chapter examines the balance achieved by the ECJ and the EC773 legislature 
to ensure that trade-mark rights are not used to compartmentalise the EU 
Common Market into different national markets. In this regard, the Chapter 
addresses some fundamental principles, which determine the precincts of a trade 
mark monopoly, namely, the existence-exercise dichotomy, the specific subject-
matter and essential function of trade marks, as well as the principle of 
exhaustion of trade-mark rights. The chapter explores further various practical 
instances that clarify the doctrine of exhaustion. Some preliminary considera-
tions in the Chapter are directed to provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), which stipulate the principle of free movement of 
goods. 
The central thesis of this chapter is that the principle of free movement of 
goods in the EU Common Market is not an absolute, but a qualified freedom, as 
it accommodates some concessions which are necessary to ensure that trade 
mark proprietors enjoy the monopoly in a way that does not distort competition 
in the internal market. In this regard, the Chapter reinforces a legal position that 
the “capacity of a trade mark proprietor to oppose the marketing of products by 
an importer, where they have been placed on the market in the Member State of 
export by him or with his consent is regarded as justified, unless it is established, 
in particular, that such opposition contributes to the artificial partitioning of the 
markets between Member States”.774  
 
773   Throughout this Chapter the terms EC (i.e. European Community), EU (i.e. European 
Union) and EEA (i.e. European Economic Area) are used interchangeably to refer to the 
geographical area to the scale of which the Community trade mark directive and the 
CTMR, as well as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are 
applicable.  
774   ECJ, Case C-379/97 Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v Paranova A/S [1999] ECR I-0692, para. 
72 of  summary of the judgment.  
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B. Legal basis for free movement of branded goods 
I. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The interplay between intellectual property and free movement of goods in the 
European Union (EU) is regulated under Articles 34 to 36 and 345 of the 
TFEU.775 The use of intellectual property rights to prohibit free movement of 
goods constitutes a measure having equivalent effects within the meaning of 
Article 34 of the TFEU. The Article provides that “Quantitative restrictions776 on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States”. For its part, Article 36 of the TFEU manifests recognition by 
the EU legislature of the significant role of industrial property rights in a free 
market economy “despite their inherent potential to undermine the E.U. free 
trade objective”.777 It stipulates that “The provisions of Articles 34 shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports… or goods in transit justified on 
grounds of … the protection of industrial and commercial property”. However, 
the reliance on intellectual property rights to prohibit free movement of goods 
may be justified only to the extent such use does not constitute a “means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States” – a requirement stipulated in the proviso to Article 34 of the TFEU. 
The term “disguised restriction on trade between Member States”, as 
expressed in recent ECJ’s case law, refers to a scenario in which a trade mark 
proprietor devises a scheme enabling him to artificially partition the market 
between the EU Member States. For instance, the proprietor will be regarded as 
embarking on artificial partitioning of the EC Common Market when, with 
deliberate intention to segment the market, he relies on a national law, or 
contractual arrangements, to prohibit imports of similar goods bearing his trade 
mark that were legally marketed in another Member State.778 The ECJ’s use of 
the term “artificial partitioning” presupposes existence of “natural partitioning”. 
It follows from the principles laid down in Article 36 TFEU, that the proprietor 
of a trade mark is naturally allowed to rely on his trade mark rights as owner to 
oppose the marketing of the branded goods “when such action is justified by the 
 
775   The consolidated version of the TFEU was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union No. C 115/47 of 9.5.2008.   
776   Quantitative restrictions encompass “measures which amount to a total or partial 
restraint of, according to the circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit” (cf. 
ECJ, Case C-2/73 Gedo v Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865, para. 7). 
777   Cf. GROSS, N., “Trade mark exhaustion: the U.K. perspective”, 23(5) E. I. P. R. 224, 
226 (2001). 
778   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 45. 
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need to safeguard the essential function of the trade mark”, in which case the 
resultant partitioning could not be regarded as artificial.779  
The essential function of intellectual property rights is one of the principles 
developed by the ECJ in the course of interpreting provisions of the EU law in 
relation to the free movement of branded goods. It was preceded by the principle 
that requires a distinction to be made between the existence and exercise of 
intellectual property rights, and the principle of specific subject-matter of 
intellectual property rights.   
II. Principles developed by the ECJ  
1. Existence and exercise of intellectual property  
The principle that requires a distinction to be made between the existence and 
exercise of intellectual property rights was expounded by the ECJ as a response 
to a fundamental question of how to achieve a balance between the legitimate 
interests of right holders to enjoy a monopoly in respect of industrial property 
protected under the national law and the EU’s objective to maintain undivided 
common market. This question becomes of paramount importance when the 
owner of a national industrial property seeks to enjoy his rights in a way that 
clashes with interests of the EU’s Common Market, namely the principle of free 
movement of goods. A partial solution to this question can be found in Article 36 
of the TFEU, which disqualifies any attempt, by individuals, to rely on intelle-
ctual property to hamper free movement of goods, especially where such reliance 
disguisedly restricts trade between Member States. However, Article 345 of the 
TFEU, which provides that the Treaty “shall in no way prejudice the rules in 
Member States governing the system of property ownership”, is a very antithesis 
of the foregoing conclusion. In the light of this Article, the TFEU seems to 
subordinate the EU law governing ownership of intellectual property to national 
law of the Member States regulating the same subject. This begs the question 
whether the proviso to Article 36 of the TFEU outlaws the use of national 
industrial property adjudged to be a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States.     
The provisions of Article 345 and the first part of Article 36 of the TFEU 
ostensibly trigger individuals in the EU Member States to assume that their 
nationally protected copyrights, patents, trade marks and other forms of 
 
779   Cf. joined cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova 
  [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 53. 
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intellectual property are sacrosanct rights, unassailable on the basis of 
Community law, but “left to the authority and control of the Member States”.780  
Nevertheless, in view of some ECJ’s judgments, such as Grundig,781 Parke,782  
Sirena,783 and Deutsche Grammophon,784 this assumption would be treated as a 
clear misconception of the relationship between Community law and the laws of 
the Member States. Insofar as this relationship is concerned, these cases offer a 
two-level approach:  
 The court seized of the matter must acknowledge that the existence of 
intellectual property rights protected in the Member States is a matter of 
national legislation of a Member State concerned and abstain from 
questioning such existence on the basis of the Community law.  
 The same court must thus employ a legal fiction to isolate existence 
from exercise of intellectual property rights so that whenever the 
exercise of intellectual property right comes into conflict with the 
Community law, such exercise shall be declared illegal without 
affecting existence of the respective rights under the national law.  
As the discussion below elaborates, the above cases were basically decided 
based on competition law rather than the rules on free movement of goods 
contained in Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU. The relevant competition 
provisions of the TFEU are Articles 101 (1) and 102.  
Article 101(1) of the TFEU provides that:  
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market...  
On its part, Article 102 of the TFEU stipulates that:  
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market 
insofar as it may affect trade between Member States...  
 
780   MANIATIS, S., “Trade Marks in Europe: A Practical Jurisprudence” (1st ed.) 454 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006).  
781   ECJ, Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grudig-Verkaufs- 
  GmbH v Commission of the European Community [1966] ECR 00299. 
782   ECJ, Case 24/67 Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and 
Centrafarm [1968] ECR 00055, para. 2 of summary of the judgment. 
783   ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 1of 
summary of the judgment. 
784   ECJ, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte 
   GmbH & Co. KG. [1971] ECR 00487. 
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Grundig785 is one of the early ECJ’s cases which involved the exercise of 
intellectual property rights in a way that conflicts with the Community law. The 
material facts of the case present Grundig as a company registered in Bavaria, 
Germany. It owns, and affixes to all its goods, a trademark “GINT”. Grundig 
entered into an exclusive distribution agreement with French Company – 
Consten. The Grundig-Consten agreement manifests a win-win scenario: 
Consten is assured access to Grundig stocks on a condition that it must abstain 
from selling the stocks in EU countries other than France, whereas Grundig 
rewards Consten’s forbearance by undertaking not to distribute similar products 
to Consten’s business competitors in France. To ensure that no third party could 
export to France products bearing Grundig’s GINT mark bought elsewhere, 
Consten registered the trade mark “GINT” as a French national mark. The 
registration was undertaken as a part of Grundig-Consten agreement. Analysing 
the circumstances surrounding the case, the ECJ concluded that the registration 
of GINT as a French national trade mark aimed at restricting parallel imports 
into France of Grundig products. Thus, the registration strengthened the 
contractual restrictions already agreed upon by the parties, with the conseque-
nces that no third party could import Grundig products from other Member 
States of the Community for resale in France “without running serious risks”.786  
Having been convinced that the Grundig-Consten agreement aimed at 
“isolating the French market for Grundig Products and maintain artificially, for 
products of a very well-known brand, separate national markets within the 
Community”, the ECJ held that the agreement distorted competition contrary to 
Article 101 of the TFEU. Drawing on the fact that the agreement prevented 
undertakings other than Consten from importing Grundig products into France, 
and at the same time restricted Consten from re-exporting those products to other 
countries of the common market, the ECJ held that the agreement affected trade 
between Member States contrary to the provisions of the TFEU.787 
The ECJ hinted, indirectly, on the existence-exercise dichotomy by arguing 
that “the Community rules on competition do not allow the improper use of 
 
785   ECJ, Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grudig-Verkaufs- 
  GmbH v Commission of the European Community [1966] ECR 00299. 
786   Cf. ECJ, Joined cases 56 and 58-64 Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grudig- 
  Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Community [1966] ECR 00299, para. 6 
of summary of the judgment.  
787   Cf. ECJ, Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grudig- 
  Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Community [1966] ECR 00299, para. 6 
summary of the judgment. 
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rights under national trade-mark law in order to frustrate the Community’s law 
on cartels”.788 With this conclusion, the ECJ intimated that the trade mark 
registration of the GINT mark made under the French law could not justify 
restriction on trade between Member States, since the registration in issue was 
secured in execution of a plan agreed upon by Grundig and Consten – a plan 
which contravenes the EU competition law.  
b) Parke 
Parke case789 depicts some weaknesses inherent in the Grundig-Consten judg-
ment. The Grundig case basis solely on competition rules of the EC Treaty to 
prohibit proprietors of intellectual property right from relying on their rights to 
restrict trade between the EU Member States. In order for Article 101(1) of the 
TFEU to apply, it is necessary to prove the existence of an agreement..., or a 
decision... or concerted practice... which tends to restrict trade between Member 
States.790 This was not a case in Parke, which basically concerned reliance on a 
patent legally protected in the Netherlands. The patent covered medicinal 
products. The contentious issue was whether the proprietor of the patent in issue 
was justified to prohibit marketing, in the Netherlands, of similar medicinal 
products produced in another Member State where such medicinal products do 
not qualify for protection under patent law. The referring court had asked the 
ECJ to determine whether the action by the patentee was contrary to the 
provisions of Articles 101(1) and 102 of the TFEU. The ECJ affirmed that 
existence of a patent right protected in the Member State could not be affected 
by the prohibitions contained in the above provisions. Since there was no 
agreement, decision or concerted practice involved, the exercise of the said 
patent was not contrary to the provisions of Article 101(1) of the TFEU. In a 
case (such as Parke) in which the conditions required for Article 101(1) to apply 
are not fulfilled, the patentee can only be restrained from relying on his protected 
rights if he contravenes Article 102 of the TFEU. However, the exercise of 
patent right cannot be enjoined on the basis of Article 102 of the TFEU; unless it 
is proved that the right holder abused his dominant position.     
 
788   Cf. ECJ, Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grudig-
Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Community [1966] ECR 00299, para. 10 
of summary of the judgment. 
789   Case 24/67 Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and 
Centrafarm [1968] ECR 00055. 
790   ECJ, Case 24/67 Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and 
Centrafarm [1968] ECR 00055, para. 2 of summary of the judgment. 
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c) Sirena   
According to Sirena791 case, a contract for an assignment of a trade-mark will 
always be invalidated if it negatively affects trade between EU Member States. 
In the case at hand, an American company (henceforth the US company) owned 
a trade mark in connection with which it used to market cosmetics and medicinal 
cream worldwide. The US Company “sold, assigned and transferred all rights, 
titles and interests in the said trademark” to two European Companies, namely an 
Italian company (henceforth IT) and a German company (henceforth DE).792 
Each company was required under the agreement to use the trade mark on its 
own territory. IT registered the trade mark in Italy in respect of cosmetic and 
medicinal products. DE sought to import in Italy cosmetic and medicinal 
products bearing a trade mark identical to that used by IT on identical goods. IT 
regarded such importation as an infringement of its trade mark registered in Italy 
and objected the importation. The following question was thus framed by the 
referring court (i.e. the Italian Court) soliciting the ECJ’s response thereto: 
“assuming that the national law recognises the right of a trade-mark proprietor to 
impede imports from other Member States, does Community law affect the 
extent of this right?”.793 As what might be seen as a response to this question, the 
ECJ conceded that: 
A trade mark right, as a legal entity, does not in itself possess those elements of contract or 
concerted practice referred to in Article [101(1)]. Nevertheless, the exercise of that right 
might fall within the ambit of the prohibitions contained in the Treaty each time it 
manifests itself as the subject, the means or the result of a restrictive practice. When a 
trade mark right is exercised by virtue of assignments in one or more Member States, it is 
thus necessary to establish in each case whether such use leads to a situation falling under 
the prohibitions of Article [101].794 
While building on the principles established in Parke,795 the ECJ, in Sirena case, 
made some slight improvements on the former judgment. It clearly associated 
the rules in Articles 101(1) and 102 of the TFEU with the provisions of Article 
36 of the TFEU which justifies, in certain instances, the exercise of intellectual 
property to prohibit free movement of goods.  In this regard, a relevant paragraph 
of the judgment provides that: 
 
791   ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069. 
792   ECJ, Case 40/70 Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 2. 
793   ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 3. 
794   ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 9. 
795   Cf. ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 1 of 
summary of the judgment. 
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... [Article 36], although it appears in the chapter of the Treaty dealing with quantitative 
restrictions on trade between Member States, is based on a principle equally applicable to 
the question of competition, in the sense that even if the rights recognised by the 
legislation of a Member State on the subject of industrial and commercial property are not 
affected, so far as the existence is concerned, by Articles [101 and 102 TFEU], their 
exercise may still fall under the prohibitions imposed by those provision.796    
Thus, if the cumulative assignments to different users of a national trade mark 
protected in two or more Member States for the same product re-enacted 
“impenetrable frontiers between the Member States” a conclusion could be 
drawn that such practice affected as well trade between the Member States, and 
distorted competition in the common market797 - a fact that would lead sanctions 
against the said behaviour being proffered based on Articles 36 and 101(1) of the 
TFEU.  
d) Deutsche Grammophon 
In Deutsche Grammophon798, the ECJ was asked to determine whether “the 
exclusive right of distributing the protected articles which is conferred by a 
national law on the manufacturer of sound recordings may, without infringing 
Community provisions, prevent the marketing on national territory of products 
lawfully distributed by such manufacturer or with his consent on the territory of 
another Member State”. The court was urged to respond to this question in the 
light of the provisions of Article 101(1) of the TFEU.799 However, the ECJ 
“widened the scope of the question, linked competition with free movement, and 
exported the distinction between existence and exercise of a right from the field 
of competition to that of free movement of goods”.800 This new approach 
acknowledges the fact that the exercise of intellectual property rights which does 
not result from an agreement between the parties cannot be enjoined under 
Article 101(1) TFEU even where such exercise produces some shrewd effects on 
the common market. However, under the circumstances as the foregoing, it is 
necessary for the court to consider whether such use is in consonance with other 
provisions of TFEU especially those concerning free movement of goods.801   
 
796   ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 5. 
797   ECJ, Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 00069, para. 10. 
798   ECJ, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte 
  GmbH & Co. KG. [1971] ECR 00487. 
799   Cf. Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon [1971] ECR 00487, para. 4. 
800   Cf. MANIATIS, S., “Trade Marks in Europe: A Practical Jurisprudence” (1st ed.) 455 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006).  
801   Cf. ECJ, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon [1971] ECR 00487, para. 7. 
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The aim of attaining a single market in the European Community provided an 
impulse for the ECJ to link competition rules and the principles of free 
movement of goods contained in Article 36 of the TFEU.802 
Returning to the provisions of Article 36 of the TFEU, the court, justifiably, 
made a distinction between existence and exercise of industrial property rights as 
follows: 
Amongst the prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of goods which it concedes 
Article [36] refers to industrial and commercial property. On the assumption that those 
provisions may be relevant to a right related to a copyright, it is nevertheless clear from 
that Article [36] that, although the Treaty does not affect the existence of rights recognised 
by the legislation of a Member State with regard to industrial and commercial property, 
the exercise of such rights may nevertheless fall within the prohibitions laid down in the 
Treaty.803       
Adding to the foregoing, the ECJ made an important step for the protection of 
the European internal market by providing a predictable demarcation of the 
extent to which intellectual property rights may be based upon to abrogate the 
freedom of movement of goods: 
Although it permits prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of products, which 
are justified for the purpose of protecting industrial and commercial property, Article [36] 
only admits derogations from that freedom to the extent to which they are justified for the 
purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific-subject matter of such 
property.804    
The court did not, however, provide a firm interpretation of what constituted 
“specific subject-matter” of intellectual property. 
2. Specific subject-matter of intellectual property 
The principle of specific subject matter of intellectual property right essentially 
means that when a trade between Member States may be affected by a proprietor 
who relies on his right, such reliance must be justified on the grounds of 
protecting the specific subject-matter of the right concerned. The principle, 
therefore, aims to prevent trade mark rights to be used to “partition off national 
markets” and thereby restrict trade between the Member States, in a situation 
where no such restriction was necessary to guarantee the essence of the exclusive 
right flowing from the trade mark.805 Where the reason is to protect a specific 
 
802   Cf. ECJ, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon [1971] ECR 00487, para. 8. 
803   Cf. ECJ, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon [1971] ECR 00487, para. 11. 
804   Cf. ECJ, Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon [1971] ECR 00487, para. 11. 
805   ECJ, Case C-16/74, Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Winthrop BV [1974] ECR 
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subject-matter of an intellectual property right, derogation from the Community 
law requiring unhampered free movement of goods will be justified.806 
Each type of intellectual property has a specific subject-matter which it 
protects: 
In relation to trade marks, the specific subject-matter ... is the guarantee that the owner of 
the trade mark has the exclusive right to use that trade mark, for the purpose of putting 
products protected by the trade mark into circulation for the first time, and is therefore 
intended to protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and 
reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.807 
It is apparent that a trade mark proprietor may not prohibit marketing in his 
national territory of a product put on the market of another Member State by 
himself or with his consent, since under this scenario, the proprietor will be 
presumed to have profited from the specific subject-matter of the protection 
extended to his trade mark.  
The ECJ has however held that the scope of the right to enjoy a specific 
subject-matter of a trade mark can be determined by making a reference to 
essential function of a trade mark.808 
3. Essential function of a trade mark 
The ECJ made it clear in Hoffmann-La Roche809 that the essential function of a 
trade mark was to guarantee “the identity of the origin of the trade-marked 
product to the consumer or ultimate user, by enabling him without any 
possibility of confusion to distinguish that product from products which have 
another origin”. The essential function of trade marks is therefore to provide an 
assurance to the ultimate consumer that a branded good which is being marketed 
to him comes directly from the proprietor of a trade mark or from a person 
authorised to use a mark by the proprietor so that the consumer is certain of 
quality of the products usually bearing the proprietor’s mark.810 In the event third 
 
  01183, para. 11. 
806   ECJ, Case C-16/74, Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Winthrop BV [1974] ECR 
  01183, para. 8. 
807   ECJ, Case C-23/78, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 01139, 
  para. 7. 
808   ECJ, Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v HAG G AG [1990] ECR I-03711, para. 14. 
809   ECJ, Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 01139, 
para. 7. 
810   ECJ, Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 01139, 
para. 7. 
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parties interfere with the essential function of a trade mark, the proprietor will 
not be able to enjoy the specific subject-matter of his trade mark.  
It follows naturally that the proprietor can enforce his specific subject matter 
of a CTM based on the essential function of a trade mark as well. This could 
happen if a third party, who has no authorisation to a use a mark, markets the 
goods bearing the mark in such a way as to impair the “guarantee of origin”.811  
It is important to note that the principles of specific subject matter and the 
essential function of trade mark right are relied upon by the ECJ to define the 
extent to which manufacturers and/or trade mark proprietors may rely on the 
principle of trade mark exhaustion stipulated in Articles 7 and 13 of the TD and 
the CTMR respectively, to prohibit free movement of goods. As is shown in 
section C below, the principle of exhaustion is the ECJ’s approach to the 
balancing of two opposing interests, namely, the fundamental tenet of free 
movement of goods assured by Article 34 of the TFEU and the legitimate 
interests, which trade mark proprietors can enforce based on Articles 345 and 36 
of the TFEU.812  
C. Exhaustion of trade mark rights 
I. Delineation and forms of trade mark exhaustion 
Section C (I) (2) (a) of chapter 3 hints to the fact that a regime for trade mark 
exhaustion is usually delimited to a specific geographical area.813 The doctrine of 
trade mark exhaustion in the EU “relates to the territory of the Member States”. 
The European Union applies to the Community trade mark regime the principle 
of regional exhaustion based on Article 13(1) of the CTMR. Similarly, Member 
States are required under Article 7(1) of the TD to apply the principle of regional 
exhaustion to trade mark rights protected under the national law. Pursuant to the 
principle of regional exhaustion, “trade mark rights cannot be invoked to restrain 
the free movement of goods within the EU, but they can be used to restrain the 
entry of such goods into the EU”.814 Thus, regional exhaustion of CTM rights is 
 
811   ECJ, Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 01139, 
para. 7. 
812   ENCHELMAIER, S., “the inexhaustible question – free movement of goods and 
intellectual property in the European Court of Justice’s Case Law, 2002-2006”, 38(4) 
IIC 453 (2007). 
813   Cf. STUCKI, M., “Trademarks and Free Trade” 26 (Staempfli Verlag AG, Bern 1997).  
814   Cf. Commission of the European Communities, “possible abuses of trade mark rights 
within the EU in the context of Community exhaustion”, Commission Staff Working 
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a “necessary tool to safeguard the objective of the establishment of a single 
market. Any other solution would inevitably lead to the fragmentation and 
partitioning of the market”.815  
Regional exhaustion of CTM rights can be differentiated in a number of ways 
from national and international exhaustion.816 In the context of national 
exhaustion, the trademark proprietor waives his rights in relation to goods he 
puts on the national market. This leaves him with the freedom to prevent import-
ation of the goods in his own territory, where the said goods have not been 
marketed in the national market by the proprietor or any other person with the 
trade-mark owner’s approval. With regard to international exhaustion, the trade 
mark proprietor cannot control subsequent marketing of his products which he 
has sold in a particular country. It does not make any difference if he markets the 
goods in the country where the trade mark is registered or in a third country 
where the trade mark does not enjoy any protection. The decisive factor is the 
first marketing of the product in any part of the world, after which event trade 
mark rights exhaust globally.817 
II. Rationale of Community trade mark exhaustion 
One reckons with the fact that while the principles underlying Community trade 
mark exhaustion were developed to meet the desire of having an undivided 
market in Europe,818 adaption of regional trade mark exhaustion to CTM went 
beyond the initial motives. If the aim were just to ensure that goods circulated 
freely after the first sale, the doctrine of international trade mark exhaustion 
would as well have achieved the same end. It would therefore seem that besides 
the urge to meet the demand of undivided EU’s internal market, the legislature 
had also to take account of the interests of the EU’s business community. This 
can be viewed in light of the features characterising the principle of regional 
exhaustion. The principle enables CTM proprietors to market their branded 
 
  Paper No. SEC (2003) 575. 
815   STAMATOUDI, I. A. & TORREMANS, P.L.C., “International exhaustion in the 
 European Union in the Light of “Zino Davidoff”: Contract Versus Trade Mark Law”, 
31(2) IIC 123, 125 (2000). 
816   National and international exhaustion principles are discussed in section C (I) (2) of 
chapter 3 supra. 
817   Cf. TORREMANS, P., “Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law” 448 Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2008).  
818   Cf. FRANZOSI, M., “Grey Market – Parallel Importation as a Trademark violation or an 
Act of Unfair Competition”, 21(2) IIC 194, 203 (1990). 
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goods outside the EU Common Market without exhausting the rights within it.819 
Thus, the Community-wide trade mark exhaustion is inclined to protect the 
competitiveness of the EU industry since, by giving power to the EU companies 
to decide where the initial marketing of their products takes place; EU 
companies are given an incentive to invest in new brands with high quality of 
goods and services.820 If adapted, international exhaustion would defeat this 
noble objective, since the EU Common Market could no longer be reserved for 
EU undertakings or establishments alone. Goods placed in the market outside the 
EU would easily find their way back to the EU market. To put it simply, the 
“flow of goods into the EU could not be restrained” on the basis of CTM 
rights.821  
The ECJ, in Silhouette case,822 made it clear that Member States were not 
allowed to introduce the principle of international exhaustion of trademark rights 
in their domestic laws. The case concerned re-importation, into Austria, of goods 
originally produced by the proprietor of a trade mark registered in Austria. The 
proprietor, who opposed such re-importation, had marketed the goods in 
Bulgaria.823 Although Austria had already implemented Article 7 of the 
Community trade mark directive, authorities in this country were unsure whether 
the principle of regional exhaustion contained in the Directive rendered 
inapplicable the principle of international exhaustion, which originally contained 
in the Austrian trade mark law.824 The ECJ ruled out the principle of interna-
tional exhaustion of trade mark rights protected in the EU Member States by 
providing that “... national rules providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in 
respect of products put on the market outside the EEA under that mark by the 
proprietor or with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the Directive”.825 
To the extent that they do not support the principle of international exhaustion 
of trade mark rights, the Community trade mark directive, the CTMR and the 
Silhouette decision may be criticised. Proponents of international exhaustion 
 
819   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to C-416/99 ZinoDavidoff SA [2001] ECR I-08691, para. 33. 
820   Cf. ZARPELLON, S., “The scope of the exhaustion regime for trade marks rights”, 
22(9) E.C.L.R. 382, 386 & 386 (2001).  
821   Cf. Commission of the European Communities, “possible abuses of trade mark rights 
within the EU in the context of Community exhaustion”, Commission Staff Working 
  Paper No. SEC (2003) 575, at section 2.  
822   Cf. ECJ, Case C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer 
  Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1998] ECR I-04799, para. 39. 
823    Note that, when the Silhouette judgment was rendered in 1998, Bulgaria had not yet 
secured the EU membership. 
824   As per explanatory memorandum to the Austrian law implementing Article 7 of the 
  Directive (cf. ECJ, Case C-355/96, Silhouette[1998] ECR I-04799, para. 12). 
825   ECJ, Case C-355/96, Silhouette [1998] ECR I-04799, para. 31. 
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argue that the principle of regional trade mark exhaustion discourages parallel 
importation notwithstanding some justifiable policy grounds.826 Parallel 
importation is a tool that limits the ability of trade mark owners to dissect the 
global markets into pieces of national or regional markets. As a tangible benefit 
of this tool, intra-brand competition is enhanced with the results that the prices of 
branded goods are reduced. Moreover, essential function of trade mark supports 
the practice of parallel trade, for the essence of trade mark regime is to guarantee 
the origin of trade-marked goods and hence their quality.827 This guarantee 
remains unaffected by a normal practice of parallel importation except in some 
isolated scenarios, discussed in section C (III) below in this chapter, in which the 
practice of parallel importation is likely to contravene some legitimate interests 
of trade mark proprietors especially where the condition of goods is impaired or 
the packaging is changed.          
III. Conditions for Community trade mark exhaustion 
Pursuant to the provisions of Articles 7(1) and 13(1) of the TD and the CTMR 
respectively, a “trade mark owner’s rights are exhausted in respect of specific 
goods once he puts those goods on the market in the EEA himself or if he has 
either expressly or impliedly consented to those goods being marketed there”.828 
The purpose of Articles 7(1) and 13(1) of the TD and the CTMR is “to make 
possible the further marketing of an individual item of a product bearing a trade 
mark that has been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark 
proprietor and to prevent him from opposing such marketing”.829  
To the extent the trade mark proprietor is able to adduce some legitimate 
reasons justifying his action of opposing further commercialisation of the goods 
to whose sale he has already consented, the doctrine of exhaustion will not apply 
in respect of those goods. This could particularly be the case, if the “the 
condition of the goods has been changed or impaired after they have been put on 
the market”.830   
 
826   Cf. N. GROSS, “Trade mark exhaustion: The U.K. perspective”, 23(5) E.I.P.R. 224, 228 
  (2001). 
827   Cf. ECJ, Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. SA v G-B Unic SA [1999] ECR I-04103, para. 16. 
828   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy” 285 (Oxford University Press, 
  Oxford 2003). 
829   ECJ, Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. and Ancianne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic 
SA [1999] ECR I-04103, para. 20. 
830   Cf. Articles 7(2) and 13(2) of TD and CTMR respectively. 
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Trade mark rights protected in Europe cannot be regarded as exhausted, unless 
it is proved that not only the goods have been put on the market but also that the 
putting of goods on the market was accompanied by a clear consent on the part 
of the trade mark proprietor. 
1. Putting goods on the market 
The central question in this section is whether the mere putting of trade-marked 
goods on the market exhausts the trade mark proprietor’s exclusive rights. The 
term “putting goods on the market” simply means an act of marketing the goods 
in the Community. The term can be clearly and precisely explained in light of the 
Peak Holding case.831 The dispute in this case concerned the use of Peak 
Performance trade mark owned by Peak Holding – a group of companies. Peak 
Performance Production AB (henceforth the claimant), being a member of that 
group, was able to secure some rights to use the trade mark in relation to clothing 
and accessories, that it produced and marketed in Sweden and in other countries. 
Factory Outlet (henceforth the defendant) carried out parallel imports of goods 
bearing claimant’s trade mark in Sweden. It transpired that the goods in issue 
were manufactured outside the EU and imported into the EU by the claimant, 
who put the products in production shops and in base camp stores for purpose of 
selling them to final consumers. The defendant received the claimant’s products 
from another dealer (independent of the claimant) before those goods were 
actually sold in the EU by the claimant. The defendant maintained that the goods 
had been put on the market by virtue: (i) of their import into the internal market 
by the claimant with the intention of selling the goods in the Community, and (ii) 
of having been marketed by the claimant in its own shops and the Base Camp 
Store. The defendant reiterated that, in the foregoing circumstances, the goods 
had been offered to consumers.832   
As the defendant’s submissions necessitated a legal interpretation of the term 
“putting goods on the market”, the ECJ responded that:  
... goods bearing a trade mark cannot be regarded as having been put on the market in the 
EEA where the proprietor of the trade mark has imported them into the EEA with a view 
to selling them there or where he has offered them for sell to consumers in the EEA, in his 
own shops or those of an associated company, without actually selling them.833   
 
831   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313. 
832   Cf. Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, paras. 6 to 
  18. 
833   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 44. 
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The argument in the above quotation is based on the legal position which regards 
an act of placing the goods on the market outside the EEA as incapable of 
exhausting the trade mark owner’s right to prohibit the importation of those 
goods.834 This legal position reflects the mind of the EU legislature expressed in 
Articles 9 and 13 of the CTMR. It must be recalled that Article 9 grants a CTM 
proprietor some exclusive rights, whereas Article 13 tactically limits those rights 
in a way that does not affect the right of a trade mark proprietor to control the 
initial marketing of the goods in the EEA of goods bearing the mark.835 Both 
Articles 9 and 13 of the CTMR incorporate the term “putting the goods on the 
market”, albeit in different connotations. 
It is noteworthy that Article 9(2) of the CTMR stipulates some specific acts in 
relation to a trade mark, which can only be perpetuated by a trade mark 
proprietor or another person authorised by him. Some of these acts include: (a) 
affixing the signs to goods or to the packaging thereof; (b) offering the goods, 
putting them on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign, 
or offering or supplying services thereunder; (c) importing or exporting the 
goods under that sign. The term “putting them on the market” appearing in 
Article 9(2) (b) has been interpreted differently from a semantically similar term 
found in Article 13(1). The term “putting on the market” as a sword which the 
CTM proprietor may apply against third parties pursuant to Article 9(2) (b) is not 
necessarily confined to actual selling of the branded products but encompasses as 
well an act of putting the goods in the shop for the purposes of selling them or 
any act of putting the goods in the state which would constitute an act of 
selling.836 However, the term as applied in the context of Article 13(1) to restrict 
the proprietor from controlling the after-market goods, refers to an actual sale of 
the product concerned.837 This is opposed to merely stocking the goods in a shop 
waiting for customers to buy the goods. Thus, goods offered in a shop have been 
put on the market for the purpose of Article 9(2) of CTMR but not for the 
purpose of Article 13(1) of the CTMR.838    
It cannot be presumed that where a trade mark proprietor imports his goods 
with a view to selling them in the EEA or offers them for sale in the EEA, has 
 
834   ECJ, Case C-16/03 Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 36. 
835   Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, in: ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding [2004] 
  ECR I-11313, para. 20. 
836   Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, in: C-16/03, Peak Holding [2004] ECR I-
11313, paras. 28 & 29. 
837   Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, in: C-16/03, Peak Holding [2004] ECR I-
11313, para. 40. 
838   Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, in: C-16/03, Peak Holding [2004] ECR I-
11313, paras. 36 & 37. 
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put the goods on the market within the meaning of Article 13(1) of CTMR.839 
Through these acts, the CTM owner does not dispose of the goods nor does he 
“realise the economic value of his trade mark”.840 Thus, putting the goods on the 
market within the meaning of Article 13(1) signifies an act of actual sale of a 
branded good for the first time. Thereafter, any third parties are free to put the 
same good on the market for the subsequent times without infringing exclusive 
trade mark rights enjoyed by the proprietor under Article 9 of CTMR.  
2. Consent 
The term “consent” as stipulated in Article 13 of CTMR refers to an act of 
putting the goods on a market in the EEA. The purpose of requiring the 
proprietor’s consent as a condition for trade mark rights to be exhausted is to 
allow the CTM owner to control where and when initial marketing of his 
branded product(s) should take place. Thus, consent is a legal proof of the fact 
that the proprietor has renounced his exclusive CTM rights.841 Evidence of such 
renunciation is governed by the rule that (i) consent is required for each specific 
batch of goods sold, (ii) implied consent can only be inferred from unequivocal 
facts, and (iii) contractual restrictions between the parties do not extend to the 
principle of trade mark exhaustion.  
a) Consent is given for specific goods  
Consent, for purpose of CTM exhaustion, relates only to specific goods whose 
initial marketing was done by the proprietor himself or any other person with the 
proprietor’s approval. The trade mark owner’s consent in relation to a single 
batch of goods “does not exhaust the rights conferred by the trade mark as 
regards the marketing of other batches of his goods even if they are identical”.842 
This position is confirmed in Article 13(2) of CTMR. By employing the phrase 
“further commercialisation of goods”, Article 13(2) limits the principle of 
 
839   Indeed, if a mere importation customs clearance of branded goods could be considered 
as exhausting trade mark rights, the “proprietor would, in the final analysis, have no 
control over the first sale of the goods in the EEA” (cf. opinion of Advocate General 
Stix-Hackl, in Case C-16/03, Peak Holding [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 25). 
840   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 42. 
841   ECJ, Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q. GmbH v Lifestyle sports + sportswear 
  Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Michael Orth [2003] ECR I-03051, para. 34. 
842   ECJ, Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc  SA v G-B Unic SA [1999] ECR I-04103, para. 15. 
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exhaustion to “only specific goods which have first been put on the market with 
the consent of the trade-mark proprietor”.843   
b) Express and implied consent 
Consent for the sale of specific batch of goods must be expressed positively. The 
case law provides an appropriate response to the question whether a trade-mark 
proprietor’s consent must be express, or whether it may also be implied. In Zino 
Davidoff,844 the ECJ was called upon to clarify the circumstances under which a 
trade mark owner may be presumed “as having consented, directly or indirectly, 
to the importation and marketing in the EEA by third parties who currently own 
them, of products bearing that trade mark, which have been placed on the market 
outside the EEA by the proprietor of the mark or with his consent”. The court’s 
findings attached great weight to the fact that the proprietor’s consent 
extinguishes the trade mark owner’s exclusive rights that enable him to control 
the initial marketing in the EEA. In view of this serious effect, the court held that 
“consent must be so expressed that an intention to renounce those rights is 
unequivocally demonstrated”.845 While the proprietor’s intention to renounce his 
exclusive rights is derived from an express statement of consent, in some cases, 
such intention may also be discerned from “facts and circumstances prior to, 
simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods on the market 
outside the EEA”.846 These facts and circumstances must, nonetheless, 
demonstrate unambiguously that the proprietor signified his intention to 
renounce his rights. It follows that where consent is not expressly given, an 
implied consent can be endorsed by the court only if the facts of the case 
demonstrate, unequivocally, that “the trade mark proprietor has renounced any 
intention to enforce his exclusive rights”.847 However, implied consent, for the 
marketing of the goods in the EU of the goods initially marketed outside the EU 
market, cannot be discerned from the fact that the trade mark proprietor was 
silent and/or did not oppose the subsequent marketing of the goods in the EU or 
the goods did not carry with them the proprietor’s notice to such opposition.848      
 
843   ECJ, Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. SA v G-B Unic SA [1999] ECR I-04103, para. 20. 
844   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 34. 
845   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 45. 
846   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 46. 
847   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 53. 
848   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, paras. 55 - 58. 
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c) Contractual restrictions do not vitiate consent  
It is of particular interests to enquire whether, a third party, who buys some 
branded products, can be prohibited, by a contract between him and the trade 
mark proprietor, to resale those goods in the EEA.  
Contractual restrictions on resale may be elaborated under two instances. The 
first instance relates to a scenario in which a trade mark proprietor sells the 
branded product in the market outside the EEA with an express prohibition from 
reselling the product in the EEA. This scenario reflects the facts of Zino 
Davidoff849 which reveal that the company Zino Davidoff SA (henceforth the 
claimant) owns cool water and Davidoff Cool Water trade marks registered in 
the United Kingdom. The claimant uses the two trade marks to market, within 
and outside the EU, a wide range of toiletries and cosmetics.850 The claimant 
sold the products to a trader (henceforth the distributor) in Singapore pursuant to 
an exclusive distribution agreement which required the distributor not to resell 
the products into the EU. The distributor undertook as well to impose the same 
restrictions on traders to whom the goods were subsequently distributed by the 
distributor. It transpired that A & G Imports Ltd (henceforth the defendant) 
acquired the claimant’s products produced in the EU but which had been sold, 
legally, in Singapore. The defendant re-imported the products into the United 
Kingdom. The claimant alleged that by importing and selling the goods in the 
United Kingdom, the defendant infringed the claimant’s rights, and thus bringing 
the question of consent required under Article 13(1) of CTMR in issue, since the 
claimant submitted that it had not consented to the marketing of the goods in the 
EU. In view of these facts, contractual prohibition would seem unnecessary for 
the trade mark proprietor to achieve his aim of keeping the goods out of the EEA 
market, since the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion allows a trade mark 
owner to market goods outside the EU common market without exhausting the 
rights within the EU market.851   
The second instance may be exemplified by a scenario in which a trade mark 
owner sells the product to a purchaser in the EEA with a restriction on resale of 
the purchased product in the EEA. This is a typical situation reflected in Peak 
Holding case,852 in which the claimant sold the goods to the defendant 
 
849   ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 34. 
850   Cf. Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to Cosmetic products (OJ 1976 L 262, p. 169), which was 
implemented in the United Kingdom by the Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 
1996 (SI 2925/1996). 
851   Cf. ECJ, joined cases C-414/99 to 416/99, Zino Davidoff [2001] ECR I-0869, para. 33. 
852   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313. 
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established in France. The defendant signed an undertaking stipulating that it 
(the defendant) was not allowed to resell the products in European countries 
other than Russia and Slovenia.853 The court held that: 
...the stipulation, in a contract of sale concluded between the proprietor of the trade mark 
and an operator established in the EEA, of a prohibition on reselling in the EEA does not 
mean that there is no putting on the market in the EEA within the meaning of Article 7(1) 
of the Directive and thus does not preclude the exhaustion of the proprietor’s exclusive 
rights in the event of resale in the EEA in breach of the prohibition.854  
The court clarified further that any territorial restrictions on the right to resell the 
goods imposed on a purchaser by a contract concerns only the relations between 
the parties to the contract.855 This confirms the elaborative opinion, of Advocate-
General Stix-Hackl, which holds that:  
...exhaustion of rights arises by operation of law, irrespective of the contract between the 
proprietor and purchaser. Breach of any territorial restrictions on sale which the proprietor 
may have imposed on a purchaser of the goods in relation to their sale in the EEA may 
give rise to claims under the contract, but is not relevant in principle under trade mark 
law.856 
In the light of the holding in the above cases, it is appropriate to conclude that 
the rights of the trade mark proprietor within the Member States of the 
Community are determined by the Community legislature. It is therefore, 
unacceptable to apply the national law of contract to limit the rights of the trade 
mark proprietor (such as where goods, which were marketed outside the EEA, 
are considered exhausted), or to extend those rights beyond the parameters set 
out in Article 13(1) of CTMR (i.e. where the contract allows the proprietor to 
retain control over the after-market goods).   
3. Burden of proof in relation to exhaustion 
The general rule of evidence places a burden on whoever alleges existence of 
certain facts to prove those facts. In light of this rule, it would seem that a 
defendant who pleads exhaustion as a defence against trade mark infringement 
has to prove that the proprietor’s rights in branded-goods are exhausted.857 Under 
 
853   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 12. 
854   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 56. 
855   ECJ, Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB [2004] ECR I-11313, para. 54. 
856   Cf. opinion of Advocate-General, in: Case C-16/03, Peak Holding [2004] ECR I-11313, 
para. 49.    
857   ECJ, Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q. GmbH v Lifestyle sports + sportswear 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Michael Orth [2003] ECR I-03051, para. 35. 
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certain circumstances, the court may depart from the general rule of evidence 
especially if placing a burden of proof on the defendant may lead to the 
partitioning of the internal market contrary to the provisions of Articles 34 and 
36 of TFEU. In the Van Doren case858 the ECJ appreciated the need to qualify 
the above general rule of evidence in order to avoid a conflict with the principle 
of free movement of goods. 
One would wonder as under which circumstances could a rule requiring a 
defendant to prove that the trade mark proprietor’s rights are exhausted interfere 
with the free movement of goods. Manufacturers have unhampered powers to 
establish own exclusive marketing or distribution systems. Under most exclusive 
distribution systems, manufacturers supply their products only to distributors 
who are faithful to the distribution scheme. The manufacturers ensure that only 
members of the exclusive distribution systems get the supplies. In so doing, the 
manufacturer is able to partition the internal market. A third party’s commercial 
interests in maintaining future supplies require him not to disclose a distributor 
(belonging to the exclusive distribution system) who sells the goods to him, since 
if disclosed, the manufacturer would stop supplying his products to this 
unfaithful distributor.  
A defendant who raises a reasonable doubt that “there is a real risk of 
partitioning of national markets if he himself bears the burden of proving that the 
goods were placed on the market in the EEA by the proprietor of the trade mark 
or with his consent”,859 is discharged from that burden. Instead, the burden shifts 
to the trade mark proprietor by being required to adduce evidence showing that 
he had never sold the goods in the EU, and the goods in respect of which a third 
party claims exhaustion were marketed by the proprietor of the trade mark 
outside the EEA. The burden shifts again to the defendant to prove that even if 
the goods were marketed outside the EEA, they were thereafter marketed in the 
EEA with the consent of the trade mark proprietor.860 
IV. Factors vitiating exhaustion 
The principle of exhaustion provided in 13(1) above can be derogated from on 
the basis of Article 13(2) of CTMR.861 According to the Article, CTM rights are 
 
858   ECJ, Case C-244/00, Van Doren + Q. GmbH, ibid., para. 37. 
859   ECJ, Case C-244/00, Van Doren + Q. GmbH, ibid., para. 41. 
860   ECJ, Case C-244/00, Van Doren + Q. GmbH, ibid., para. 41. 
861   Cf. BAINBRIDGE, D. I., “Intellectual Property” (6th ed.) 782 (Longman, London 
2007).  
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not exhausted “where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose 
further commercialisation of the goods, especially where the condition of the 
goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market”. A central 
question in relation to Article 13(2) of CTMR hinges on the interpretation of the 
term “legitimate reasons” and “change or impairment of the condition of the 
goods”.  
The term “legitimate reason” is too general to be ascribed to a single notion. 
The term is capable of encompassing several scenarios in which a trade mark 
proprietor may prohibit further commercialisation of his branded products 
notwithstanding his consent to the first sale of the products in issue. Reasons can 
always be considered legitimate if they are supported by the law. In the context 
of trade mark rights, legitimate reasons entitle the CTM proprietor to enforce 
against third parties his legitimate expectations in relation to his trade mark. The 
trade mark proprietor has a legitimate expectation to maintain goodwill of his 
CTM by marketing quality goods. This constitutes a legitimate reason for him to 
prohibit further marketing of products, by recalling them, if it appears that the 
products under his CTM have contaminated some obnoxious elements and their 
continued sale would negatively impact on his legitimate expectations of 
maintaining a high-quality brand.  
Legitimate reasons exist as well if for whatever reasons imported products 
“contravened local ingredient-labelling regulations or their packaging infringed 
intellectual property rights which were owned locally by third parties”.862 Under 
these circumstances, the trade mark proprietor will have legitimate reasons to 
prohibit resale of those products, as he will be supported by the law. 
Article 13(2) hints as to what might inclusively constitute legitimate reason on 
which the trade mark proprietor may base to prohibit resale of the products. The 
Article specifies, without giving tangible examples that the defendant’s act of 
changing or impairing the original condition of the goods is against the trade 
mark proprietor’s legitimate interests. It follows that the proprietor will have a 
justified cause to control the after-market goods by opposing resale of his 
products, which had been stored inappropriately, especially if the quality of these 
goods has been affected to an appreciable degree.  
The subject under Article 13(2) may better be explored based on repackaging 
cases.  
 
862   PHILIPS, J., “Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy” 291 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2003). 
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1. Repackaging and re-affixing of a trade mark 
Parallel importers have a tendency of buying the branded goods in their original 
forms and modify their packaging in a way that would enable them market the 
repackaged goods parallel to the original goods being sold by the trade mark 
proprietor. As long as the repackaging and/or re-affixing of the trade mark does 
not contravene the trade mark’s essential function and specific subject-matter, a 
third party cannot be enjoined from competing with the trade mark proprietor. It 
has to be recalled that the concept “essential function” in relation to trade mark, 
is associated with the trade mark’s perceived ability to guarantee the origins and 
quality of the goods. In view of this principle, the repackaged goods still 
originate from the trade mark owner; hence, the proprietor’s mark re-affixed on 
the packaging of the repackaged goods fulfils faithfully the essential function of 
guaranteeing the origin of the goods. What is questionable, however, is whether 
the re-affixed trade mark can still faithfully guarantee that the quality of the 
repackaged goods is the same as that of the original goods. Generally speaking, 
“so long as the third party has made only objectively necessary modifications to 
the packaging of the goods, the trade mark proprietor cannot complain, and so 
such modifications are deemed permissible”.863 
The ECJ has, in a number of cases,864 clarified some factors that can be relied 
upon to allow a third party to resale the repackaged goods notwithstanding the 
trade-mark proprietor’s objections. Consequently, the trade-mark proprietor 
cannot oppose marketing of repackaged products if the third party is able to 
adduce evidence showing that (1) there is a danger of partitioning the internal 
market; (2) the repackaging does not affect the condition of the product; (3) a 
notice to the trade mark proprietor has been given; (4) identity of the person who 
repackaged the goods is legibly indicated on the packaging; and (5) repackaging 
does not damage the reputation of a the trade mark concerned. These factors are 
considered below. 
 
863   EDENBOROUGH, M., “The Free Movement of Trade Marked Goods in the European 
Community”, in: POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P. & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “The 
Community Trade Mark: Regulations, Practice and Procedures” (2nd ed., Release #4) 
XII.16 (INTA, New York 2005). 
864   The first case to deal with repackaging of branded products was ECJ, Case 102/77, 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse 
mbH [1978] ECR 01139. The principles set out in this case have been relied upon in 
various subsequent ECJ’s decisions such as the joined cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and 
436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457 (which has become a 
leading decision on issues regarding repackaging of pharmaceutical products), Case C-
276/05 The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Paranova Pharmarzeutika Handels GmbH 
[2008] ECR I-10479; (also reported in 40(7) IIC 874 et seq. (2009).  
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a) Artificial partitioning of the common market  
Member States have different requirements and practices relating to the size of 
the packets of branded products, pharmaceutical products in particular. In certain 
instances health insurance companies make reimbursement of medical expenses 
subject to the “size of the packaging, or a well-established medical prescription 
practices based, inter alia, on standard sizes recommended by professional 
groups and sickness insurance institutions”.865 Usually the package of the 
product bears some description of the product concerned. The description 
language may differ according to the national market intended for the respective 
product. This may force a trade-mark proprietor to adapt different packaging 
standards according to the requirements in force in a particular Member State. 
Thus, in order to be able to resale in country C2 a product destined for country 
C1, a third party will be obliged to repackage that product, aiming to conform to 
the packaging regulations in force in C2.  
It would constitute an artificial partitioning of markets if a trade mark owner 
were to rely on his trade mark rights to prevent changes in the packaging that are 
necessary in order to market the product in the Member State of importation.866  
A court confronted with a dispute relating to repackaging of branded goods 
has to determine the question whether the marketing requirements in the Member 
States where importation is sought may be complied with without the need for 
repackaging. The court may particularly find out whether this end could be 
attained by “affixing to the original external or inner packaging new labels in the 
language of the Member State of importation, or by adding new user instructions 
or information in language of the Member State of importation, or by replacing 
an additional article not capable of gaining approval in Member State of 
importation with a similar article that has obtained such approval”.867 Affirma-
tive findings on this question will mean that the trade mark proprietor is entitled 
to oppose repackaging of his products in new external packaging.  
 
865   Cf. ECJ, joined cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova 
[1996] ECR I-3457, para. 53. 
866   Cf. SCHUMACHER, C., “Use of trade marks on repackaged and relabeled 
pharmaceutical goods”, in: PHILLIPS, J. (ed.), “Trade Marks at the Limit” 74 (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 2006).  
867   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 55. 
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b) Condition of goods 
A lawful repackaging by a third party does not have adverse effects to the 
condition of the goods inside the packaging. The trade mark proprietor is entitled 
to oppose repackaging if such repackaging is likely to affect the original 
condition of the product. There is no hard and fast rule to determine whether 
repackaging may affect the condition of the goods, as this question depends on 
the nature of the goods and the method of repackaging.868 In many cases, it can 
be presumed that the original condition of the product is not likely to be 
adversely affected if the products concerned have been marketed in a double-
packaging and that only the external (NOT the internal) packaging is affected by 
the repackaging. This presumption holds true also if the repackaging is subject to 
inspection by a public authority in charge of ensuring that there is no risk for the 
condition of the repackaged products to be adversely affected.869  
Under certain circumstances, the original condition of the product inside the 
packaging may be affected indirectly and thus entitling the trade mark proprietor 
to oppose such packaging. Indirect adverse effect to the goods may be 
exemplified by two instances,870 namely, where: 
 the external or inner packaging of the repackaged product, or a new set 
of user instructions or information, omits certain important information 
or gives inaccurate information concerning the nature, composition, 
effect, use or storage of the product; or  
 an extra article inserted into the packaging by the importer and designed 
for the ingestion and dosage of the product does not comply with the 
method of use and the doses envisaged by the manufacturer. 
The indirect adverse effects to the condition of the goods cannot be confirmed, 
unless it is revealed, by a comparison between products marketed by the 
importer and those marketed by the trade mark proprietor that the information 
added by the importer contradicts the original information by the manufacturer.  
c) Notice of repackaging 
Repackaging will be opposed, unless the trade mark proprietor is given notice of 
that fact prior to the sale of the repackaged products. The parallel importer is 
 
868   Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse 
mbH [1978] ECR 01139, para. 10. 
869   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 60. 
870   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 65. 
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duty-bound “to furnish to the proprietor of the trade mark the information which 
is necessary and sufficient to enable the latter to determine whether the 
repackaging of the product under that trade mark is necessary in order to market 
it in the Member State of importation”.871 In this connection, the trade mark 
proprietor may require the reseller to furnish him with some samples of the 
repackaged products in order to satisfy himself that the importer has repackaged 
the products in a way that does not affect the original condition of the goods. 
Indeed, this check mechanism will allow the trade mark proprietor an 
opportunity to discover some counterfeit goods, if any, among the repackaged 
goods.872  
Moreover, a trade mark proprietor’s interest is to see that consumers under-
stand that products bearing the proprietor’s mark are marketed under his control 
and that the proprietor is responsible for their quality. It is thus natural for the 
trade mark proprietor to require a prior notice from marketers of repackaged 
products, on which the proprietor’s mark is affixed. The notice gives the 
proprietor an opportunity to control by ensuring that consumers do not confuse 
the repackaged goods with the original goods.873   
d) Identity of a person who repackaged the goods 
The importer has to indicate clearly on the external packaging of the repackaged 
product that he, the importer, is responsible for the repackaging.874 Where the 
importer includes additional article in the repackaged product, he has to state that 
fact so that the consumer knows that the origin of the added article is not the 
trade mark proprietor but the third party who has repackaged the product.875 This 
information should be “in print such that a person with normal eye-sight, 
exercising a normal degree of attentiveness, would be in a position to 
understand”.876 
 
871   Cf. ECJ, Case C-276/05, The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Paranova Pharmarzeutika 
Handels GmbH [2008] ECR I-10479, para. 2 of operative part of the judgment. The case 
is also reported in 40(7) IIC 874 et seq. (2009).  
872   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 78. 
873    Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG [1978] ECR 01139, para. 12. 
874   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 71. 
875   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 73. 
876   KITCHIN, D., et al, “Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade names” (4th ed.) 553 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005).  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
233 
 
e) Reputation of a trade mark 
Reputation of a trade mark is a property nurtured by and protected for the benefit 
of the trade-mark proprietor. The proprietor has, by virtue of the specific subject 
matter of a trade mark, some legitimate interests to enjoin certain acts by third 
parties that would damage the reputation of trade mark. Inappropriate 
presentation of the repacked product may damage a trade mark’s reputation 
notwithstanding a notice that might have been printed on the package indicating 
that the trade mark owner is not responsible for the packaging of the repackaged 
product.877 In examining whether a repackaged product presented in a particular 
manner is likely to damage reputation of the trade mark, preliminary regard must 
be directed to the nature of the products and the market for which the products 
are intended. The approach, based on the nature of the product, is necessary to 
distinguish between normal products such as those in the clothing industry and 
sensitive products such as those in the pharmaceutical industry in which only the 
high quality and integrity of the product concerned (including its packaging) may 
attract public confidence in relation to the product concerned. The market-based 
approach must be acknowledged for being decisive as to whether a trade mark’s 
reputation is likely to be damaged through repackaging.  
Insofar as sensitive products are concerned, it is always presumable that 
“defective, poor quality or untidy packaging could damage the trade mark’s 
reputation”.878 Indeed, if it is established that “repackaging of the pharmaceutical 
product is necessary for further marketing in the Member State of importation, 
the presentation of the packaging should be assessed only against the condition 
that it should not be such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trade 
mark or that of its proprietor”.879 Where pharmaceutical products, for instance, 
are destined to be sold to hospitals, packaging of the repackaged products may 
not damage reputation of the trade mark concerned as the representation of 
medicines is not relevant to professionals such as medical doctors who are 
responsible for administering medications to consumers. However, where the 
products concerned are sold to consumers through pharmacies, packaging of the 
product is of paramount importance, notwithstanding the duty of care inherent in 
 
877   Cf. SCHUMACHER, C., “Use of trade marks on repackaged and relabeled 
pharmaceutical goods”, in: PHILLIPS, J. (ed.), “Trade Marks at the Limit” 78 (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 2006).  
878   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 76. 
879   Cf. ECJ, Case C-276/05, The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Paranova Pharmarzeutika 
   Handels GmbH [2008] ECR ECR I-10479, para. 1 of the operative part of the judgment. 
  The case is also reported in 40(7) IIC 874 et seq. (2009).  
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patient-doctor relationship that necessitates a conclusion that patients will build 
up confidence in medical prescriptions.880  
2. Extension of repackaging principles to other case scenarios 
a) Rebranding 
A third party may be unable to import a product in a particular Member State if 
the trade mark affixed on the product contravenes the law of the country of 
import. This may necessitate rebranding the product, since it is only by 
substituting the proprietor’s trade mark with another mark that meets the legal 
requirements a further commercialisation of the product will be possible in the 
country of import.881 However, rebranding cases do not fall within the precincts 
of Article 13(1) of CTMR. Where rebranding is in issue, the rights of the parties 
will be determined on the basis of Articles 34 and 36 of TFEU. Thus, the 
principles relating to the free movement of goods established in the context of 
repackaging and relabeling or re-affixing of a trade mark apply to rebranding 
cases as well.882 
b) Removal of a stock code 
In the light of the principles discussed above in the context of repackaging, it is 
interesting to inquire whether those principles could be relied upon by an 
importer who, in order to undertake a further commercialisation of the import 
products, is forced to remove the product identification code usually used by 
manufacturer to control distribution and redistribution of their products in the 
commercialisation chain.  
 
880   Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb v Panarova [1996] ECR I-3457, para. 77. 
881   Cf. Davis, J., Intellectual Property Law, (2nd ed.) 305 (LexisNexis UK, London 2003). 
Cf. also J. Davis, Intellectual Property Law, (3rd ed.) 242 (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford 
2008).  
882   EDENBOROUGH, M., “The Free Movement of Trade Marked Goods in the European 
Community”, in: POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P. & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “The 
Community Trade Mark: Regulations, Practice and Procedures” (2nd ed., Release #4) 
XII.17 (INTA, New York 2005). 
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The ECJ’s judgment in Frits Loendersloot case883 whose contentious issue 
was whether relabeling of the products in order to remove the product 
identification code placed by the trade mark proprietor was illegal, provides 
some guidance as to when removal of product identification code can be allowed 
and vice versa. The decision to endorse the removal of identification code hinges 
on the effects that the respective codes would have on the internal market. This 
will always be determined in light of any existing product distribution scheme 
that the manufacturer might have devised. It is thus, upon the importer to show 
that, in view of that scheme, the identification codes help the trade mark 
proprietor to control and identify who sells which products to which importer. 
Importer’s positive evidence will prove that the “identification numbers have 
been placed on products by producers to enable them to reconstruct the itinerary 
of their products, with the purpose of preventing their dealers from supplying 
persons carrying on parallel trade”.884 In the circumstances, the importer’s 
decision to remove the codes would be justified in view of the need to hide the 
identity of the distributor who supplied the products to him. In this connection, 
the court observed that: 
...removal of the identification numbers might nevertheless prove necessary to prevent 
artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States caused by difficulties for 
persons involved in parallel trade in obtaining supplies from distributors for fear of 
sanctions being imposed by the producers in the event of sales to such persons.885 
It is equally important to note that trade mark proprietors may, sometimes, 
decide to use product identification numbers with good intentions. For instance, 
a product coding system would be practically helpful in case the necessity to 
recall faulty goods arises.886 Sometimes the trade mark proprietor will use 
product code numbers in order to fulfil the requirements of the law.887 Moreover, 
the provisions of Article 13(1) CTMR entitle a trade mark proprietor to prohibit 
 
883   ECJ, Case C-349/95, Frits Loendersloot v George Ballantine & Son Ltd and others 
[1997] ECR I-06227. 
884   Case C-349/95, Frits Loendersloot v George Ballantine & Son Ltd and others [1997]  
  ECR I-06227, para. 40. 
885   Case C-349/95, Frits Loendersloot v George Ballantine & Son Ltd and others [1997] 
  ECR I-06227, para. 40. 
886   EDENBOROUGH, M., “The Free Movement of Trade Marked Goods in the European 
Community”, in: POULTER, A., BROWNLOW, P. & GYNGELL, J. (eds.), “The 
Community Trade Mark: Regulations, Practice and Procedures” (2nd ed., Release #4) 
XII.4 (INTA, New York 2005).  
887   Cf. Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to Cosmetic products (OJ 1976 L 262, p. 169), which was 
implemented in the United Kingdom by the Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 
1996 (SI 2925/1996). 
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marketing of the products in the EU where the proprietor sold the products in 
issue outside the EU single market.888 Thus, code numbers would for all practical 
matters enable the producer to identify importers who infringe the specific 
subject of his trade mark rights. 
c) Reworked products  
Article 13(2) of CTMR is relevant in many aspects. The clothing sector is not an 
exception to the rule stipulated in Article 13(2) of CTMR. The “Dyed Jeans” 
case889 clearly reveals that the trade mark owner can legitimately prohibit the 
sale in the EU of jeans bearing its trade mark but which have been dyed by 
another party without the proprietor’s consent, when they have been put on the 
market with the proprietor’s consent in the EU. However, the court admits that 
not every incidence of dyeing will infringe the trade mark proprietor’s legitimate 
interests and thus allowing him to interfere with further commercialisation of the 
goods – a right which would otherwise be considered exhausted but for the 
dyeing. The dyeing must be conducted in a way that changes the characteristics 
of the branded goods so that the trade mark owner is entitled to oppose further 
commercialisation of the goods. In this particular case, the court concluded that 
the defendant’s act of dyeing the jeans in flashy colours interfered with the 
inherent quality of the jeans in question. The court had to analyse the defendant’s 
motive behind the dyeing and found that the use of flashy colours instead of the 
original muted ones aimed to meet the interests especially demonstrated by 
young persons in flashily coloured jeans. In the court’s view, the modification 
made to the jeans was tantamount to creating some new jeans.890 
D. Concluding summary 
The discussion in this chapter has revealed a healthy interplay between 
intellectual property rights and the single market’s principle of free movement of 
goods achieved in the EU through some necessary concessions. The interplay 
 
888   See the judgment of the Germany’s Federal Supreme Court  in “Dyed Jeans” 28(1) IIC 
131 et seq. (1997), in which Article 13(1) of the CTMR applied and not Article 13(2), 
since the products whose original condition was claimed to have been changed were first 
sold in the US, and thereafter imported into the EU.  
889   German Federal Supreme Court, “Dyed Jeans” 28(1) IIC 131, 133 (1997). 
890   German Federal Supreme Court, “Dyed Jeans” 28(1) IIC 131, 133 (1997). 
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ensures that intellectual property rights – trade marks in particular – are not 
based upon to distort competition in the EU’s internal market. This has led to the 
acceptance of the basic principle that as long as the trade mark proprietor basis 
on the specific subject-matter of his trade mark rights to prohibit free movement 
of goods, such reliance is not a disguised restriction on trade between the 
Member States since, it is the only means for the trade mark concerned to 
perform its essential function.  
The essential function of a trade mark does not entitle a trade mark proprietor 
to monopolise the after-market goods. Except where goods initially marketed by 
the trade mark proprietor are subjected to further processing or repackaging 
which affect or impair the condition of the goods, trade mark owners are not 
allowed to prohibit third parties from further commercialising the goods. It has 
thus emerged in this chapter that under certain circumstances, it will be 
necessary for the third parties to repackage the products, to re-affix the trade 
mark, and to rebrand the products, without a permission of the trade-mark 
proprietor. These activities are only allowed insofar as they are objectively 
necessary for the third party to access the market for the goods concerned. 
Where it is clear that the third party seeks to secure commercial advantages at 
the expense of the trade mark proprietor, the above-mentioned acts will be 
enjoined in the proprietor’s commercial interests.  
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Chapter 7:  A Model Trade Mark Regime for the East African 
Community 
A. Introduction 
The task in this chapter is to depict a regional trade mark system that may 
contribute to the proper functioning of the EAC common market. To realise this 
goal, the ideal EAC trade mark regime should not only be capable of facilitating 
the free movement of goods and serve as a legal means of integrating branded 
goods into the system of intra-EAC competition, but should also be capable of 
affording manufacturers and marketers an opportunity to expand economic 
activities throughout the EAC without undue interference by third parties on the 
basis of trade mark rules of the individual Partner States. These objectives are 
articulated in EAC law891 and they reflect similar goals which actuated the EU to 
introduce the CTM system.892 This objective similarity provides a strategic 
ground for scrutinising the principles governing the EU’s CTM system with a 
view to determining the extent to which the principles may be employed to 
establish the EAC trade mark system. In this regard, the chapter questions 
whether the key trade mark principles such as the unitary principle and the 
principle of trade mark coexistence underlying the EU’s CTM system may be 
based upon to develop the envisaged EAC trade mark system. In a concrete 
approach, the chapter scrutinises the merits and demerits of these principles in 
relation to the regulation of regional trade mark rights. In a bid to redress the 
deficiencies (if any) inherent in the trade mark coexistence and unitary 
principles, the chapter resorts to the rules underlying the trade mark protection 
regime under the Benelux Uniform Trade Mark Law893 and the trade mark rules 
 
891   In relation to the free movement objective cf. Articles 2(4) and 4(2) of the CMP, as well 
as the sixth recital to the CMP. With regard to the system of fair and free competition 
objective cf. Articles 33 and 36 of the CMP. In relation to general objectives of the EAC 
including extension of economic activities to the EAC scale cf. Article 5 of the EAC 
Treaty. 
892   Cf. Commission of the European Communities, “The need for a European trade mark 
system. Competence of the European Community to create one”, Commission working 
paper No. III/D/1294/79-EN of October 1979, at p. 17.  
893   The principles underlying the EU’s CTM system “lean heavily for their derivation on the 
Benelux law of trade marks”, hence the latter may be helpful in interpreting the former 
(cf. TATHAM, D. & RICHARDS, W., “ECTA Guide to E.U. Trade Mark Registration” 
22 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998).  
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that were devised to govern trade mark rights after the reunification of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The hybrid of these principles894 will form a 
framework for the proposal regarding rules and principles that should govern the 
creation, maintenance and cession of EAC trade mark rights insofar as the 
contemplated EAC trade mark regime is concerned.  
B. Key Principles governing Community trade mark system 
CTMR enshrines the tenets of trade mark coexistence895 and the unitary 
character896 as the centrepiece of the EU’s CTM system. The question may be 
posed as to whether CTMR’s principles mentioned in the immediately preceding 
sentence could be adapted for devising the EAC regional trade mark system. A 
negative response to this question would mean that the principles under 
discussion should necessarily be modified to make them suit the ideal EAC trade 
mark system. A deliberation on these issues follows below.    
I. The principle of unitary character 
The principle of unitary character is a legal technique that embellishes a 
particular regional trade mark system with more attractive features than those 
enjoyable under the national systems of trade mark protection. These features are 
reflected in the fact that when applied in relation to the Community trade mark 
system, the principle of unitary character, suggests avoidance of segmentation of 
the common market based on a system of protection of trade mark rights.897The 
principle requires that Community trade marks be registered for, and the 
exclusive rights stemming thereof be protected to the scale of, the entire 
Community.898 In this sense, the Community trade mark registration must be 
 
894   i.e. the principles underlying the EU’s CTM system, the Benelux trade mark regime and 
Germany’s trade mark system which was designed to concretise reunification of the East 
and West Germany after the cold war. 
895   Cf. section B (I) of chapter 5. 
896   Cf. Article 1(2) of the CTMR. 
897   From a semantic point of view, the term “unitary” in the phrase “principle of unitary 
character” has been expounded as follows: “having the character of a single thing that is 
a constituent of a whole”. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/unitary> (status: 30 
July 2012). 
898   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Koexistenz und Einheitlichkeit im Europäischen Markenrecht 
- Überlegungen zur Berücksichtigung älterer Rechte im künftigen europäischen  
  Markenrecht für den Gemeinsamen Markt”, 25(1) GRUR Int. 27, 28 (1976). 
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refused on the basis of prior rights existing in only one Partner State.899 The 
corollary of this is that a registered Community trade mark is vulnerable for 
revocation or cancellation even where the prior rights forming the basis for the 
invalidity proceedings are only protected in a single Member State of the 
regional organisation. Moreover, application of the principle of unitary character 
means that the Community trade mark rights can only be alienated or assigned 
for the whole territory of the regional organisation.900  
II. The principle of Coexistence of trade mark rights  
When applied in relation to national and regional trade mark protection regimes, 
the principle of coexistence901 connotes that introduction of a regional trade mark 
system does not become a replacement of, but a supplement to, the existing 
national trade mark protection schemes of the Member States of a given regional 
organization.902 In this sense, the principle of trade mark coexistence allows 
existing national trade mark systems to operate alongside the regional trade mark 
scheme.903 Thus, the principle provides trade mark proprietors with a freedom to 
pursue their own business interests. A choice between the national and the 
regional trade mark systems should naturally be dictated by one’s own business 
plans. In this regard, a trade mark proprietor wishing to trade to the scale of a 
regional bloc would find registration of his trade mark as a Community trade 
mark a suitable option, whereas a national trade mark registration would suit a 
person who has resolved to confine his business in a single Member State. 
Moreover, a person owning several registrations of the same mark in different 
Member States may decide to consolidate those national registrations into a 
Community trade mark registration while being assured by the principle of 
coexistence that should the consolidation process fail, or the consolidated 
 
899   In relation to grounds for trade mark refusal, cf. section D of chapter 4 supra.  
900   Under certain circumstances, exceptions that avoid the rigidity of the unitary principle 
are applicable. For instance, registration of a sign as a Community trade mark may be 
granted even where identical or confusingly similar prior rights of mere local 
significance are protected in one of the Member States (cf. by implication Article 8(4) 
of the CTMR). 
901   The World English Dictionary defines the term “coexistence” to mean “to exist together 
at the same time or in the same place” (cf. 
  <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coexistence> (status: 30 July 2012)). 
902   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Koexistenz und Einheitlichkeit im Europäischen Markenrecht 
  - Überlegungen zur Berücksichtigung älterer Rechte im künftigen europäischen 
  Markenrecht für den Gemeinsamen Markt”, 25(1) GRUR Int. 27, 28 (1976). 
903   Cf. section B (I) of chapter 5. 
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Community trade mark be cancelled, the national trade mark regime will avail 
him with protection of his trade mark based on the principle of trade mark 
conversion.904  
It is noteworthy that the principle of trade mark coexistence has a direct 
connection with the principle of free movement of trade-marked goods 
underlying the EAC’s common market. If, supposedly, the envisaged EAC 
regional trade mark system is designed to coexist with the national trade mark 
regimes, the chances that trade marks protected under the coexisting systems 
may conflict with one another are very high. This would in turn lead to several 
consequences such as restrictions on the free movement of goods,905 and 
distortion of competition in the EAC common market. 
III. Interaction between trade mark coexistence and unitary principles 
On the one hand, the principle of coexistence allows national trade mark systems 
to be maintained along with a regional trade mark regime irrespective of whether 
the national and regional trade mark rights may conflict with one another. But, 
on the other hand, the danger of trade mark conflict within the coexisting trade 
mark systems is minimised by the unitary principle, which allows registration of 
a trade mark only if there is no registration of similar mark in the national or in 
the Community trade mark register.906 Thus, the main role played by the unitary 
principle is to ensure that the coexisting trade mark regimes coexist in harmony 
without frictions resulting from conflicts between trade marks. Similarly, the 
principle applies only with respect to registrability of a Community trade mark, 
since failure of a trade sign to meet the requirement of the unitary principle and 
hence failure to meet registrability requirements does not mean that the trade 
sign cannot be registered as a national trade mark.  In this sense, the solution to 
trade mark confusion provided by the principle of unitary character only 
addresses this problem907 in limited context of the relationship between national 
and regional trade mark systems. Thus, the principle does not solve the 
likelihood of confusion of national trade marks inter se. It instead exacerbates 
the danger of national trade mark confusion. In this regard, suppose that an 
 
904   Cf. MÜHLENDAHL, A., “Unitary Character and Problems of Coexistence in the future 
European Trade Mark System”, 7(2) IIC 173, 177 (1976).  
905   Cf. BEIER, F.-K., “Industrial Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal 
European Market” 21(2) IIC 131, 141 (1990). 
906   But see the exception regarding prior rights of mere local significance implied in Article 
8(4) of the CTMR. 
907   i.e. Trade mark confusion. 
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application for registration of a trade mark (say PUNCHO) as an EAC trade 
mark is refused on the ground that a PUNCHO national trade mark is already 
registered in Uganda. This refusal, which is basically actuated by the principle of 
unitary character, will mean that the applicant for an EAC trade mark will, 
pursuant to the principle of trade mark conversion, be allowed to register 
PUNCHO trade mark as a national trade mark in all EAC Partner States except 
in Uganda where a similar registration already exists. Application of the 
principle of unitary character as in the immediately preceding scenario will give 
rise to three legal problems. Firstly, the likelihood of trade mark confusion 
cannot be avoided since PUNCHO trade mark in Uganda is identical to 
PUNCHO trade marks in other EAC Partner States: It will be difficult for 
consumers to distinguish between, and clearly identify the origin of, the goods 
bearing the PUNCHO trade mark. In this sense, the trade mark will no longer 
serve its intended function.908 Secondly, the principle of free movement of goods 
underlying the EAC common market is likely to be circumvented: The proprietor 
of PUNCHO trade mark in Uganda will be able to prohibit PUNCHO goods 
from other EAC Partner States to circulate freely in Uganda. Thirdly, even if the 
principle of regional trade mark exhaustion909 is applied to the national trade 
mark as a legal guarantee that the PUNCHO proprietor in Uganda is restricted 
from invoking his trade mark to prohibit free circulation, in Uganda, of 
PUNCHO goods from other EAC Partner States, this will only solve the free 
movement problem but will not solve the danger of trade mark confusion.  
These problematic aspects of the interface between the principle of trade mark 
coexistence and the unitary principle have to be addressed while devising an 
EAC trade mark system. 
C. Principles that should govern the EAC trade mark system 
Given the demerits inherent in the principles of unitary character and trade mark 
coexistence, it is sensible to question whether the proposed EAC regional trade 
mark system should be governed by these principles. It is particularly necessary 
to address the issue whether the legal problems associated with the application of 
the unitary principle910 may be solved by modifying the principle, for instance by 
relaxing the condition requiring the unitary character to be defined by the entire 
 
908   Cf. section C (I) (1) of chapter 3 in relation to a discourse on trade mark functions. 
909   Cf. section C of chapter 6 in relation to the principle of regional exhaustion of trade 
mark rights. 
910   Explained in section B (III) supra. 
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territory of the EAC common market; or whether the problems may be solved, 
once for all, if the unitary principle is abandoned. In relation to the principle of 
coexistence it might be questioned whether the abolition of the national trade 
mark systems; or whether employing the principle of coexistence as a transition 
to a single EAC regional trade mark regime could pave a way for acquisition of 
EAC trade mark to which the principle of unitary character applies. These issues 
are considered below.  
I. Modifications to the principle of unitary character 
The uniform Benelux law on marks911 may clearly explain the proposed 
modifications to the unitary principle governing the EU’s CTM.912  In a proper 
analysis, one may discover that the law under discussion913 does not accentuate 
that a trade mark should have a unitary character in order to be registered and 
protected as a Benelux mark. Article 32 of the Benelux law enshrines a general 
rule that guarantees that the validity of a Benelux mark will be enjoyed to the 
territorial scale of the three Benelux countries. However, this rule is subject to 
two exceptions: The validity of a Benelux mark cannot extend to the territory of 
a Benelux country where another person lawfully owns an identical or similar 
Benelux trade mark effective in that territory; or where a trade mark which is a 
subject of extension would be regarded invalid either for lack of distinctiveness 
or due to other grounds for nullification of a trade mark.914 This implies that a 
 
911   i.e. The Uniform Benelux Law on Marks (amended by the Protocol of November 10, 
1983, amending the Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks and by the Protocol of 
December 2, 1992, amending the Uniform Benelux Law on Marks) (henceforth, the 
Benelux law).The text is available at <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/results_ 
treaty.jsp?col_id=&organizations=BOIP&cat_id=4> (status: 30 July 2012). 
912   The Uniform Benelux Law on Marks provides for a possibility of securing trade mark 
registration and protection effective in three countries forming up the Benelux territory, 
namely, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg (cf. Article 36 of the Benelux law). Prior to the establishment of 
the Benelux trade mark system, these countries had national trade mark protection 
regimes. The Benelux law incorporates some provisions which facilitated the 
transformation of national trade marks into the new regional trade mark regime (cf. 
section C (II) (2) (b) of this chapter).  
913   This law is not the current law (cf. last paragraph of section C (II) (2) (b) of this 
chapter). The law is therefore discussed here to indicate how the Uniform Benelux Law 
on Marks was initially designed and to see whether the same design may be adapted for 
designing the EAC trade mark system.  
914   The grounds for nullity of a Benelux trade mark are outlined in Article 14 of the Benelux 
law. 
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Benelux trade mark may be registered and have its effects in less than the three 
Benelux States. A trade mark lawfully registered in the Benelux becomes a 
Benelux mark regardless of whether it has effects in one, two or all three 
Benelux States.915  
The proposal to either abandon the unitary principle or to relax the principle in 
such a way that trade mark’s unitary characters are not necessarily required for 
the entire territory of the regional bloc clearly reflects the trade mark 
registrability requirements applicable in the Benelux. It only remains to assess 
the legal impacts such proposals might have on a regional trade mark regimes 
such as the envisaged EAC trade mark system. 
 1. Abandonment of the unitary principle 
The central question under this heading is whether a regional trade mark system 
such as the proposed EAC trade mark regime could achieve its objectives if the 
trade mark rights protected under it are not subjected to the unitary principle. To 
address this issue, one should proceed from the premises that the abandonment 
of the unitary principle will justify the curtailment of the territorial scope of the 
EAC trade mark. Rights protected under the envisaged EAC trade mark system 
will no longer be unified and predictable: Non-observance of the unitary 
principle would mean that an EAC trade mark could even be granted to have its 
effect only in one EAC Partner States if similar or identical trade marks are 
already registered, as national trade marks, in other Partner States. In turn, this 
would lead to a situation whereby various identical or confusingly similar trade 
marks, both EAC and national trade marks, are registered and protected in the 
EAC common market. Under these circumstances, consumer confusion would 
not be avoided since similar or identical trade marks could be applied to identical 
or similar goods having different origins. 
2. Unitary character not to be defined by the entire scale of the regional bloc 
Alternatively, it may be debated whether granting registration of a trade mark as 
an EAC mark could make any sense if the unitary character of a registered trade 
mark is not rigidly required for the whole EAC territory. A positive response to 
this question would mean that an EAC trade mark could be registered to have its 
 
915   Cf. section C (II)(1) of this chapter, which shows that the only trade mark in existence in 
  Benelux is a Benelux mark. 
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effect in more than one Partner State but not necessarily in all EAC Partner 
States. In this sense, if a national trade mark identical to or confusingly similar 
with an EAC trade mark applied for is already registered and protected in Kenya, 
this should not be a reason to deny registration of the same trade mark as an 
EAC trade mark effective in Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Under the 
proposal at hand, it is possible to obtain unity of trade mark rights albeit to a 
lesser geographical area of the EAC.  
3. Justifications for the proposed modifications to the unitary principle 
As a condition for implementation in the EAC trade mark system, the proposed 
modifications to the unitary principle should contribute to the realisation of the 
key EAC interests. According to the stipulations under the EAC Treaty and the 
EAC Common Market Protocol, the EAC is interested to achieve the following 
goals: (a) the free movement of goods; (b) fair and free competition in trade-
marked goods; (c) providing manufacturers and marketers with legal means to 
extend economic activities to the EAC scale.916 These goals are discussed below. 
a) Free movement of goods 
The proposal requiring the unitary principle not to be necessarily defined by the 
entire territory of the EAC facilitates free movement of goods albeit in a limited 
manner: Pursuant to the proposal, goods bearing an EAC trade mark with effect 
say in four EAC Partner States may circulate freely to the scale of these four 
States. While this is not a complete answer to a situation whereby trade mark 
rights act as a barrier to the free movement of goods, it is an improved solution 
when compared with the proposal for the abandonment of the unitary principle. 
Both proposals917 do not remove the possibility that trade mark proprietors may 
invoke their exclusive trade mark rights to segment the EAC common market 
and thus restrict the free movement of goods. The only difference between the 
two proposals is the degree to which the segmentation is possible. By providing 
for the legal possibility of securing registration of an EAC trade mark in a single 
EAC Partner State, the proposal for the abandonment of the unitary principle 
facilitates dissection of the EAC common market in the same manner the 
 
916   Cf. Article 5 of the EACT and Articles 2(4), 4(2), 33 and 36 of the CMP. 
917   i.e. the proposal requiring the unitary principle not to be defined by the entire EAC 
territory and the proposal for the abandonment of the unitary principle. 
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proposal requiring the unitary principle not to be defined by entire EAC territory 
does. In line with the latter proposal, a trade mark proprietor may secure EAC 
trade mark registration covering two or more (but not all the five) EAC Partner 
States. This proposal may in effect serve as a conduit pipe for the segmentation 
of the EAC common market. 
b) Competition in trade-marked goods 
A trade mark is an instrument of competition. It extends to the proprietor a right 
to exclude others from the relevant market.918 The two proposals for the 
modification of the unitary principle described above make it hardly possible to 
integrate trade mark protection into a system of intra-EAC competition in trade-
marked goods.919 The proposals under discussion allow registration of a trade 
mark as an EAC trade mark notwithstanding the fact that the validity of the trade 
mark concerned does not extend to the scale of the entire EAC territory. 
Protection of an EAC trade mark as above cannot escape the consequence of the 
territoriality principle 920 underlying national trade mark protection systems: An 
EAC trade mark registered to have its effects in one, two, three or four Partner 
States cannot be invoked to prohibit anti-competitive behaviour being 
perpetuated on the basis of a national trade mark protected in the fifth EAC 
Partner State where the EAC trade mark does not enjoy protection. This means 
that unless an EAC trade mark is registered to confer exclusive unitary rights to 
the EAC scale, competition issues relating to the exercise of the monopoly right 
of the EAC trade mark will be regulated based on the national competition 
regulatory framework. National trade mark law would strictly enforce the 
principle of territoriality pursuant to which a trade mark protected outside the 
national borders enjoys no protection within those borders. The result here is that 
goods bearing an EAC trade mark effective outside the borders of one EAC 
Partner State, cannot be placed within those borders to compete with identical or 
confusingly similar goods bearing a protected national trade mark which is 
identical with or confusingly similar to the EAC trade mark concerned. Under 
these circumstances, distortion of competition may not be regarded unfair since 
 
918   Cf. Article 9 of the CTMR. 
919   Cf. Commission of the European Communities, “The need for a European trade mark 
system – Competence of the European Community to create one”, Brussels, 1979 
(III/D/1294/79-EN), p 17. 
920   In relation to this principle cf. section B (II) of chapter 3. 
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the EAC trade mark is not protected in the Partner State where the market entry 
is denied.     
c) Unitary character as a means of expansion of economic activities 
The abandonment of the unitary principle as a guiding principle of the proposed 
EAC trade mark regime means that a significant objective for which the EAC 
was established may not be realised. The EAC is charged with a duty to develop 
policies and programmes that are necessary for widening and deepening 
cooperation among the Partner States in various fields and affairs.921 This 
cooperation would inter alia lead to the attainment of “accelerated, harmonious 
and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities” in 
the EAC.922 In this regard, “trade marks enabling the products and services of 
undertakings to be distinguished by identical means throughout the entire EAC, 
regardless of frontiers, should feature amongst the legal instruments which 
undertakings have at their disposal”.923 This calls for the introduction of the EAC 
trade mark system pursuant to which manufacturers and marketers should be 
able, by means of  an uncomplicated, single procedure, to secure an EAC trade 
mark which is not only uniformly protected but also which is effective to the 
scale of the EAC.  
While the measure to abandon the unitary principle is opposed to the objective 
of enabling manufacturers and marketers in the EAC to expand their economic 
activities, the principle of unitary character may still be instrumental for 
achieving the foregoing objective even where application of the principle is not 
necessarily defined by the entire territory of the EAC. Even where because a 
conflicting national trade mark is registered in one EAC Partner State the EAC 
trade mark cannot be registered to have effect to the EAC scale but only to the 
scale of four Partner States, still this allows the trade mark proprietor to market 
trade-marked goods throughout the territorial precincts of the four States by 
means of a single EAC trade mark and hence, extension of economic activity by 
means of an EAC trade mark. 
 
921   Cf. Article 5(1) of the EACT. 
922   Cf. Article 5(2) of the EACT. 
923   Cf. the third sentence, recital 2 of the CTMR. 
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II. Modifications to the principle of co-existence 
The legal problems associated with the application of the principle of unitary 
character are exacerbated by the principle of trade mark coexistence. The 
conditions to which the former principle is subjected do not give room for 
registration of a sign as a regional trade mark unless there is no identical or 
similar existing national trade mark or other prior rights protected at the national 
level. In order to ensure that the existence of national trade marks does not serve 
as a barrier against registration of several signs as EAC trade marks, the 
principle of trade mark coexistence should be modified. The possible modifica-
tions may include (a) abolishing the national trade mark registration and 
protection systems; (b) employing the principle of co-existence as an interim 
solution; and (c) employing the trade mark model under the German Extension 
Law, which concretised the re-unification of West and East Germany.  
1. Abolition of the national trade mark 
An alternative to a situation whereby national and Community trade marks 
coexist is to abolish the national trade mark protection systems. This should be 
done in a way that does not negatively affect the trade mark rights that are 
already secured.924 The Benelux trade mark system925 may be cited as an 
example whereby the national trade mark systems are abolished and the trade 
mark rights initially protected under the abolished national systems are 
transformed into regional trade marks.926  
 
924   If abolition of national trade mark systems negatively affected the trade mark rights 
already protected under these systems, such abolition would be regarded to contravene 
property right which the constitutions of the EAC Partner States guarantee (cf. Article 24 
of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended) (Cap. 2 of 
the laws of Tanzania), Article 75 of the Constitution of Kenya, Revised Edition 2008 
(2001), and Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (as 
amended)).   
925   Discussed in section C (II) (2) (b) below. 
926   Cf. TATHAM, D. & RICHARDS, W., “ECTA Guide to E.U. Trade Mark Registration” 
28 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998).  
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2. Coexistence as a transition solution 
The fact that the national systems of trade mark protection already exist in the 
EAC Partner Sates means that coexistence of national trade marks and trade 
marks that will be protected under the proposed EAC trade mark regime cannot 
be avoided at least for a certain period of time. In other words, even where the 
national trade mark systems are abolished, the principle of trade mark 
coexistence may still be observed for some time as a means to facilitate smooth 
transition from national to regional system of trade mark protection. Coexistence 
modalities which are relevant in this respect are (a) the EU’s CTM modality, 
which does not expressly incorporate a rule requiring all existing national trade 
marks to be transformed into Community trade marks, but embellishes the CTM 
regime with many advantages in a bid to allure trade mark proprietors to seek 
trade mark protection under the CTM system and hence the importance of 
national trade mark systems would gradually decline; and (b) the modality under 
the Benelux trade mark system pursuant to which trade mark coexistence is 
allowed for a certain period of time within which trade mark proprietors should 
actively transform their national trade mark rights into regional rights.  
a) Incentives to ensure that the national system fades away 
Under the “incentive” modality, it would not be necessary to take active legal 
action to abolish the national trade mark systems: The coexistence problem could 
be solved by employing legal techniques that make the EAC trade mark more 
attractive to the extent that proprietors could trust in the regime than they would 
in the national trade mark systems. The possibility of securing an EAC trade 
mark registration using one process and single application fee would be a 
sufficient economic ground to win over the interests of trade mark proprietors in 
the EAC trade mark system. A similar effect would be produced if protection of 
an EAC trade mark is subjected to single renewal process and fees. 
These incentives have been tested under the EU’s CTM regime, with a similar 
objective of making the regime more attractive in comparison with the national 
trade mark systems,927 but have hitherto not led to the diminishment of the 
national trade mark protection systems of the EU Member States. However, the 
failure of these incentives in the EU does not mean that their intended results 
cannot be realised in the EAC. It might turn out that the national trade mark 
 
927   Cf. BEIER, F.-K., “Objectives and Guiding Principles of Future Trade Mark Law”, 8(1) 
IIC 1, 16 (1977). 
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systems in the EU still attract interests of trade mark proprietors on the basis of 
the quality of the services offered under the systems. Given that IP protection 
infrastructure in the EAC is generally weak in comparison with those in the EU, 
the trade mark incentives under discussion might produce positive results if 
employed under the EAC trade mark protection system.  
However, even if the EU’s national trade mark protection systems were weak, 
the incentives under discussion would not lead to the total disappearance of these 
systems so long as the system of trade mark conversion is still observed under 
CTMR: Trade mark conversion makes sense only if the national trade mark 
regime is there to accommodate the regional trade mark being converted into 
applications for national trade mark registrations.928 Therefore, if the incentives 
under discussion are to make any significant impact on the gradual disappeara-
nce of the systems of national trade mark protection of the EAC Partner States, 
the principle of trade mark conversion should not form part of the EAC trade 
mark jurisprudence.   
b) The Benelux model: Transforming existing national trade marks into EAC 
trade marks 
As a means to do away with coexistence of trade mark rights protected in two 
different systems of trade mark protection, a proposal requiring all existing 
national trade marks to be transformed into Community trade marks would hold 
water. The Uniform Benelux Law on Marks (henceforth, the Benelux law) 
employs a trade mark model which provides for the trade mark transformation 
from one system to the other.  
In this regard, the Benelux law adopts the following approach: In the first 
place, coexistence of national rights and the regional trade mark rights secured 
under the Benelux law could coexist only for one year after the coming into 
force of the Benelux law.929 The coexistence was devised in order to allow 
proprietors of nationally protected trade mark rights an opportunity to upgrade 
their rights to regional level.930 If they did not do so within a year, the national 
trade mark rights would retrospectively cease to have effect from the day the 
 
928   Cf. Section B (III) of chapter 5, which discusses the principle of trade mark conversion. 
929   Cf. Article 30 of the Benelux Law. 
930   According to Article 29 of the Benelux law, national trade mark rights include both 
registered and unregistered trade marks which were valid according to the national law 
before the coming into force of the Benelux law. Unregistered trade mark rights are 
secured by virtue of first use in trade of the mark. 
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Benelux law came into force. The retrospective cessation of effect means that the 
national rights can no longer be invoked against registration of a Benelux mark 
even where the Benelux mark was applied for and registered within the one year 
period in which coexistence is allowed. This is due to the fact that any registered 
Benelux mark (be it a national trade mark transformed into a Benelux trade mark 
or a new trade mark applied for and registered as a Benelux mark) is deemed to 
have been valid as from the date of entry into force of the Benelux law.931  
At this juncture, it is safe to endorse a position that the coexistence approach 
adopted under the Benelux law as a transition from national to regional based 
trade mark regime is a strategy that the EAC may adopt while transforming the 
existing national trade marks into the envisaged Community trade marks.  
It is worth mentioning that the current Benelux trade mark regime differs from 
the one described above: The Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property 
(Trademarks and Designs) of 25/02/2005 (henceforth, the replacing law) has 
replaced the Uniform Benelux Law on Marks and its amending Protocols.932 The 
replacing law does not, for instance, refer to a situation in which a Benelux trade 
mark can be owned by two persons (who are not connected in trade) in different 
Benelux States. Thus, an inference can be drawn from the scope of trade mark 
protection stipulated under Article 2.20 of the replacing law that the new 
Benelux trade mark regime allows trade mark registration and protection for the 
entire territory of the Benelux States.  
3. The German trade mark model  
Two trade mark regulatory models are implicit in the trade mark regime that 
concretised the re-unification of West and East Germany in 1990. On the one 
hand, the regime avoids coexistence of trade mark systems by providing for 
cross-extension of the trade mark rights which were protected in the two parts of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. But, on the other hand, the regime permits 
coexistence of trade mark rights as opposed to coexistence of trade mark 
systems. Thus, the Unification Treaty concluded between the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG) and the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR) of August 31, 
1990933 may offer a trade mark model that could possibly serve as a reference in 
 
931   Cf. Article 32 of the Benelux law. 
932   Cf. recital 1 of the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and 
Designs), (i.e. the replacing law).   
933   The Treaty is available at http:/germanhistorydocs.ghi- 
  dc.org/pdf/eng/Unification_Treaty.pdf (status: 30 July 2012).   
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845242156, am 02.12.2021, 20:43:23
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
253 
 
designing the EAC trade mark system. Article 3 of the Unification Treaty 
extended application of the basic law of the FRG to the GDR, since the GDR 
opted to join the FDR by accession.934 As a condition for the Unification Treaty 
to enter into force, the FRG and the GDR governments were required to fulfil 
certain internal requirements that were essential for the unification to 
materialise.935  In relation to industrial property rights for instance, the internal 
requirements were fulfilled by enacting the Law on the Extension of Industrial 
Property Rights of April 23, 1992.936  
Pursuant to section 1 of the Extension Law, industrial property rights, such as 
trade marks, and the applications for such rights already existing on May 1, 
1992, in the FRG were extended to the territory of the GDR and maintained their 
priority. Similarly, by virtue of section 4 of the Extension Law, industrial 
property rights, such as trade marks, and the applications for such rights already 
existing on May 1, 1992, in the GDR were extended to the territory of the FRG 
and maintained their priority.  
While trade marks protected in the FRG and extended to the territory of GDR 
continued to be governed by the federal trade mark law, validity issues regarding 
trade mark rights created and protected in accordance with the trade mark law of 
the GDR and extended to FRG continued to be governed by this law. As 
concerns other trade mark issues, the GDR trade marks extended to the FRG are 
“governed by the provisions of the Federal law transferred to them under the 
Unification Treaty”.937  
The cross-extension of trade marks and of applications for registration of trade 
marks stipulated in sections 1 and 4 of the Extension Law depicts an interesting 
legal scenario: An informed and inquisitive trade mark expert may wonder as to 
how, in such situation of cross-extension, the danger of trade mark confusion 
could be avoided. In this regard, the Extension Law offers a two-tier solution. In 
the first place, the Extension Law allows cancellation of a registered trade mark 
or opposition of registration of a trade mark if the challenging party satisfies the 
 
934   Cf. PREUß, U.K., “German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes”, Hertie School of 
Governance – Working Papers, No. 48, November 2009, at p. 4. The paper is available 
at<http://www.hertie-school.org/facultyandresearch/publications/working-
papers/working-papers/2009/> (status: 30 July 2012). 
935   Cf. Article 45 of the Unification Treaty. 
936   i.e. Gesetz über die Erstreckung von gewerblichen Schutzrechten (Erstreckungsgesetzs-
ErstrG) vom 23. April 1992 (i.e. The Law on the Extension of Industrial Property Rights 
(Extension Law-ErstrG) of April 23, 1992 (as last amended by the Law of August 30, 
1994)). The law as last amended came into force on January 1, 1996. The text is 
available at <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126205> (status: 30 July 
2012).   
937   Cf. Section 5 of the Extension Law. 
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relevant conditions. A third party seeking cancellation of a trademark extended 
to the GDR on the identity or similarity of marks ground must, in order to be 
successful, prove that the application leading to registration of a challenger’s 
mark and which forms the ground for trade mark cancellation, was submitted to 
the FRG trade mark office not earlier than July 1, 1990 and not after October 2, 
1990.938 A similar time condition applies to a person who seeks cancellation of a 
trade mark originally registered in the GDR and extended to the FRG by virtue 
of section 4 of the Extension Law, provided that the challenger’s trade mark was 
extended to the GDR by virtue of section 1 of the Extension Law and such mark 
enjoys a priority date which is earlier than the trade mark being challenged.939 In 
relation to trade mark opposition, the Extension Law provides for the possibility 
of opposing an application for registration of trade mark which has been 
extended either to the GDR or FRG provided that before its extension the 
application was filed in the respective trade mark authority between July 1 and 
October 1990. In this regard, in case two applications for trade mark registration 
are pending before the trade mark authorities in both the GDR and the FRG, a 
trademark proprietor whose application for trade mark registration in the GDR is 
pending, may successfully base on his pending application to oppose extension 
to the GDR territory of the trade mark application filed in the FRG if the 
application pending in the GDR has a priority date which is earlier than that 
which the applicant in FRG enjoys.940 The opposite trail of this scenario means 
that if the trade mark application in FRG has an earlier priority date than that of 
the trade mark application in the GDR, the former trade mark application will 
form a basis for opposition of extension to the FRG territory of the latter trade 
mark application.941 This means therefore that, a proprietor of a trade mark 
(registered in the FRG) who has successfully extended his trade mark to the 
territory of GDR may successfully base on his trade mark rights to oppose 
extension to the FRG territory of similar or identical trade mark application 
provided that the trade mark serving a basis for opposition enjoys an earlier 
priority right than that of the trade mark application whose extension is being 
sought.942  
Prospective trade mark rights pose no challenges insofar as trade mark 
conflicts are concerned, since the GDR trade mark regime became defunct in 
order to allow all future trade mark applications to be processed and protected to 
 
938   Cf. Section 2 of the Extension Law. 
939   Cf. Section 21 of the Extension Law. 
940   Cf. Section 3 of the Extension Law. 
941   Cf. Section 23 of the Extension Law. 
942   Cf. Sections 3 and 23 of the Extension Law.  
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the scale of the combined territory of the GDR and FRG based on a single trade 
mark law administered by the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. In relation 
to trade mark rights created before and after the dates mentioned above,943 the 
Extension Law also offers a model for solving trade mark conflicts. The general 
rule in this regard stipulates that trade mark conflicts resulting from cross-
extension of trade marks within the ambit of sections 1 and 4 of the Extension 
Law will be solved in the following manner: a GDR trade mark extended to the 
FRG territory will be used only in the GDR territory, and the proprietor of an 
FRG trade mark extended to the territory of the GDR cannot use his mark in the 
GDR. Under these circumstances, the trade mark may only be used in the 
prohibited territory, as per the foregoing elaboration, only if the proprietor of the 
competing trade mark consents to that use.944 Exceptions to this rule apply to 
allow a person who would otherwise be prohibited to market his trade-marked 
goods in one part of the Federal Republic of Germany (as per general rule) to use 
his mark in that part of the Republic without such consent of the owner of a 
conflicting trade mark.945   
Irrespective of whether the exception to the general rule applies or not, the 
solution to cross-extension stipulated under the Extension Law allows 
coexistence of trade mark rights protected under a single law, owned by different 
persons, used for identical or similar goods. For that matter, the envisaged 
solution does not completely solve the problem of trade mark confusion: 
Pursuant to the general rule regarding the solution at hand, the use of trade marks 
is limited to the segmented territories of the GDR and the FRG. However, once 
the goods bearing the trade mark are sold in one part of Germany (be it the GDR 
or the FRG) are supposed to move freely to every part of the Federal Republic.946 
 
943   i.e. the time between July 1 and October 1990 stipulated in sections 3, 21, and 23 of the 
Extension Law. 
944   Cf. Section 30(1) of the Extension Law. 
945   Section 30(2) of the Extension Law outlines the conditions to be fulfilled in order for the 
exception to apply. The exception applies, in particular, if (1) the trade mark is used in 
the advertisement (say television or radio broadcasting, internet, and Newspaper 
advertisement), which from a technical point of view cannot be restricted to one part of 
the Federal Republic where the trade mark exclusively enjoyed protection before the 
extension, to the other part of the Republic, of the said mark (section 30(2), paragraph 
1); or (2) “the owner can convincingly show that he is entitled, under the provisions of 
the Law on Property, to the return of the other mark or of the undertaking to which the 
other mark belongs” (Section 30(2), paragraph 2); or (3) “exclusion from use of the 
mark in that territory proves unreasonable taking into account all the circumstances of 
the case and weighing up the justified interests of those concerned and of the general 
public” (Section 30(2), paragraph 3). 
946   This is because Germany is required, by virtue of Article 7 of the Community trade mark 
Directive, to implement in the Federal trade mark law the principle of regional trade 
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This may lead to post-sale consumer confusion947 and thus allowing one of the 
two trade mark proprietors to trade on the coattails of the other’s trade mark, 
depending on the degree of reputation and goodwill one trade mark enjoys in 
comparison to that enjoyed by the other mark. The danger of trade mark 
confusion is multiplied in the event the exception (under section 30(2) of the 
Extension Law) applies: Trade-marked goods of different origins will be 
marketed with the same or confusingly similar mark(s) in a single territorial 
market.  
On the one hand, the risk of confusion inherent in the general rule regarding 
the solution to trade mark conflicts resulting from cross-extension does not allow 
a trade mark to serve as a legal means to extend economic activity to the scale of 
the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. But, on the other hand, 
the exception to the general rule which is meant to allow proprietors to extend 
economic activity to the whole territory of the Federal Republic may lead to 
distortion of fair competition since trade mark proprietors are likely to trade on 
the coattails of another’s trade mark.  
While the trade mark model under the Extension Law may serve as a template 
for devising the EAC trade mark regime, the shortcomings contained in the 
Extension Law, particularly with respect to the danger of trade mark confusion, 
should be adjusted to suit the objectives for which the EAC trade mark system is 
to be established.948 
D. The Proposal for the EAC trade mark regime 
In the light of the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter,949 the trade 
mark regulatory models under the EU’s CTM system, the uniform Benelux Law 
on Marks and the Germany’s Extension Law have some strengths and 
weaknesses. The EAC trade mark protection system should be designed in such a 
way that it avoids the weaknesses of these models. In this regard, the EAC trade 
mark system should borrow the unitary principle underlying the EU’s CTM 
system. In relation to the principle of trade mark coexistence, the EAC trade 
mark system should employ the principle of coexistence of EAC trade mark 
 
mark exhaustion. This provision has been implemented by Article 24 of the Gesetz über 
den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen (i.e. The German Law on the 
Protection of Trade Marks and other Signs (Trade Mark Law) of October 25, 1994 as 
amended). 
947   Cf. INGERL, R. & ROHNKE, C., “Markengesetz” (3rd ed.) 421( Beck, München 2010). 
948   The objectives are described in section C (I) (3) of this chapter. 
949   i.e. sections C (I) and (II) of this chapter. 
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registers (i.e. trade mark register maintained by the national office and the 
register maintained by the EAC trade mark office). This is opposed to the 
principle of coexistence of national and Community trade mark regimes 
observed in the EU. The principles under the Germany’s Law on Extension 
should be applied in the EAC context as a means to regulate national trade mark 
rights and applications for national trade mark registrations existing at the time 
when the EAC trade mark regime will have come into force, especially when it 
comes to transforming these rights into EAC regional trade mark rights. 
I. Acquisition of trade mark rights and the extent of validity  
The EAC trade mark system should be based upon both examination and non-
examination registration systems. Non-examination system of trade mark 
registration should be conducted at the national trade mark office; whereas the 
EAC trade mark office should be empowered to offer trade mark protection in 
respect of examined trade marks. A trade mark protected in the EAC should be 
unitary and its validity appreciated to the EAC scale. 
1. Non-examination system at national offices 
The role of national trade mark offices of the EAC Partner States should be 
changed from that of accepting and processing national trade mark applications 
to that of accepting and recording in the register existence of a trade mark owned 
by a proprietor who is a resident or established in the Partner State where 
recording is sought. The validity of a trade mark so recorded should extend to the 
entire territory of the EAC. However, a person whose trade mark has been 
recorded in the trade mark register of the Partner State must put that mark to 
genuine use in each of the EAC Partner States within the prescribed time as a 
condition for the prolongation of the exclusive rights.950   
The national trade mark register of one EAC Partner State should be made 
electronically accessible to other EAC Partner States.951 In view of the envisaged 
accessibility, the national trade mark office should search in the national trade 
 
950   Consequences of failure to comply with the use requirement are outlined in section D (I) 
(3) of this chapter. 
951   In this regard, it is assumed that, in view of the current development level of internet 
technology and information society, it will be possible for one national office to access 
trade mark register of other EAC Partner States.  
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mark registers to find out whether an identical or confusingly similar trade mark 
is already recorded in one of the national trade mark registers and which in effect 
would serve as a prior right against protection of trade mark whose recording is 
requested.   
Under the recording system, there should be no trade mark opposition. The 
recourse to redress the grievances caused by recording of a trade mark should be 
pursued before the EAC trade mark office. This means that if objection is sought 
by a proprietor of another trade mark recorded in the national register, the 
proprietor must apply for registration of his trade mark with the EAC trade mark 
office as a condition for securing a standing to object recording of another 
conflicting mark in the national trade mark register. The same should apply when 
the objection is based on an unrecorded right. The same procedure should also be 
followed by a proprietor who wants to object registration of a trade mark at the 
EAC trade mark office. The fact that a proprietor of a trade mark recorded in the 
national register can challenge registration and/or the use of an identical or 
confusingly similar trade mark only if his trade mark is registered in the trade 
mark register maintained by the EAC trade mark office, or if application for 
registration in the EAC register has been filed, signifies the inferior legal 
protection enjoyed by an EAC trade mark recorded in the national register. In 
effect, the requirement will serve as an incentive to have many marks recorded in 
the national register being submitted to the EAC trade mark office for examina-
tion and registration in the EAC trade mark register, and hence stronger 
protection. On the other hand, the proposal for recording procedure takes into 
account the fact that trade mark examination requires a high level of technical 
and legal expertise which personnel in the national trade mark office may be 
lacking. Moreover, the recording system makes it easy for newcomers in the 
relevant market to access trade mark protection infrastructure than if the trade 
mark protection system in the EAC were centralised. Since under the recording 
system there should be no requirements for trade mark examination, trade mark 
protection costs would be much lower.      
2. Examination system at the EAC trade mark office 
Alternative to the recording system under the national trade mark regimes, the 
EAC trade mark office (manned with competent personnel) should be 
empowered to receive and examine trade mark applications and register the same 
as EAC trade marks. Registration of trade mark in the trade mark register 
maintained by the EAC trade mark office should be effected on the condition 
that proprietor of the mark has used or has signified his intention to use the trade 
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mark concerned in each of the EAC Partner State within a time stipulated under 
the law. In order to be registered in the EAC trade mark register, there should not 
be in the national trade mark register an identical or confusingly similar trade 
mark with a priority date which is earlier than that of the trade mark whose 
registration is sought in the EAC register. In this regard, a trade mark recorded in 
the national trade mark register should serve as a ground for opposing 
registration of a trade mark in the EAC trade mark register.952  
3. Trade mark use requirement and the consequences thereof 
a) The use requirement 
Any EAC trade mark should be subjected to the use requirement as a condition 
for the continuation of the validity of the trade mark concerned. This condition 
should apply for both trade marks recorded in the national register and those 
registered in the trade mark register maintained by the EAC trade mark office. In 
relation to this requirement, a trade mark should be used within a time limit 
specified under the law. This statutory time should be counted from the date of 
trade mark registration and from the day of any subsequent renewals of such 
registration.  
b) Consequences of non-compliance with the use requirement 
The consequences for non-compliance with the use requirement should differ 
depending on the register in which a trade mark concerned is registered. 
Failure to put to genuine use953 (in each of the EAC Partner States) a trade mark 
registered in the EAC trade mark register should render that mark prone to 
deregistration. A proprietor of a trade mark deregistered as above should be 
allowed to file for recording of the same mark in the national trade mark register 
and maintain priority date of the deregistered mark, provided that the reason for 
deregistration was the proprietor’s failure to use the trade mark to the scale of 
entire EAC territory. Therefore, recording in the national trade mark register of a 
deregistered mark should be allowed only if the trade mark has been used in at 
 
952   See the requirements for objecting registration of a trade mark in the EAC trade mark 
register outlined in section D (I) (1) of this chapter. 
953   Genuine use should be regarded to include use of a trade mark by licensees in relation to 
goods and/or services for which the mark is protected. 
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least one Partner State. The use in one or more limited EAC States will indicate 
that the trade mark proprietor had either no commercial interests or sufficient 
financial capability to use the mark in other States, which altogether rule against 
conferring exclusive monopoly in the mark for the territories where the proprie-
tor is unlikely to use the mark. Conditions regarding trade mark recording in the 
national trade mark register (except the time limit for complying with the use 
requirements) should apply to the deregistered trade mark under discussion. 
However, a deregistered EAC trade mark recorded into the national trade mark 
register should not enjoy the time limit for putting to genuine use of a trade mark 
originally recorded in the national trade mark register. This means that the 
consequences for non-compliance with the genuine use requirement regarding a 
trade mark recorded in the national trade mark register should apply forth-with to 
a trade mark deregistered from the EAC trade mark register.    
Failure to put to genuine use a trade mark recorded in the national trade mark 
register should lead to two alternative consequences depending on whether the 
trade mark was not used in any Partner State at all; or whether it was used in one 
or few Partner States. In relation to a trade mark which was not used at all, third 
parties should be able to apply for registration of the same mark in the EAC trade 
mark register. Once the trade mark in issue is registered in the EAC register, 
recording of the same mark in the national trade mark register should immedia-
tely cease to have its effects. Regarding a trade mark recorded in the national 
trade mark register and which was put to genuine use in one or few Partner 
States, third parties in the Partner States where the mark was not put to genuine 
use should be allowed to register the same mark in the EAC trade mark register 
as an EAC collective mark.954 Coexistence of the registered EAC collective mark 
and the trade mark recorded in the national trade mark register which has failed 
to comply with the use requirement, which would result into trade mark 
confusion, should be avoided. To achieve this, the proprietor whose mark is 
recorded in the national trade mark register should be afforded an opportunity to 
adduce evidence regarding genuine use of his trade mark as a condition for 
registering the EAC collective trade mark by third parties. Even where he fails to 
prove the genuine use requirement to the entire EAC scale, the proprietor of the 
trade mark recorded in the national trade mark register must be one of the 
proprietors of the EAC collective mark so registered, provided that the proprietor 
of the recorded mark proves that his mark was at least used in one of the EAC 
Partner States. Loss of the right to use the mark will thereafter be undertaken in 
accordance with the rules governing proprietorship of the EAC collective marks.  
 
954   It means that the EAC trade mark office will examine the trade mark concerned and 
register the same if it passes the registrability conditions. 
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II.  Integration of the existing national trade mark rights into the EAC trade 
mark regime 
The term “national trade mark rights” is employed under this section to mean 
both trade marks registered and protected in the Partner States and applications 
for trade mark registrations pending in the national trade mark offices of the 
Partner States before coming into force of the proposed EAC trade mark 
protection regime. 
1. National trade mark registrations 
Trade marks protected in the EAC Partner States should be integrated into the 
EAC trade mark regime by extending the exclusive trade mark monopoly to the 
entire territorial scale of the EAC. In realising this, cross-extension of trade 
marks cannot be avoided: The validity of trade marks registered in Kenya will be 
extended to Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda; and vice versa. This cross-
extension would lead to conflicting trade marks being protected in the EAC 
common market – a situation which will lead to trade mark confusion and the 
consequences stemming thereof.955  
To avoid the danger of trade mark confusion, the cross-extension of national 
trade marks should be formalised only after ex-officio examination of the 
national trade mark registers of all EAC Partner States has been undertaken to 
identify all conflicting trade marks. Proprietors of conflicting trade marks should 
be contacted by the trade mark conciliatory board (to be established)956 with the 
proposals as to how the conflicts may be resolved. It is only after resolving the 
trade mark conflict, the conflicting national trade marks may be entered into the 
EAC trade mark register.  
2. Applications for national trade marks 
Trade mark applications that will be pending before the national trade mark 
offices should, after the entry into force of the EAC trade mark protection 
 
955   The consequences of trade mark confusion include the following: (a) restriction on the 
free movement of branded goods, (b) distortion of fair and free competition in trade-
marked goods, (c) a trade mark not serving as a legal means for extending economic 
activities to the EAC scale (cf. section C (I) (3)of this chapter). 
956   Duties of the conciliatory board are described in section D (II) (3) of this chapter. 
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system, be treated as applications for EAC trade mark registrations. The EAC 
trade mark office should be empowered to examine these trade mark applications 
in light of the national trade mark law of the Partner State before whose trade 
mark office the application was initially filed. All trade mark applications of this 
category should be examined for compliance with the registration conditions. A 
trade mark which passes the substantive requirements test, and which do not 
conflict one another, should be registered in the EAC trade mark register.957 
Those trade mark applications meeting the substantive requirements for trade 
mark registration but which conflict one another should be identified. Proprietors 
of the conflicting applications should be informed accordingly. Solutions to the 
conflicting applications should be processed through the trade mark conciliatory 
board. 
3. Conciliation board 
Conciliation as a means to resolve trade mark conflicts is not a new 
phenomenon. The success of the conciliation procedure in Germany,958 for 
instance, shows that the EAC trade mark regime also stands to benefit from the 
establishment of the conciliation board. The trade mark conciliation board should 
be established as a department in the EAC trade mark office. This department 
should be manned not only by legal (trade mark) experts, but also economists 
(who would determine the value of the conflicting trade marks, and the extent to 
which each proprietor has contributed to that value). The conciliation board 
should be empowered to aid the proprietors of conflicting trade marks to reach to 
an amicable settlement of the conflicts. The board’s proposals in relation to trade 
mark conflict should be two-tier, namely, binding and non-binding proposals. In 
relation to a non-binding proposal, the conciliation board should, inter alia, 
suggest the following: 
 To limit the goods and services in respect of which conflicting trade 
marks may be used so that while the trade marks remain identical, the 
list of goods and services is adjusted to avoid consumer confusion.  
 The conflicting trade marks to be used in specific form, such as 
applying the marks on different packaging, provided that, in view of the 
 
957   The conditions explained in section D (I) of this chapter should apply to the EAC trade 
mark under discussion as well. 
958   Cf. Part 3 of the Germany’s Law on the Extension of Industrial Property Rights of April 
23, 1992 cited above. 
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board’s finding, this measure is sufficient to allay the danger of 
consumer confusion.  
 The proprietor who has not massively invested in the trade mark 
concerned to be fiscally compensated and leave registration of the trade 
mark in the EAC trade mark register in the name of the other proprietor 
who has invested in the mark. 
In case there is no amicable agreement between the proprietors as per above 
proposals, the board should be empowered to issue some binding proposals for 
the avoidance of trade mark conflicts. In this regard, it would be practicable for 
the board to require the parties concerned to register the conflicting trade mark as 
an EAC collective trade mark. The board should be able to identify and propose 
the means to compensate the economic loss suffered by a proprietor, who has 
massively invested in the mark, as a result of consolidating the conflicting trade 
marks as above. In this sense, it should be the duty of the person who has not 
massively invested in the mark to compensate the other proprietor. If it appears 
that the proprietor who is required to compensate the other is financially 
incapable to do so, the board should have some funds from which compensation 
should be drawn. However, if the board compensates a trade mark proprietor as 
above, it should attain a status of co-owner of the trade mark concerned for the 
purposes of recovering the compensation paid. In this regard, the board should in 
effect be able to license the collective trade mark concerned. The owners of the 
collective trade mark so registered should have right to buy out the board’s share 
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